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Abstract 
My research examines the relationship between political violence and democratic 
structures in Thailand since 1975. To examine this relationship, I focus specifically on 
violence in Thai electoral politics. The main objective of my research is to identify the 
primary factors and processes that enable or foment violence in elections and to explain 
the variation in Thai electoral violence across time and space. 
Since democrat ization began in the mid- l 970s, electoral processes in Thailand have 
been tainted with various forms of violence. Apart from targeted assassinations, other 
forms of election-related violence include attacking polling stations on election day, 
bombing candidates' and vote canvassers ' houses, threatening election-related 
personnel, burning of political parties' headquarters, and post-election mass protests. In 
the last fourteen national general elections from January 1975 to July 2011, including 
several local ones within the same period, hundreds of people have died or been injured 
as a result of election-related violence. Arising from this are two important elements of 
variation that call for investigation. 
First, the patterns and degrees of violence have shifted over time. Election-related 
violence first manifested itself in the 1975 and 1976 elections. The intensity and degree 
of violence increased in the 1980s and remained relatively constant until the late 1990s. 
Thai society then observed a sharp rise in violence in the 2001 and 2005 elections. 
Despite predictions that the deep political polarization which occurred after the 2006 
military coup would intensify electoral competition and produce higher levels of 
bloodshed during polling, electoral violence declined in 2007 and 20 1 I. In explaining 
the changes in forms and patterns of violence over time, I focus on the patrimonial 
characteristics of the state , the changes in electoral and _party systems, the impact of 
decentralization, and the relative importance of ideological politics. These factors help to 
exp lain cross-temporal variation in electoral violence nationwide. 
Second, electoral violence in Thailand is unevenl y distributed in spatial tenns. National-
level factors cannot account for the very substantial geographical variation in levels of 
violence across the country, as data show that some provinces are more violent than 
others. Since electoral violence in Thailand is province-specific, my research focu ses 
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specifically on the local factors that promote violent conflict. In short, rather than merely 
exam ining the macro-political picture at the national level, this research explores micro-
political-economic conditions and micro-power structure at the provincial level of Thai 
politics, and the way in which national and local power interact. I compare three 
provinces harboring chronic electoral violence, namely Phrae, Nakhon Sawan, and 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, with three provinces that are relatively peaceful: Phetchaburi, 
Buriram, and Sa Kaeo. Each case represents different regional locations, socio,economic 
conclitions, and political environments of provincial politics in Thailand. Collectively, 
they illuminate the dynamics of political contestation and violence in other provinces 
throughout the country. 
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Part I: Introduction 
Chapter 1 
Electoral violence and political development in Thailand 
Thailand's democracy and electoral violence 
Since the revival of the parliamentary system and elections in the late 1970s, Thai 
society has witnessed the increasing frequency of assassination of Members of 
Parliament, nouveau riche tycoons, provincial bosses (or potential bosses), and vote 
canvassers by professional gunmen. These political killings are private-enterprise 
murders relating to national and local electoral competition, with political and business 
rivals contracting gunmen to take out opponents. The gunmen are mainly professional 
assassins, former security guards, petty gangsters, moonlighting policemen and military 
personnel. The violence has occurred both before and after elections: effective 
candidates were threatened with violence, kidnapped or killed by the rivals during the 
course of campaigning. Disloyal vote canvassers were also killed by their own bosses, 
and successful vote canvassers were eliminated by opponents from rival camps. In an 
attempt to explain this phenomenon, Benedict Anderson has advanced the "murder and 
progress" argument, i.e. that the increasing prevalence of politically motivated murders 
in the late 1980s reflected the high "market value" of Members of Parliament in 
Thailand, thereby signaling the greater importance of elections in determining who 
would obtain political power. The widespread murders of candidates and their 
canvassers, therefore, indicated the "progress" of parliamentary democracy in Thailand. 1 
If this is the case, it is definitely "progress" with a price. 
Since the 1980s, elections have gained increasing significance as mechanisms for 
assuming and maintaining power and for managing political change in Thailand. The 
decades of the 1980s and 1990s witnessed radically changing structures of Thai politics , 
from a "military-bureaucratic dictatorship" to a parliamentary political system. In 
essence, there was a gradual transfer of power from the old group of bureaucratic and 
military leaders to the new coalitions of national and provincial business elites. 
1 Anderson I 990. 
Burgeoning parliamentary democracy further opened space fo r journalists, academics, 
activists, non-governmental organizations, and grass-roots people to mobilize and 
express their voices. Articulation and aggregation of interests grew fro m extra-
bureaucratic forces and created certain impacts on the po licy-making process. 2 At the 
same time, this period was the starting point of so-called thurakit kanmueang (money 
polit ics) and the commercialization of electoral politics, activities that led to corruption 
cycles, unruly electoral campaigns, and abuses of power.3 The widespread perceived 
negat ive aspects of money politics led to the fo rmation of a political reform movement 
in the early 1990s. The major political outcome of the reform movement was a new 
constitution adopted in 1997, the primary goal of which was to curb money politics and 
reduce the influence of boss-styled politicians. Aft er the new constitution was 
promulgated, scholars and political analysts expected all kinds of electoral fraud, 
including electoral violence, to disappear or dramatically decrease under the new ru les 
of the game intended to make extra-legal methods ineffective and costly. 4 Violence and 
intimidation, however, were still employed by many candidates and political parties-
and even to a greater extent in some cases. More importantly, violence took new forms. 
In the 2001 polls, the first election held under the new constitution, violent protests in 
several constituencies disrupted vote counting and electoral announcements. In the .July 
20 11 poll, Thai society st ill endured electoral vio lence during the course of 
campaigning. 
In short, since democratization began in the late 1970s, electoral processes in Thail and 
have been tainted with various forms of violence. Apart from targeted assassinations, 
other fo1ms of election-related violence include attacking the po lling stations on election 
day, bombing candidates' and vote canvassers' houses, threateni11g election-related 
personnel, burning of po litica l parties ' headquarters, and post-election mass protests. In 
the last fourteen nat ional general elections from January 1975 to July 201 1,5 includ ing 
2 Anek 1992; Hewison 1996. 
3 Scholars who focus on the nega tive effects of electora l democracy in the 1980s and 1990s argue that it 
exc luded people who lacked the financial means or politica l conn ecti ons and tlia t money politi cs has deepened political patronage and encouraged corruption. The commerciali za tion of th e electora l process, 
scholars note, means that fact ion leaders with the greatest patronage resources often ga in important cabinet 
pos iti ons when a coa liti on government is fo rmed (Surin and McCargo 1997; Pasuk and Sun gsidh 1994 ; 
Somba t 1993). 
4 On the ca uses and consequences of Thailand's 1997 constitutional des ign , see McCargo 2002 ; Hi cken 
20076. 
1 These ten nati onal electi ons were held in January 1975, April 1976, April 1979, April 1983, July I 986, 
July 1988, March I 992 , September I 992 , Jul y 1995, November 1996, Jan uary 200 1, February 2005, 
December 2007, and July 20 11 . 
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several local ones within the same period, hundreds of people have died or been injured 
as a result of election-related violence. Arising from this are two important questions or 
puzzles that call for investigation. First, electoral violence in Thailand is unevenly 
distributed across the country-some provinces are more violent than others. Second, 
the patterns and degrees of violence have shifted over time. Election-related violence 
first manifested itself in the 1975 and 1976 elections. The intensity and degree of 
violence increased in the 1980s and remained relatively constant until the late 1990s. 
Thai society then observed a sharp rise in violence in the 2001 and 2005 elections, even 
with the newly implemented democratic constitution of 1997 and the emergence of 
programmatic and policy-oriented politics. Despite predictions that the deep political 
polarization which occurred after the 2006 military coup would intensify electoral 
competition and produce higher levels of bloodshed during polling, electoral violence 
declined in 2007 and 2011. 
The changing trends and characteristics of electoral violence in Thailand occurred under 
the dramatic political changes of the past three decades: a brief democratic interlude 
from 1973 to 1976; semi-democracy in the 1980s; democratic breakdown (by military 
coup) in 1991; a long stretch of democratic institutions from 1992 to 2005; democratic 
(re)breakdown (by another military coup) in 2006; political upheaval from 2007 to 2010; 
and a return to electoral democracy in 2011. My research examines the relationship 
between political violence and democracy in Thailand since democratization began in 
the 1970s. To examine this relationship, I focus specifically on political violence in Thai 
electoral politics. The main objective of my research is to identify the primary factors 
and processes that enable or foment violence in elections and to explain the variation in 
Thai electoral violence across space and time. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that academic analysis of political violence is the result 
of an urgent, real political problem. Throughout the world, many newly developing 
democratic countries have been coping with intense political conflict and violence at 
every tum. And yet little is known about how democracies can be set up to avoid or 
mitigate such serious problems. To find a solution to the problem of political violence in 
democracies requires us to understand the mechanisms and factors affecting political 
violence within a democratic context. Until recently, the study of democratization has 
been dominated by normative claims about the benefits of democratic rules and 
institutions. Democratization is frequently praised for its capacity to create conditions 
3 
fo r lasting peace, generate economic growth, and reduce human rights violat ions. 
According to this argument, the emergence and expansion of democracy leads to a 
reduction in po litica l vio lence.6 In the past few years, however, many scholarly works 
have demonstrated that democratic transition and newly competitive electoral politics 
can be a major source of violence. A substantial body of work has developed to present 
the view that democratization, particularly in ethnically heterogeneous, weak civil 
society, and low income countries, is in fact linked to greater human rights vio lations 
and large-scale violence. 7 One of the most important fonns of political violence in new 
democratic society is election-related violence.8 Each year hundreds of people lose their 
lives in connection to electoral competition. The 2008 Human Rights Watch world 
report documents the inauspicious global phenomenon of election-related violence 
perpetrated in various forms not only by ruling parties but also by state officials, 
opposition parties and their affi liated organizations. The common goal of the violence is 
to change, manipulate and/or distort the outcome of elect io ns. Recent serious cases 
include Lebanon, Chechnya, Cambodia, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, Iran, Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, Egypt, 
and Tunisia,.9 The widespread nature of this phenomenon points to a pressing need for 
incisive analysis of vio lence in the context of electoral politics. 
The prevalence of election-related violence in Thailand and elsewhere presents a 
significant dilemma. Elections, as .a vital element of democracy, ideally provide 
opportunities for citizens to express their preferences and peacefu lly part icipate in 
polit ical systems; they allow, moreover, for the peacefu l transfer of power and make it 
possible to ass ign accountab ility to those who govern. In many places and at di fferent 
times, however, the elect ion process is frequently accompanied by violence. Under 
certain circumstances, as Timothy Sisk argues, electoral processes turn out to be 
violence-inducing, rather than violence-reducing. 10 · Systematic research is clearl y 
required in order to understand how democratic and electoral processes in some 
countries have been chronically violence ridden. My research investigates the causes, 
6 Pate 2008. 
7 Klopp and Zuren 2007; Snyder 2000. 
8 For pioneering studies on election-related violence, see Rapoport and Weinberg 2001; Fisher 2002; 
Bjornlund 2004; Large and Sisk 2006; Kl opp and Zuren 2007; Basedau, Erdmann , and Mehler 2007; Sisk 
2008. 
9 Human Rights Watch 2008. 
'
0 Sisk 2008. 
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patterns, consequences, and contexts of Thailand's election-related violence in broad 
comparative perspective. 
Electoral violence: typology, geography, and temporal order 
There is no consensus in the literature as to whether or not violence is a common 
phenomenon within democratic politics. 11 The debate, however, has been advanced in 
many different ways. Considerable research has examined how regime type or the level 
of democracy relates to violence. Much of it focuses on the question of whether some 
regime types exhibit a higher propensity for violence than others. 12 Another strand of 
research focuses on how changes in regime type lead to violent conflicts. 13 
The seminal work on this issue is Hegre et al. (2001). The authors employ a cross-
national, large-N statistical study that uses data from 152 countries in the period from 
1816-1992, and ask two research questions: 1) Are strong democracies and harsh 
autocracies conducive to peace, while semi-democracies are prone to violence? and 2) 
Do states in political transition experience more violence? They conclude that 
consolidated democracies and harshly authoritarian states experience less violence, and 
intermediate regimes (regimes intermediate between a democracy and an autocracy) are 
the most conflict prone. Furthermore, they find that political violence also seems to be 
associated with political change, whether toward greater democracy or greater autocracy. 
States in political transition, they conclude, thus experience more violence. In a nutshell , 
Hegre et al. posit a generalized proposition that countries which have a semi-democratic 
regime and are in political transition will experience the greatest degree of civil 
violence. 14 The implications of their causal explanation and related generalized 
proposition are enormous. With this line of generalized argument, there is a growing 
literature based on large-N data sets and also case studies that posit a link between 
democratization and large-scale vio Jenee. 15 These studies suggest an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between violence and democratization in which there is more violence in the 
transitional moment when incumbents and challengers confront each other and less 
11 See debates in Hegre et al. 2001, Zielinski 1999; Jaggers and Gurr 1990; Krain 1998; Carothers 2007; 
Tilly 2003. 
12 Rummel 1994; Mann 2005. 
13 Snyder 2000; Francisco I 995; Saideman et al. 2002. 
14 Hegre et al. 200 I: 35. 
15 Muller and Weede 1990; Gurr 1993; Fein 1995; Huntington 1997; Uvin 1999; Zielinski 1999; Snyder 
2000; Klopp 2001 , Mousseau 2001 ; Gagnon 2005; Pate 2008. 
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violence when regimes are either mainly au thoritarian or democratic. 
The ex isting literature has clearly pointed out the potential relationship between 
democratization and violence, but many questions remain unresolved. To be more 
specific, the existing literature 's effort to analyze the relationship between political 
violence and democracy is far from complete, and is in need of further development . 
along three axes of variation: types of violence, locations of violence, and timing of 
violence. First, in terms of typology, most of the existing literature does not distinguish 
among various types of political violence. The mere level of violence cannot 
meaningfully tell us about the relationship between political violence and democracy. 16 
In fact , current arguments concerning violence and democrat ization tend to come out of 
ethnic conflict studies. They measure the level of violence by looking primarily at ethnic 
conflict, and use the ethnic conflicts and civil war data sets to establish the link between 
democratization and violence. 17 It is highly problematic to measure the politi cal violence 
in any country by only counting only the frequency of civil war. Civil war is only one 
specific type of political violence. In addition to civil war, there are several other types 
of violence that promote or demonstrate a country's political instability, i.e. genocide, 
riots, pogroms, terrorism, and electoral violence. Harsh autocracies classified by many 
studies as "peaceful" polities commonly have histo1ical records of committing violence 
on a mass scale. I therefore argue that we need to disaggregate different types of political 
violence and examine how they come into play differently during the democratization 
period. 
Electoral vio lence is a significant type of political violence that has received surprisingly 
little theoretical or methodological attention compared to other types of political 
violence. In this research, I will conduct a systematic study of electoral violence and 
wish to elucidate how electoral violence has its own distinct characteristics, different 
from other types of political vio lence. I employ a broad definition of electoral violence 
in my study, in which electoral violence means 
acts or threats of coercion, intimidat ion, or physical harm perpetrated to 
affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral 
competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence 
16 See Till y 2003. 
17 Mousseau 200 I; Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 200 I. 
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may be employed to influence the process of elections - such as efforts to 
delay, disrupt, or derail a poll - and to influence the outcomes: the 
detennining of winners in competitive races for political office or to 
secure approval or disapproval ofreferendum questions. 18 
Under this definition, violent acts can be targeted against various kinds of people or 
things, including candidates, vote canvassers, voters, or election officials and include the 
destruction of campaign materials, vehicles, offices, houses, or ballot boxes. The 
widespread phenomenon of election-related violence tends to reflect the highly personal 
nature of political systems and/or the decay of the state's monopoly on the use of force. 
In contrast, mass killings and genocide are more likely to occur under autocratic regimes 
with strong state capacities. 19 The changing modality of political violence in Thai 
politics from the state-sponsored killings of the 1950s to the 1970s (targeting opposition 
parties, student activists, peasant and labor union leaders, and leftist intellectuals) to the 
prevalence of electoral violence since the 1980s can be viewed as a crucial indicator of 
the changing nature of state-society relations in Thailand ( see further discussion in 
Chapters 2 and 3).20 Precisely because they have different causes and mechanisms, the 
mitigation of election-related violence is likely to be very different from the mitigation 
of civil wars, genocide, and terrorism. 
The second axis of variation relates to location. Spatially speaking, most of the existing 
literature examines political violence from the national perspective, and is unable to 
account for variations in violence at the subnational level. Despite rising violence in 
democratic transitions, many regions and/or localities in the world stiJI manage to escape 
the atrocities. Elections in many regions and provinces have been held without violence, 
even if they are rife with fraud, cheating, or vote-buying. Studies in the case of India 
show that electoral violence tends to be highly local or regional in concentration. Not 
every city in India suffers violence in elections; some cities are more violence prone than 
others. 21 Even with respect to the mass violence that occurred in Rwanda, research traces 
significant local variation in the pattern of violence. The violence against Tutsis was 
18 Sisk 2008: 5-6; see also Fischer 2002. 
19 Rummel 1994; Midlarsky 2005. 
2
° For the role of state officials and right-wing movements in state-sponsored killings during the 1950s-
J 970s, see Anderson 1977, and Kongkirati 2005, 2008. See also Anderson (1996) on how the decline of 
the Thai leftist movement made bourgeois democracy an acceptable alternative for the Thai elite because 
there was no more threat from below. 
21 Varshney 2002; Wilkinson 2004. 
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more intense in some areas than in others, and the violence started at different times in 
different regions.22 
One can observe a similar situation in the case of Thailand, in which electoral violence is 
a provincial-based phenomenon--some provinces have experienced a higher level of 
election-related violence than others. Variations across space thus constitute a 
challenging puzzle in this research and require an examination of political vio lence at 
the micro level. To understand the relationship behveen political vio lence and 
democracy, research needs to be conducted at the subnational level. 23 In the course of 
investigating Thailand's electoral violence, we are compell ed to ask why violence occurs 
in so me provinces but not others. Wbat factors or mechanisms make some provinces 
especially prone to violence? The list of possible factors can be divided into three major 
categories: socio-economic development, political institutions, and state structure. They 
include the levels of economic development in each province, the importance of illegal 
economic activities, the prevalence of criminal nehvorks and local bosses, the degree of 
monopoly of power held by political elites, the existence of local civil associations, the 
strength of local media, the capacity and bias of the police, the nature of the polit ical 
paity and electoral system, and the impact of decentralization. 24 Among these many 
factors we can make a separation behveen local and national factors. State institutions, 
the political party system, the electoral system, and the impact of decentralization are 
political inst itutions that are nationally determined, while the rest are locally determined. 
National factors cause some countries to be plagued with a higher degree of vio lence in 
the election process than others; the historical development of a set of nationally-
determined factors also helps us understand the rise and decline of electoral violence 
natiom\·ide. Nevertheless. these national-level factors do not help us explain the 
geographical Yariation of violence within the country. Since electoral vio lence in 
"'Straus 2006. Also see Straus 2007 for comparati\"e research on mass ,iolence and genocide. 
" See King (200-1) for bis re,iew of the trends in the study of political , iolence of what be called the 
··micro political rum.·· For the methodological discussion of how subnational comparisons can strengthen 
the case-stud,· re.search de.sign by increasing the number of obsef\-atioas and making controlled 
comparisons. see Sa,"der 200 I. 
'' This list of possible fuctors is based on the ,~ing theoretical lenses commonly used by scholars who 
study political conflict and ,iolence and seek to explain the causes -,f ,ioleace. For analysis based on 
economic den,lopmenL see Gurr 1ro. 1993: Collier and Hoefler 2001; for nature of economic acti,ities 
and opportunities. see Leonard and Straus 2003. and Collier 2000: for state capacity. see Fearon and Laitin 
~003: for criminal and local influential networks. see Brass 1997: for political party and electoral S\Stem. 
see \\"ilkinson 200-l. and Bastian and Luckham 2003: for ci,il associations. see Varshney 2002: for 
impacts of decentralization. see Siegle and o· :-.1ahon~ 2006. 
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Thailand is province-specific, my research focuses specifically on the local factors that 
promote significant variation, while holding the national factors constant. 
By examining variations at the subnational level, scholars can better understand the 
dynamics of political violence in a democratic context. To date, there have been many 
fine studies concerning local power, local strongmen, and central-local relations in Thai 
and Southeast Asian politics.25 These studies have drawn our attention to the hitherto 
neglected importance of local politics and its interaction with politics at the national 
level. While these studies throw much light on the structure and dynamics of local 
politics, however, political violence is generally not the primary focus of analysis. Thus 
far, there has been no systematic attempt to connect local politics with diverse patterns 
of coercion and violence. Without an incisive framework, the role of violence is either 
understated or over-dramatized in the literature on Thai local politics (as further 
discussed in the next section). Building on these pioneering studies, my research will 
integrate literature on local power and politics with studies on political violence with the 
goal of formulating a new analytical framework. 
Third and finally, the existing literature on political violence does not pay adequate 
attention to the timing of violence. Why does violence occur at certain times, but not 
others? In the case of electoral violence, the timing of violence falls into three main 
phases in relation to the electoral cycle: pre-election violence, election-day violence, and 
post-election violence. 26 Benazir Bhutto's assassination in Pakistan in December 2007 
was a case of pre-election violence, whereas vio lent clashes in Kenya in the same year 
were a clear example of post-election violence.27 Electoral violence tends to takes on 
different forms depending on when it occurs on an election timeline.28 Generally, 
assassinations of political rivals are mainly used during the pre-election period in order 
to weaken the opponents ' campaigns, violent attacks or ambushes often occur on 
25 A partial list would include Anek 1996; Arghiros 2001; Nishizaki 2002, 2006; Ockey 1998, 2002, 2004; 
Nelson 2005; McVey 2000; McCargo and Maisrikrod 1997; McCoy 1993; Lacaba 1995 ; Side! 1999; 
Hutchcroft 2000; Aspina ll and Fealy 2003; Hadiz 2003; Nordholt and Klinken 2007, and Trocki 1998. 
26 Some scholars break down these phases into more specified categories. Timothy Sisk (2008), for 
example, divides the cycle into five phases: phase I: the long run-up to elections, phase II : the campaign 's 
final lap , phase Ill: polling day(s), phase IV: between voting and proclamation, and phase V: post-election 
outcomes and their aftemrnth. I use the standard three-phase division. 
27 Kenya has a long history of electora l violence going back to the 1990s when multi-party politics was 
introduced, see Klopp 2001. For a full investigation of the 2007 post-election violence in Kenya , see 
Human Rights Watch (2008); for Bhutto ' s assassination, see "Independent UN probe into Bhutto killing 
concludes second visit to Pakistan," 30 September 2009 
<http :/ /www.un.org/apps/news/story. asp?NewsID= 323 76&CFbhutto&Cr I=> 
28 Fischer 2002, 2004. 
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election day with an aim to disrupt voting, while protests or riots are commonly 
mobilized to influence, manipulate, or challenge election outcomes. Apart fro m 
investigating the timing of vio lence in each election, it is very important to examine how 
the level, intensity, and pattern of violence change from one election to another. 
Variat ions across time constitute another crucial puzzle in the study of electoral 
violence. Examination of the underlying factors that explain different timing and 
historical development of electoral violence wi ll help us prevent or mitigate the violence 
more effectively. The major task of my research is to gather the necessary empirical data 
to evaluate local dynamics, and to locate the causal mechanisms that account for spatial 
and temporal variat ions in the patterns of electoral violence in Thailand. 
In sunun ary, due to the fact that electoral violence remains an unmapped research field , 
my study has four goals. First, I demonstrate how election-related violence is different 
from other types of po litical violence and thereby deepens our understanding of the 
relationship between violence and democracy. Although there is growing academic 
recognition of the need to come to tenns with the distinguishing characteristics of 
electoral vio lence, there has been no sufficient attempt to create a theoretical concept to 
explain this phenomenon. Until now, there have been only a few studies focusing on 
conceptual aspects of electoral violence. 29 Therefore my first goal is to develop a clearer 
conceptual understanding of electoral vio lence. 30 Second, I identify the factors and 
processes that cause violence in electoral politics. By shifting the focus of study from the 
center and national levels to the regional and local levels, my research offers a new 
theoretical contribution to understanding the causes, mechanisms, and dynamics of 
electoral violence. Third, I offer an explanation of the variation in timing of vio lence in 
electoral politics. Last ly, my research bridges a gap that has existed in the literature 
between studies of po litical conflict and violence and those of electoral politics. There is 
a body of "e lectoral engineering" literature dealing with the question of how electora l 
systems can be "designed" to prevent conflicts or promote peace in div ided societies. 31 
Neveriheless, there is no similar body of literature dealing with the glaringly obvious 
reality that elections are, more often than not, a major source of conflict, rather than a 
tool to resolve conflict. A theoretical understanding of th is po litical paradox is clearly 
needed. 
29 Rapoport an d Weinberg 200 1; Fischer 2002, 2004; Sisk 2008; Hoglund 2009; Hoglund and Pi yarathne 
2009. 
30 The significance of concepr format ion in the socia l science is discussed in Gerring 1999. 31 Horowitz l 99 1a, 199 1 b; Lijphart 1977, 2004 ; Reilly and Reynolds 2000; Reilly 2001; Kumar 1998. 
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To date, there have been few works that attempt to compare Thailand's experience with 
those of other countries, or to link its experience to a general theory of political violence. 
Even comparative studies within the Southeast Asian region itself are relatively rare. 
Compared to Thailand, research on Indonesian and Philippine political violence is much 
richer. 32 Three edited volumes, Anwar 2005, Croissant 2006, and Abraham, Newman, 
and Weiss 2010, try to fill this gap by linking political violence in Southeast Asia to 
broader debates on political violence in the field of comparative politics. Nevertheless, 
most studies, including the three edited volumes, focus primarily on ethno-religious 
violence and violence in the context of armed conflict, rather than violence in the 
context of electoral politics. My research broadens the analysis of conflict and violence 
in Thailand, a country that has, since the 1980s, gradually become part of the so-called 
' third wave' of democratization.33 Broadening the geography of our debate might help 
us build a theory in more fruitful directions. I · strongly believe that experience from 
Thailand-and other Southeast Asian countries-can offer valuable empirical insights 
and theoretical challenges to current debates on political violence and democratization. 
A stronger body of theoretical work, in turn, can shed new light on Thai and Southeast 
Asian studies. 
Beyond culture, state capacity, and ruthless "godfathers": .heterogeneous power 
landscapes and the political economy of violence under patrimonial states 
My theoretical framework draws upon a synthesis of existing literature on political 
violence as I seek to overcome the weakness of literature on electoral violence. Above 
all, explain Rapoport and Leonard (2001 ), "we lack a theory which enables us to explore 
the paradoxical and complicated relationships of ballots and bullets. " A few existing 
articles on elections and violence mention a long list of potential factors that might 
contribute to the occurrence and persistence of electoral violence, but none have 
conducted systematic investigations or attempted to make causal inferences. For 
example, Schimpp and McKernan (2001) mention grievance and greed, access to 
conflict resources, weak state capacity, and regional and international support. Hoglund 
32 On Indonesia, see, for example, Anderson 200 1; Columbijn and Lindblad 2002 ; Robinson 1995; Side! 
2006; Roosa 2006; Cribb 1990; Bertrand 2004; Searle 2002; Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin 
2004; Coppel 2006; Hedman 2008; Klinken 2007; Aspinall 2007; Davidson 2008; Barron, Kaiser, and 
Pradhan 2009. On the Philippines, see, Hedman 2000; Gutierrez 2003; Torres 2007; Side! 1999; and 
McCoy 1993. 
33 Huntington 1991. 
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(2006) identifies the nature of conflict societies, the conflict ive dimensions of 
democracy and democratization, and the design of electoral systems and administration. 
Patino and Velasco (2006) refer to the personalistic nature of elections, the weakness of 
the state and electoral institutions, uneven development and poverty, internal security 
problems, and deepening social cleavages. Sisk (2008) lists social structural co nditions, 
electoral-system choice and the stakes of political competition, the neutrality and 
competence of electoral administration, and the nature and functioning of the security 
sector. Therefore there is no substantive theory on electoral violence avai lable fo r us to 
test or rely on. My research seeks to overcome this shortcoming by making a valid 
causal inference with a subnational controlled- comparison research method (explained 
below). I fo rmulate my analytical framework by building on established theoretical and 
empirical insights fro m the literature on political conflicts and violence. In order to clear 
the way fo r the insights on which I build my analysis, the initial step is to highlight 
limitations in the current literature. 
First of all, my research is an effort to overcome the limitations of the culturalist 
explanations of political vio lence. In this study I argue that to explain the occurrence, or 
absence, of political violence, cultural, economic, and political factors have to be taken 
into consideration. These factors are connected. I agree with Rogers Brubaker and David 
Laitin (1998) that culturalist approaches ought not to be segregated from other 
approaches in examining political violence. Cultural analyses alone, however, are not 
able to illuminate political killings. I reject the notion of a "culture of violence," which 
suggests violence as inherent in and characterist ic of pa1iicular culture in particular 
locations: "African," "Islamic," "Indonesian," or "southern Thai," for example. I do not 
think we can assert that some cultures are inherently prone to violence. This notion 
simplifies and stereotypes those cultures; moreover, it overuses and abuses the concept 
of "culture" itse lf. 34 For the well-known case, several scholars attempt to explain the 
prevalence of political vio lence in Indonesia by claiming that Indonesia has a vio lent 
culture. They refer to the "primitive" headhunting culture of many Indonesian regions as 
exemplars oflndonesian's deep culture of violence. Others commonly make reference to 
the running amok as the typical or specific culture of Indonesia, especiall y in the 
countryside. They use these " local" cultures to explain why, during 1965-66, the killings 
spread so quickly and mainly in the rural areas and why many local people committed 
34 See Whi tehead 2004: 8. 
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the killings.35 Some scholars suggest that the Javanese shadow puppet play, or wayang, 
portrays the characters on the left of the puppeteer as both wrong and doomed to violent 
destruction, and thus inclined Indonesians to expect the Communists to be destroyed in a 
bloody ways. 36 
Similar arguments have been made by scholars studying Thai politics. A number of 
scholarly works suggest "culture" is a main factor behind the violent political behavior 
of Thai people in some regions or provinces, emphasizing factors such as preferences for 
macho leadership styles and supernatural power, revenge killings, honor codes, 
anarchistic values etc. Some claim that certain provinces-Phetchaburi, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, Chonburi-are more prone to violence than others because they have a 
strong culture of lawlessness, revenge murder, and village justice that predates the 
introduction of the parliamentary system and electoral politics. 37 The serious flaw of this 
cultural explanation is that these characteristics are not specific to particular provinces, 
nor do they primarily reflect a unique "culture" of the areas considered. Other provinces 
that share similar cultural characteristics were not tainted with violence. More 
importantly, the "culture of violence" notion, particularly influential in Thai 
criminological studies, fails to distinguish between ordinary crime and political-
motivated murders. These two categories of violence have different causes and 
motivations; provinces that face a high rate of homicide are not necessarily plagued with 
political violence, and vice versa. Phetchaburi is a prime example; it is infamous for 
crime and concentrations of gunmen, but witnesses orderly and peaceful elections (see 
details in Chapter 10). To understand violent incidents in elections, we need to look far 
beyond local cultural norms and values. 
Some scholars also argue that people in some regions are disposed towards acts of 
violence; they are quick tempered, rebellious, subversive, disorderly, and love fighting. 
One Thai sch0lar, for example, describes people in the southern region as skillful 
speakers who are strong-headed, stubborn, direct, frequently involved in heated 
arguments, and lacking consideration for the feelings of others. He claims that 
bullfighting, a popular sport in the south, is a cultural metaphor that truly reflects the 
35 See explanations and discussion of headhunters and people running amok in Carr and Tan 1976; Dijk 
2002; Colombijn 200 I , 2002. 
36 This explanation fails to deal with the complexity of Javanese shadow puppet philosophy. See Anderson 
1965. 
37 On Nakhon Si Thammarat, see Natthawit 2000; Niphon et al. 1990; Worawan et al. 2000. For Chonburi, 
see Narit 2003; Atcharaphon 1992; for Phetchaburi , see Thawirot 2005; Pongsak 1998; Phakphum2008. 
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character of southern people.38 It is interesting to note that this type of character-based 
explanation is popular among southern Thai scho lars. 39 They use it to explain 
southerner ' s voting behavior, their particular styles of electoral campaigning, and other 
political behavior in general. This explanation fa lls under the behavioral approach which 
umavels political violence by dealing with social-psychological factors facilitating 
violence. To examine the matter in this vein, behaviora list scho lars develop and provide 
some plausible explanations. The classic exp lanation focuses on people 's minds: some 
humans are violent by nature so violent events occur when violent people congregate. 
We can refer to this view of political vio lence as propensity-driven behavior. Scholars 
who consider politically violent action as propensity-driven behavior locate its cause 
within the actor, calling attention to genetic, emotional, or cognitive peculiarities that 
incline a given individual or category of persons toward particularly destructive 
behavior.40 
Unfortunately, there are many weak points and shortcomings in this explanation. The 
boundary between violent and peaceful people actually blurs. Many studies show that 
under certain circumstances, ordinarily peaceful persons can become involved in 
orgarnz mg or perpetrating violent activities. 41 It is problematic how some scholars 
studying Thai politics make neat distinctions between vio lent and non-violent bosses by 
arguing that the latter type of boss gained their dominance through political shrewdness 
and skillful manipulation, not the use of force. 42 I argue that non-violent bosses can be 
violent if necessary or if circumstances require it. The use of fo rce and political 
manipulation could be employed by the same boss in a different situation. A key to their 
political success is their ab ility to know and make the right decision as to when and how 
they should use vio lent tactics. Fear can be as effective as loya lty in acquiring and 
maintaining power. 
To sum up, attempts to use the notion of a "culture of violence" and/or a "character-
based explanat ion" to account for politica l vio lence are unsatisfactory. Many scho lars 
have criticized these explanat ions as cultural detenninism wh ich is inadequate to explain 
violence. Genera lly speaking, it is difficult to argue, either theoretically or empirically, 
38 Akhom 2000: 56. 
39 Akhom 2000; Sarup and Thongsai 2000; Ruoh omaki 1999; Nakharin 2008. 40 See a summary and cril ique of thi s approach in Till y 200 1. 
41 See, fo r example, Browning 1998 and Staub 1989. 
" McVey 2000; Nishizaki 2004, 2006, 2008. 
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that political violence flows directly from deeply encoded cultural propensities to 
violence. To explain why political violence happens, it is essential to explore the various 
factors and mechanisms that enable and motivate the killings. 
Beyond culturalist and behavioralist explanations, there are two additional strands of 
argument in the causal explanation of violence. The first and older strand, "the demand-
side" argument, emphasizes individual motivation, resource mobilization, and strategies 
of political actors as the main factors causing violence. According to this argument, 
political violence occurs because there is a group of aggrieved people, with enough 
resources, who employ violence to change the conditions of their lives and achieve their 
political goals. "The demand-side" argument commonly focuses on two types of factors: 
those which motivate people to use violence and those which enable them to use it. The 
motivating factors include group grievances, discrimination, economic inequality, and a 
group's sense of identity. 43 The resources that enable mobilization include money, 
weapons, equipment, manpower, infonnation, and organization. 44 More recent literature 
on political violence tends to reject the significance of group grievances, resource 
mobilization, discrimination, ethnic identity, and economic inequality in explaining 
violence and rebellion. Such scholars as Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Lacina (2006) 
claim that group grievance and economic inequality are too common to explain the 
occurrence of political violence because these factors exist in almost every country but 
political violence is still rare. 
They look instead at the structural conditions that favor or facilitate violence. This 
second strand of research is known as the "supply-side" argument. According to this 
argument, the most important structural condition that allows political violence to occur 
and persist is the decay of the state.45 Weak state structures, they argue, provide 
opportunities and incentives for people to employ violent strategies. The limitation of 
such states, so the argument goes, is their inability to enforce the law and manage 
intense conflicts. This contributes to the persistence of conflict. State weakness thereby 
43 The most influential theory along this line of argument is that of relative deprivation developed in Gurr 
1970. Two decades on, Gurr (1993) still argued that group grievances and the strength of group's sense of 
identity are significant in causing ethnic conflicts. For other seminal works that give importance to 
individual or group motivation in explaining violence, see Tambiah 1996, Horowitz 2001, and Peterson 
2002. 
44 The classic explanation of collective violence using resource mobilization theory is Tilly 1978. The 
early works of Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, developing the idea of"greed and grievance," also fit into 
the resource mobilization exp lanation. See Collier 2000, and Collier and Hoeffler 2001. They shifted their 
focus, however, in later works. 
45 Fearon and Laitin 2003 ; Leonard and Straus 2003. 
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not only permit s political violence to continue but also indirectly encourages it since 
political actors can commit violence with little fear of legal punishment. As many 
theorists have demonstrated, state responses (or non-responses) play a crucial role in the 
success or fa ilure of violent tactics.46 
From the perspective of theory building, the theoretical debate between demand-side and 
supply-side literature is not constructive or fruitful. Demand-side and supply-side factors 
function like two sides of the same co in; in combination, they produce political 
outcomes. I argue that a better causal explanation of political violence is the one that 
combines both factors in a single theoretical account. In other words, we need to look for 
explanat ions· involving both actors and structures. Structural factors create the conditions 
and incentives, and determine the costs invo lved for actors in employing violence in 
connection to elections. The goals and strategies of actors are equally important in 
explaining how the vio lence is used and organized. 
On structural (or enabling) factors, I argue that we need to go beyond the state capacity 
dimension. State capacity is significant but not sufficient as an explanatory factor. Weak 
state capacity, as many theorists argue, provides opportunities for political actors to 
ernplo y violent strategies. In Thailand, the use of violence and other abusive methods by 
local bosses during election campaigns is common knowledge to local government 
officials. There have been, however, very few arrests or prosecutions for those lega l 
violations. The fact is, in many provinces, local administrations are weak and their 
officials are incompetent and corrupt. Moreover, several government officials, police 
officers in paiiicular, are invo lved in those crimes themselves and therefore ignore the 
legal violations. There is evidence showing that , in many cases, po lice officers are 
subordinates or business partners of godfathers in their province. 47 Nevertheless, not all 
weak states suffer from widespread elect ion-related vio lence. In analyzing the state's 
role in electoral violence, the discussion should not be limited to the capacity of the state 
as an attributing factor. 48 The weak-state argument highlights only one dimension of 
violence propagation-that weak states fa il to achieve a monopo ly control on the use of 
46 T ill y 2003; Wilkinson 2004; Payne 2000. 
47 See deta il s in all empiri ca l chapters, especiall y Chapter 5 and 6. Also see Pasuk and Sungs idh l 996; 
Pasuk, Sun gsidh , and Nualnoi 1998. 
48 Most scholars in th e fi eld propose "state weakness" or "weak stat e capac ity" as one of the most 
importan t ca uses of electoral violence. See Sisk 2008; Schimpp and Jvl cKernan 2001 ; Fischer 2002 and 
2004. 
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legitimate force in their territory and thus cannot control violence in the political sphere, 
including in the electoral process. 
It is equally, or more important to understand why political actors, particularly business 
politicians, need to capture state power in the first place. Positions in public office 
provide material incentives, which lead us to discuss the character of the state apparatus. 
I argue that a state that exhibits strong patrimonial features-as opposed to "rational-
legal" bureaucratic structure-provides not only opportunities but also strong incentives 
for predatory oligarchs to control state machinery. Under patrimonial states, which "lack 
above all the bureaucratic separation of the 'private ' and the 'official' sphere,"49 political 
offices constituted the major source of rent-seeking opportunities, providing an avenue 
to lucrative contracts, licenses, concessions, quotas, loans, and power to manipulate laws 
and regulations. so The stakes of winning elections under patrimonial states are extremely 
high as victory enables winners access to state coffers; in this structure, business-politico 
elites become actively involved in electoral competition using all necessary means, legal 
or illegal, non-coercive or coercive, to eliminate their opponents and win seats. The 
higher the level of spoils that political office provides, the more cut-throat electoral 
competition becomes. Therefore, an understanding of the development and changing 
character of the Thai patrimonial state is vital for the understanding of electoral 
violence; the issue is further discussed in Part II: Historical Development (Chapters 2-3). 
In addition to national institutional settings, we have to consider Thai provincial 
economic and power structures (both fonnal and informal). National state structures 
establish structural incentives for the acquisition of power and the national capital is the 
desired destination of all ambitious power seekers. The first step to power, however, is 
located in provincial towns. Those who aspire to capture state power first have to control 
the provinces-the political space in which they build networks, negotiate and compete, 
and, if necessary, intimidate and kill their rivals. Electoral violence in Thailand is, as 
mentioned earlier, province-based. The main focus of this research is thus on the degree 
of existence and absence of power monopoly at the provincial level. I examine the 
formal and informal economic and political structures in selected provinces. Political 
struggle among elite and influential groups in each province is of special attention, in 
49 Weber 1978, II: 1028 quoted in Hutchcroft 1998: 5. 
50 The account of the way in which Philippine oli garchs and cronies capture state apparatus and penetrate 
the administrative departments of government through legislative control is highly pertinent for 
comparison. See Hutchcroft 1998. 
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order to understand the ways power seekers interact, either in contention or in 
compromise, wi th one another. 51 In short, rather than merely examining the macro-
politica l picture at the national level, this research explores the micro-socioeconomic 
conditions and micro-political processes at the provincial level of Thai politics, and the 
way in which national and local power structures interact. The location of each province 
is significant because different locations provide different economic opportunities and 
political environments. The main explanatory factor, however, is not the geography per 
se but the political and economic landscape of the province. The interdependent 
relationships between local economy and local politics are clearly explained by 
Emmanuel S. de Dias, in his work on the origins, functions and consequences of local 
power in the Philippines: 
The nature of local political relationships depends primarily on the social and 
economic structure of the communities invo lved. Political leaders (always 
remembering the specific circumstances that they must compete in electoral 
contests) must adjust and accommodate themselves and their behavior to 
what are largely exogenous conditions, and to changes in the economic and 
social envi.rorunent. They must do so if they are to appropriate benefits from 
political office, since the character of such benefits themselves is strongly 
conditioned by such environments.52 
Such an argument can be exemplified by looking at the type of local political eco nomy 
that makes any province prone to violent electoral competition. The most obvious 
dangerous landscapes are border or "fron tier communities", where the central 
government has limited reach. In these communities, property rights are often in dispute, 
and illegal operations and smuggling prevalent. Private violence can be a popular means 
to assert authority and enforce business deals, given the weak existence of law 
enforcement entities in the area. It is also not difficult for perpetrators to run away fro m 
government officia ls as they can easi ly find hiding places in neighboring countries. 53 
51 For th e long debaJe over JJ1e character of power structures and control in loca l politi cs, see Dahl 1961 
and Mill s 1956. Mill s argues that America 's governm ents are under control of a unifi ed and 
demographi ca ll y narrow power elite. Dahl , on JJ1e contrar y. exa mines th e power structures in JJ1e city of 
New Haven. Conn ecti cu1. as a case study. and fi nds JJ1a1 JJ1ere are several different elites in volved, who 
work both in contenti on and in cooperation wiJJ1 one anoth er. Thi s led to the pluralist argument of 
democrat ic poli tics proposed by Dahl. 
" De Dios 2007: 175-76. 
53 Cambod ia is a popular destination for Thai polit icians in JJ1is regard . At least two powerful poli tical 
bosses went in to ex ile in Cambodia to escape prosecution. 
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For these reasons, many scholars of Thai local politics make a connection between 
border areas and widespread violence among local bosses.54 The causal linkage between 
these two variables is not entirely wrong but can be misleading. As I argue, the main 
explanation lays in the local political economy not the geography per se. Border areas 
are undoubtedly prone to illegal activities and lawless violence but my research shows 
that not all border provinces fall under the curse of geography. The best example is Sa 
Kaeo, a northeastern province, which shares a long borderline with Cambodia and stands 
as one of the most peaceful and orderly provinces in the country (see Chapter 12). 
This leads to three further arguments. First, illegal activities and political mafia can exist 
in diverse geographical areas beyond the frontiers. Smuggling, contraband trading, and 
drug trafficking might heavily concentrate in the coastal and border provinces, but other 
kinds of illegal enterprises such as illicit logging, prostitution, and gambling, are found 
everywhere. 
Second, it is not only illegal businesses that carry a high r isk of violent electoral 
competition, but also two types of rent-seeking activities-natural resource extraction 
and government-regulated businesses. These two enterprises require very low skills and 
technology but generate high profits as they are monopolistic by nature; both also share 
similarities in their heavy dependence on government connections and protection for the 
success and continuity of businesses. In contrast to profit-seeking or productivity-
improving economic activities in which "assets and incomes are won and lost on the 
basis of the ability of the business owner to develop the property," rent-seeking is an 
activity in which "ownership of property alone guarantees the access to wealth ... [ and] 
the operation of the state determine the assignment of and the continued enjoyment of 
economic advantages."55 In general, this "property" includes government protection 
from competition through quotas, tariffs, access to loans and grants, and licenses and 
concessions. And once these proper.ties are obtained, the obtainers need not develop 
them; rather, "they only need to maintain and expand their ownership of economic 
advantage."56 Since natural resource extractive businesses (like logging, mining, 
quarries, etc) and businesses on which the government imposes strict regulations (such 
as liquor or cigarette dealerships, tobacco curing, buses, gas stations, slaughter houses, 
54 Sombat 2000; Ockey 1993, 2000; Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994; Mc Vey 2000. 
55 Montes 1988: 64-66, quote in Hutchcroft 1998: 20-21. 
56 As a result, the "internal efficiencies and investments" of their companies become a secondary concern 
(Montes 1988: 64-66, quote in Hutchcroft 1998: 21). 
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and construction) are enormously profitable, they attract plenty of aggressive contenders. 
And, in Thai land as in many countries, winning elections is the surest way to ownership 
of property and monopoly rents emanating from administrative offices. Under these 
circumstances, elect ions become a zero-sum-game with an economic monopoly at stake. 
The provinces with a high propensity to electoral vio lence are the ones in which the 
leading political actors come from business elites whose wealth is primarily based on 
illegal and/or rent-seeking economies. These violence-prone provinces are found in 
every region (north, northeast, central, and south). It is the political economy, not the 
topography or location, of these provinces that determine vio lent outcomes. 
Third and finally, in addition to local economic structures, electoral violence is further 
shaped and determined by local power structures. Elections are peaceful in provinces 
under complete control of a single elite or one political dynasty, even though 
underground and rent -seeking activities are pervasive. It is peaceful because elections 
are void of real competition. Political monopoly is definitely hard to achieve, but once 
obtained it is highly rewarding; it wards off competition and acquires submissiveness 
from other people. Provincial bosses who control absolute power are able to discourage 
challengers easily and command local government officials to manipulate electoral 
process for their advantage. They need not resort to overt vio lence. On the other hand, 
electoral violence is most likely to occur when power monopoly is absent. The research 
findings demonstrate that both a polarized power structure (where two groups compete 
for power) and a fragmented power structure (where multiple groups compete for power) 
facilitate violence. Without a monopoly, no political group is able to en list the local state 
apparatus' s full protect ion and cooperation. The lack of a dominant polit ical force also 
turns that provincial territory into a wide-open grab for power. As discussed above, all 
political bosses strive for a monopoly since it produces massive wealth, privilege and 
protection. But without monopolistic power, vo ting fraud and/or electoral manipulation 
are not options for struggling bosses. Therefore, po litical bosses have to fight fiercel y 
against their business and political riva ls to win. The path to power monopo lies is prone 
to end in violence and bloodshed. But localized monopolies of economic and political 
activi ties are responsible for producing a local peacefu l political order. In this sense, 
vio lence is the precursor of local monopo lies and "peace. " This guiding framework, 
pointing to the significance of the power st ructure, helps us understand that the mere 
ex istence of a godfather in any province does not necessaril y render elections in that 
province bloody. 
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On the demand-side, or actor-factors, I agree with Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Lacina 
(2006) that resource mobilization is too common to explain the variation in violence. In 
general, guns, aggressive hoodlums, and unemployed young men are all in plentiful 
supply in developing countries-Thailand is no exception. 57 A combination of factors 
makes the supply of violence in Thailand relatively cheap and abundant. Most important 
is the large scale Thai illegal economy, which includes a wide range of enterprises, 
including drug trafficking, goods and human smuggling, contraband trading, illicit 
logging, prostitution, and gambling. Since the 1980s, the illegal economy has rapidly 
developed side by side with Thailand' s economic growth. 58 Because of the unlawful 
nature of the businesses, the owners need protection, and in the Thai system, there are 
two available sources of protection: government and illegal rackets. Organized crime 
provides private protection services to entrepreneurs who lack access to official 
protection. The growth of the underground economy strengthened the power of 
underworld. bosses and spurred the trade in arms and the business of hired gunmen. For 
several decades since the Cold War, Thailand has been part of cross-border arms 
trading- a lucrative business that gives handsome profits to the politicians, government 
officials and businessmen involved. Firearms are exported to neighboring countries, but 
large numbers of illicit weapons are sold within Thailand for use by organized crime and 
gangsters.59 Guns are thus highly accessible and cheap in the underground market, as 
one local government official in Sa Kaeo said, "Contraband guns are everywhere. People 
know how to get them whenever they want. " In provincial towns, notes the official, one 
need pay only 15,000 bah! (USD 500) to possess an automatic handgun. 60 Thailand 's 
underworld sells not only cheap guns, but also hired assassins. In the 1950s, professional 
hit men provided protection to those in urban rackets, particularly gambling and 
prostitution, eliminating enemies and trouble makers. 61 With the resurgence of 
57 With the exception of some countries, such as Malaysia, that have strict gun control laws, thus making 
access to coercive resources more difficult and expensive. 
58 There are many overlapping terms for the informal economy, such as underground economy, black 
market, shadow economy, parallel economy. Pasuk, Sungsidh and Nualnoi (1998: 5-6) noted that this type 
of economy ·can be broken down into five categories: a) illegal activities, such as drug traffi cking, 
smuggling, etc; b) tax evasion; c) income from corruption; d) informal sectors activities, such as self-
employment and casual work; and, d) household work done by family members but not included in value-
added of the formal economy, such as caring of the sick and elders. In this research, I focus on th e first 
category~the illegal economy. 
59 Pasuk, Sungsidh and Nualnoi 1998: 127, 138-39, 152-53; Research and Development Division , Police 
Department I 996. 
60 Interview, local government official, Sa Kaeo, 4 April 2002. After interview, this government official 
offered to take me to the "black-market" to buy a cheap gun for myself 
6 1 See Suriyan 1989 for a firsthand account of the origin of hired gun business. 
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parliamentary democracy in the early 1980s, the contract-killing business expanded into 
political murders associated with elections. Contract killing was extremely profitable 
and thus attracted a lot of people. As a competitive business, the market price for 
political assassination was inexpensive. By the 1990s, the minimum price for killing key 
vote canvassers was 50,000 baht, while killing an MP cost I million baht. 62 For business 
politicians, the price was, however, rather low compared to the total cost of their election 
campaign (which was about 60-80 million baht per candidate).63 
Since the 1980s Thailand has witnessed growth in vio lence-providing services; classified 
as the "violence specialists" and "violence entrepreneurs." Gunmen, unlike other 
electoral stakeholders, specialize in exercising physical force. For them, violence is the 
enterprise, and a resource. According to the literature, they are "vio lent specia lists": 
"who contro l [coercive] means of inflicting damage on persons and objects" and have 
"extensive skills" in using violence. Generally speaking, Charles Tilly argues, "they 
deliver damage more efficiently and effectively than other kind of political actors. They 
deliver damage under discipline" and "often they do so at the behest of employers who 
themselves never engage directly in damaging acts."64 In Thailand, most vio lence 
specialists work through brokers or "agents", who usually invest in hired gunmen as 
another branch of illegal business. 65 According to Charles Tilly, these agents are "violent 
entrepreneurs," "activating, connecting, coordinating, and representing participants in 
violent encounters."66 They act as intermediaries bringing violence specialists together 
fo r business. 
Because coercive resources-weapons, violence specialists and vio lence 
entrepreneurs- are pervasive in Thailand, they are not explanatory factors for variations 
in violence. Not all provinces with gunmen dens and a thriving arms trade suffer from 
violence. Some provinces with few gunmen, on the other hand, have violent 
62 Watthana 1995: 30-3 I ; Ditti ta 2005: 119-1 22. 
63 TI1 is estimated number is app li ed to MP sea ts in the 1990s; the in formation was revealed by ca ndidates 
competing in tliat peri od (see Chapter 3 for detail s). 
64 Till y 2003: 35, 232-33. 
65 Interview, senior poli ce in the Crime Suppression Division, Bangkok, 11 April 20 12. 
66 Til ly 2003: 34. " Violent spec ialists" and "violent entrepreneurs" are Ti lly's term s, but they might be 
more clearly described as "violence spec ia lists" an d " violence entrepreneurs." For violence entrepreneurs 
in Russia, see Volkov 2002; in India, see Brass 1997; in Italy, see Ga mbetta 1996; in th e Philippines, see 
Gutierrez 2003. Some scho lars employ the term "violent entrepreneur" to ex plain the behav ior of rebel 
leaders in African civil war, who make profit from mass violence mobili za tion aga inst the sta te (see 
Collier 2000; Muell er 2000; Le Bi llon 2006; for a cri tique of this argument, see Kalyvas 2003, 2006; 
Wood 2003; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Weinstein 2006). 
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confrontations between opposing candidates. The question is: why do certain candidates 
employ violent methods, and under what circumstances? Money, violent men, and 
coercive tools are not obstacles to the use of violence as argued by scholars.67 It is 
political demand that determines the occurrence of electoral violence. Wherever demand 
emerges, supply follows. To understand the timing and location of electoral violence in 
Thailand, we need to move beyond the coercive resource factors and focus specifically 
on the motivating factors (the demand side) that compel political actors to use violent 
strategies. 
The electoral murder market developed out of aspiring politicians' need to eliminate 
opposition. It is the provincial business-cum-political elites or jao pho (godfathers) who 
drove the demand for violence in Thai electoral politics. 68 They employ "violence 
specialists" to act on their behalf The service of hired gunmen provides political bosses 
with distance from violent acts. When political murder occurs during elections, officials 
can, at best, link the murder to gunmen or gunmen's agents. Furthermore, for politicians, 
the hired gun business obviates the cost of building a private army. Thai political bosses 
normally have only four to five personal goons protecting them. 69 This pattern contrasts 
with how political bosses in some other countries build their own large networks and/or 
organization of violence specialists. In India, for example, Paul Brass describes the 
existence of "institutionalized riot systems"-the system of organized gangs created by 
politicians to foment riots "as a strategic tool" to win elections. 70 In Thailand, political 
elites employ many local people to work under their networks for vote-collecting (rather 
than the vio lence-instigating). This group of local people is known as hua khanaen or 
vote canvassers, whose main jobs is conducting campaign, canvassing votes, and buying 
votes for candidates. They are essentially "political entrepreneurs," not "violence 
entrepreneurs," as most activities are non-coercive. Violence specialists, on the contrary, 
engage in threatening opponents, burning opposition candidates' offices, and killing 
opposing candidates and vote canvassers. These specialists on violence are not 
necessarily part of the provincial boss 's network. Most literature on Thai political 
67 For example, Hicken (2007: 53-54) argues that coercion is not adopted by every candidate because 
"most candidates lack sufficient resources (money, men , and connections) to use violence as their primary 
electora l strategy." 
68 The term jao pho originally means a local spirit and is "alluded to supernatural power to act above the 
law" (Baker and Pasuk 2005: 239). Since the late 1970s it has become a translation of "godfather" and 
popularly used by media and academics to refer to provincial bosses. 
69 Interview, underworld protection racket's owner, Bangkok, 6 April 2012. Only few eminent bosses are 
able to build a large entourage. 
70 Brass 1997. See also Varshney2003 and Wilkinson 2006 for further discussion of political violence and 
mass organization in India. 
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studies conflates political entrepreneurs with violence entrepreneurs and thus fails to 
comprehend the complex operation and dynamics of electoral violence in Thailand.7 1 
Provincial bosses are relatively new political actors, who entered politics after the 
October 1973 uprising and rose to power during the semi-democratic period of the 
1980s. Local godfathers hold sway in the district or province, acting as heads of a 
patronage system in which they have enormous control over social, economic, and 
political activities . The power of local godfathers depends on their abi lity to monopolize 
the local economy and po litical system. They are involved in either illegal businesses or 
rent-seeking activities requiring coercive power and government protection for the 
extraction of surplus. By the 1990s, they had become leaders of political factions in 
several political parties.72 My research shows that, among all electoral stakeholders, 
provincial bosses are responsible for the most electoral violence in Thai land. 73 The more 
important point, however, is that political bosses only adopt violent strategies in specific 
circumstances, and the violence serves broader business-political purposes than merely 
acquiring votes. 
Prominent bosses need violence to achieve two major goals: a) eliminating business-
politico rivals who threaten their conquest of a monopoly in elections, and b) 
co nso lidating their power networks. For election victory, violence and intimidation is, as 
Allen Hicken and many other scholars argue, not the only strategy to win elections. Thai 
cand idates use many strategies to win votes, including "targeting government pork and 
patronage to a cand id ate's constituents," "relying on name and frame to cu ltivate a 
perso nal vote," "using patron-client relationships to engender loyalty and support," or 
direct vote buying. 74 Boss-type candidates are usually in a stronger position than other 
types of cand idates because of their superior financial and political resources. At the 
same time, fo r provincial business elites, because of their involvement in illegal and 
rent-seeking activities, winning electio ns are more impo1iant than for other types of 
candidates. When boss-type candidates face non-boss contenders, the boss-types need 
not to reso rt violence because they can defeat their competitors with stronger vo te-
canvassing networks supported by healthy war chest. Vio lence is, however, necessary 
71 See, for example, Som bat 1987 ; Pi chai , Sorn ch et, and Vora wit 1988; Phoern phong 1990; Arghiros 1995 ; 
Ca llahan and McCargo 1996; Anyarat 2007; 20 10. 
72 Mc Vey 2000; Ockey 2000. 
73 ln Chap1ers 3 and 4, I discuss in detail al l types of aclors, including provincial bosses , who perpetrate 
violence in electi ons. 
74 Hi cken 2002 , 2007. 
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when confronted with the same political species-the rival boss-in the battle for the 
monopoly of power. Boss-types pitted against each other employ similar ( dirty) tactics, 
and have similar power and wealth. Under these circumstances, the only option is to 
eliminate their opponents by force. Moreover, when rival provincial elites campaign 
against each other, business and political conflict intertwine, business rivals become 
political enemies, and electoral competition becomes a war of all or nothing. Therefore, 
provincial elections are most prone to violence when boss-style candidates confront each 
other over a power monopoly. 
For consolidating power, bosses deploy violence to get rid of disloyal subordinates. 
These insubordinates are mainly vote canvassers who double-deal during election 
campaigns. Eliminating disloyal vote canvassers may not ensure electoral victory but 
preserves boss power. Bosses lose respect and control if they do not discipline 
insubordinates. In these circumstances, the use of coercion serves the Jong-term purpose 
of authority maintenance, rather than merely the immediate goal of electoral winning. 
Unfortunately, the existing literature on local Thai politics has neglected, downplayed or 
otherwise oversimplified the motivations of provincial bosses and the role of violence 
and coercion in shaping economic accumulation and political competition. 75 Until now, 
there have been three competing frameworks on Thai electoral politics and local studies: 
the patron-client relationship, the "godfather" model, and the identity and everyday 
politics analysis. The patron-client view is the longstanding, and still influential , 
framework adopted by many scho lars (as well as media and political commentators) to 
explain the function of the Thai political system and political behavior, particularly in 
rural politics. 76 The analytical focus of this classic framework is on personalistic and 
imbalanced relationships between persons of higher social status and those of lower 
status in face-to-face and long-lasting ties of reciprocity. Patron-client relations are 
portrayed as an enduring character of Thai social culture and values, primarily based on 
kinship, personal gratitude, smooth-interpersonal relations, and conflict avoidance. 
Political organizations and activities, scholars argue, build on and revolve around these 
traditional values. Relations between patrons and subordinates, elites and followers, are 
75 See Sidel (1999) for his critique on this issue in the Philippines studies. 
76 A partial list of significant works would include Akin 1969; Arghiros 2001, 2002; De Young 1966; 
Fishel 2001; Johnston 1980; Kemp 1976; Moreman 1969; Neher 1974; Nelson 1998, 2005; Porter 1976; 
Sharp and Hanks 1978; Pichai , Somchet, and Vorawit 1988 ; Phoemphong1990. 
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largely "symbiotic, smooth, and reciprocal."77 In his critique on the shortcomings of 
patron-client framework, Kerkvliet rightly points out that even though "patron client and 
other personal relations are indeed significant in Philippine political life," the framework 
"leaves out and obscures a great deal about Philippine politics." 78 His critique can be 
appropriately applied to Thai political studies. The most serious problem with the 
framework is that it leaves little or no room for direct confrontation, open conflict and 
violent struggle between people. Under the patron-client framework, coercion and 
violence play no vital role in electoral competition, economic exploitation, and social 
relations. Relying on the static patron-client model, scholars and political observers have 
failed to acknowledge the evolving relationships between politicians, vote canvassers, 
and gunmen that emerged after the 1980s which are less reciprocal, more conflictual and 
unstable, and business-oriented. 
The two other interpretations of Thai politics highlight issues that the patron-client 
framework omits, but they also have crucial shortcomings. The identity and everyday 
politics framework contribute to the field of Thai studies by demonstrating that there are 
other values and ideas, and different lines of cleavage and struggle beyond personal, 
familial factions that shape political organization and behavior. For instance, Yoshinori 
Nishizaki's study on Banham Silpa-archa argues that Banharn 's hegemonic power in 
Suphanburi stems from the fact that Banharn has successfully created positive provincial 
identity among Suphanburi residents through various kinds of projects and activities. 
Andrew Walker's notion of a rural constitution based on his study of one northern 
village describes how the locally-embedded sets of values formulate and shape the 
political preferences and political actions of villagers. 79 These perceptions 
notwithstanding, the identity and everyday politics advocates share a disregard for the 
significance of violence in economic and political compositions. The difference Jays in 
their (shifting) focus on ordinary people-the bottom-up view-showing how certain 
types of political leadership are more successful and more popular than others from the 
local peop le's perspect ive. Using Nishizaki's te1minology, the alternative art of (non-
coercive) domination is possible. The problem is Banham's domination ofSuphanburi is 
rather exceptional and thus difficult to apply to the political successes of many 
politicians and families in other provinces, where electoral victory and dominance rely 
77 Quote from Kerkvli et 1995. For a classic definition of cli enteli stic rela ti ons, see Scott 1972: 93 ; and 
La nde 1966. 
78 Kerkvli et 1995: 40 1. 
79 See N ishizaki 2005, 2006, 2011 ; Wa lker 2008, 2012. 
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on coercion and manipulation. Some achieved power without making the residents proud 
of their provincial identity as Banharn did. I do not deny the significance of identity and 
everyday politics in the formation of political authority, but these features alone are not 
sufficient to explain the characteristics of Thai politics. More impo1iantly, they do not 
explain historical and geographical variations of political domination and violence that 
has developed since the 1970s. By distnissing the coercive dimension in electoral 
politics, scholars deprive themselves of a complete understanding of power 
accumulation and contestation in the Thai polity. 
Of the three frameworks, the literature on "godfathers" which emerged in the 1990s pays 
most attention to coercive forces. 80 In my opinion, the godfather proponents are heading 
in the right direction in countering the tendency of Thai acadetnia of paying too much 
attention to the patronage system and the role of traditional values. Nevertheless, their 
arguments run a risk of going to another extreme of essentializing godfather and 
violence. Deliberately or not, their work, based on a few selective cases of famous 
godfathers in the 1990s, portray the ubiquitous power and ruthlessness of rural 
politicians. Gruesome murders and merciless killings overshadow other political stories. 
In fact , the power of godfathers varies from province to province and changes over time. 
Not every godfather enjoys monopolistic power. Some have to struggle with state 
bureaucrats, political activists, and adversarial bosses to climb to the top. And they have 
to expend perhaps more . energy to maintain their hard-acquired power. Instead of 
picturing godfathers as invincible, this research suggests their vulnerability. My 
comparative studies show there is no single characterization of Thai provincial boss rule. 
Any attempt to understand local power dynatnics and electoral violence needs to take 
variations into account. And jao pho are not violent men by nature; coercive force 
operates under a particular logic, as discussed above. For political bosses, even the most 
notorious ones, violence is a tool, not a trademark. Bosses resort to violence when 
required, i.e. for dealing with specific kind of threat. Once the situation changes, 
violence can be abandoned. 
The creation and continuation of power of individual political elites and fatnilies in 
Thailand need to be explained by a different, and more comprehensive, analytical 
framework beyond those developed under the paradigms of patron-client, godfather, and 
'
0 A list of important works are Ockey 1992, 1993, 2000; Pasuk and Sungsidh 1992, 1994; Anderson 
1990; Sombat 1992; Somrudee 1991 , 1993 ; Somkiat 1993; Viengrat 1994, 2000; McVey2000. 
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identity and everyday politics. In this research, I formulate an analytical frame that 
allows observers to explore the heterogeneity of the political and economic landscape 
that fundamentally exists in Thai polity. The heterogeneous geography of political 
economy (conditioned by a combination of national and local factors) provides 
incentives to and shapes the paths of actors. Different political and economic settings 
require politicians to assume multiple roles. They might act as patrons in their political 
strongholds but act like bosses in other areas and situations.81 Because elections at each 
level are interconnected I investigate a variety of localities and different levels of 
electoral contest (national, provincial, municipal, and sub-district) to understand the 
political dynamics of provinces. In the next section, I describe my research 
methodology. 
A note on methodology, data, and materials 
My study identifies the major factors that explain the causes, patterns, and consequences 
of election-related violence in Thailand. A good explanation needs to be able to account 
for variation over time and space since, as mentioned earlier, there are ebbs and flows of 
violence over the years, and violence is not evenly distributed across the country. This 
variance is at the heart of my research. Therefore I conduct a sub-national comparative 
analysis by collecting observations on the degree and character of electoral violence; the 
explanatory factors relate to multiple spatial and temporal subunits. 82 I establish the 
province as the spatial subunit of my analysis. 83 Since electoral vio lence in Thailand is 
province-specific, as explained above (some provinces have experienced a higher level 
of election-related violence than others), I investigate the causal mechanisms at the 
provincial level. For my temporal subunit, I examine fourteen national elections and 
several local elections from 1975 to 20 11 in each selected province to account for the 
variation across time. 
81 In the case of the Philippines, see a succinct critique of Sidel ' s bossism framework by Hutchcroft 2003 . 
Hutchcroft convincingly argues that the category of " patron" shou ld not be enti rely banished from the 
analysis of Philippine politics. See also De Dios 2007. 
82 For the idea of multiple spatial and temporal subunits, see Brady and Collier 2004: 3 12- 13. 
83 Thailand is divided into 77 provinces (changwal), which are geographically grouped into 4 regions 
(north , northeast. central , and south). The country is subdivided into 877 districts (amp/we); the nwnber of 
districts in each province varies, from three in the sma llest provinces to fifty in Bangkok. Subordinate 
levels are tambon (sub-district) and finally, muban (vi llage). Each province is administered by a governor, 
who is appoi nted by the Ministry of lnterior. TI1e only exception is Bangkok, in whi ch the governor is 
direct ly elected by its population. 
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To find causal mechanisms that explain violence, however, we cannot study only violent 
provinces since a set of common factors that appear in violent cases might also appear in 
the peaceful cases. Such factors would not be crucial to explaining the phenomenon of 
electoral violence. What we need to do is to conduct a comparative study of peaceful and 
violent provinces and find out factors that appear in all violent cases but not in the 
peaceful case. To study only violence-prone provinces, we will miss the chance to find 
the critical factors that differentiate peaceful provinces from violent ones. My research 
design is inspired by Ashutosh Varshney' s study of ethnic riots in India, in which he 
studies six cities in India and divides them into three pairs. Each pair is comprised of one 
riot-prone and one peaceful city. His sub-national comparative research design allows 
him to identify the factors that appear in all peaceful cases but not in the violent ones. 84 
Similarly, but slightly modified, my research selects six provinces in Thailand and 
arranges them into two groups: three violence-prone provinces and three relatively 
peaceful. In each province, the methodological tool of process-tracing is applied to 
identify the mechanisms and processes that account for divergent outcomes (presence 
and absence of electoral violence). In-depth research was needed in each province 
because, though the large-number studies are helpful in suggesting general relationships 
that might exist between factors, it cannot help us tease out the mechanisms and 
processes by which violence occurs. Only in-depth case studies can give us the details of 
how electoral violence is organized and where the motivation CGmes from as well as 
who perpetrates violence under what circumstances, against whom, and in what 
sequence. 
The emphasis on the variance leads to an important methodological question of case 
selection. Which provinces should be selected? Information based on my data collection 
helped me identify the historical and spatial trends and thus map out the distribution of 
electoral violence across the country over the period of time. With this national-level 
picture, certain high-risk and low-risk .provinces could be identified, and therefore allow 
me to decide which provinces were to be selected as case studies. 85 The list is comprised 
of three provinces harboring chronic electoral violence (Nakhon Si Thanunarat, Nakhon 
Sawan, and Phrae) as well as three provinces that are relatively peaceful (Phetchaburi, 
84 Yarshney's finding is that interethnic civic life is a critical factor that differentiates peaceful cities from 
violent ones. All peaceful cities he studied had a strong civic engagement between Muslims and Hindus, 
while all the riot-prone cities either did not have strong interethnic engagement or merely had intra ' ethnic 
associations of Muslims and Hindus. See Varshney 2002. 
85 Data collection is discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
29 
Buriram, and Sa Kaeo) (see map). Each chosen province assumes distinct characteristics 
and represents a different trajectory of power contestation and violence. Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, according to the data, is the most violent province when it comes to 
elections. It is thus crucial to investigate what makes this large province, dominated by 
one political party and located in the south (the region that scholars usually describe as 
free of godfathers and corrupt electoral practices) the most notorious spot. Nakhon 
Sawan is a not a poor province as it is a hub of commercial trade connecting the central 
and northern regions and a center of the Thai-Chinese community, and the province has 
never been perceived as violence-prone. The data shows otherwise; Nakhon Sawan is 
one of the most high-risk provinces for violent elections. The fragmented power 
structure of the province, I argue, is the key. Phrae, is the most violence-prone province 
in the north. Unlike Nakhon Si Thammarat, the province is fairly small both in terms of 
size of population and area; and its level of economic development is lower than Nakhon 
Sawan. The distinctive feature of Phrae lies in its polarized political structure, witnessing 
long-standing fierce rivalries between two camps of bosses. 
As for the relatively peaceful provinces, three were chosen with controlled variables in 
mind. All three provinces are well-known as hubs of hired gunmen and forceful, 
ambitious godfathers-especially Phetchaburi, the "gunmen capital. " The abundant 
coercive resources do not, however, render these areas prone to violent elections. 
Furthermore, the three provinces have different population sizes (which mean different 
numbers of allocated MP seats) and levels of economic development. Phetchaburi is a 
rather small province like Phrae, Sa Kaeo is a medium-sized province not different from 
Nakhon Sawan, while Buriram shares an equal number of MP seats as Nakhon Si 
Thammarat. Size is therefore not a detennining factor of electoral vio lence. What really 
matters are the degree of power monopoly and the economic bases of provincial elites 
engaged in elections. All vio lent case study provinces share a common attribute: they 
witness an absence of a power monopoly and boss-type politicians competing with each 
other for do1nination. In all peaceful provinces, by contrast, political bosses monopolize 
power or there are no inter-boss struggles. In other words, bosses compete not with other 
bosses but rather with their own family members, with professional, non-boss 
candidates, or with leaders of mass movements. 
My study of six provinces, while not representative of Thailand as a who le, nonetheless 
represents all Thai regions (Phetchaburi and Nakhon Sawan from Central Thailand, 
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Buriram and Sa Kaeo from the Northeast, Phrae from the North, and Nakhon Si 
Thammarat from the South) . Each case represents different socio-economic conditions, 
cultural settings, and political environments of provincial politics in Thailand. 
Collectively, they illuminate the dynamics of political contestation and violence in other 
provinces throughout the country. Comparing each of them across the broad typology 
allows extrapolation to similar experiences in other provinces unexamined in this 
research. Overall, my subnational research design overcomes the chronic problem of 
scholarly work on electoral politics in contemporary Thailand, which is overwhelmingly 
dominated by single-case (one village, sub-district, district, or province) studies.86 
Scholars tend to extrapolate from their specific case 's findings without making reference 
to possible variations existing in other localities. In fact , the absence of comparative 
studies certainly limits their analytical ability to make a generalization. 
Until now, there has been no database on election-related violence in Thailand. Also 
absent is a large-N cross-national data set on election-related violence for scholars to 
use. Official electoral administrative bodies as well as non-governmental organizations 
working on election observation and monitoring have never collected data on violent 
incidents in election campaigns. I have created a database for my study, which will 
benefit other scholars in the future. The national-data set of the temporal and 
geographical variation of electoral violence is based on primary .sources, in particular 
careful examination of major daily newspapers. Methodologically speaking, in a country 
that lacks a systematic and reliable national database, it is not uncommon to use 
newspaper reports as a main source to record patterns ofviolence. 87 The reading of the 
newspapers covered fourteen national elections (1975-2011) and, in each election, both 
the pre- and post-election periods (from the day after the dissolution of the House to one 
month after election day). I cover the one-month period after the vote as many Thai 
candidates carry out violence after elections. These incidents are classified as election-
related violence on two conditions. Fir.st, it has to be physical violence against persons m 
property (i.e. house, office, party headquarter, polling station, ballot box, and campaign 
vehicle), including threats and intimidation but excluding the countless verbal attacks 
made in Thai election campaigns. I also exclude campaign poster and billboard 
86 See, for instance, Arghiros 2001 (Ayutthaya); Nishizaki 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 (Suphanburi); 
Somrudee 1991 (Khon Kaen) ; Ueda 2000 (Nakhon Ratchasima); Hewison and Maniemai 2000 (Khon 
Kaen); Fishel 2001 (Phetchaburi); Chaiyon and Olam 2008 (Rayong); Viengrat 2008 (Chiang Mai); 
Walker 2012 (Chiang Mai). 
87 See, for instance, the discussion of the methods used in the case of Jndonesia in Barron and Sharpe 
2005. 
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vandalism for similar reasons. Second, it has to be a violent act targeting electoral 
stakeholders. In Thailand, government officials dismiss all violent incidents occurring 
during elections as non-election related (i.e. personal or business conflict) as they do not 
want to be involved in heated political conflict among politicians and lose their jobs. 
According to the officials, the occurrence of election violence is, therefore, always very 
low. This creates the problem of systematic bias of data. In this research, I include all 
violent incidents aimed at election-related actors during the election campaign as 
electoral violence as it is untenable to separate out business and political conflicts-they 
are closely connected. I exclude the incident only when the report (and subsequent 
investigation) indicates it is purely personal, such as a.vote canvasser being murdered by 
his wife because of his adultery. The number of violent incidents present in my database 
is thus higher than the number given by security officers, but for all the reasons noted 
above I am confident that my data, based on systematic reading of newspapers, presents 
a much better picture of realities on the ground.88 
Newspaper archives in Thai libraries are not complete (especially prior to 1997), so I 
relied on var ious supplementary sources. 89 For the 1975 and 1976 elections, I collected 
data from Thai Rath and Prachachat Daily; from 1983 to 1996, I relied mainly on Thai 
Rath and Matichon; and after 1997, the data is compiled from Thai Rath, Matichon, 
Daily News, Khao Sod, and Krungthep Thurakij. These newspapers are my primary 
sources as they are among the best-selling and most influential daily newspapers in 
Thailand. They also have credible staff investigating criminal cases and election 
campaigns. I admit that my national database created from newspapers is not perfect. 
Some violent incidents might no t have been reported ; the quality of journalists of each 
newspaper (in each period) differs, having the potential to create bias in the dataset; and 
so me elections might have received more thorough investigative reporting than others. 
But under exist ing circumstances, we have no better alternative. To prevent the bias, I 
read and codified the data as meticulously as possible. Also, there is strong reason to 
argue that certain biases do not exist or, if they do, do not significantly distort the real 
situation. Murders and po litical crimes are gripping stories that sell in Thailand (and 
88 For example, in the Jul y 20 11 electi on, pol ice officers sa id there were onl y 3 dea ths resultin g from 
electoral competiti on, whil e my data coll ection indicate 14 casualties (see Chapter 4). 
89 Most daily newspapers in Thailand do not provide on line access to th eir old printed versions, and only a 
few libraries have old newspapers accessible to resea rchers. In this resear ch, I conducted documen tary and 
archi va l resea rch in tl1 e Thai Nati onal Archives, the Thai Nationa l Library, and the librari es of 
Chulalongkom and 17,amrn asa t Universities. 
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arguably everywhere), therefore there is little or no reason for major newspapers not to 
report them. And, after all, national elections are key events in Thai society. Even so, to 
cross check, my reading of newspapers is complemented by additional data from reports 
appearing in weekly and monthly magazines and from information available through the 
Ministry oflnterior, the Royal Thai Police Department, local police statfons, the Election 
Commission of Thailand, the People Network for Election in Thailand (PNET), and the 
Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). 
In order to gain a deep understanding of local power dynamics, I conducted eighteen 
months of field research in six provinces of Thailand. At the provincial level, my 
research is based on the following sources of data: I) documentary research for accounts 
of national and local elections in each province; 2) a reading of local newspapers to 
determine the timing, perpetrators, targets, and patterns of political violence; and, most 
importantly, 3) purposive and focused interviews with the key local informants, 
including politicians and their vote canvassers, gunmen and their agents, staff members 
of political parties, leading businessmen, family members of political murder victims, 
local election commissioners, local journalists, NGOs, and police. Besides provincial-
based actors, my interviews included a number of key informants in Bangkok, notably 
government officials of the Ministry of the Interior, national electoral commissioners, 
senior police, journalists, party leaders and strategists, retired hit men, and prominent 
figures in the underworld. Because of the sensitive nature of the topics discussed, most 
informants agreed to interview on condition of anonymity. Therefore I do not reveal 
their names and exact positions in the references; the information I provide is general 
occupation or line of work of the interviewees, and dates and places of the interviews. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into five major parts. Part I contains this introductory chapter, 
which lays out the significance of the study, theoretical and conceptual frameworks, 
methodology and thesis outline. Part II is comprised of three chapters dealing with the 
historical development of electoral violence in Thailand. Chapter 2 discusses the period 
1932-1976 and elaborates the broad historical change in Thai political and economic 
structure and the evolving significance of electoral institutions prior to the 1980s. It 
explains the absence of electoral violence from the 1932 revolution to the 1973 student 
uprising-the period in which Thai society was ruled under authoritarian regimes with 
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patrimonial administrative state structures. Then the chapter explains the changing 
institutional settings and new patterns of political conflict after 1973 and identifies the 
causes and mechanisms that led to the emergence of state-directed electoral vio lence in 
the 1975 and 1976 elections. 
In Chapter 3, which focuses on the period 1976-1 996, I discuss the revival of the 
parliamentary system and electoral institutions that brought with it the privatization of 
electoral killings: frequent assassinations of Members of Parliament, provincial bosses 
and vote canvassers by hired gunmen. It outlines the essential structure of national and 
local economies and po litics, and the linkages between patrimonial oligarchic rules, 
illegal and rent-seeking local economies, polit ical boss domination, and electoral 
violence. T hen it details the emergence of the supply and demand of electoral vio lence : 
the lucrative business of hired killings and the rise of provincial bosses. Chapter 4 
provides data and analysis of the patterns and character of electoral vio lence from 1979 
to 1996 with the explanation regarding the main actors, vio lent methods and timing of 
violence. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the phenomenon of the rise of elect ion-related violence brought 
about by a combination of factors in the 2001 and 2005 elections, and the decrease of 
violence in the 2007 and 201 1 electoral competit ions. As for explanatory causes and 
mechanisms, I examine the effects of the 1997 economic crisis, the new rules of the 
game set by the 1997 const itution, the decentralization process, the rise of the Thai Rak 
Thai Party and Thaksin Shinawatra, the 2006 coup, the emergence of ideo logical 
politics, and the changing ro les and status of provincial elites and their effects on 
electoral politics and violence. Chapter 6 provides data and analysis of the patterns and 
character of electoral violence from 1997 to 201 1, with the explanation of changing 
trends and level of electoral vio lence witnessed in this turbu lent period. 
Following Part Il ' s discussion of historica l development, Part s III focuses on the 
geographical dimensions of electoral violence. It discusses three vio lence-prone 
provinces in comparison with the three relatively peaceful ones. Chapter 7 examines the 
northern province of Phrae-a polarized power landscape----which suffers from violent 
struggles between two groups of formidable bosses competing for the contro l of the 
local economy and politics. Chapter 8 studies Nakhon Sawan, the most dangerous 
province in the central region, whose election campaigns are always tainted with 
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coercive tactics used by multiple groups to achieve dominance in the power-fragmented 
territory. Chapter 9 investigates the country's most violence-prone province Nakhon Si 
Thammarat. The analysis demonstrates that this southern province contains all the 
elements that make one province conducive to violent voting: the highly fragmented 
power terrain; rampant illegal, natural resource extraction; rent-seeking activities; and 
the active involvement oflocal bosses in electoral processe_s. 
Chapter 10 examines why Phetchaburi, the notorious hub of gunmen and jao pho, 
interspersed with smuggling and drug trafficking routes, has managed to have 
remarkably peaceful elections for the past three decades. Despite the province harboring 
plenty of hit men, the (hidden) monopolistic control of one large clan that took over in 
the mid 1980s explains the absence of bloodshed. From the mid 1980s to 2011, electoral 
contests in Phetchaburi were essentially intra-clan political wrangles in which 
compromise, lobbies, and negotiation created election results, not bullets and bloodshed. 
Therefore Phetchaburi is a prime example in which the geography of supply and demand 
of violence do not necessary overlap. Chapter 11 discusses a challenging case, Buriram, 
which has turned from a ferocious, violence-prone province to a peaceful one in the 
space of a decade. From the late 1980s to the early 2000s, Buriram's electoral 
competitions were violent in line with several other provinces in which a prominent 
political family attempted to monopolize provincial politics only- to be confronted by 
business rivals. When the family prevailed, the province became peaceful. However, a 
puzzle arose in 2007 and 2011 when a clan's monopoly was critically challenged but 
elections were peaceful. I argue that since 2006 the emergence of ideological politics 
paved the way for peaceful elections in Buriram. Ideological contest has broken the 
violent cycle of personal vendettas and channeled election campaigns toward political 
ideas and platforms. Chapter 12 investigates Sa Kaeo , one of the country' s most 
peaceful provinces, which exemplifies how powe~ monopolies determine orderly 
elections. The monopolized power structure is a fundamental condition overriding other 
potentially violent factors, namely a frontier geography, an illicit economy, and the 
direct involvement of bosses in elections. 
The conclusion summarizes all arguments and findings. In addition, it discusses the 
implications of my study for the conceptual and theoretical developments in the field of 
electoral violence and local political studies, and how the case of Thailand can 
contribute to cross-national comparative analysis. Finally it shows how subnational 
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comparative research sheds new light on the understanding of the Thai state, electoral 
politics, and patterns of wealth and power accumul ation. 
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Part II: Historical Development 
Chapter 2 
Authoritarian regimes and democratic transition: 
State non-electoral and electoral violence, 1932-76 
To comprehend rising electoral violence and political developments across the past three 
decades, a broad understanding of political vio lence in Thai polity from 1932-76 is 
instructive. After the administrative reforms of King Chulalongkom, Rama V, in the late 
19th century, the Thai state gradually succeeded in centralizing political administration 
and monopolizing the use of force through _the introduction of the modem army. The 
1932 People Party revolution which overthrew the absolute monarchy was a radical 
regime change, bringing to Thai society a constitutional democracy. The post-revolution 
regimes, however, inherited a centralized, patrimonial state structure. The state 's control 
of the means of coercion was a legacy of the previous state structure. Intra-elite conflict 
between rival ideological factions dominated the Thai polity from 1932-47, and factions 
used the state apparatus to eliminate opposition. After 1947, the military became the 
predominant political force through over a quarter century of -military authoritarian 
regimes. Under military-led governments, state security personnel perpetrated violence 
against dissidents, students, farmers, labor union leaders, communist suspects, and 
progressive politicians. This military era saw the most intense period of state-sponsored 
murders. The 1973 student-led uprising toppled the military government and ushered in a 
democratic transition. The fledging democratic period lasted for only three years before 
royal-military elites and right-wing groups crushed the student-farmer-labor movements 
in the 1976 massacre, ending the short period of democratic exuberance. 
From 1933-73 , Thailand held nine general elections. All electoral contests were peaceful, 
not because governments provided effective security, but because there was no genuine 
competition. The governments controlled electoral processes and manipulated outcomes 
through the state apparatus. The lack of competition also stemmed from the fact that 
elections were not the primary mechanisms for assuming power in Thailand prior to 
1973. Elite factions instead used military coups to control state power. Once in control, 
they conducted elections merely as political rituals to legitimize their administration . 
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After the 1973 revolution, elections gained increasing significance and thus became 
venues of intense competition, mainly between left-wing and right-wing groups, resulting 
in vio lent campaigns. This was most apparent in the 1975 and 1976 elections when deep 
political polarization and confrontation between progressive and conservative movements 
contributed to the eruption of electoral violence. The pattern and character of electoral 
vio lence observed in 1975 and 1976 were different from those of later elections when 
ideological battles were replaced by fighting among po liticians for patronage and 
government spoils. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts: the first part explains the absence of electoral 
violence in the 1932-73 period; the second part describes the context and mechanisms 
that led to electoral vio lence in 1975 and 1976. 
Thailand's authoritarian regimes, state crimes and electoral manipulation, 1932-
1973 
Authoritarian regimes and state violence 
The first quarter of a century after the 1932 revolut ion saw a crucial transition in Thai 
po litics, from the authoritarian constitutionalism of People's Party rule (1932-47) to 
military abso lutism under field marshals Sarit Thanarat and Thanom K.ittikachom (1958-
73). Great political instability and violence marked this period, with serious conflict 
among individuals, groups, and ideological factions. 1 Vio lent conflict engulfed this 25 
year period, with erupt ions between elements of the People 's Party, the royalist clique, 
and their main followers. Popular methods employed by the elites to el iminate their 
political enemies were assassination and forced disappearance. Perpetrators typically 
were men in uniform associated with ruling elites. The prime example of this mode of 
violent conflict was the antagonism between police chief Phao Sriyanond and anny 
general Sarit Thanarat in the 1950s, in wh ich both sides used uniformed "muscle" to 
sabotage each other. At times during the 1950s, rulers used state violence to target so me 
progressive intellectuals, politicians, journalists, and religious minority leaders perceived 
as tlu·eats to the regime. 2 
1 Kasian 200 I: 76. 
2 On poli tics in the 1940s and the 1950s, see Thak 1979; Ka sian 200 1; Sutachai 1991 ; Anderson 1990. 
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After the 1947 coup, the Phibun government perpetrated many "dirty tactics" against the 
opposition forces-notably the socialists and progressive-minded politicians affiliated 
with Pridi's faction. Police chief Phao established the infamous, covert force called the 
"Knights of the Diamond Ring" spearheaded by security personnel. These "Knights" 
abused state power to threaten, detain, kidnap, and murder many political enemies in a 
secretive, brutal manner. The most notorious case was the killing of four former cabinet 
members serving under the Pridi-supported administration in 1949. The four victims 
were prominent MPs from the northeast, known as long-standing fighters for democracy 
and the interests of impoverished rural people: Thongin Phuriphat, Ubon Ratchathani 
MP; Thawin Udon, Roi Et MP; Chamlong Daoruang, Maha Sarakham MP; and 
Thongpleo Chonlaphum, Prachinburi MP. In February-March 1949, police arrested the 
four MPs, accusing them of plotting to overthrow the government. On 4 March 1949, 
while in custody and being transferred to prison, they were shot dead by a _ group of 
policemen who accompanied their transfer. The government made a press conference 
concocting a story that Southern Malay-Muslim separatists ambushed the government 
vehicles and killed those four assemblymen. Nobody believed the government's 
statement, but state-sponsored spectacular violence effectively terrorized the general 
public and government opposition. Apart from this shooting, throughout the Phibun-
Phao regime, the Knights of the Diamond Ring carried out several other extrajudicial 
killings eliminating government threats. 3 
State crime reached its heyday during the Sarit-Thanom dictatorship, in which the 
military government employed both covert and overt violence against non-elite 
dissidents. In contrast to the previous era, the structure of power in this period of rapid 
economic development was a narrower and unified oligarchy. The military took 
dominant control by eliminating other group of elites, and Sarit legitimized his 
patrimonial rule with his revival and sacralization of the Monarchy. The Sarit regime 
went further than previous rulers by legalizing its arbitrary use of state violence through 
the constitution. State-sponsored violence targeting citizens classified as "enemies of the 
state" replaced intra-elite violent competitions. From 1965 onward, the Thanom regime 
mounted a counterinsurgency operation against the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). 
The number of clashes between communist insurgents and government forces rose from 
3 Phao recruited the rogue police officers into the secret unit and gave them the signature ring, leading to 
the name "the Knights of the Diamond Ring." On Phao and his secret police, see Phut 1981; Chit 1960; 
Chaiyong 1980; Chumsai 1995; Chitphon 1996. On four ministers' murders, see Anan 1974; Chamvit and 
Tbamrongsak 2001. 
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around one per day in the late I 960s to a peak of around three per day in 1977. 4 In the 
early years of the state's counter insurgency campaigns, the state apparatus committed 
most of the violence. But as the conflict deepened and widened, the Thai state created 
paramilitary groups to help fight communist insurgents. Rural vigilantes, village toughs, 
and moonlighting security personnel fo rmed these paramilitary forces. The Thai state 
used militias throughout the counterinsurgency campaign until the c01mnunist threat 
faded in the mid 1980s. 5 In general, the literature suggests that the prevalence of 
vigilante violence reflects the state 's weakness. However, the evidence from Thailand 
demonstrates that militia vio lence can arise out of state rulers ' political and logistical 
support.6 Motivated by a desire for plausible deniability, the Thai state resorted to 
paramilitary groups. Under the counterinsurgency wars, hundreds of local civilians 
suspected of communist sympathies were killed by the state security apparatus and 
paramilitary forces. The two most notorious cases were the Red Drum slayings (1971-
72) in which local peasants in Patthalung province, most still alive, were incinerated by 
the security forces in gasoline-filled, used oil drums; and the Ban Na Sai affair (1974) in 
which the whole village was burned to the ground, and many of the villagers smmnarily 
executed.7 
Administrative patrimonial states, electoral authoritarianism, and electoral 
manipulation 
Writing in the 1960s, major scholars characterized Thailand ' s post-1932 political 
structure as a "bureaucratic po lity," in which power exclusively resided and was 
contested within the bureaucracy.8 Comparatively speaking, Thailand 's bureaucratic 
po lity, witnessed in the pre-1 973 period, had many parallel with other countries 
class ified as "patrimonial administrative states"- denoting political systems in which 
4 By the mid- 1970s, it was esti mated th ere were some 8,000 arm ed guerrill as, 4 12 villages completely 
under CPT control, and 6,000 villages with a tota l populati on of 4 milli on under some degree of CPT 
influence. By 1976, the government estinrnted tl1at 2,173 guerrillas and 2,642 government troops had died 
in 3,992 clashes. When tl1e civil war ended in l 983, the death toll on botl1 sides had risen to over I 0,000 
(Kanok l 983; Chai-anan et al. l 990: 63-64; Saiyud 1986). 
5 It is important to note tl1at the United States-tl1e most powerful all y of Thai governm ent during the 
Cold War- p layed a cru cia l role in Tha i coun ter insurgency opera tions. The use of rura l th ugs as milit ias 
was imported and influenced by Ameri can coun ter insurgency program in Vietnam. Rura l peop le were 
recui ted and paid to be sp ies and executioners and undertook oth er tasks directed by state officials. Al so, 
the 0ux of firearm s result ing from Ameri can aid to the Tirni mil itary and police, as well as to the 
American "secret war" in Laos, intensifi ed th e leve l of violence in rural areas (Anderson 1990: 33-42). 
6 This is similar to what Geoffrey Robinson (20 10: 76-77) found in Indonesia, where civilian militia and 
paramil itary receive encouragement from sta te authorities to opera te. For li tera ture on tl1e connection 
between parami litary and state violence, see Sluka 1999; Corradi , Fagan , and Garreton 1992 . 
7 Ma ll et 1978; Haberkorn 20 11 ; Ju larat 2007. 
8 See classic works of Riggs 1966 and Siffi n 1966. 
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the bureaucratic elite or "political aristocracy" is the predominant social force and 
countervailing forces from civil society are weak. 9 Under authoritarian regimes, 
bureaucratic elites enrich themselves by plundering public resources and extracting rents 
from a weak business class. They monopolize and/or nationalize businesses and 
industries for personal gain. Moreover, they use political influence to protect their 
profitable illegal enterprises (gambling, drugs, and natural resource exploitation etc). 
Businessmen who aspire to secure governrnent contracts and business licenses need to 
establish close connections with bureaucratic elites, particularly military generals, and 
appoint them to the company board or pay them bribes. 10 
Under patrimonial administrative states, electoral competition has no real significance 
because elective posts have limited power and privilege. First of all, bureaucratic elites 
circumscribe the scope and jurisdiction of elective office. They allow voters to fill the 
House with elected MPs, but keep the administrative center of power away from 
people's representatives. Before 1973, no constitution required that the prime minister or 
cabinet members be elected. Moreover, most constitutions allowed bureaucrats to 
assume cabinet positions while retaining their official posts. Therefore, Thai cabinets in 
the period 1932-73 were dominated by leading civil servants and military officers, as 
well as technocrats. 11 Elected constituency MPs and businessmen rarely took up 
administrative posts (a situation that changed dramatically in the late 1970s, as the next 
chapter explains). Through this strategy of cutting representatives from the decision-
making process, bureaucratic leaders walled off the policy arena from democratic 
interference. They also curbed elected politicians' legislative power by filling half of the 
assembly with appointed MPs, who had equal authority as their elected counterparts (as 
in the 1932 and 1952 constitutions), and by establishing the senate fully appointed by the 
prime minister (as in the 1947 and 1949 constitutions). Governrnent rulers appointed 
assemblymen and senators from their personal networks, strengthening their regime with 
loyal friends and supporters. 12 In the pre-1973 period, elected MPs thus acquired no real 
power in either administrative or legislative domains. Consequently, the emasculated 
9 The term "patrimonial administrative state" comes from Thomas Callaghy's work on Zaire (Callaghy 
1984, chapter 1). The term was borrowed and further developed by Hutchcroft (1998: 46) to describe the 
Thai state before 1973 and Indonesian state during Suhaiio's New Order regime. 
'
0 On Thai political economy from 1932-1973, see Suehiro 1989; Hewison 1989; and Sungsidh 1983. 
11 Only the 1946 and 1949 constitutions stipulated that cabinet members cannot simultaneously assume 
bureaucratic posts. These two constitutions were, however, short lived, and, in practice, all prime ministers 
still recruited their ministries from the rank of civil service. On occupational distribution of Thai cabinets 
from 1932-1973, see Rangsan 1988. 
12 Only the 1946 constitution requires the senate be indirectly elected, in which voters elect their electoral 
college who will respectively elect senators (Chaowana 2007: 119). 
41 
character of MP posts offered leading businessmen and provincial elites with little 
incentive to launch themselves into politics. Occupational backgrounds of elected MPs 
in the early period after 1932 were mainly retired civil servants, teachers, lawyers, 
writers and journalists or supporters of the People 's Party. 13 With almost nothing at 
stake, electoral competitions were unaggressive, orderly and peaceful, and, to a large 
extent, not exciting for stakeholders, including the candidates and their supporters. Voter 
turnout was very low, averaging 40% of eligible voters; the lowest level came in the 
1948 election with a turnout ofonly 29%. 14 
The real site of power contestation occurred in the bureaucracy, where elites fought for 
control of perks and privileges. The higher the position one can ascend to the state 
apparatus, the more manpower, budgets, and rents one can control. Thai ruling elites 
enhanced their power through the expansion of their organizations. Bureaucracies were 
thus large and constantly expanding. Extra-bureaucratic forces, on the contrary, were 
weak and diminished as state elites deliberately suppressed, emasculated or destroyed 
them. Election-related institutions were poorly-developed. Political party legislation, 
allowing rights and freedom of party association and legalizing party organizations, was 
not passed until 1955. Most political parties established during 1932-73 centered on and 
evolved around prominent political figures. Parties were ad hoc and short-lived 
organizations created to support certain individuals' political ambit ions in competition 
with their immediate rivals. No party had mass support, a clear vote base, or a well-
developed party branch and organization, and most disbanded immediately after their 
leader's demise. From 1932-47, staunch supporters of the People 's Party founded new 
political parties to protect the revolutionary agendas and solicit support for their faction 
leaders. The anti-revo lution groups, led by royalists and bureaucrats from the old 
regime, responded by creating parties to oppose and compete with the pro-revolutionary 
movement. The notable royalist party, the Democrat Party, founded in 1946 and led by 
Khuang Abhaiwongse and Kukrit Pramoj (( 191 1-1 985) was an attempt to undermine the 
popularity and power of Pridi Banomyong (1900-1983), the People 's Party 's lead er. 15 
13 See a full-li st of elected MPs in each province from 1932-57 in Departm ent of Provincial 
Administra tion, Interior Ministry, volume I and 2, 1957. Chapter 7 on Nakh on Si Thammarat , and 
Chap ter 8 on Phetchaburi provide detail ed profil es of th ese MPs. 
14 The average percentage is calculated from information in Department of Provincial Admini strati on, 
Interior Ministry, volume I , 1957: 7-8. Voter turn out rose to 50-70 percent in tl1e I 980s-90s. 
15 The Democrat Party developed from th e Kaona (Progress) Party founded in 1945 by Kukrit Pramoj. 
Kukrit was one of Thailand ' s most influenti al royali st thinker and politicians. He was a great -grandson of 
King Rama II. He played many di fferent rol es tliroughout hi s colorful caf'eer, including foundin g Siam 
Rath newspaper ( 1950), becomin g Speaker of th e House (1973-1974), foundin g th e Social Action Party 
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After the 1947 coup, the influence of the People's Party declined and some of their 
leading members were forced to live in exile. Power struggles shifted to rivalries among 
the three major state leaders: prime minister Field Marshall Phibun, police chief Phao , 
and army general Sarit. They established political parties to attack their enemies. Phibun 
and Phao founded the Serimanangkasila Party in 1955, in preparation for the 1957 
general election, mobilizing extensive government resources to back party activities. 
Several cabinet members and leading bureaucrats, including Army-Navy-Air force 
commanders, joined the party as committee members, and the middle- and lower rank 
officials acted as party staff. The separation between state and political party was 
completely blurred. Media commentators and voters in the 1950s, correctly, called the 
Serimanangkasila Party the "government" party. 16 Sari! was officially the deputy head of 
this government-backed party, but he also created his own party called Sahaphum to 
tacitly sabotage Phibun and Phao. Like their enemies, Sarit mobilized the state 
machinery to endorse his party. Later in the 1960s, rulers such as Thanom K.ittikhachon 
and Praphat Charusathian adopted the Serimanangkasila-model, creating the 
government-sponsored Sahaprachathai to legitimize their authoritarian rule. 17 
Over a long period from 1932 to 1973 ( except for the brief post-war years 1945-47), the 
Thai patrimonial administrative state oscillated between closed authoritarianism and 
electoral authoritarianism/autocracy. 18 Under closed authoritarianism (Phibun 
government, 1938-45, Sarit government 1958-63, and Thanom government 1963-69, 
1971 -73), military rulers severely restricted civil liberties and prohibited all democratic 
institutions. Dictatorial leaders showed no attempt to legitimize their governing through 
popular support. They did not invest in holding elections, even sham ones. Apart from 
these full autocratic regimes, the other governments in the pre- 1973 era fell into the 
regime type classified as "electoral authoritarianism," the regime that neither practiced 
liberal democracy nor operated as a full-blown authoritarianism. Electoral authoritarian 
leaders allow limited space for political participation and competition through electoral 
(1974), and being prime minister from 1975-76 (see next chapter for further deta il s on his roles and the 
Social Action Party) . For historical background and early development of the Democra t Party and other 
parties associated with th e People's Party leaders, see Murash im a, Nakharin, and Som ki at 1991 ; Yut 1974; 
Noranit I 987. 
16 Singhakhom 1969: 292-293. 
17 ln formation on Sabaprachathai Party is based on Montri et al 1969: 1-48; Chaowat 1974: 264-66. 
18 From 1945-47, Pridi ' s civi lian faction dominated the adm in istration and assembly. Pridi and hi s 
supporters passed the 1946 constitution, regarded as one of th e most dem ocrati c constitutions in Thai 
hi story, eliminating th e appointed MP. A brief democratic interlude ended in November 1947 when the 
army staged a coup and toppled the Pridi-backed government. 
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processes. By holding periodic elections, scholars explained, the rulers " try to obtain at 
least a semblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal 
actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls 
they try to cement their continued hold on power," and their ultimate goal is to "reap the 
fruits of electoral legitimacy without running the risks of democratic uncertainty." 19 If, 
by definition, democracy is a system in which power can at least alternate between 
opposing parties, electoral authoritarianism is a system in which ruling parties almost 
always win elections and opposition parties almost always lose. 
In a nutshell, scholars conclude, electoral institutions and processes occurring under 
electoral authoritarian regimes are "little more than a theatrical setting for the self-
representation and self-reproduction of power."20 In general, ruling elites around the 
world have various tools (legal and illegal) to ensure their victory and deprive voters of 
genuine electoral choices. Thailand 's authoritarian rulers were no less imaginative than 
their counterparts when it came to electoral manipulation. The control mechanisms 
available for autocrats to stage non-democratic elections include excluding opposition 
candidates from the electoral arena, restricting access to information and resources, 
disenfranchising some groups of voters, and committing electoral fraud. 2 1 
Evidence from the 1957 and 1969 elections provides an informative account of these 
manipulative techniques. The February 1957 election, known as Kanlueaktang 
Sokkaprok (the dirty election), was regarded as the most corrupt and non-democratic 
vote in Thai history. 22 This election was held when Premier Phibun wanted to enhance 
the legitimacy of his long-standing rule both domestically and internationall y 
(particularly with the U.S.). Also, Phibun expected the democratic credentials gained 
fro m the election would give him greater leverage over other elite factions. To make the 
election appear legitimate, the Phibun government allowed some competition. Before the 
election, moderate and co nservative politicians gathered their small gro ups of supporters 
to fo nn the part ies to stand in this election, including the revived Democrat Party led by 
19 Sched ler 2002: 36-37. Electoral authoritarian ism is a conceptual term scholars used to describe hybrid 
regime tha t fall short of either closed auth oritari anism or full democracy. For more conceptual and 
empirical discussion regarding electora l au th oritarianism, see Levitsky and Way 20 10; Brownlee 2007 ; 
Snyder 2006: Mun ck 2006; Case 2010 (on Southeast Asia) ; Carrion 2006 (on Peru). 
20 Schedler 2002: 36-37. And see Przeworski 1991 for defi ni tion of democracy. 
21 Schedler (2002: 36-50) provides a list of electoral mani pul ations aggregated from around the world. 
Case (2006: 95-1 12) offers releva nt discussion on Southeast As ian experience. 
22 Foll owing accounts of th e February l 957 election are drawn from Chongkon 1974; Sin ghakh om 1968; 
Kriengsak 1974; Chumsa i 1995; Ch itphon 1996; Thongchai 1974; Department of Provincial 
Adminisrration , Interior Minisrry, volumes I and 2, 1957. 
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royalists. The progressive or left-leaning parties played no role in the competition. 
Through a series of state assassinations, government rulers virtually excluded the 
involvement of progressive and leftwing politicians in the electoral arena long before the 
election campaign started. 
The exclusion of formidable candidates was merely one component of the government 's 
plan to control elections. To ensure a decisive victory, government leaders mobilized 
state networks to support government-backed Serimanangkasila candidates, competing 
with 22 other parties for 160 MP seats. Shortly before the House dissolution, 
government dispensed largesse (over a hundred million baht) for building infrastructure 
and provided goods to people in opposition-strong provinces. Government leaders 
campaigned for their provincial party members using public money. The most notorious 
case was general Phao, who assumed multiple roles as secretary of the Serimanangkasila 
Party, the chief of police, and the deputy minister of Interior, and through the latter 
capacity had the official duty of administering the election. Phao made several trips 
northeast with his large police entourage, claiming to oversee polling preparation, but in 
fact campaigning for the government party. Leading bureaucrats, especially those from 
the Interior ministry ordered local officers- kamnan, village headmen, district chiefs, 
and provincial governors- to canvass votes for the Serimanangkasila Party. Civil 
servants became the government's so-called "Huana Nuai Khum Siang" (chief vote 
controllers)23. These local officers were responsible for gathering local residents for a 
meeting and instructing them to vote for the government-supported party, with the main 
slogan "Our country will develop if you elect Serimanangkasila Party."24 The education 
minister ordered local schools to cancel teaching, asking teachers and students to 
campaign for government candidates. The government also told municipal workers to 
get rid of the opposition 's campaign billboards and posters. Government-controlled 
television and radio stations allocated a large amount of airtime for Serirnanangkasila 
campaign advertisements, whereas officials restricted opposition parties ' access to 
public channels. 
23 In Thai studies literature, the most common word for vote broker who gather votes for candidates during 
the campaign is vote canvasser which translates from Thai word hua khanaen. However, as far as the 
historical evidence shows, hua khanaen was not a popular word until the I 969 election. Before 1969, 
commentators used a few terms interchangeably, and Huana Nuai Khum Siang was one of them. 
24 Chumsai 1995: 124-125, 130; Kriengsak 1974: 102-21. 
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When their nonnal campaign was deemed insufficient, the government deployed police 
and so ldiers to intimidate voters. They coerced opposing candidates to withdraw from 
competition and/or stop campaigning. Some journalists were also government targets. 
Under certain circumstances, security personnel so licited help from nakleng and 
anthaphan (local tough guys and hooligans) as officials knew these local toughs were 
able to command fear and respect. Government leaders hired local toughs and issued the 
Serirnanangkasila Party's membership cards to those who electioneered for government 
party candidates. The card functioned as a "free-pass" ticket for hoodlums to carry out 
illegal activities- harassing government rivals and disrupting opposition party's 
electioneering- without being obstructed by the authorities.25 The co llusion between 
governmental authority and local gangsterism was by no means accidental; rather, it was 
an official electioneering strategy authorized by Phibun and Phao. From the very 
beginning, Phao organized meetings with national and local gangsters, asking members 
to support the Serirnanangkasila party. Media reported that the meeting was in effect a 
"surreal gathering of criminal s presided over by the police chief' ; attendees were 
prominent gangsters engaged in extortion, gambling, prostitution, smuggling, and the 
opium trade.26 In one government-sponsored banquet, Phao gave a long speech 
promising rewards for those who helped, and praising nakleng as people 
who are brave, being real men ... widely-connected, generous, highly 
respectable and trustwo1ihy among people," and, he further noted, 
"My political party supports nakleng because nakleng are good 
people .. J make friend s with everyone who votes for the 
Serimanangkasila Party. Unlike the police depa1iment system, my 
political pa.iiy does not exclude nakleng.27 
Local thugs assisted the government to weaken other pa.i·ties ' campaigns and controlled 
rural vo ters (for a detailed example, see the analyses of Phetchaburi in Chapter 10). Prior 
to I 973 , it was government rulers, not provincial bosses, who were patrons of loca l 
coercive forces, giving local thugs protection and patronage. Starting in the 1980s, the 
mode of relationship changed. Local thugs came to be more attracted to the enormous 
25 Singhakhom 1968: 98-99, 295-97; Chongkon 1974: 383-421; Thongchai 1974: 94. 
26 Thai weekly, February 1957: 32, quoted in Chumsa i 1974: 132 
27 Thai weekly, February 1957: 32, quoted in Chumsai 1974: 131- 132. 
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wealth and influence of provincial bosses and less enamored with government officials 
( see next chapter). 
Concerned that the pre-electoral schemes were not sufficient for victory, the government 
employed many dirty tactics on election day to distort the electorate 's preferences. 
Officials manipulated the electoral rolls, disenfranchising a large number of opposition 
supporters. False registrations abounded. In some villages, residents ' names were wiped 
from the list, and dead people ' s were added. 28 Local officers, with the help of hooligans, 
barred opposition supporters from going to polling stations. At the polling stations, 
officials allowed phon ram or "ghost voters" to cast ballots repeatedly for the 
Serimanangkasila party. They also heavily tampered with the ballots. Officials stuffed 
ballot boxes with ballot papers (called phai fai or ghost ballots) pre-filled out for the 
Seri.manangkasila Party. In some precincts, goons threatened those witnessing the 
government's ballot stuffing. Electoral fraud occurred most heavily in the vote counting 
process, where officials did not count votes for opposition candidates, but gave extra 
votes to government candidates. In some precincts, government poll officers 
intentionally turned off the lights to change the tallies. In Bangkok, where the opposition 
parties, particularly the Democrats, were very strong, vote counting was delayed for two 
days. With the early vote counted in 8 districts ( out of 13), tallies showed the Democrats 
leading the government candidates. But when the official results were announced, the 
Democrats won only 2 seats, while the Serimanangkasila candidates won the other 7 
seats. Phibun was the winner with the highest number of votes. Nationwide, the 
Serimanangkasila Party won decisively with 86 seats, more than half of the assembly. 
The Democrat Party, the runner-up, grabbed 30 seats and the rest were distributed 
between small parties. 29 
The government 's brazen electoral fraud led to student protests. On March 2, 1957, four 
days after Phibun 's party victory, Chulalongkorn, Thammasat, and Kasetsart students 
led a march, joined by Bangkok voters and opposition politicians, denouncing the 
government party and accusing it of rigging the results. The protesters called for a 
nullification of the election result and the holding of a new general election. The student-
led demonstration had the tacit support of Field Marshal Sarit, Phibun and Phao ' s 
28 Chumsai 1995: 133. 
29 Prasert 1974: 866; Department of Provincial Administration , Interior Mini stry, volume I , 1957: 147-
154. 
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political rival, who signaled to the students that he was on their side. The protest ended 
with the storming of Government House. Sari! managed to calm the situation, and after 
this incident the Phibun government 's legitimacy deteriorated sharply. Meanwhile, Sarit 
bui lt himself up as the people's hero. Students had become entangled in the power 
struggle between competing military figures in the Phibun government. Unintentionally, 
student groups helped weaken the Phibun-Phao faction and strengthen Sarit's authority. 
Eventually, using electoral fraud and civi l unrest as pretexts, Sarit and his fo llowers 
(Thanom and Praphat) staged a coup on September 16, 1957, toppling the Phibun 
government and introducing a strong-rule military absolutist regime. The students ' 
agenda had been hijacked by autocratic rulers. The Sarit administration (1958-63) 
revoked the constitution and ruled the country by military decrees, disso lving the 
assembly, banning all political parties, civic associations, and elections. 30 
After Sari! died, power passed to his political heir Thanom, who continued the military 
regime for ano ther decade with the support of the American government. As mentioned 
in the previous section, state-directed violence reached its peak during the Thanom era. 
The government used security forces in an excessive and arbitrary manner to crack down 
on anti-government activists. A large group of politicians and activists were imprisoned 
without charges and some were executed, and those who managed to escape were fo rced 
to go underground or into exile. Again, the Thai political system was cleansed ofradical, 
progressive gro ups. Therefore when Thanom ca lled for an election in 1969- under 
growing domestic and international pressure; having had no election for eleven years-
his Sahaprachathai Party (United Thai People's Party) faced no real challenge. The 
Sahaprachathai Party was a replication of the Serimanangkasi la Paiiy, and the 1969 
campaign was a rerun of the 1957 "dirty" election. Government electoral fraud and 
malpractice were pervasive as the government-backed Sahaprachathai Party won the 
election handily by using the same old tactics. The election went peacefully. Prior to the 
poll, students fro m fifteen universities and co lleges set up the student vo lunteer groups 
to observe the elections. Their vo luntary role in monitoring the election was praised by 
the media and general public, but created no impact on making the election free and fai r 
as the student organizations were still rather weak and inexperienced. Government 
officials intimidated students who tried to file complaints about voting irregularities. 31 
30 Thak I 979; Kasian 200 I; Sutachai 1991. On th e student movements ' roles in the 1950s, see Prajak 
20 I 2: 230-235. 
·
11 See the Student Volunteer Election Observation Group (1969) for full report on electoral malpracti ce in 
the 1969 election , and see Seksan ·s memoir ( 1988) for a first-hand account of intimidation faced by 
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Also, the Thanom administration had learnt a lesson from the 1957 election well enough 
to rig the vote more subtly this time. Military elites were unified and had dominant 
control over the system, therefore no post-election protests occurred. In the provincial 
areas, military regimes still received cooperation from local thugs. Nevertheless, in some 
provinces- such as Phetchaburi, Ratchaburi, Nakhon Sawan, Buriram, Chonburi, 
Nakhon Ratchasima, and Prachuap Khiri Khan- provincial business elites involved 
themselves more actively in the competition. Most ran under the government 's 
Sahaprachathai Party, reflecting good collaboration between state and local strongmen. 
Some of them were elected as first time MPs, with the support of state machinery.32 In 
the following elections, these local strongmen' s political and business fortunes enhanced 
rapidly to the point at which they were able to build their own political machine and win 
elections on their own (see next chapter) . 
In short, the absence of electoral violence in the early period of Thailand 's political 
struggle stemmed from two fundamental reasons. First, elective posts entailed no power, 
perks, or privileges worth fighting for. Second, there was no actual competition in 
electoral campaigns as authoritarian rulers suppressed opposition (both long before and 
during the campaign) and rigged the vote. Under autocratic control, electoral fraud was 
widespread, while electoral violence, non-existent.33 Political realities underwent major 
transformations after 1973 , with the increased significance of electoral institutions and 
extra-bureaucratic forces. 
Thailand 's democratic transition, political polarization, and state-sponsored 
electoral violence, 1973-1976 
The Thanom regime was brought to an end by the mass uprising led by students on 14 
October 1973. During the demonstration, so ldiers fired into the demonstrators, killing 77 
students. The student's election observati on group later evolved into the Student Volunteer Group of 
Thailand, which organized many kinds of activities, including summer work camps in rural areas, 
cultivating a sense of civic duty among participating students (Prajak 20 12: 235 -240). 
32 Well-known Phetcbaburi poli tical boss Piya Angkinan ran for national election for first time in this 
election under th e Sahaprachathai Party (Chapter 8) . In Nakhon Sawan and Buriram, the patriarchs of the 
Khamprakop and Chidchob famili es also competed in the competition (Chapters 6 and 9). 
33 It was not a coincidence that the one and on ly reported election-related violent incident in the pre-1973 
peri od occurred in the August 1946 election, held under the most democratic environment under the Pridi 
government. In this election, a Democrat candidate for Bangkok MP, Tha -nga i Suwannatbat, was attacked 
by grenade while be was campaigning on the stage. The assault injured a few people, killed one, and made 
Tha-ngai lose one of his legs (S ingbakhom 1968: 49-50). 
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and wounding 857.34 The intervention of the king on the side of certain military elites 
(Thanom's rivals) and students, plus the persistence of the protestors even after initial 
killings, rendered military suppression ineffective. 35 The 1973 uprising ushered in a 
highly unstable interim peripd of civilian democracy. Under the governments (October 
1973 to February 1975) of prime minister Sanya Thammasak, a royalist judge, the 
country witnessed greater political participation than in any other period before or since. 
During this period, press censorship virtually disappeared to the delight of editors, 
newsmen, and readers; the democratic 1974 constitution was promulgated, creating the 
more open political environment; trade unions were rapidly formed , pressing a host of 
demands through strikes and marches; peasant organizations were created to urge land 
reforms; and even high-school children demanded the expulsion of hated principals. 
Several left-leaning and socialist parties were established to compete in the general 
elections. 36 
After their success in toppling the authoritarian regime, the student movement 
maintained pressure on the new civilian government to sustain constitutional democracy, 
and it also fonned an alliance with peasants and workers to fight for social and economic 
justice. This progressive alliance threatened the traditional beliefs, economic interests, 
and political power of the privileged class, including army and bureaucrat leaders, 
business tycoons, rural landlords, and roya lists . 37 The ruling cliques strongly felt their 
long-enjoyed privileges and power threatened by the student-peasant-labor tripartite 
a lliance. Some factions in the army were increasingly alarmed by the alliance 's radical 
ideas which challenged the military's concept of a controlled orderly society and their 
national security policy. The student movement 's campaign for the withdrawa l of US 
troops from Thailand was especially tlu·eatening. Und er military dictatorship, 
government bureaucrats were accustomed to exercising arb itrary authority and enjoyed 
virtual immunity from criticism. After the uprising, they found themselves being 
34 On that day, half a million people joined a student-led demonstration to demand a constitution. The 
student leaders ex tracted a promise from th e military leaders to reintroduce a consti tution within a year. 
But the dispersa l of the demonstration on the mornin g of October 14, 1973 turned into violence (Chamvit 
1993). 
35 Divisions witJ1in auth oritarian regime can be traced back to tJ1e late 1960s. The most significa nt di vide 
was withu1 tJ1e army, bu t there were also signs of tension between the army and the pa lace, especially after 
the 1971 coup. In genera l, th e king endorsed the military rule, believing its stron g role was needed to 
uphold th e monarchy and defeat th e communists. Neverthe less, he fi-equently criticized the government 's 
poli cies when he tJ1 ought they had gone in th e wron g directi on, and he did so more strongly in tJ1 e ea rl y 
I 970s. The presence of the monarchy as an independent power center within the regime eventuall y 
became vi tal to the success of stud ent mobilization in toppling th e regime (Prajak 20 12: 243). 
36 Anderson 2000: 269-70; see Haberkorn (201 !) for fanner movements. 
37 Pasuk and Baker 2005: 190. 
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criticized and questioned by the poor and the disadvantaged. Business entrepreneurs 
could no longer enjoy the extremely cheap labor that the military regime had guaranteed 
in the previous decades. Now, they had to negotiate with labor unions, which were 
supported by the student movement and left-wing politicians. Landlords also felt 
frustrated by the peasant ' s demand for land reform. Many ruling elites considered the 
civilian governments too weak and incapable of protecting their interests, and 
accordingly ventured to extra-parliamentary tactics. They created right-wing militias and 
paramilitary groups, whose leadership and logistical support was provided by the 
military elites, to weaken and disrupt the progressive coalition. State assassins carried 
out a series of clandestine assassinations targeting leaders of peasant, labor and student 
organizations. Confrontational and violent tactics by the Rightists, combined with 
government inaction, had debilitated the student movement. 38 
The 1975 and 1976 elections took place in this context of tumultuous ideological 
struggle between the left and the right. The right-wing movements and conservative 
elites waged war on burgeoning socialist political parties and their candidates. Unlike 
the elections in previous authoritarian settings, electoral competitions in 1975 and 1976 
were umuly and full of bloodshed. State security agencies and right-wing activists 
resorted to violence to attack left-wing candidates and their supporters. Electoral 
violence was, in essence, part of the establishment 's larger violenLcampaign to eradicate 
the left-wing movements. 
The January 1975 election 
After the Assembly passed the new constitution in October 1974, Prime Minister Sanya 
dissolved parliament and called for a new election on 26 January 1975. The Thai people 
welcomed the election with enthusiasm as it was the first polling competition held in a 
democratic atmosphere for many decades. There were 42 political parties registered 
prior to the poll, competing for 269 seats. Except for the Democrats, the rest were new 
parties established after 1973 . The Chart Thai Party was the most ultra right-wing party 
formed by military generals and provincial oligarchs; they recruited many former 
Sahaprachathai MPs to become their members. Another major party was Kitsangkhom 
led by Kukrit, representing the interests of royalists and national capitalist groups. Most 
importantly, three major left-wing parties entered the competition for the first time: the 
Socialist Party of Thailand led by Somkhit Sisangkhom, the Naeoruam Sangkhomniyom 
38 Prajak 2006. 
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(Socialist Ally) led by Khlaeo Norapati, and the Phalang Mai (New Force) led by Krasae 
Chanawong. These three parties gained popular support from the student-farmer-labor 
coalitions. After the election, there were 22 parties able to win seats but no party 
managed to win a majority of seats, leading to a large and unstable multi-pa1iy coalition. 
Seni Pramoj, the Democrat Party's head , briefly assumed the premier post but stepped 
down after his government's policy statement was not approved by the Assembly, giving 
way to the election of his brother Kukrit Pramoj. 39 
Leftist parties campaigned impressively as their three major parties combined gained 37 
seats nationwide. But their securing of many seats came at a high cost as several of their 
workers lost their lives. There were 20 incidents (12 assassination attempts, 6 mob 
clashes, and 2 acts of physical intimidation, causing 20 deaths and 10 woundings (see 
table 2.1 ). Government security forces and the Internal Security Operations Command 
(ISOC) carried out secretive operations in a large number of villages throughout the 
country, paiiicularly those in the northeast , intimidating residents into not voting for 
progressive parties. The secretary of the Socialist Party, Bunsanong Punyodhayana, told 
media that local police threatened to imprison his party supporters if they voted for the 
socialist candidates. 40 Media and student 's election monitoring groups reported that the 
state 's heavy interference in election campaign was "anti-communist psychological 
warfare," in which local state appai·atus, like kamnan, village headmen, and public 
school teachers, tried to brainwash villagers, accusing all leftist candidates of being 
Communists who conspired to destroy the monarchy, rel igion and the nation. 41 
Violent incidents occurred mostly during the campaign period, but election day was 
very turbulent as well (see table 2.3). In precincts that were Communist Party 
strongho lds (such as Nakhon Phano m, Kanchanaburi , Udon Thani) or where Muslim 
separatist movements were strong (as in Pattani, Ya la, and Narathiwat) , the insurgent 
groups attempted to disrupt vot ing by attacking polling stations, assaulting pbll workers, 
and stealing ballot boxes. For example, on 24 January 1975, in a remote district in 
Kanchanaburi, Communist rebels clashed with border patrol police and poll workers, 
killing one and wounding five officers. The provincial governor had to change the 
3
" Chaowana 2007: 42-43. 
,o Prachachat Daily, 3 January 1975: 3. 
"Prachaclwt Dailr. 6 January 1975: 3: 5 February 1975: 7. 
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polling station's location to avoid further attacks. 42 Casualties resulting from the clashes 
between government forces and insurgents accounted for more than half of the total dead 
victims, demonstrating a significant threat the insurgency posed to election security (see 
table 2.2). Clearly, security personnel became both perpetrators and victims of election-
related vio lence. Their heavy interference in electoral processes continued in the next 
election as they stepped up their violent operations against the socialist parties. 
The April 1976 election 
Facing strong pressure from daily protests and his own coalition parties, Prime Minister 
Kukrit dissolved the parliament on 12 January 1976 and called for a new general 
election on 4 April 1976. The elect ion result meant no political party was able to win a 
majority of votes, paving the way for a coalition government led by the Democrat and 
Chart Thai Parties who garnered the first and second-largest number of seats. Kukrit's 
Kitsangkhom, the third-largest party, became the opposition, and Kukrit lost his 
Bangkok MP seat to the rising right-wing politician Samak Sundaravej. Seni Pramoj 
from the Democrat Party assumed the premiership, amid widespread rumors of a coup, 
trying to take his government through the crisis. The Seni government lasted for only six 
months. 
The right-wing and security forces mounted a full-scale violent campaign to prevent left-
wing all ied parties from winning votes. Their acts of aggression were very effective-
incessant waves of death threats, bombings, and assassinations paralyzed and destroyed 
the leftists' campaigns. Consequent ly, the Socialist Party of Thailand, the Naeoruam 
Sangkhomniyom, and the Phalang Mai suffered a heavy defeat: three parties combined 
won only six seats nationwide (compared to 37 in last time) , and several of their party 
personnel and supporters were brutally killed. In total, there were 21 violent incidents (9 
assassination attempts," 2 mob clashes, and 3 acts of physical intimidation, 6 blasts, and I 
arson attack) leading to 16 deaths and 19 woundings (see table 2.1 ). Even though the 
number of incidents and casualties were not significantly greater than those in the last 
election, the perpetrators were highly indiscriminate and ruthless- thus making this 
election more chaotic and terror-ridden. 
42 Thai Rath, 25, January 1976: 1, 2, 16; 26 January 1975: 1, 2, 16. For violent incidents in Nakh on 
Phanom, Narathi wat, Yala, and Udon Thani , see Thai Rath, 26 January 1975: 1, 2, 16; and 27 January 
1975: I, 2, 16. 
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The main perpetrators of vio lence in this election were state agents and hired right-wing 
vigilante groups. The primary victims, as mentioned, were supporters and members of 
political parties that espoused socialist ideology. Early in the campaign, a gang of 
hooligans working for military leaders attacked the Phalang Mai Party' s headquarter 
with grenades. The party building was left seriously damaged but, fortunately, all party 
staff survived the bomb. 43 In early February, two Phalang Mai MP candidates for 
Lopburi were shot dead while they were canvassing for votes. And a few days later, on 
28 February, Bunsanong Punyodhayana· the Socialist Party secretary and a Thammasat 
University professor, was assassinated in central Bangkok while he was driving home. 44 
Many leading public figures denounced this brutal act of what they called "barbaric 
political murder." Puey Ungphakon, rector of Thamamsat University, demanded that 
government bring perpetrators to justice and prevent electoral competition from 
descending into "the fighting tlu·ough bullets."45 He further commented, "It [the 
shooting] was abhorrent and appalling.. any political parties were supposed to 
campaign with non-violent methods. There should have not been shootings or bombings. 
These [violent methods] degrade democracy."46 Boonsanong's shooting demoralized the 
progressive candidates. Nevertheless, violent campaigning did not stop. On 24 March, at 
the Phalang Mai's campaign stage in Chainat, militias threw bombs into the crowd, 
instantly killing eight people and injuring I 0-- one of the most violent incidents in the 
history of Thai electoral campaigns. After this incident, all candidates affiliated with 
progressive allies requested government protection, but to no avail. On 28 March, in 
Udon Thani, right-wing militias stormed the campaign of the Socialist Party, harassing 
candidates and voters, burning billboards, and attacking campaign vehicles. Head of the 
Socialist Party Somkhit Sisangkhom had to tenninate the campaign in the province to 
avoid further violent attacks. Two days before vot ing day, in Roi Et, Phalang Mai ' s 
campaign stage was again assaulted by hand grenades, but, fortunately, nobody was 
injured. 47 Election day was as turbulent as in the last election (see table 2.3). Various 
kinds of violence occurred: burnings of and shootings into polling stations, threatening 
voters, bombings, and clashes between the Communist and separatist insurgents in the 
southernmost pro vinces. 
43 However. th ere was one culprit accidentall y killed by his own grenade (Prachachat, 16 February I 976: 
! , 12). 
44 Prachachat, l 8 February 1976: I, 12 . 
45 Prachachat, I March 1976: 12. 
46 Prachachat, 3 April I 976: l 2 . 
41 Prachachat , 26 March 1976: I, 12; 28 March 1976: 12; 2 April 1976: 12 . 
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By the end of the 1970s, the April 1976 election ranked as the most unru ly polling 
competition in Thai history. Caretaker Prime Minister Kukrit admitted his failure to 
make the election fair and peaceful, saying "I felt that this election was very ruthless. 
There were so many shootings. "48 General Krit Srivara the former Anny Commander-in-
chief under the Thanom regime, who was accustomed to uncompetitive elections, 
remarked that this election was "murderous" and "disorderly." 49 From the victim's 
perspective, Somkhit Sisangkhom, whose Socialist Party won only two seats, lamented 
"considering the result, it was demoralizing. This election is the dirtiest, cruelest and 
most barbaric. Bunsanong certainly died free ." He declared that "I will continue my 
political fight in the parliament." However, this veteran socialist warned the powers that 
be: "some party members who have been discouraged [by electoral violence] might 
pursue their struggles underground. That was their choice."50 Somkhit 's warning was 
prophetic. 
The ultra right-wing's employment of forceful violence in the 1976 election might have 
succeeded in wiping the socialist groups off the electoral map, but it created a ferocious 
blowback. The escalation of violence led to political turmoil and ended with a brutal 
student massacre on October 6, 1976.5 1 According to police records, 43 people were 
killed, several hundred injured, over three thousand arrested on that day, and some five 
thousand later. One army faction staged a coup taking power from the elected civilian 
government on that evening, terminating three years of popular democracy and 
progress ive movement's mass mobilization and turning Thai politics back to a 
dictatorship. In comparative perspective, what happened in Thailand during 1973-76 
confirmed the proposition of the fragile and violent character of democratic transition by 
abrupt regime collapse. 52 Nonetheless, it was not the mobilization of progressive 
reformers that was responsible for the breakdown of democratic transition, but the 
violence perpetrated by the royal-mi litary-bureaucratic elites, with the deployment of 
48 Prachachat, 3 April 1976: 12. 
49 Prachachat, 5 Apri l 1975: 4. 
so Prachachat, 10 April 1976: 1, 2. 
51 That mornin g, units of the Border Patrol Poli ce from several provinces, units of poli ce in Bangkok, 
along with ri ght-wing paramilitary groups in vaded Thammasat University, where fi ve thousand people 
had ga th ered peacefull y all night to protest the return of th e former dictatorial prime minister ousted three 
years earli er by a student movement. They were firing rockets, hand-guns, and anti-tank missi les into th e 
uni versity. A handful of students who tried to escape were brutally lynched, raped or burnt ali ve outside 
th e uni versity (Thongchai 2002). 
52 O ' Donnell , Schmitter, and Wh iteh ead 1986. 
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right-wing groups.53 After 1976, unprecedented number ofradical students, intellectuals, 
political activists, and politicians took up the armed struggle, joining the Communist 
Party of Thai land waging guerrill a warfare with the Thai state in jungle areas-a deadl y 
civi l war that lasted for almost decade and killed thousands of people. 
Table 2.1: Election-related violent incidents in national elections, 1975-76 
I Violent incidents I Death toll I Wounded 
assassination fights, phys ica l bombings burnings I total I Total 
attempts clashes, intimidation 
brawls, 
scuffles 
12 6 2 0 0 20 20 
9 2 3 6 1 21 16 
21 8 5 6 I 41 36 
Chart 2.1: Methods of electoral violence in national elections, 1975-76 
53 There were, however, strategic moves between two competing mi li tary facti ons, trying to assert control in the midst of crisis: one fa ction u1 stigated a massacre on the morning of October 6, 1976, but another fac tion staged a coup swiftly afterwards. 
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I total 
10 
19 
29 
Table 2.2: Identity of election-related violent incidents' dead victims in national 
elections, 1975-76 
Election Dead victims 
dates 
vote Candidates journalists, gunmen voters 
canvassers security 
officials, poll 
administrators 
and observers 
26/1/1975 5 2 3 (officials) 8 (insurgents) 2 
4/4/1976 3 3 1 1 (right-wing 8 
members) 
Total 8 5 4 9 10 
Chart 2.2: Dead victims of electoral violence in national elections, 1975-76 
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journalists, poll 
administrators 
and observers 
11% 
Total 
20 
16 
36 
Table 2.3 : Timing of election-related violent incidents in national elections, 1975-76 
Election Timing of violent incidents 
dates 
pre-election election day post-election Total 
(from House (I month after 
dissolution to election day) 
election day) 
26/ 1/1975 13 6 l 20 
4/4/1976 13 8 0 21 
Total 26 14 1 41 
Chart 2.3 : Timing of electoral violence in national elections, 1975-76 
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Patterns, methods, and logic of Thai state-sponsored electoral violence, 1975-1976 
Electoral violence in 1975 and 1976 is inseparable from the royal-military alliance's 
violent campaign against their enemies that occurred outside the ballot boxes. Electoral 
and non-electoral violence were closely connected- both were caused and motivated 
mainly by ideological struggle at the national level. At stake was state power and 
ideological shaping of the state. Essentially, electoral violence was a continuation of 
state violence by other means. The rapidly changing environment after democratic 
change in 1973 forced traditional elites to rely on both electoral and non-electoral 
violence. Before 1973, as discussed earlier, authoritarian bureaucratic elites relied on 
various strategies to exclude progressive force from the electoral sphere and to win 
elections: assassination, imprisonment, unlawful detention, execution, kidnapping, 
military suppression, draconian laws, electoral fraud, and coup. These tactics rendered 
the elections from 1932 to 1973 both unfree and uncompetitive; the use of violence in 
elections was thus unnecessary. After the democratic uprising in 1973, the establishment 
lost their control of exercising the exclusionary tactics and electoral manipulation. 
Democratic constitutions, civil society, and civilian governments paved the way for 
more open political participation, more inclusive electoral space, and more transparent 
electoral administration. Therefore, royal-military elites needed to reso1i to brute force to 
eliminate election-related threats and to control electoral outcomes._ 
In both the 1975 and 1976 elections, violent incidents occurred mostly during the 
campaign and on election day, with various methods ranging from assassinations to 
bombings. Even though assassination was the most frequently used tactic among 
perpetrators, there were other methods to achieve their objectives. State agents and state-
sponsored vigi lante groups, militias, and thugs were the leading perpetrators. 
Communists and separatist insurgents followed their rank, their primary purpose to 
disrupt voting. Left-wing party workers were the chief target of electoral violence, and 
their suppo1iers also suffered from indiscriminate bombing and/or shooting. Apart from 
this main pattern, data revealed that a few incidents of private killings lurking behind the 
shadow of ideological-driven vio lence. The 1976 election witnessed some violent 
attacks between rival politicians in the following provinces: Chonburi, Phichit, 
Phetchabun, N akhon Si Thammarat, and Ang Thong. 54 These private murders 
54 See Prachachat, 14Februaryl976: 1,2; 12March 1976: 1;3April 1976: I, 12;4April 1976: I, 12. 
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perpetrated by provincial elites were, however, marginal in the course of violence 
dominated by ideological struggle. 
After 1976, the pattern, logic, and methods of electoral violence changed into a new 
form as a result of major political and economic changes at both the national and local 
levels. State-sponsored electoral violence disappeared, and the marginal acts- private 
murders perpetrated by provincial elites- became mainstream. Electoral violence 
turned out to be more privatized, specifically targeted, local-directed, and 
entrepreneurial. These new patterns are the focus of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Privatization of violence: 
Democratization and electoral violence, 1976-1996 
Since the 1980s, elections have gained increasing significance as mechanisms for 
assuming and maintaining power in Thailand. The period the 1980s to the 1990s 
witnessed a radical change in Thai politics from a "military-bureaucrat ic authoritarian" 
to a parliamentary democratic system with competitive elections. These elections, 
unfortunately, were dominated by a new system of money and patronage politics and 
invo lved levels of electoral vio lence. 
The revival of the parliamentary system and the competitive elections of the 1980s 
brought with it frequent assassinations of Members of Parliament, nouveau riche 
tycoons, local bosses (or potential bosses), and vote canvassers. These political killings 
are private-enterprise murders related to national and local electoral competition, with 
profess iona l gunmen hi.red by the victims' political and business rivals. The gunmen 
were comprised of professional assassins, former security guards, petty gangsters, and 
moonlighting policemen. 1 Violence occurs both before and after elections as candidates 
and their supporters are threatened by their rivals with kidnapping or murder. Vote 
canvassers who betray a candidate may be killed to prevent this kind of behavior in 
future elections, and highly successful vote canvassers are sometimes also eliminated by 
their opponents.2 In an attempt to explain this phenomenon, Benedict Anderson argued 
that the increasing prevalence of politically motivated murders in the late 1980s reflects 
the high "market value" of Members of Parliament in Thailand, and thereby signaled the 
greater importance of elections as a ru le of the game deciding who obtains po lit ical 
power. 
The chapter explains the causes, patterns, and consequences of election-related violence 
in Thailand. A good explanation accounts fo r variatio ns over time and geograph ical area 
since violence ebbs and flo ws and is not evenly distributed across the country. These 
differences are at the heart of the investigation. 
1 Anderson 1998: 171 -191 ; Ockey 2000: 74-96. 
2 Ockey I 998: 39-53. 
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This chapter has many foci. It outlines the essential structure of national and lo cal 
economy and politics and the linkages between political murder and political 
deve lopment in Thailand 's parliamentary democracy. It also identifies the emergence of 
the lucrative business of hired killing and its connection to the provincial elites' pattern 
of accumulation of wealth and power. Importantly, it explains the main causes of 
electoral violence from the 1979 to the 1996 elections. 
The national political setting: parliamentary democracy and electoral competition 
under a patrimonial state 
From 1979 to 1996, Thailand held 8 general elections, faced 3 coup attempts (1 
successful in 1991 and 2 failed in 1981 and 1985), had two constitutions (the 1978 
constitution and the 1991 constitution which was slightly amended after the May 1992 
crackdown), and witnessed a large demonstration in 1992 against the unelected military 
prime minister. In rural areas, after the 1976 massacre when students and intellectuals 
joined the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) it strengthened and gained momentum. 
The government attacked the CPT in several parts of the country using enormous 
resources and manpower, and it was not until the mid 1980s that the CPT collapsed and 
was no longer a political or security threat to the Thai ruling elites. These two decades 
between the 1976 massacre and the 1997 economic crisis were a turbulent and unstable 
period in Thai politics. Nevertheless, it was during this period that a new politica l order 
emerged. Parliamentary democracy was stead ily established to replace the authoritarian 
bureaucratic polity (even though interrupted briefly by the 199 1 co up) and the balance of 
power had over time shifted from the bureaucratic elites to the metropolitan and 
provincial capitalists. 3 Electoral politics became more significance as the primary 
channel to position, privi lege, patronage and wealth. This changing politica l 
enviro nment provided both opportunities and incentives for business leaders and local 
elites to enter politics. 
For a brief period after 6 October 1976, Thai society was ruled under the civilian 
dictato rship ofThan in Kraivixien, a staunch anti-communist lawyer highly trusted by the 
3 For genera l political contex t of the 1980s and 1990s, see Anderson 2000: 174- 191; Chai-anan 1989; 
Anek 1992; Hewison 1997; Ockey 1992. On the politi ca l economy of the Thai state during this era , see 
Brown 2004; Hewison 1989; Pasuk and Baker 1995. 
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king. Thanin pursued authoritarian policies undermining all democratic institutions, 
including elections and political parties. He announced a 12-year plan towards 
"democracy," by which he aimed to establish absolute control over society without 
public participation or political contestation. Thanin's ultra royalist and conservative 
rule alienated nearly all societal groups, business elites, and extra-bureaucratic forces 
that had emerged since the Sarit Thanarat's era of rapid economic development. Theses 
groups had become a formidable force since the mid- l 970s and they demanded wider 
political participation. The Thanin government's authoritarian turn was considered 
unacceptable and detrimental to their fortunes. They criticized Thanin's rule and, in less 
than a year, Thanin lost public support and was overthrown by military officers on 20 
October 1977. The coup group appointed General· Kriengsak Chamanand, a more 
reform-minded army leader, as the new prime minister. The Kriengsak administration 
was aware of the changing political landscape in which the bureaucracy could no longer 
rule the country without accommodating the interests of those-especially from the 
private business community-who demanded an open parliamentary system. The 
Kriengsak administration knew that the government needed to resume political 
participation through elections. The coup leader appointed constitutional experts and 
technocrats to draft a new constitution to pave the way for the next general election. 
Against this backdrop, the 1978 constitution was a social contract between two groups of 
elites, the old bureaucratic leaders and the new business elites, to-share power under the 
agreed parliamentary platform.4 
The mode of political compromise and power-sharing was manifest in several articles of 
the 1978 constitution. The constitution established a bicameral Nat ional Assembly, 
consisting of an elected House of Representative (of 301 members5) and an appointed 
Senate (with 225 members appointed by the prime minister). The Lower House had 
power to submit a motion of no-confidence against the government, meanwhile the 
senate had mandatory power to oversee and block the Lower House's legislat ion. Most 
importantly, the constitution stipulated that it was not necessary for the prime minister 
and cabinet members to be elected, allowing civil bureaucrats or army leaders to take 
positions without standing for election. Those who drafted the constitution designed the 
senate-by-appointment and unelected prime ministership to retain power bases for the 
4 For the politica l role and ideas of the military group in the 1980s, see Chai-anan 1982; for the politics of 
I 978 constitution, see Saneh I 986. 
5 The number of available seats for MPs is not fi xed but changes according to population figures. The 
electoral law uses the ra ti o of 150,000 people per MP. 
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military and traditional elites within the parliamentary system. 6 Under the 1978 
constitution, in which elected and unelected power holders coexisted side by side in the 
assembly and government, the Thai polity was popularly labeled "a semi-democratic 
system."7 
The change in relative power between the state and business interests occurred under the 
overarching structure of a patrimonial state "lack[ing) above all the bureaucratic 
separation of the 'private' and the 'official ' sphere."8 Since democratization began in the 
early 1980s, the character of this patrimonial state was largely sustained. What had 
changed was the relative strength of bureaucratic and business elites and the direction of 
rent extraction. Under previous military authoritarian regimes, bureaucratic elites 
extracted rents from a weak business class, while under the semi-democratic regime a 
more powerful business class started to extract rents from a weakened bureaucracy. In 
this sense, from the late 1970s to the 1990s, the Thai polity experienced a major shift in 
the nature of power relations. At the beginning of this period, it was what Paul 
Hutchcroft calls a "patrimonial administrative state" that is a political system in which 
bureaucratic elite or "political aristocracy" is the predominant socia l force and 
countervailing social forces from civil society are weak. 9 By the 1990s, it had gradually 
moved to a "patrimonial oligarchic state," polity in which the business elite is the 
predominant social force having "an economic base largely independent of the state 
apparatus, but the state nonetheless p lays a central role in the process of wealth 
accumulat ion. " In co ntrast to the patrimonial administrative state, Hutchcroft continues, 
"the influence of extra-bureaucratic force swamps the influence of the bureaucracy, 
[and) the major power resides not in a class of officeho lders but rather in a private 
sector. " 10 The intensity and speed of the institutional change from "patrimonial 
administrative state" to "patrimonial oligarchic state" was intermittent, a traditional 
bureaucratic elite resisted this direction of state transformation. But the combinat ion of a 
patrimonial state with the burgeoning of Thai parliamentary democracy offered high 
6The 1978 constitution also had a temporary clause, stipulatin g that within th e first 4 years of constituti on 
usage, the senate would have equal power to the Lower House, including power to use a no-confidence 
moti on. A lso, according to the temporary clause, civil servants and military officers are able to assume 
premi ership and cabinet posts and retain th eir bureaucratic positi ons. Suchit and Pornsak 1984: 78-84. 
7 For a deta iled discussion of th e term "semi-democratic system," see Chai-anan 1989. 
8 Weber 1978, vol. 2: 1028 quoted in Hutchcroft 1998: 5. 
9 The term "patrim onia l admini strati ve state" comes from Th omas Cal laghy' s work on Zaire (Cal laghy 
1984 , chapler I). The tenn was borrowed and furth er devel oped by Hutchcroft (I 998: 46) to describe the 
Thai state be fo re 1973 and Indones ian state durin g Suha110 · s New Order reg ime. See also Crouch 1 979 on 
the Indonesian case. 
'
0 Hu tchcroft 1998: 52. 
64 
incentives fo r business elites to become involve in electoral competition. Their goal was 
maximum access to the centralized state machinery, the major channel for rent-seeking 
opportunities. Public office provided an avenue to lucrative licenses, permits, 
concessions, quotas, loans, and power to manipulate laws and state regulations. 11 The 
stakes of winning election were higher than ever as victory gave capitalists access to 
state coffers and divided up the rents in a manner more favorable to non-bureaucratic 
forces. In this changed environment, major business leaders grasped opportunities at 
both national and local levels. With higher stakes, electoral competition became fiercer. 
In analyzing the state's role in electoral violence, it is important to look both at the 
nature of the state and the goals of private actors. 12 The weak-state argument highlights 
only one dimension- the "supply" side- that weak states fail to achieve a monopoly 
control on the use of legitimate force in their territory and thus cannot control the use of 
force in the political sphere, including in the electoral process. It is equally, or more 
important to understand the "demand" side of political actors, particularly the business 
class, seeing why they eagerly need to capture state power in the first place. Considering 
political actors' acquisition of power, it leads us to discuss the character of the state 
apparatus. A state that exhibits strong patrimonial features-as opposed to "rational-
legal" bureaucratic structure-provides not only opportunities but also strong incentives 
for predatory oligarchs to control state machinery. 
However, not every geographical area under the Thai patrimonial state that electoral 
competition turned violent. The immediate causes of violence are rooted in local 
economic and political settings (as I wi ll explain further). 
Weak political parties and the Block-Vote electoral system 
Apart from the patrimonial state structure, the 1978 constitution developed an electoral 
system that played a significant ro le in personalizing electoral campaigns and thus 
intensifying the use of violent tactics in elections. By examining the way institutions and 
institutional rules structure political arrangement and decisions, we gain a better 
understanding of the phenomenon of electoral vio lence. 
11 See Hutchcroft 1998 for the analysis of Phili ppine oligarchs. 
12 Most scholars in ti1e field propose "state weakness" or "weak state capacity' ' as one of th e most 
important causes for electora l violence (Si sk 2008, Schimpp and McKeman 200 1, Fischer 2002 and 2004). 
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Prior to the constitutional reform of 1997, Thailand 's election for the House of 
Representatives used the Block Vote (BV) electoral system which combines multi-seat 
constituencies with multiple votes and the plurality rule. The country' s seventy-six 
provinces were divided into 142-156 electoral districts, with each district containing one 
to three seats (and most districts having more than one seat). Seats were allocated by 
province, and each province had varying numbers of seats which can change from one 
election to another, depending on the population. The least populated provinces can have 
only one MP seat, while the most populous province, Bangkok, has from 32 to 36 
MPs. 13 The multi-member constituency system allows voters to vote for candidates on 
an individual basis, rather than on a party basis, and voters, while not allowed to cast all 
their votes for one candidate, are allowed to split their votes among candidates from 
different parties. 14 The parliamentary electoral system of this type structurally promotes 
high spending in electoral campaigns because it encourages as much fierce competition 
between candidates of the same party as it does between parties. It also promotes weak 
political parties. Almost all Thai political parties are short-lived alliances of factions tied 
together largely by personal and patronage networks, rather than a cohesive union of 
like-minded politicians. Factions can move from one party to another to enhance their 
chances of winning the election and joining a coalition government. In general, factions 
of powerful provincial politicians formed core elements of parties and their political 
calculations can affect the survival of a government. Withdrawal of tactical support of 
large factions frequently leads to government demise. The weakness of political parties 
in Thailand in the pre-1997 period was manifested in the fact that new parties emerged 
in every election and old parties disbanded. Statistics indicate that, on average, Thai 
political parties compete in less than three elections before disbanding. Many of them, in 
fact, compete in only one election. 15 Party switching is also a common practice. Well-
estab lished politicians could expect 'transfer fees ' of I 0-20 million baht for changing 
paii ies.16 
Even though the Block Vote system generates vote-buying, it produces a mixed effect on 
the use of coercive tactics. Jn one way, it helps candidates avo id one-on-one 
13 See the number of MP seats in each province in Interior Ministry 1983; 1986; 1988. 
14 Hi cken 2006: 381-407. 
15 On Thailand 's political party weaknesses and sho1i-lived character, see Hi cken 2006: 388; Ockey 1994: 
Siripan 2006. 
16 McCa rgo and Maisrikrod: 132-48. In the Jul y 20 1 I electi on, the price in the politica l market cou ld be as 
high as 50 to 80 mil lion baht. Interview, nationa l election commiss ion 's seni or officer, Bangkok, 8 June 
2011. 
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confrontation as they do not need to win most votes to get elected. For example, in a 
constituency that has three MP seats, the weakest candidate could collect just enough 
votes to win the third position and became MP. In this way, the Block Vote system helps 
diminish the conflict between strong candidates usually witnessed in the single-member 
districts or the First Past the Post system (FPTP), as there is only one available winner 
per district. 17 However, the Block Vote system generates electoral conflict in two 
ways. 18 First, constituencies with too many strong candidates competing for limited seats 
can be prone to violence. The 1979 Phetchaburi election is a prime example, in which 
four powerful local bosses fought fiercely for two MP seats, and used violence to reduce 
the number of competitors (see Chapter 10). Second, the Block Vote system produces 
intra-group conflict because voters have freedom to vote for candidates from different 
parties. As a result, Allen Hicken explains, "[T]his intra-party competition undermined 
the value of party labels to candidates and voters and contributed to making the parties 
factionalized and incohesive." 19 Consider Phetchaburi again, the candidate had to 
compete with his opposing team and his teammate to ensure victory. The strongest 
candidate tends to campaign separately and invest resources toward his own victory 
rather than share the campaign resources with his/her team members. 20 The weak 
candidates therefore have to campaign very hard, with every means possible, to not be 
left behind. The overall outcome is the widespread employment of personal campaign 
strategies by individual candidates from all parties. Hence campaigns conducted under 
the Block Vote system are full of tension, manipulation, and betrayal , frequently ending 
in bloodshed. The violent incident in the Phetchaburi 1979 election mentioned earlier 
was an insecure candidate ordering his gunmen to assassinate his (strong) teammate. 
The patrimonial characteristic of the state, the Block Vote electoral system and weak, 
factionalized political parties were institutional factors that existed nationwide, and they 
made the Thai elections in the 1980s and 1990s generally prone to violence. These 
17 The First Past the Post (FPTP) system is one of the simplest forms of plurality/majority electoral 
system, using single-member districts and majority vote. Voters can cast only one vote for their favorite 
candidate and the winning candidate is the one who received most votes. The 1997 constitution replaced 
the Block Vote system with th e FPTP and list Proportional Representation (List PR) (see Chapter 5). For 
the general advan tages and disadvantages of Block Vote and FPTP, see Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis 2005: 
35-44; Farrell 20 11: Norris 2004: 39-65. 
18 Some scholars on electora l violence (Rapoport and Leonard 2001, Hoglund 2006; Sisk 2008) identify 
electora l system choice and its design as a crucial factor causing electoral violence, but they fall short of 
identifying the specific mechanisms and processes behind the linkages of electoral systems and violence. 
19 Hicken 2005: l 06. 
20 This practice was part ly encouraged by the bloc vote electoral system which allows voters to "partially 
abstain by not casting all their available votes" (Hicken 2005: 105). For example, in a three-seat district, 
some voters cast their votes for only one or two favorite candidates. 
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national structural and institutional conditions created personalistic electoral campaigns 
and heightened the stakes of electoral competition, encouraging political actors to 
employ all tactics- legal or illegal, peaceful or violent- to win over their competitors. 
Consequently, Thailand, Like the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and several African countries 
(such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe and Kenya) who share dominant 
character of patrimonial states and personalistic politics, suffered from violent elections; 
election-related violence became endemic to electoral- process in the country. 2 1 
Nevertheless, data reveal that electoral violence in Thailand has been unevenly 
distributed across the country: some provinces experienced a higher level of election-
related violence than others, these national factors are thus insufficient to explain the 
pattern and causes of violence. The investigation needs to focus on the local factors , 
mechanisms, and processes that contribute to the geographical variation. 22 
The next section focuses on local political and economic settings and the leading actors 
involved in perpetrating electoral violence. 
Local settings: the political-economic foundations of electoral violence 
Local economy : subnational enclaves, rent-seeking and illegal economies 
In Thailand, two types of transformation dramatically changed Thai provincial li fe : the 
shift from a rural to an industrial economy which started in the 1960s, and the advent of 
parliamentary democracy began after 1973 . Political and economic environment 
transformed into a new landscape with a new array of actors. Economic development 
programs and investment started to expand into rural areas in every region, and thereby 
produced more jobs, factories, capital, business services, and opportun it ies fo r local 
elites to develop into a cap italist class. Nevertheless the pace of provincial economic 
development was slow and its scale was small. The gap between Bangkok-based 
economies and provincial economies was staggeringly large. Even in the 1990s, scholars 
characterized the provincial economies as " backward," co nsisting of three dominant 
characters- "small-sca le business, weak manufacturing, and few exportab le 
21 For electoral vio lence in th e Phi lippines, see Linantud 1998, Pat ino and Velasco 2006, Chua and 
Rim ba n 20 11 ; in th e case of Sri Lanka, see Hoglund and Pi yarathn e 2009; also see Kl opp 200 I for Kenya. 
22 TI1 e questi on of geogra phical varia ti on is di scussed thoroughly in Part llJ (Chapters 7- 12) through th e 
in-depth srndi es of six provinces. 
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manufactured products."23 For example, a study of Nakhon Ratchasima, the largest 
province and the economic center of the northeast region, found that by the late 1980s, 
businesses run by local entrepreneurs were small scale: only two companies in Nakhon 
Ratchasima "were ranked among the top I, 111 companies in terms of sales, profits, and 
assets."24 In fact, only a few provincial-based companies were on the list. There were 
two significant examples: the country's largest bus company run by the Nirot family in 
Nakhon Sawan (see Chapter 8) ranked 944"1 in the country in terms of assets, while the 
tobacco company of Narong Wongwan's family, the most powerful clan i.n Phrae (see 
Chapter 6), stood at the 1006tli in terms of profit. 25 Generally, the provincial 
manufacturing sector was weak as only a very small number of local businessmen 
engaged in modern manufactw-ing, having "the ability to develop-high-valued and 
exportable new products... in reply to changes in the world market."26 This 
characterization generally applies to almost every province outside Bangkok. The main 
reasons for the provincial business comparative disadvantage were limited capital, and 
lack of technology and skilled-labor (mainly caused by the government 's policy bias of 
spending most of government resources in developing Bangkok as the single, dominant 
economic center).27 
Even by the 1990s, industrial investment i.n provincial areas was still limited and did not 
contribute significantly to provincial economic development. The agricultural sector was 
still the main source of jobs and income for locals. Only some local business ebtes had 
invested in manufactw-ing, concentrating on agricultural products or low-skilled and 
labor-intensive manufacturing. 28 More attractive to provincial entrepreneur was 
"unproductive profit-seeking activity," in other words rent-seeking.29 In contrast to 
profit-seeking or productivity-improving economic activities in which "asset and 
incomes are won and lost on the basis of the ability of the business owner to develop the 
property," rent-seeking is an activity in which "ownership of property alo ne guarantees 
access to wealth .. . [ and] the operation of the state determine the assignment of and the 
23 Ueda 1995: 87. See other studies of provincial economies and local entrepreneurs in Somkiat 1992; 
McVey2000. 
24 Data from lnternati ona l Business Research (Thailand) Co., Ltd. 1990 quoted in Ueda 1995: 87. 
25 Ueda 1995: 115. 
26 Ueda 1995 : 87-88 . 
27 Doner and Ramsay 2000, 2003; Bello, Cunningham, and Li 1999. 
28 Ueda 1995; Bell o, Cunningham, and Li 1999. 
29 Also, rent cap italism or " politically-determined cap it alism' ' can be defined as system in whi ch "money 
is in arrangement for appropriating wealth which has already been produced rather than in [arrangemen ts 
for actua lly producing it]."Weber 1978, vol. I : 240, quote in Hutchcroft 1998: 19. For a conceptu al 
discussion of rent-seeking in Thailand , see Tbanee an d Pasuk 2008. 
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continued enjoyment of economic advantages."30 In general, thi s "property" can include 
government protection from competition through quotas, tari ffs, access to loans and 
grants, and licenses and concessions. And once these properties are obtained, the 
obtainers need not develop it; rather, "they only need to maintain and expand their 
ownership of economic advantage."31 
For Thai provincial elites, the two popular rent-seeking activities which required very 
low skill and technology but gave high profits were natural resource extractive 
businesses (logging, mining, quarries, etc) and businesses on which there were strict 
regulations imposed by government and hence opportunities for monopolistic profits if 
acquired (such as liquor or cigarette dealerships, tobacco curing, buses, gas stations, 
slaughter houses, and construction). Public-sector construction is, among others, a 
popular business enterprise. According to data from the early 2000s, there were 75 
political fami lies in seven different parties with strong economic bases in construction. 
These fami lies were very successful in elections and dominated parliament. In the 2001 
election, for example, 79 MPs (or 15.8 percent of the assembly) were members of 
families tied to these construction cartels. 32 The attractiveness of the construction 
business lies in its large income and profits. Some lo cal elites further emiched 
themselves by outsourcing projects they have successfully acquired to other contractors 
and then collecting commissions. 33 Construction also suppo11s other locally owned 
businesses, such as quarries, lumber, bus services, etc. Moreover, provincial elites can 
use the government construction projects to build clientelisitc networks: by allocating 
projects to business allies, relatives, and subordinates, and gaining popularity from locals 
by bringing development to the region. In sum, construction brought enonnous wealth 
and prestige to provincial elites. It is no surprise to find large numbers of leading 
provincial business-cum-politicians (including in our six case studies) actively investing 
in construction. Since the 1960s, the construction sector has boomed as a result of the 
rapid economic and expansion of infrastructure development both in Bangkok and 
provincial areas (roads, highways, bridges, dams, airports, public buildings) . As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, under military-rule in the 1960s and 1970s, businessmen sought 
rents by establishing close connections with genera ls, appointing them to the company 
30 Montes 1988: 64-66, quote in Hutchcroft 1998: 20-2 1. 
31 As a result, the " internal effic ienc ies and investments" of th eir companies become a secondary concern 
(Montes 1988: 64-66, quote in Hutchcroft 1998: 21). 
32 Most information on the constructi on business is drawn from Noppanan 2006: 280-357. 
33 The commission fee usua ll y amounts to 30-40 percent of the project budget (Chaiyon and Olam 2006: 
358-415; Noppanan 2006: 282). 
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board or paying bribes. But only a small number of national-based companies managed 
to build strong relationships to earn them megaprojects worth billions of baht. The 
provincial bosses' companies normally acquired only small-size projects in their local 
areas. The parliamentary rule after the 1980s worked in favor of the provincial capitalists 
when they could establish relations with many different parties and have direct access to 
state resources through elections. 34 Throughout the 198Os and 1990s, the national 
government budget for public construction and roads maintenance increased 
exponentially, attracting a lot of local elites to invest. In turn, a group of cabinet 
members and lawmakers, who enriched themselves from the construction business, 
succeeded in pushing for larger government projects and increasing construction 
budgets.35 
Since natural resource extraction, dealerships, and construction require government 
contracts obtained through political connections, they create incentives fo r provincial 
businessmen to step into politics. Since these businesses are monopolistic by nature, it 
creates a zero-sum-game for stakeholders involved. Being elected as an MP enables one 
to secure contracts for business . Therefore wealth accumulation requires political 
connections, and acquiring and sustaining political power in tum requires considerable 
wealth. Conversely, losing elections means losing power and wealth. Also, the fact that 
provincial businessmen lived remotely from the central loci of power and were 
surrounded by limited local resources forced them to engage in national electoral politics 
more actively than their Bangkok-based counterparts, many of whom enjoyed proximity 
and financial clout over the policy makers. For provincial businessmen, sitting in the 
House gave then influence over the allocation of patronage and rents and of course the 
policymaking process; and they became aware that their votes mattered to sustain weak, 
multi-partied coalition governments. 
Each Thai province has only a few wealthy business entrepreneurs, and, as previously 
discussed, local economic activities were not diversified or extensive-provincial 
business elites focused their investments in their own province or, at best, on a regional -
scale. Generally, they have been unable to establish an economic footprint in the capital, 
let alone international markets. Their province forms their business "enclave" or 
34 Pasuk and Baker 2000; He,vison and Maniemai 2000. 
35 The budget was worth 8,143 million baht in 1988, but then increased almost sevenfold to 59,71 6 milli on 
baht in 1996 (Noppanan 2006: 305). Banbarn Silapa-archa ' s cabinet (1995-1 996) was full of construction 
contractors, including Banbarn himself. 
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"fiefdom" that they cannot afford to lose, and they need a solid base of political power to 
contro l their district areas. With these political-economic conditions, requiring heavy 
investment in rent-seeking, provincial business elites face higher stakes in elections than 
do other types of candidates. In fact, one can say that the higher the degree of 
candidates' involvement in rent-seeking, the fiercer the election becomes. The most 
dangerous situat ion occurs in rival bosses' competition for limited MP seats. Business 
and political conflict intertwine, business rivals become political enemies, and electoral 
competition is transformed from "mere" race for office into a war of monopoly and 
survival. 36 
Another activity attractive to provincial elites is the high-risk, high-return illegal 
economy. The scale of the Thai illegal economy is large and extends across a wide range 
of enterprises, including drug trafficking, goods and human smuggling, contraband 
trading, illicit logging, prostitution, and gambling. 37 Studies show that since the mid 
1980s, the illegal economy has rapidly developed side by side with the economic growth 
of Thailand. In the period 1993-1995, according to (conservative) estimates, the sum of 
these illegal activities "generated 286-457 thousand mi ll ion baht of value-added per 
annum .. [,] equivalent to 8-13 % of GNP."38 Illegal activities appeal to greedy 
businesspersons because huge profits can be made quickly. Provincial bosses like illegal 
businesses because they enable them to finance their clientelistic networks by providing 
employment and income for local people. However, il legal economic activity entails 
high risk. Theoretically, bosses put themselves in a vulnerable position as they could be 
arrested, charged and prosecuted by law enforcement authority. To reduce the 1isk, 
provincial bosses acquire political protection, either through connections or winning 
elect ions to obtain power. Under the unstable multi-paiiied coalition government, using 
connections is not appealing because power changes hands frequently, and bosses face 
the risk of relying on others to dispense protection for them. Having a political position 
is essential for protection from invest igation and prosecution. There are many examples 
showing how illegal entrepreneurs moved themselves from a vulnerable to an 
36 See, in particular, Chapter 7 on Phrae, in wh ich two tobacco-business famili es compete violently against 
each oth er in nati onal elect ions; and Chapter 8 on Nakhon Sawan where competing construction business 
owners fight wiU1 one another for MP seats, leading to many deaths. 
37 As exp lained in Chapter I, there are many overlappin g terms for the informal economy. In thi s research, 
I focus on th e ill egal economy. 
38 Pasuk , Sungsidh and Nual noi 1998: 7-8, 232 (quotation from page 7). These figures exclude several 
other un lawful business ventures such as trafficking of people to third countri es, trading in protected 
an imals and plants, and other forms of ill ega l gambling, like bookmaking on horse racing and boxing, 
billiard hall s, th e stock market lottery etc. The figure could amount to 20 percent of GNP if th ese were 
activities included (Pasuk, Sungsidh and Nualn oi 1998: 8). 
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"untouchable" position by being elected as MPs. 39 Being elected to parliament also gives 
access to allocation of legitimate rent-seeking opportunities. Rents and protection 
become two valuable "properties" emanating from patrimonial governmental offices. 
Once in power, provincial entrepreneurs-turned-legislators enrich themselves from both 
rent-seeking and illegal activities, as noted by Pasuk, Sungsidh and Nualnoi: "while 
there are many businessmen who seek rents without transgressing the line of criminality, 
ultimately the two spheres are closely enrneshed." 40 
In sum, with empowered parliamentary politics and rapid economic growth, the practice 
of rent-seeking and illegal business is connected to electoral politics. Their 
interconnectedness creates conditions for high-stakes elections, which leads to 
uncompromising competition and the use of violence in securing elective posts. The next 
section discusses the key characteristics of local power structures, political dynamics, 
and predominant figures. 
Local politics: terrain of power contestation 
Although rent-allocating and protection-dispensing occur in the capital, the primary 
battlegrounds are in the province. In order to make a political impression nationally, 
provincial elites have to strive for a solid local political base. Some locals launched their 
political career in the local administrative offices (district, municipal and provincial 
councils) before running for a national legislative position. The local elections trained 
them in electioneering skills and network building. Local political families usually put 
their relatives in these offices so they can acquire political experience and create local 
power bases.41 However, prior to decentralization (implemented in 1997), these local 
offices operated with only a small budget and limited political mandate, and were largely 
controlled by civil bureaucrats. Prominent elites regarded local offices as stepping stones 
to a more powerful and lucrative MP career. 
39 Prime examples are provincial bosses in Na khon Sawan and Nakhon Si Thammarat, two provinces rife 
with illegal activities, who abused their political office's power to protect their illegal business (see 
Chapter 8 and 9). 
40 Pasuk, Sungsidh and Nualnoi 1998: 5. Their study mentioned twenty to thirty MPs in the 1990s 
" prominent figures in the ill ega l economy either through direct participation, protection, or financing" 
(262). This is possibly a conservative estimate. My fie ld research on six provinces suggests deeper and 
wider interconnection between il legal businesses and politicians in the 2000s (see, in particular, Chapter 9 
on Nakhon Si Thammarat). 
41 Almost all influential families in my case studies follow this practice; the best examples are the Nirot 
fami ly ofNakhon Sa wan (Chapter 8) and the Angkinan family in Phetchaburi (Chapter I 0). 
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Since the 1979 election, each province witnessed an increase in provincial business-
cum-political elites, popularly called as jao pho (godfather), in national parliamentary 
politics. Their spectacular rises and political ro les had attracted attention from media 
observers and scholars. 42 In spite of widespread attention, there are some misconceptions 
that my study will clarify. The four main misinterpretations are: first, not every 
provincial businessman is invo lved in elections, and not all are jao pho; second, not 
every jao pho has a monopoly over provincial political and economic resources; third, 
business-cum-political elites' power is not static but changes over time; and last, they are 
not "men of violence" by nature. 
First , even though the local economic environment provides incentives for business 
elites to engage in politics, not all businesspeople enter politics. Several prefer business 
only and stay away from direct invo lvement in politics-particularly entrepreneurs 
whose businesses do not depend primarily on political connections or coercive power. 
For some businessmen, their revenue mainly come from the service sector such as 
hotels, shopping malls, and education; from trading (equipments, stationery, steel) ; or 
from manufacturing (sugar, textiles, glass, electronics, automobile parts). Instead of 
being enmeshed in risky political investment, they were able to enjoy direct access to the 
financial institutions in Bangkok or, in so me cases, fo reign investors, for loans and 
technology. This permits less reliance on local power and more reliance on market 
mechanisms. Despite the relatively small-scale local industry and manufacturing sector, 
some local figures were able to build their wealth from these low-risk businesses. And 
not all local businessmen entangled themselves in illegal business ventures. The vo lati le 
nature of provincial po litics scared off many businesspeople. 43 Families or individuals 
who have been active in politics, on the contrary, generally run businesses that need 
pol itical power to enhance and protect their wealth. These so -called "godfather fi gures" 
engaged in vio lence in electio ns. 
Second and third, not every provincial boss enj oys monopolistic power in their own 
provinces, and their acquired power should not be viewed as a permanent attribute. The 
power of Thai provincial bosses is more limited than genera lly perceived and portrayed , 
and the monopolist ic boss is the except ion rather than the ru le. Thai local bosses are far 
42 See the li st of important stud ies regarding the "provincial godfath ers" in Chapter I. 
43 A remarkable case is Nakhon Sawan, where provi ncial polit ics were dominated by underworld figures , 
making leg itimate businessmen stay away from politics (see Chapter 8). See also Th awa tchai (1998), 
Ekchai ( 1995) who identifi ed some families that have economi c bases in modern trade and manufacturing. 
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from being what Robert Nozick defines as a "minimal state," namely one "which enjoys 
an undisputed control over the use of force in a certain territory and protects everyone, 
whether they like it or not. "44 In comparison to their counterparts in African countries, as 
mentioned in Chapter 1, Thai bosses control limited territorial and coercive power. The 
flourishing "godfather" literature in the 1990s tended to portray the omnipotent image of 
the Thai provincial bosses, represented by only few spectacular cases. The colorful lives 
of kamnan Poh in coastal Chonburi, Charoen Phattanadamronchit (aka Sia Leng) in 
Khan Kaen, and Piya Angkinan in Phetchaburi are three most cited examples who 
overshadow (and distort) the actual political lives of the rest. The representation of these 
notable bosses is also inaccurate; instead of boundless and absolute power, they have 
had unstable and turbulent political careers. 45 The boss 's terrain is, in fact , confined to 
their home district or province. Only a very few managed to expand their power beyond 
their own province (and only for brief periods). Undoubtedly, most bosses had large 
businesses and controlled many subordinates. The power of local godfathers depends on 
their ability to monopolize the Jocal economy and political system as the absence of 
competition created considerable profits and privilege. However, a monopoly is a rare 
commodity and needs to be established and maintained, rather than occurring naturally. 
Each province has more than one ambitious figure or family with ambition to amass 
wealth and power at the expense of others. A degree of political competition thus exists 
in every province. The successful boss is the most competent and cunning in exercising 
his or her financial, political, and coercive resources to weaken and/or even eliminate 
their opponents. The path to securing a power monopoly, in certain circumstances, is 
tainted by violence. 
Apart from challenges from rivals, provincial bureaucratic elites contested godfathers ' 
power. In other words, godfathers have had to operate and exercise their power under an 
archaic bureaucratic structure long existed in the province since the absolute monarchy 
regime. It is misleading to think of them as local warlords or patrimonial lords who 
roamed freely in their territories, in which they operated like a parastate using power to 
administer and adjudicate, and control all activities and resources in the area. 46 Instead 
of functioning in the political landscape of a failed, crumbling, or dysfunctional state, 
44 Nozick 1974, Cited in Gambetta 1993: 7. 
45 See Chapter JO for Piya ' s and his Angkinan clan 's struggle. 
46 For example, the Philippines local bosses are able to possess enormous economic power and assume 
"quasi-military and quasi-judicial functions in their localities" (Hutchcroft 1998: 43; see al so Side! 1999; 
McCoy 1993). For the even more striking power of African warlord politi cs, see Reno 1998; Bayart, Elli s, 
and Hibou 1999; Weinstein 2006. 
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Thai provincial bosses emerged and existed under local power structures that had 
previously been controlled by a coterie of bureaucratic elites: the provincial governor, 
provincial department heads, district chiefs, sub-district heads, vi llage heads, as well as 
provincial police chiefs and military commanders. 47 The provincial bosses need to 
negotiate, cooperate, and/or sometimes strive against the state authorities to carve out 
their territorial power in their localities. 
In the past, under the period of absolute monarchy and the People Party's regime (1932-
1957), central rulers co-opted rural elites- bandits, monks, teachers, merchants- into 
government service, especially in remote areas beyond the state 's reach. The Thai state 
depended on them carrying out many tasks but, at the same time, tried to domesticate 
their influence over local people. Overall, they succeeded as the central government 
controlled more economic and coercive power. The mutual, but unbalanced, relationship 
continued under the military regime of Sarit and Thanom in the I 960s and I 970s. In the 
1980s, as discussed, the provincial business elites were relatively richer and wielded 
more power through political positions, and were thus more confident of asserting their 
power in their localities- they wanted to be patrons, rather than clients of top 
bureaucrats. The contestation of power between long-standing state authority and 
emerging bosses manifested differently from province to province.48 In provinces in 
which two warring factions fought or many warring factions battled bosses fierce ly 
fighting and weakening each other 's factions, the bmeaucrats enjoyed relative 
autonomy. Phrae is the best example of polarization, while Nakhon Sawan and Nakhon 
Si Thammarat were two fragmented provinces (see Chapter 7, 8, 9 for polarized and 
fragmented landscapes) . On the other hand , in provinces co mpletely contro lled by a 
47 Thai Roya l Army structure is divi ded into four regions (central , northeast, north, and south), 14 mi litary 
circles (manda las), and 36 mi litary districts (wi th provincial headquarters and commanders) in 36 
provinces. This structure origin all y dates back to the absolute monarchy of the late 19th century. The 
military district is located in a large or strategica ll y important province, but its territoria l power also 
covered adjacent provinces. For example, Nakhon' Sawan military district covers Na kh on Sawan, 
Kamphaeng Phet and Uthai Thani . All my case studies, except Phrae, are located mili tary bases. 
"Studies on Thai local politics in the 1990s provided different accounts of th e balance of power between 
the bureaucracy and elected politicians. Varyi ng interpretations, I argue, stem from different location of 
observation. Michael Ne lson's work on Chachoengsao (based on hi s fie ld research from October 1990 to 
Ma rch 1992) conc ludes that " th e bu reaucrat ic polity still seems to be very mu ch ali ve in the cou ntryside" 
(Nelson 1998: 3); Daniel Arghiros (200 I : 227), who conducted fie ld research in Ayu tthaya in 1989- 1990 
and 1995-1997, shared s imi lar conc lusions. However, he noticed a significant change that loca l 
businessmen had become pol itically stronger by the "accumulation of elected pos it ions." Oth er scholars 
foc used on the ri se of rura l godfa thers, especiall y James Ockey ( 1992; 1993) emphasized instea d the 
change of power ba lance, in which local notables were wielding stronger power than and no longer 
kow1owing to local bureaucrats). Both Nelson and Argh iros based th eir conclusion on fie ld research in 
provinces lack of dominant bosses, wh ile Ockey's in terpretation reli ed ma inly on accounts of promin ent 
godfathers in Chonburi, Phetchaburi, KJ1on Kaen, and Pichit. 
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single boss (or one clan), bureaucrats were under the boss's thumb (see prime example, 
Sanoh Thienthong ofSakeo, in Chapter 12). 
In conclusion, the wealth and power of provincial notables varied from province to 
province- some bosses were more successful in business and political ventures than 
others. There is no unified characterization or pattern of local boss rule. Any attempt to 
understand the dynamics of local power and patterns of electoral violence need to take 
this variation into account. There were only a few bosses who achieved a monopoly, 
which gave them high levels of rent and protection. The rest had to compete constantly 
against their opponents to acquire and maintain oligarchic positions. Several of them, 
after losing many elections, lost their fortunes and political standing leading to their exit 
from politics. Some political dynasties declined or even collapsed after losing their 
charismatic patriarchs and lacking capable successors. Others disintegrated through 
intra-clan conflicts. 49 Political bosses, therefore, emerge and disappear as a result of 
changing political and financial circumstances. It is mistaken to portray the godfather's 
power as ubiquitous and permanent. Often forgotten is the fact that Thai provincial 
bosses are a short-lived phenomenon. In contrast to the Philippine political dynasties that 
date to the early 20th century, the majority of Thai political clans entered politics after 
1973. Out of97 clans active in Thai politics from 1933 to 1996 (20 in the north, 21 in 
central, 31 in northeast, 17 in Bangkok, and 8 in the south), only JS local clans entered 
politics before the 1960s. And by 1996, all but two of these old clans had withdrawn or 
disappeared from national politics. so Their time in politics is relatively short: 25 percent 
of political families sustain power for only one or two terms of legislation, and of the 20 
percent intermittently stood in election, only half managed to stay in power for more 
than two terms. 51 Historically, their instability was caused by frequent military coups, 
which interrupted parliamentary institutions and the electoral process. Also, their short 
time in polit_ics meant these bosses were under severe pressure from both business rivals 
and the local state apparatus. Moreover, by the time they had succeeded in climbing to 
the top of power in 1996 (through the Banham administration), the political and 
49 See, for example, the Ketchart family in Nakhon Si Thammarat (Chapter 9), whose power declined after 
their family head passed away. For intra-clan conflicts, see Phetchaburi (Chapter I 0). 
50 One is the Khamprakob in Nakhon Sawan and another is the Angkinan in Phetchaburi. These figures 
based on calculation from data in Thawatchai (1998: 42), which defined political clan as "any family that 
have more than one family member in the parliament" (not necessary at the same time) during 1933 to 
1996. Ifhe counted only the families that have more than one family member at the same time, the number 
of political clans would be significantly diminished. 
51 Thawatchai 1998: 335. 
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economic landscape had been transformed in a way that seriously reduced their power 
(see Chapter 5). 
My research suggests that the situations most prone to electoral violence were on the 
pathway from oligarchy to monopoly or from monopoly to oligarchy. When ambitious 
bosses are not content with their power-sharing mode (with fe llow bosses) and aim for a 
monopoly, -elections turn violent. On the other hand, when monopoly power is 
challenged, bosses fight violently to retain their power. 52 To understand the role of Thai 
rural "godfathers" in democratic politics and their invo lvement in electoral violence, one 
must understand their ultimate vulnerability to challenges from rivals. 
Last, provincial bosses are not "men of vio lence. " They do not employ violence out of 
whim or use violent methods routinely or randomly. They do not use violence because 
they are "barbaric", or because they are acting according to a local culture that honors 
the practice of bloodletting or vengeful feuding. The political godfather is not a bandit, 
outlaw, or common criminal; the comparison and historical connection between these 
categories made by some scholars is misleading. Political godfathers are a distinct socio-
political entity. They aim to be the local supreme leader, and thereby see petty criminals 
or local thugs as obstacles to order they are seeking to construct or maintain in their 
controlled territory. 53 For political bosses, as explained by Diego Gambetta on his classic 
work on the Sicilian mafia, violence constituted "a means, not an end ; a resource, not the 
fina l product" to achieve political and business goals. "It may be argued," Gambetta 
explains, that boss po wer "rests on the abil ity to use force, but it does not fo llow that it 
coincides with it. " 54 Even though coercion plays a crucial ro le in capital accumulatio n 
and political contestation in Thai local politics, coercive force operates under a particular 
logic. 
As the pattern shows, the use of violence in Thai elections has specifrc targets and 
limited scope. Not every boss used vio lence in electoral campaigns, and for those who 
did, violence was not used repeatedly. Otherwise, the number of electoral vio lent 
incidents would be much higher. Precisely because political bosses perceived vio lence as 
52 The dynamic is simil ar to Am eri can gang warfa re (see Schneider 1999). 
53 Chapter 12 examines how politi ca l boss Sanoh Thienth ong establi shed order in hi s Sa Ka eo province by 
elimina ting loca l thugs. 
54 Gambetta I 993: 2. The di scussion in thi s secti on was signifi cant ly influenced by conceptua l and 
th eoreti ca l argum ent s elaborated in Gambetta 's work . 
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a tool, they employed it only when necessary. Once the situation changed, the tool was 
dropped. Thai bosses ' behavior is, in fact , not unique as studies elsewhere have found 
other powerful organizations who specialize in controlling coercive means (mafiosi, 
gangsters, protection rackets) generally seek "compliance without violence if possible," 
and their ideal "is to manipulate others without damaging anything."55 Apposite are the 
examples of bosses who monopolized their respective provinces, and thus local 
government functionaries. There is no need to use vio lence when one has alternative 
means to manipulate, fix, rig, or steal votes. 56 
The existence of jao pho in any province does not automatically render the province 
prone to electoral violence, as assumed or implied by many studies. For example, in 
November 1991 , the Police Department estimated there were 97 godfathers in border 
and/or coastal provinces, and 71 in the rest of the country. In total, police identified 25 
provinces outside Bangkok as areas plagued by godfathers. 57 But the data on electoral 
vio lence showed that violent deaths and injuries took place in 15 provinces in the March 
1992 election, and only 11 provinces in the September 1992 election. As Gambetta 
explains, to define "bosses" as violent men is a grave misunderstanding. Political 
circumstances and only certain kinds of threat make some bosses prone to violence. 
Even a perfectly "benevo lent patron," if the situation demanded, could engage in 
violence to become powerful. 
The next section elaborates the demand and supply aspects of electoral violence and 
explains how specific actors, mechanisms and processes produce violent outcomes in 
elections. 
Order and business of political murders: the demand and supply of electoral 
violence 
If there is no conflict over vested interest, there will be no killings in 
elections. It is not worth it. No candidate shoots their opponents to win 
55 Ti lly 2003: 198 , 36 (respectively). 
56 See, for example, electoral competi tion in Buri.ram (Chapter l l ) and Sa Kaeo (Chapter 12) after clans 
dominated th e provinces. A monopoli stic "patron" like Banharn Silpa-archa had no reason to engage in 
any coercive methods, because he and hi s fa mi ly achieved absolute provincial control. Suphanburi 's 
elections were therefore ca lm and peacefu l. For Banharn 's domination, see N ishizak i 201 1. 
57 Figures quoted in Sombat 2000: 62, 7 l. 
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election just because they really want to use their MP position to help 
poor villagers. None at all. 58 
The electoral murder market developed out of a need to eliminate opposition from those 
who sought office for personal gains. Provincial bosses drove the demand fo r violence in 
the 1980s-1 990s, however, they did not carry out the attacks or assassinations. They 
operated on the demand side of the vio lence, while another group -"vio lent 
entrepreneurs" and "vio lent specialists"-operated on the supply side. Prominent bosses 
needed a supply of vio lence to eliminate both rivals who imposed threats to their attempt 
at power monopoly and disloyal subordinates who put their political network and control 
over resources in jeopardy. 
Demand for murder: provincial bosses and their networks of influence 
The emergence ofrepresentative democracy at a time of poor political party institutions, 
combined with a lack of civic associational life, opened up a vast political opportunities 
for the local notables to enter. Since military rule weakened and interrupted Thailand ' s 
political party institutionalization, parties had never had a chance to develop their long-
term political strategy and policy, or their branches and mass bases support outside the 
capital. They therefore were forced to depend on local brokers to conduct campaigns and 
canvass votes for them. The absence of party-oriented, programmatic politics, in tum, 
made the majority of candidates lack of alternative means of differentiation; they have to 
rely on personal popularity and support network. In this way, the occupation known as 
"liua khanaen" (vote canvassers or brokers) emerged. The role of vote canvasser can be 
traced back to as early as the 1940s, even though it carried a different name back then. 59 
Usually, candidates recruited local notables to act as their vote canvassers. These locals 
might be local goverrunent officials such as sub-di strict heads, village headmen, 
teachers, local merchants, or highly respected local leaders such as monks, and 
strongmen. These people assumed the role of vote canvasser to enhance their status in 
the loca l community and to obtain money and power from their supported candidates. 
58 interview, provi ncial councilor an d dominant clan member, Phetchaburi , 15 December 2009. 59 Journ ali sts used the term "Hua na Nua i Khum Siang" (vote con trolling chief) in th e I 940 to I 950s 
(S ingha khom 1968). Prior to th e 1969 electi on, the term " hua khana en" appeared more oft en in the 
newspaper and li terature (Chongkon 1974). For th e translation, scholars used many term s interchangeabl y 
to trans late the word "hua khanaen," among th em : vote ca nvassers, vote brokers, vote so licitors, and vot e 
gatherers. But "vote ca nvasser'' is most comm onl y used. In this resea rch I fo ll ow the popular usage of vote 
canavsser. 
80 
And because political parties were weak, the electoral success of most candidates 
depended on the strength of their own personal networks--on how many local brokers 
they could win over to work on their behalf- rather than party policy or organization. 
Personal circles of influence play a crucial role in shaping electoral competition and the 
dynamics of politics, especially in rural areas. Voter mobilization by local networks is 
the key to electoral victory. Thereby, prior to 1997, the relationship between a politician 
and the local vote canvassers established the most crucial link in electoral campaigns. If 
candidates selected the wrong canvassers, i.e. the ones without significant status or 
networks, they could be doomed to fail. 
Vote canvassers administered the election campaign, planned strategies, visited 
constituencies, and distributed goods and services, including hard cash (in vote-buying 
operations). If the situation required, they also engaged in smear campaigns and electoral 
fraud, cheating, and misconduct. By design, the Block Vote 's multi-member districts 
created large electoral constituencies and thereby forced candidates to build as large a 
network as possible. The more powerful and affluent the candidate, the more high 
quality vote canvassers he or she could command. Over time, the vote canvassing 
system developed from simple circles of friends and families into a complex, pyramid-
like structure with the candidate positioned at the top.60 
Chart 3.1: Vote canvassing networks 
' ""';'"' 
supporting 
vote canvasser 
60 The information and analysis on vote canvassers and th eir networks is drawn from Som bat 1987; Pichai, 
Som ch et, and Vora wit 1988; Phoemphong 1990; Arghiros 1995 ; Ca llahan and McCargo 1996. For analysis 
of vote canvass ing network 's development after 1997, see Anyarat 2007; 2010. 
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The more complex the networks, the more decentralized they are, which led to the 
division of labor among people in the same network. Candidates typically had no direct 
contact with low-level vote canvassers, let alone a majority of voters in the district, as 
they farmed out all tedious work through the chief vote canvassers. The candidates only 
recruited the main vote canvassers, who usually were close friends, family members or 
long-time associates. The main vote canvassers were responsible for creating networks 
by managing other brokers at the lower levels, channeling money through them, 
assigning them their tasks, and taking care of them after elections. One important 
advantage of creating a highly hierarchical organization is that the candidate is distanced 
from, and commonly has no knowledge of, vote-buying and other unlawful operations 
carried out by their minions. 61 But electioneering's outsourcing has it downside. Even 
though most candidates want to know every detail of their election campaign, they 
cannot afford the time and capacity to control everything taking place in their network. 
Monitoring thus became a fundamental problem. 
When the boss fai led to keep a tight grip on his subordinates, a wide range of 
unfavorable behaviors took place. Dishonest vote canvassers enriched themselves by 
embezzling campaign (and vote-buying) money before it reaches voters. It was common 
to find that voters received only 40 or 50 percent of original value set by the boss, which 
leads to disappointment and anger directed toward candidates (not the vote canvassers). 
Some vote canvassers were paid but did not collect votes.62 Also, greedy vote canvassers 
co uld switch sides and worked for a higher bidder or gather votes for more than one 
candidate or party (who are rivals) . Locals called this behavior "nok song Ima" (two -
headed bird) . These dishonorable, defiant and double-dealing behaviors put the boss's 
election campaign and the who le political empire in peril as the vote canvassers 
controlled resources and inside information about the campaign and business activities, 
including the boss's underground ventures. Moreover, the boss loses respect if he allows 
insubordination to go unpunished. In this circumstance, provincial elites use violence to 
contro l and command respect and conso lidate power. The use of coercion thus served 
the long-term purpose of authority maintenance, rather than only the immediate goal of 
po ll winning. Nevertheless, the more often coercive force was emplo yed, the clearer it 
reflected the weakness of the candidates and hi s patronage network. Frequent internal 
61 For example, when vote canvassers are caught by th e police on charge of preparing money to buy votes, 
they do not revea l for whom th ey are workin g or tell the poli ce that their bosses are aware of th eir action (see Chapter 11 for the real incident occu rred in Buriram in 1995). 
62 See all case studies in part 3 and 4 for these politica l beha viors. 
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violence reflected a losing grip on supporters, and failing to demand loyalty from them. 
As discussed in the first chapter, to understand the dynamics of local politics and 
electoral violence, one needs to go beyond the extant patron-client framework. Many 
vote canvassers work as "election entrepreneurs," enriching themselves by being a 
political broker; they do not carry out the job because they owe any patron a debt of 
gratitude. Thereby they worked for the highest bidder or those who have a better chance 
of winning (because they knew they could benefit more from elected MPs). Instead of 
engaging in a "long-term, enduring, mutual" relationship, many vote canvassers built 
short-term, instrumental relations with the candidates for whom they worked. And as the 
commercialization of electoral politics accelerated in the 1990s, campaigns witnessed 
increasing numbers of brokerage-type canvassing replacing the old clientelistic style.63 
This is why vote canvassers were primary target of violence in elections. 
Besides punishing vote canvassers who double-crossed them or were incompetent and 
corrupt, candidates also used violence to deal with threats from outsiders. Particularistic 
campaigns, in contrast with programmatic or ideological campaign, were typically filled 
with personal conflicts and animosities because candidates had no institutional support 
or policy platforms (see the discussion regarding electoral and party system above) .64 All 
political parties attempted to win the support of and recruit local godfathers to run under 
their banner. If all influential bosses campaigned together under._ the same party, the 
competition was relatively smooth. But when rival bosses ran against each other under 
different parties, elections were tense and had the potential to tum violent. Nevertheless, 
rivalry among bosses had not always been so lved with vio lence. In some provinces, 
competing bosses or families came to an agreement of power-sharing by dividing 
territory, number of seats, and/or rents among themselves because they realized they had 
no capacity or inclination to destroy all other groups and monopolize the power. 65 At the 
same time, the bosses who enjoyed the monopolistic power could refrain from using 
violence (as discussed earlier) . 
63 Every scholar, both Thai and foreign , studying Thai loca l politics in the 1990s observes the 
phenomenon of "commercialization of electoral politics." See, among them, Sw·m and McCargo 1997; 
Sombat 1993; Somrudee 1993 ; Pichai, Somchet, and Vorawit 1988; Phoemphong 1990; Arghiros 1993 ; 
Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994. Importantl y, popular fiction and non-fiction books (in Thai) noticed the 
ex istence of vote canvasser as a profit-making occupation, which emerged under the parliamentary 
democracy, well before scholars. See Setthaphon 1976; Ton 1980; Khomkrit 1984; Withun 1986. 
64 A nuan ced conceptual and theoretical discussion regardu1g programmatic and particularistic politi cs is 
offered in Hutchcroft (forthcoming 2013). 
65 This kind of situation occurred in Buriram politics before 1995 (Chapter 11), and in Phetchaburi after 
l 992 (Chapter I 0). 
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Importantly, findings from six provinces show that, when conflict arose, provincial elites 
attempted to employ all non-coercive means to solve their disputes. These included 
negotiation, manipulation, deal-making, bluff, deceit , bribes, and exchange of interest. 
For political bosses, threats of violence are preferable to the actual use of violence. Truly 
powerful bosses deployed threat persuasively so their opponents comply before violence 
erupts.66 Violence was a last resort when other possibilities had been exl;iausted, and 
when bosses face stiff resistance. Evidence from this thesis suggests two circumstances 
in which bosses are recalcitrant or unwilling to cooperate. First, when they wish to 
acquire a political monopoly. This usually happen when a young but ambitious 
generation of provincial elites replaced their predecessors; or when the business fortune 
of one political boss was enhanced considerably, surpassing others, to the point they 
believe they can dislodge all of their competitors and be the supreme boss. 67 The second 
dangerous circumstance is when a monopoly is seriously challenged. After enjoying 
rents and power without having to share them with anyone else for many years, top 
bosses and their clans did not accept the idea of having their opposition taking over their 
political enclave.68 In a nutshell , electoral violence is most likely to occur when the 
power monopoly is at stake. Polarized and fragmented power structures therefore 
facil itate conditions for violent power struggle. 
The po litical processes and logics behind the electoral violence help explain the type of 
candidates invo lved in the undertaking of violent actions. Rent-seeking businessmen or 
illegal business owners (boss-type candidates) dream of monopolizing power. Poor or 
professional cand idates (teachers, lawyers, doctors, retired civil officers, NGOs, 
journalists) do not have the capacity or political ambition fo r a monopo ly on power; 
therefore they were not a threat fo r provincial bosses. 69 When faced with these tame 
contenders, boss-type candidates need not resort to violence because they can defeat 
them by exercising a stronger war chest and vote-canvassing network. Vio lence is only 
66 There is rich evidence of all th ese tac tics in all six case studies. The godfath ers in Phetchaburi, Buriram 
and Sa Kaeo are no exception . 
67 Elections in Buriram started to turn violent precisely when th e Chidchob clan wanted to monopolize 
provi ncial poli tics in th e mid 1990s (see Chapter I I). Electi ons in Nakh on Sa wan deteri orated violently 
when th e emerg in g local notable at tempted to topple all other old dynas ti es in the late 1990s (Chapter 8). 68 Thi s dynamic took place in Phrae when th e Wongwan fa mily lost their control to their former alli es, th e 
Supasiri fa mily, and th ey attempted to take it back. The Supasiris, on th e other hand, did everything to 
protect their political domin ance (Chapter 7). It also happened in Na kh on Si Thamm ara t when th e most 
influentia l clan, th e Ketchart , stru ggled to save their long-standin g politi ca l terri tory (Chapter 9). 69 Beyond bus inessmen, these are comm on background occupa ti ons of T hai M Ps. Among 97 poli tica l 
fami li es, 60 famil ies ca me from business fa mi lies, 28 from bureaucracy, seven from law, and two from 
med ia (Thawatchai 1998: 332). 
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necessary when they are confronted with the same political species-the rival boss-in 
the struggle for power monopoly. Electoral violence in Thailand is a war of the "strong" 
against the "strong." Most casualties, however, were supporters and those from the 
lower ranks of the boss network (see the violence pattern in Chapter 4). 
Over time, pre-eminent provincial elites refrained from killing rival elites as they learnt 
that doing so was too costly for all sides.70 Killing high-profile rival candidates during 
elections brought negative public attention, police investigations, and immense political 
pressure. More importantly, the family of the dead comes after the murderers and 
masterminds for vengeance. Gunmen are reluctant to take the job; they think it "too big a 
deal. " 71 The murder of Phetchaburi top boss kamnan Chong Khlaikhlueng in the 1979 
election led to rampant revenge killings (see Chapter 10), demonstrating the deadly 
consequences of high-profile murder. Widespread blood spilling made everybody feel 
unsafe and was bad for business. These consequences taught other bosses a lesson: target 
only minions so they all could be spared from the anarchic violence of (electoral) 
warfare. After all, some bosses said, they were not barbaric, but businessman-cum-
politicians who calculate the costs and benefits of violent acts. 72 
Violence and intimidation is truly not the only strategy to win electoral competition. 73 
As Allen Hicken and many other scholars argue, candidates pursues..a variety of personal 
strategies to win votes, including "targeting government pork and patronage to a 
candidate's constituents," "relying on name and frame to cultivate a personal vote," 
"using patron-client relationships to engender loyalty and support," or direct vote 
buying. Nevertheless, the fact that the coercive method is not adopted by every 
candidate is not because "most candidates lack the sufficient resources (money, men, 
and connections) to use violence as their primary electoral strategy."74 As discussed, first 
of all, the vio lent strategies were adopted by only certain type of candidates (the political 
boss) and under specific circumstanc;es, and they served broader business-political 
purposes than merely gaining votes. Eliminating disloyal vote canvassers might not have 
70 In terview, Phetchaburi boss, Phetchaburi , 17 December 2009; interview, Nakhon Sawan boss, 3 
September 2010. See further discussion in Chapter 8 and 10 on the dangerous consequences of the elite 
killing. 
71 Gunmen know that they will get an enormous payment for taking the job, but most of them are also 
aware that the murderer of a candidate almost always gets caught. Interview, underworld protection 
racket ' s owner, Bangkok, 6 April 2012. 
72 Interview, Phetchaburi boss, Phetchaburi , 17 December 2009; interview, Nakhon Sawan boss, 3 
September 20 I 0. 
73 Hicken 2002 and 2007. 
74 Hicken 2007: 53-54. 
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brought the bosses electoral victory but could have been seen as necessary for respect 
within his group. "Money, men, and connections" are not obstacles to the use of 
violence as the supply of violence in Thailand is relatively cheap and abundant. It is the 
political demand that detennines the occurrence of electoral vio lence. 
After elaborating the demand-side of electoral violence, the next section discusses the 
supply of violence. 
Supplying the means of murder: gunmen and killing dens 
From the 1980s to the 1990s, capitalist development, parliamentary politics and 
professional gunmen developed hand in hand. The increased demand for coercive force 
(in settling disputes or eliminating business-political rivals) generated a supply of 
violence. Provincial elites authorized, subsidized and financed viol ent acts, but, as 
explained earlier, they preferred to keep themselves as far as possible from the 
bloodshed. The violence thus needed to be executed secretly and methodically. 
The ex istence of "profess ional gunmen" in Thailand thus served a specific function, 
politically and economically- albeit erratically. The gurunen, unlike provincial bosses, 
specialize in exercising phys ical fo rce; violence is a means and an end, a reso urce and 
also the fina l products . Violence is their so le commodity. They are, according to the 
literature, "specialists in violence" or "violent specialists" : "who control [coercive] 
means of inflicting damage on person and objects" and command "extensive skills" in 
using vio lence. On the average, Charles Tilly argues, "they deliver dama ge more 
efficient ly and effectively than other kind of po litical actors. They deliver damage under 
disc ipl ine" and "often they do so at the behest of employers who themselves never 
engage direct ly in damaging acts. "75 As mentioned in the previous chapter, before the 
1970s when the Thai bureaucratic state succeeded in contro lling coercion, most vio lent 
specia lists worked within or on behalf of government. By the late 1970s, with new 
national and lo cal political settings, the Thai state had lost dominant co nt ro l and large 
numbers of violent special ists operated outside government, inc luding "men in uniform" 
who started to exercise their coercive power fo r personal material gains. 76 
7; Till y 2003: 35, and 232-233 . 
76 In general, government violent specialists in clude military personnel , police, guards, jailers, 
executi oners, and judicial offi cers. Non-governm ent violent speciali sts in clude private security guards, 
pri va te police, paramilitary forces , militi as, vigilant e groups, guerrilla fi ght ers, terrori sts, thugs, bandits, 
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A large supply of hired gunmen emerged in the late 1970s. These mercenaries can be 
classified into three categories by different degree of institutionalization, 
commoditization, and independence from the provincial boss network: first, gunmen 
working directly under bosses or bosses ' gunmen; second, gunmen working for a "den 
of hired gun" or "a hit men company" 77 ; and, third, independent or sideline gunmen. 
Each type of gunman has a different modus operandi, and one person can shift along the 
way or occupy more than one category. 
Three types of gunmen: boss's gunmen, hired assassins, and independent killers 78 
Boss's gunmen: clientelistic killers 
It is important to appreciate that all outlaws and robbers require 
protection in order to operate as bandits and to survive at all. If they lack 
protection, they remain lonely wolves to be quickly dispatched, and 
those who hunt them down may be the landlord 's retainers, the police, or 
the peasants. Our task is therefore first to discover the people on whom 
the bandit relies. 79 
Boss's gunmen are part of the boss 's personal network- an employee, whose task is 
essentially being a violent enforcer. Political bosses recruit assassins for protection. 80 
The boss ' s gunmen are mainly local thugs, criminals, former security guards, petty 
gangsters, and moonlighting policemen and military officers. Compared to other types of 
gunmen, they are protected strongly by their patrons who are influential politicians. 
enforcers, gangsters, mafias, as well as gladiators, boxers, bullfighters, and wrestlers. The separation is not 
always clear cut as, under certain conditions, government recruits non-state violent force to carry out 
(rather secretive or dirty) government missions. See Nagengast 1994; Menjivar and Rodriguez 2005; 
Sluka 2000; Tilly 2003. 
77 Commonly known in Thai as sum muepuen rapchang. 
78 Information on boss's gunmen, hLred guns, and independent hit men are mainly drawn from several 
confidential interviews and the following sources: Pongsak 1998, 2002; Worawat 2010; Dittita 2005; 
Chavalit 2007; Suriyan 1989, 2001; Piak 2004, 2005a, 20056; Khan 1998; Nari I 2002; Narong 2002; 
Chaiwat 2011; Somkiat 2011; Sirirat 2005; Matichon criminal news section 1989, 1995; Special criminal 
news unit 1993; and the Research and Development Division of the Royal Thai Police Department 2004, 
2005 (unpublished). 
79Blok 1972: 498. 
80 In the same way that Indian political elites recruited wrestlers and local thugs, Russian politicians 
deployed gang members, and the Philippine bosses built their coteries of goons to protect their political 
enclaves. On the case of India, see Brass 1997, Wilkinson 2006; on Russian case, see Volkov 2002; on the 
Philippines, see McCoy 1993. 
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Using this type of gunman reduces chances of being caught or prosecuted by the state 
authorities. At the same time, it is risky because the violence could be easily traced back 
to the local politician. It is not easy to access this type of assassin as they are, 
technically, not a gun for hire. Their first and fo remost job is to provide security for their 
boss and/or oversee their boss 's business empire. Clients who want to use the boss's 
gunmen need to be the boss's friends. 81 Usually bosses lend their gunmen to only their 
associates or trusted political allies. It is common that a boss in one province has 
connections with fellow bosses in other provinces and they share mercenaries. 
Occasionally, bosses request gunmen from friends (when their own gunmen are under 
government blacklist). Also, bosses provide hiding places for friends' gunmen. 82 
Gunmen assume a specific role in the personal support network of politicians. They are 
not vote brokers or political entrepreneurs. Vote canvassers and gunmen are two 
different types and separate sets of people. Their tasks assigned by the boss during the 
elections are different. The former's task is to manage the election campaign, visit 
constituents and gather votes, but the latter 's task is to provide security for the boss 
and/or to deploy coercive fo rce against enemies. Under some circumstances, gunmen 
became invo lved more closely in the electoral campaign. Their job is to block or frighten 
rival vote canvassers: 
many times vote buying required or was buttressed by coercive force. 
Because some of our competitors have local thugs, some of whom are 
armed, blocking us from their territories. So we need to have our own 
force, either police under our payro ll or hoodlums, to show them that we 
are not afraid. Otherwise you could not buy votes even though you have 
plenty of money. 83 
Therefore gurunen and vo te· canvassers require different skil l sets and personalities . 
There have been only a few exceptional cases of people who took on the dual ro le of 
81 Pongsa k 1998: 6 1-63. 
82 In terview, former Chonburi boss 's gunman , Chonburi, 14 August 20 11. 
83 Interview, und erworld protection racket ' s owner, Bangkok, 6 April 20 I 2. This underworld boss used to 
provide hi s (violenl) service to some politicians and parties, in Bangkok and some provinces in tl1e south 
and the north , in the 1995 and 1996 general elections. See also the incidents in Phrae (Chapter 7) and 
Buriram (Chapter 11 ) showin g tl1 e use of coercive force in supp ort of vote-buying operati ons. 
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assassin and vote broker.84 On the other hand, there were few other cases in which 
politically skillful gunmen were supported by their political boss to run for elections, but 
this kind of practice was rare and uncommon as well. One exceptional case was a 
prominent gunman nicknamed "Chaikhao," who miraculously progressed from boss 's 
gunmen to mayor and then the election campaign leader for the Chart Pattana Party in 
Chonburi in the September 1992 election. He was shot dead a few weeks before the 
general election and hence had no chance to celebrate the victory of his team. 85 Even 
though having gurunen as vote canvassers or elected local politicians provide the bosses 
some advantages, their reckless and precarious lives make them unpopular choice for 
holding political position for the bosses. 86 
Influential provincial bosses usually employ more than one gunman. Normally, bosses 
do not ass ign assassinations to their closet _aides (i.e. personal driver or bodyguard) as 
the police could trace back to them easily. · A low-profile henchman would be chosen 
instead. Mostly, gunmen kill without payment as they already receive salary and other 
benefits from their boss. In the 1990s, a wealthy boss would pay 1,000-2,000 baht a day 
to his gunmen. However, sometimes gunmen earn extra pay for difficult jobs or external 
jobs requested by the boss 's friends. 87 When the gunmen are in trouble with authorities, 
bosses bail them out. Some bosses paid the police prior to the murder to ensure the case 
would not be investigated. If gunmen are imprisoned, bosses take care of their families. 88 
The demise of a boss naturally leads to the disintegration of his gangs of gunmen. 
Gurunen have to look fo r protection from a new boss, or otherwise enter the business of 
84 For example, a famed Phetchaburi gunman nicknamed "Phon" (1961 -1997), who was a gunslinger for a 
formidable village headman, but at the same time a capable vote canvasser who helped collect votes for 
the village headman ' s boss winning MP elections several times. 
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"Chaikhao" was Conburi boss's right hand man trusted to oversee the touri st dis_trict ' s illegal 
businesses. The police bad charged him for many murders but never succeeded in prosecuting him. After 
being elected mayor, he seemed untouchable. lnterview, forme r Chonburi boss 's gunman, Chonburi, 14 
August 20 11, and see also Nari! 2002 and Wattana 2005: 30-35. 
86 There was a case of former Phetchaburi MP helped his gunman, son of local Islamic clergy, become 
vi llage headman in his hometown. This was an exceptional case as the father of the gunman happened to 
be a respectable figure in the community and the gunman helped protect villagers from petty thieves. For 
the boss, to have his gunman elected as a public official was beneficial as the gunman cou ld then 
legitimately carry weapon in public. See the fascinating case of the Muslim gunman in Pongsak 1998: 83-
98. 
87 See examples of boss' s gunmen operations in Phrae (Chapter 7) and Buriram (Chapter 11). The police 
succeeded in linking the assassination to the bosses' families. Also see informative interview of gunman 
working for an MP in the northeast in Worawat 2010: 95. 
88 Interview, experienced lawyers who had represented many gunmen, Phetchaburi, 18 Apri l 20 12. For 
example, the Phetchaburi boss had to pay 60,000 baht to the police so that his Muslim gunman was 
released from prison. After that the boss fielded his gunman to run for the electi on to obtain protection 
(Pongsak 1998: 83-98). 
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hired gun. 89 The operation of boss 's gunmen underwent noticeable change after the mid 
1980s. The number of gunmen working under provincial elites diminished and the boss-
gunman relationship became more fragile, unstable, and less clientelistic. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the patron-client model that has dominated the studies of local relations in 
Thailand, including boss-gunman relations, is insufficient to understand the local 
political dynamics. It fail s to explain the complexity of the gunmen' s world in Thai 
society which evolved from a boss model to a business model. Some boss's gunmen still 
exist but they sinmltaneo usly operate as hired gunmen (with or without their boss's 
consent). Financial gain has become the motivation for killings rather than returning a 
favor or seeking revenge on behalf of bosses. 
The legend of Phet Thamrongdaeng (aka Koming) marks the shift from clientelistic 
killings to political killings as business in Thailand which began in the period 1980s to 
1990s. Koming started out as a fisherman before he became a gang leader in the central 
and the south. Later he became a pirate, robbing and killing many boat people and 
migrants from Vietnam, and became involved in the smuggling of goods and arms. An 
influential boss-turned-MP in Prachuap Khiri Khan recruited Koming to work as hi s 
right-hand man, overseeing his underground business empire. He excelled at eliminating 
competition and making handsome profits for his boss. Within a few years, he attracted 
gunmen fro m the centra l and southern regions to work for him. With his boss's approval 
and a large gang of gunmen under his control, Koming developed his contract killing 
business. At its peak in the late 1980s, Koming's "killing company" had roughly 200 hit 
men for hire, the largest gurunen den in the country. This den was located in Prachuap 
Khir i Khan but took jobs in the central, the south and Bangkok, including many election-
related murders of the 1980s and 1990s. When Koming was arrested in 1992, the 
business was taken over by other dens.90 
89 Th e case o f in fa mous gunm an "Nuay muang petch ," (Nuay of Phetchaburi ) who started h is career 
work ing with powerful Phetchaburi boss kamnan Chong Kh laikhl ueng is an example. After kamnan 
Chong was shot dead in th e 1979 e lection , "Nuay muang petch" moved to work for kamnan Poh in 
Chonburi . In the en d, he worked ind ependent ly as a h ired gun den 's owner in Phetchaburi (Pi ak 2004: 33-
55). 
90 TI1 e poli ce apprehended KomiJ1g on 27 September 1992 and his henchm an and 5.4 ki logram s of heroin . 
He was prosecut ed and sent enced for drug traffi ck in g. Th e informati on on Kom in g 's life and his g unm en 
den are drawn fr om spec ial criminal news un it 1993: 5-17; Suriyan 200 I : 59-7 1 · Piak 2004 : 55-5 8. 
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Hired gunmen: contract killers 
Do murders happen because of gambling? Well, anything involving 
vested interests can lead to murder. So can politics. So can land dealings. 
So can cheating on commission fees for land deals. Newspapers always 
link gambling with murders. This is not true. Murder can happen 
anywhere, even in the music business. We see contract killings all the 
time (Chatchawan Kong-udom).91 
The involvement of contract hit men in electoral violence has been reported since the 
1975 election, and by the mid-1980s professional hired guns had taken over electoral 
killings. The political murder of a former MP from Samut Songkram on 16 November 
1976 signaled the emergence of private violence. According to the police, the death of 
the MP stemmed from political conflict with his opposing candidate during the 
campaign. A few months after the election, a team of hit men shot him dead with heavy 
weapons at close range. Two weeks later, the police arrested one of the perpetrators. The 
arrested gunman confessed that he had received 30,000 baht to undertake this job, and 
his team was comprised of three members (whose team leader was an off-duty soldier 
dismissed from his unit due to misconduct). Based on police investigation, these "hired 
gangs for murder" were also contracted to kill other politicians. 92 
Hired gunmen work for anyone who has enough money to pay them. They are more 
accessible, impersonal, efficient, and entrepreneurial- professional business operators in 
the purest sense. A hired gunman is a laborer who uses his skills in the use of fo rce to 
make profits. As a profession, hit men accumulate skill , develop contacts, build 
organization, and calculate the cost and benefit of each job. The business of hired 
gunmen was linked to the growth of organized crime and underground business in urban 
Bangkok in the 1950s. Hired guns provid ed protection to illegal economic sectors 
(gambling, drug, prostitution) by eliminating rivals, trouble makers, or "unexpected 
difficulties."93 In the late 1970s, the co ntract killings expanded into and became 
connected with electoral competition. With the growing demand, the business made 
91 Pasuk , Sungsidh, and Nualnoi 1998: 21. Chatchawan Kong-udom is well kn own in th e Bangkok 
underworld and one of the most powerful casino owners in Thailand. He cultivated close relationships with 
many police and mili tary figures, poli ticians and parties. ln 2000, he was overwhelmingly elecied Bangkok 
senator. 
92 Thai Rath , 17, 18, 20, 30 November 1976; also see Anu 2002: 63-65. 
93 See Suriyan 1989 for a firsthand accoun t of the development ofa hired gun . 
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enormous profit and attracted a lot of people. Overtime, the hired gun market became 
structured, well-established, and competitive. 
Like Koming, many former boss gunmen ran hired-gunmen dens, recruiting and 
controlling assassins. Drug traffickers and gambling den owners also invested in hired 
gunmen as another branch of their illegal businesses.94 In Charles Tilly's terms, these 
hired gun' s agents assumed a role of "entrepreneurs of violence" who played critical 
roles in "activating, connecting, coordinating, and representing participants in violent 
encounters."95 They act as intermediaries by bringing vio lence specialists together, 
meeting with the clients, and facilitating (violent) business transaction. Gunmen agents 
are responsible for recruiting hit men, planning schemes, and providing logistics and 
equipment. 
Usually, gunmen do not have direct contact with the client who hired them. Job s come to 
them through agents or the den owner. This is a precautionary practice for both sides as 
the clients do not want to be linked to the culprits in any circumstances. Gunmen are 
also afraid of being "eliminated" by their influential clients if they failed in the job and 
are considered as a loose end or a person who knows too many secret. As one gunman 
noted, "if things had gone wrong we would be killed to cut the links in order to protect 
the clients. "96 Therefore it was better for both sides not to know the identity of each 
other. Moreover, gunmen normally have no know ledge of the client ' s motive fo r 
murder, and, in some cases, not even the true identity of the victims. Their agents 
usually provided them with only vague details of victims. From the agents ' perspective, 
the less the hit men know about their job, the more effective they will be.97 
The hired gurunan usually works with partners. The size of the team cou ld be varied, 
from a duo of two (gurunan and driver) to a large team of up to ten people (gunmen, 
drivers, plotters, navigators, etc.). The disadvantages of wo rking in a large team are· 
twofold, namely less pay and more chance of a leak. However, large teams are needed 
when the job invo lves a high-profile target who has his/her own bodyguards. For a 
94 Interview, senior police in tl1e Crim e Suppression Division , Bangkok, 11 Apri l 201 2. 
95 Till y 2003: 34. For violent entrepreneurs in Ru ssia, see Vo lkov 2002. 
96 See th e interview with tl1is gunman in Wora wat 20 I 0: 99 . 
97 Because some gunm en may be nervous when they knew their targets are powerful politicians (Dittita 
2005: J l l-1 80; Worawa t 201 0: 93 -11 3). 
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prominent target, gunmen usually take longer than a month to accomplish the mission. 98 
The service of professional gunmen brings an important advantage to political bosses as 
it provides them with protection, cover and distance from the shooting. Most of the time, 
the police can trace the murder only back to the gunmen's agents, or better yet the owner 
of the hired gun den.99 Moreover, the hired gun dens help obviate the burden of building 
and sustaining an ongoing force of violent followers-instead of having a hundred 
gunmen on the payroll as was the case for big bosses in the early 1980s, political bosses 
in the 1990s generally have only four to five goons. 100 
The hired gun business attracts a wide range of people, including the unemployed, 
young hoodlums, local thugs, farmers, low-skilled workers, taxi and motor cycle drivers, 
handymen, and athletes. It also provides opportunities for corrupt police and military 
officers. Some state agents condone and profit from the contract killing business. They 
use their professional training in coercion for personal gain with many officers 
moonlighting as hired gunmen. Clients prefer the service of "official violence 
specialists," because they are not only the calmest and best-trained, but also have inside 
information on the criminal justice process and institutions. 10 1 Many of them are 
protected by higher ranking officers, the so-called "mafia police/military officers" who 
engage in illegal business. For government, the "uniformed hit men" are the most 
dangerous and difficult to apprehend. 102 The most scandalous case was Lieutenant 
Colonel "Tueng" (nickname) who became famous in the 1980s as a brutal, corrupt 
officer. He and his subordinates extorted money, collected debts and smuggled 
contraband. When the construction business boomed in the 1990s, he protected 
contractors and helped dishonest land developers evict residents; if residents resisted he 
used violent force, driving them out and burning their properties. Finally, he created his 
own hired gun business, simultaneously assuming the roles of agent and hit man. His 
den was comprised of 5-6 low-ranking state agents and undertook only high-profile 
cases. The job that brought him national fame and ended his long, murderous career was 
98 Interview, lawyers for gunmen, Phetchaburi, 18 April 2012. 
99 Interview, senior police in the Crime Suppression Division, Bangkok, 11 April 2012; interview, senior 
crime reporter, Bangkok, 11 April 2012. 
100 Interview, underworld protection racket ' s owner, Bangkok, 6 April 2012. Only a few eminent bosses, 
such as in Phrae and Buriram, are willing or capable to build a force larger than twenty to thirty personnel. 
10 1 lnterview, underworld protection racket ' s owner, Bangkok, 6 April 2012. 
102 Interview, senior police in the Crime Suppression Division, Bangkok, 11 April 2012. See also other 
sources whi ch have the same conclusion: Narong 2002; Chaiwat 2011; and Chavalit 2007. 
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the assassination of the Yasothon provincial governor in 2001. 103 Lieutenant Colonel 
"Tueng" is only one example, among many, of public officers turned (private) contract 
killers. Data indicate many active and off-duty government violence specialists remain 
closely engaged in the violence business until the present day. Collusion between the 
state security forces and the violence business runs very deep. 104 
Numbers of hired gunmen 
The size of hired gun dens varies from small (3) to large (100), but the average size is 
about six to eight members. The hired gun business is a cartel in which owners avo id 
confrontation with each other; they carve out their own business territory and respect 
others' terrain. Sometimes they even share customers or cooperate in a difficult job. 105 
Paradoxically, the hired gun is a non-monopolistic business that exists in support of the 
political struggle fo r monopoly. 
The total number of hired guns active in the market has been changing over time as a 
result of gunmen's deaths, arrests, or retirements. In 1989, the po lice reported that there 
were large gunmen hubs in the follo wing provinces: Phetchaburi, Chonburi , Nakhon 
Fathom, Bangkok, Ayutthaya, Lopburi and Saraburi . In the north, Chiang Mai was a 
hotspot fo r the hired gunmen and owners were mafi a members. 106 In early 1992, the 
police chief identified a total of 81 9-900 hired gunmen throughout the country. 107 Prior 
to the 1995 electio n, the police had the number at 1,000 as many rookie hit men were 
recruited to the business. The central region had the highest concentration of hit men, 
with 261 hired assassins operating in eight different provinces. Police reco rds showed 
that 77 of them were in Phetchaburi, the infamous capital of gunmen. Suphanburi , 
103 This murder was caused by a confl ict over a large construction project in Yasothon province. The 
police investi gation led to. the arrest of Lieutenan t Col onel "Tueng" and hi s co-conspira tors. On 29 
September 2006, the Supreme Court gave him a dea th sentence along with his two close mi li tary aides. On 
the Ki ng 's birthday in 2007, he was granted a roya l pa rdon, reducin g hi s puni shm ent to life impri sonm en t. 
In 20 I 0, he received another pardon, reducu1 g his sentence to 50 years. A year later, he was granted a 
spec ial roya l pa rd on aga in, which reduced his sentence to 13 yea rs (Matichon, 7 December 2011 ). On th e 
career of Lieutenant Colonel "Tueng" and his involvement in crim inali ty, see Sirirat 2005: 53-54; Chaiwa t 
20 11: 139-141; Manager Daily, 27 October 2009. 
10
' Interview, sen ior police in the Crim e Suppression Di vision, Bangkok , 11 Apr il 20 I 2; interview, two 
investi ga tive reporters on military affa irs, 12 Apri l 201 2, 20 April 201 2; Chaiwa t 2011 : 139- 14 1 On ma fi a 
so ldiers, see Sirirat 2005. 
105 Interview, underworld protect ion racket's owner, Bangkok, 6 April 20 12; interview, senior po li ce in th e 
Crime Suppression Di vision, Bangkok , 11 April 20 12. 
106 In Phetchaburi and Chonburi, kingpins controlled the dens, whereas in Nakh on Path om, a loca l 
po litic ian owned th e den and policeman worked as th e den 's agents. In Bangkok, gamblin g den ma fi as 
operated three large-size hired gun dens. In Ayutthaya , Lopbu ri and Sarabu ri, gunm en dens opera ted un der 
the control of one in fluen tia l boss (Mat ichon cri min al news sect ion 1989: 52-55). 
107 Ma1ichon , 16 January 1992: I , 24 ; Ma1ichon , 19 March 1992: 21. 
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against conventional wisdom, was the second most dangerous province with 55 hit men. 
The second highest concentration was in the eastern region, with 59 professional 
gunmen spread over eight provinces. Chonburi was the most notorious with 16 
assassins. 108 In a later report, one month before the 1996 election, police listed 762 
professional hii men as their targets. Most were located in the central and southern 
· 109 regions. 
Nevertheless, a province that has a high concentration of gunman is not necessarily an 
electorally violence-prone province, and vice versa. Because hired gunmen are a highly 
mobile workforce that offers to work in areas far from their den's location, they are very 
capable of answering long-distance demands for violence. 110 
Price of hired gun 
Generally, the price of assassination ranges from 10,000 to over a million baht 
depending on the target 's importance. The more prominent the victim, the higher the 
chance that the murder would make headlines and the gunmen would be apprehended by 
the authorities. The standard operation runs like this: the client will pay half of the 
agreed price prior to the murder and the rest of it once the job is done successfully. 11 1 
Personal records kept by one hit man, working for a den in the south, revealed how the 
price of a murder job changed over the 1980s-1990s. From 1984 to 2005, this gunman 
(nicknamed "Lek" or small) had carried out 9 assassination attempts (eight successful 
and one failed) and received 30,000 baht for the first murder in 1984; 50,000 baht for the 
second murder in 1987, 30,000 baht for the third murder in 1989; 60,000 baht for the 
fourth murder in 1992; 50,000 baht for the fifth murder in 1995; 40,000 baht for the 
sixth murder in 2003; 100,000 baht for the seventh murder in 1999; 70,000 baht for the 
eighth murder in 1997; and 100,000 baht for the last murder in 2005 , in which he failed 
and was arrested. II2 The information shows that the pay increased over time ( even 
though it was not a straight line increase). The pay gunmen received per job in the 
108Matichon Sudsabda, 30 May- 5 June 1995: 5, 88-89. 
'°
9 Thai Rath, 7 October 1996: l, 18. 
11° For example, many hired gunmen working for the den in central Phetchaburi travelled to take on jobs 
in Chiangmai to the north and Phuket to the south. Therefore the geography of supply and demand of 
electoral violence are separated and not necessary overlapping. Interview, lawyers, Phetchaburi, 18 April 
2012; interview, two local police officers, Phetchaburi , 17 April 2012. Phetchaburi , Thailand ' s gunmen 
capital, is an example of the separation between supply and demand for electoral violence (see Chapter 10 
for further infonnation). 
111 lnterview, former Chonburi boss's gunman, Chonburi, 14 August 2011. 
112 The fascinating life story of this methodical gunman is found in Worawat 2010: 106. 
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1980s, however, was five to seven times higher than the average annual salary oflower-
rank bureaucrats; hence they could live comfortably on only two jobs a year. But if they 
wanted more income, they could acquire revenue from security, drug dealing, or debt 
collecting. This suggests that, since the 1980s, being a hired gunman has been a 
profitable occupation. 113 
Because all targets pursued by "Lek" were mere vote canvassers and/or small-scale 
businessmen, the prices were relatively moderate. In the 1980s-1990s, killing key vote 
canvassers cost 50,000-1 00,000 baht. Earnings from contract killings were much higher 
if the targets were MPs or prominent political bosses. The minimum price fo r killing an 
MP was l million baht, ahd the price went up to 3 million baht for a prominent political 
boss. 114 And by the 1990s, MP lives were the most valuable, surpassing drug kingpins or 
gambling-den owners. 11 5 For the rival of the targeted MP, the price is, however, not too 
high in comparison to the total spending they need to put out to win an election. 11 6 
One gunman-turned-hired gun agent, nicknamed "the moustache of Phetchaburi," 
epitomized the gunmen business in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
He started his career as a gunman and later became an agent of hired gunmen. After 
successfull y building his reputation and amassing large sums of money in his home 
province of Phetchaburi, "the moustache of Phetchaburi" moved to Bangkok to seek a 
larger fo rtune. Soon after he settled in Bangkok, a powerful gambling den mafioso asked 
his gang to provide security and protection for his business ventures. Later on, he 
expanded his protection racket to the lucrative hired motorcycle business. His den 
attracted many capable gunmen. At the peak, "the moustache of Phetchaburi" had 
around 100 hit men wo rking fo r his "hiJed killing company," and only took on jobs 
113 A rubber-pl antat ion farn1er turned hit man told one researcher tliat one assassination job earned him 
more than his annual income. Another gunmen, son of rice farmer from Nakhon Si Thammarat, took part 
in a "big" assass in ati on plot which earn ed him 250,000 baht, while his parents earned only 40,000-50,000 
baht a year from their farn1ing (Di ttita 2005: 11 3- 116, 150). 
114 In the 1995 election , four gunmen killed a key vote ca nvasser of Buncbu Tri thong, th e most powerful 
boss of Lam pang. A shooler was later arres ted and sa id he received 80,000 baht for th e job (Ma1ichon, 25 
June 1996: 13). ~, die late l 990s, four gunm en assass inated a Surat Than i MP with a price of I milli on 
baht at th e behest of the MP ' s major politica l ri va l. In 1989, Sia Huad , one of th e most influent ial bosses 
in Chonburi, was shot dead , and his rivals paid 3 mill ion baht to eli minate him (Watthana 1995: 30-3 1; 
Di tti ta 2005: 119-1 22). 
115 The assassinations of the two most powerful ga mbling mafi oso in the 1980s and 1990s cost 600,000 
baht and 150,000 baht respecti vely (Matichon crimina l news secti on 1989: 16, 32-33). 
116 On average, a winning candida te paid 60-80 milli on bah t to secure an MP seat in th e 1990s. Buriram 
MP Panawat Liangphongphan revea led this information after he survived an assassination attemp t on hi s 
life (see Chap ter 11 for deta il s). 
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valued at more than 100,000 baht. According to the police, the "company" was so large 
that 90 percent of contract killings by Phetchaburi gunmen in the early 1980s came from 
"the moustache" den. The den of the "moustache" was in high demand because of the 
effectiveness and meticulousness of both its gunmen and agents. Even the police did not 
hesitate to acknowledge this reputation: "[the moustache] was ingenious in the way he 
undertakes his job. That is why he has never been caught by the Metropolitan police." 117 
He aspired to be a powerful godfather and therefore spent his savings to open his own 
gambling dens in both Bangkok and Phetchaburi. In Phetchaburi, he ran an underground 
lottery and transportation service and engaged in drug trafficking. His wealth was 
growing very fast as well as his status. Finally he launched into politics by supporting 
some candidates in elections. His fast growing influence threatened many influential 
figures in the province. On October 6, 1988, he was shot dead along with his wife and 
minions, by, ironically, hired gunmen. The police failed to arrest any culprits but the 
authorities and local observers alike believed that the death of "the moustache" came as 
no surprise since he had involved himself in several illegal business conflicts with top 
local bosses.118 
Independent gunmen: aspiring assassins 
By the mid 1990s, the market for hired gunmen was more fluid and less orderly. The 
business tempted ambitious characters to enter the market as lone assassins. Their 
emergence exemplified the commodification and privatization of violence of the era at 
its best. Skill in using violence becomes a resource and product for sale in open market, 
with no requirement of connections, respect, debt of gratitude, or enduring mutual 
dependence. 
These gumnen work alone. They are independent gunmen who try to make money and 
build a reputation from a murder job but have no connection with powerful bosses or 
hired gun agents. Many were young hoodlums, drug addicts or delinquents. But not all 
came from poor or criminal families, as research shows that several independent hit men 
came from middle-class or educated families. 119 In the market for assassins they were 
not the first choice as they were poorly-trained and had no protection. They were 
117 Interview with police, see the quote in Matichon crin1inal news secti on 1989: 50. And see special team 
ofcrinlinal news reporters 1993: 51-63. 
11 8 Matichon criminal news section 1989: 49-51. 
11 9 There was a case of lone gunman who was a sal e manager of a large company in Bangkok, liv ing 
comfortably in condominium in business district prior to becoming a hit man. See oth er examples in 
Dittita 2005: 150-156. 
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second- or third-rate gunmen. Nevertheless, they were cheap and stayed under the police 
radar. Some of them were willing to murder for only 5,000-10,000 baht to enter the 
business. If they become successful, they climbed the ladder to work for a boss or 
agent.1 20 
Patrimonialism, electoral democracy and provincial bosses' violence 
Thailand 's oligarchic patrimonial state and parliamentary democracy that began to 
emerge from the late 1970s provided opportunities and incentives for provincial business 
elites to enter electoral competitions. Their political invo lvement made election 
campaigns fierce and uncompromising. When boss-style candidates confronted each 
other in elections with a power monopoly at stake, elections were most prone to 
violence. The demand for gunmen to eliminate opposition in elections provided work for 
violence specialists and entrepreneurs. The market for political killings expanded in line 
with rapid economic development and perso nalistic political struggles. Violence was in 
abundant supply, both inexpensive and available in various guises. However, the 
demand fo r violence, not its supply, detennined the timing and location of electoral 
violence. As long as the structural and institutional incentives and benefits generated 
from elective posts remain unchanged, the vio lence demand would exist and supply 
follow. Electoral vio lence is part of the political struggle in provincial areas. It needs to 
be situated and understood in the broad context of local power and economic structures. 
Electoral violence from 1979 to 1996 targeted political rivals, not the electoral process 
or institutions. Electoral democracy largely benefited the bosses, and chaotic vio lence 
disrupting or dismantling the electoral processes was the last thing they wanted to 
happen. Thailand 's political and economic settings, both national and local, changed 
dramatically after 1997, and the pattern of electoral violence changed accordingly (as 
wi ll be discussed in Chapter 5). 
The next chapter provides a broad picture and trends of electoral violence from the 
election of April 1978 to that of November l 996, the last election prior to the 1997 
Constitution that changed the Thai political structure and electoral system. 
120 Intervi ew, underworld protection racket 's owner, Bangkok, 6 April 20 12. 
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Chapter 4 
Violence in Thai elections, 1976-1996 
This chapter examines the general pattern of election-related violence from 1976 to 
1996. It describes the actors and violent methods in electoral competitions, and discusses 
the distinctive characteristics of electoral violence in this period. Before discussing 
patterns of electoral violence, it is necessary to briefly summarize the broad character of 
political struggle from the 1980s to the 1990s. In general, the national political struggle 
during the semi-democratic period witnessed a few incidents of intra-elite conflict, 
including fighting between army factions . The violence was less severe than during the 
period 1932-1957 because conflicts mainly concerned competition among elites to 
control public office and extract rent. Additionally, the transition from authoritarian 
(1976-1977) to semi-democratic rule came from a contingent elite bargain (pact), not a 
regime change by collapse. Experience from other regions shows that democratic 
transitions by "elite pact" are relatively stable and less violent 1, and the Thai experience 
was no exception. This elite pact stood for fifteen years, until it was broken in 1991 
when the army leaders staged a coup to topple the civilian government of Chatichai 
Choonhavan. The coup was clearly an attempt by the military to adjust the power 
balance settled by the pact as they were dissatisfied with their loss-of power. Initially, 
the middle class and general public welcomed the coup that claimed to eliminate the 
corrupt elected government, but the urban populace was soon disenchanted with it when 
one of the coup leaders appointed himself as the prime minister after post-coup 
elections. The episode led to the 1992 "Black May" event, which result~d in bloodshed 
and the resignation of the military prime minister.2 Parliamentary democracy under 
civilian rule was restored and electoral contests proceeded with no further interruption. 
1 Linz and Stepan 1996. 
2 On May 17, 1992, around 200,000 people joined a mass demonstration in Bangkok calling for a new 
constitution and the resignation of the Junta leader. The junta responded with a plan designed for a 
communist insurrection, using fully armed soldiers imported from the jungle areas on the borders. Soldiers 
shot into the crowd. Violent suppression of the demonstration continued over three nights. On the night of 
May 20, the king summoned protest ' s leader Cham long Srimuang and junta ' s leader Suchinda Kraprayun 
to the palace, and ordered them to stop violence. ln the end, the jLmta ' s leader resign ed. The death toll of 
this event was initially estimated at several hundred, but later reduced to around 40-60. More than hundred 
demonstrators have been missing. The manipulative and tense relationship between the army genera l and 
the monarchy was once again playing a decisive role in the outcome of the event. The bloodshed 
crackdown was stopped (but only after the mass killings, and after the event unfolded that the coup leaders 
had lost complete legitimacy and support among the general public), and the unpopular military prime 
minster was scarified to save the entire royal-military-bureaucratic power bloc. See analysis and details of 
event in Callahan 1998; for the politics behind Suchinda ' s action and resulting decisions, see Wassana 
2002. 
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The constitution was amend ed to enhance the power of elected representatives at the 
expense of unelected bureaucrats, stipulating that the prime minister was to be selected 
from elected MPs and the Speaker of the House of Representative, not the Senate 
President, was the ex-officio President of the National Assembly of Thailand. From the 
vantage point of the present, the 1991 coup was a disruptive event that failed to stop the 
power shifting to civilian rule. 
Table 4.1 : Thai Prime Ministers, 1976-1997 
Name Political party affiliations Terms 
Thanin Kraivixien none (coup appointed PM) October 1976- October 1977 
Kriangsak Chomanand none (coup appointed PM) November 1977- February 
1980 
Prem Tinsulanond none March 1980- April 1988 
Chatichai Choonhavan The Chart Thai Party April 1988- February 1991 
Anand Panyarachun none (coup appointed PM) February 1991 -April 1992 
Such.inda Kraprayun none (coup leader) April 1992- May l 992 
Anand Panyarachun none June 1992- September 1992 
Chuan Leekpai The Democrat Party September 1992- July 1995 
Banham Sil pa-archa The Chart Thai Party July 1995- November 1996 
Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh The New Aspiration Party November 1996- November 
1997 
The relatively peaceful environment in the capital in the period I 979-1997 (with the 
exception of the 1992 event) contrasted with violent scenes in the rural areas, in which a 
new type of polit ical vio lence had emerged out of the parliamentary democracy. From 
the 1980s to 1990s, provincial bosses competed fiercely with their political and business 
rivals for domination, leading to the widespread occurrence of violence during electoral 
campaigns. As explained in the previous chapter, local power structure and political 
economies of competition underlie these eruptions. The fo llowing sections identify the 
patterns, actors and methods of electoral vio lence from the election of 1979 to that of 
1996. 
General patterns of electoral violence, 1979- 1996 
From 1979 to 1996, there were eight general elections (Apri l 1979, Apri l 1983, July 
1986, July 1988, March 1992, September 1992, July 1995, and November 1996). A 
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large number of political parties and factions competed for seats in the House. No party 
was able to win a majority of votes to form a single-party government; instead multi-
party coalitions usually formed government, and intra-coalition conflict usually led to 
the dissolution of the House and a call for new elections. Over these eight elections, 
however, a distinct pattern of political cleavage and electoral violence emerged: personal 
conflicts between rival candidates rather than political party confrontation or mass 
mobilization protests. Many personal conflicts resulted in political assassinations (a 
popular method of eliminating opposition in the 1980s). To understand the overall 
pattern, it is necessary to examine the methods, perpetrators, victims, timing, and degree 
of electoral violence in chronological order. 
The April 1979 election 
The first national assembly elections after the promulgation of the 1978 constitution 
were held in April 1979. It was also the first election after the 1976 coup, consequently 
the atmosphere was full of enthusiasm and anticipation. There were 1,623 candidates 
vying for 301 MP positions, including many ex-officers and retired bureaucrats. Most 
outstanding was Col Narong Kittikhachon, the notorious son of former premier Thanom 
Kittikhachon, running for MP in Phetchaburi.3 Since the House had not yet approved the 
Political Party Act, candidates were allowed to run either independently or under the 
banner of political groups or factions. 4 
Even before campaigning started, the Interior Ministry identified 34 provinces as 
"dangerous. "5 The list basically covered half of the country and appeared to be very 
random. It also turned out to be inaccurate as violent provinces like Pattani, Yala, 
Lopburi, Chiang Mai were not included in the original list; it even excluded Phetchaburi, 
the most turbulent in this poll from the watch list. This poor intelligence reflected the 
ineffectiveness of the Interior Ministry in their job of overseeing elections. 6 In fact, 
violence erupted in fourteen provinces,. scattered around the country with no regional 
3 Narong had no connection with the province except knowing a local political boss who was willing to 
help him in the campaign (see Chapter 10). 
4 The Political Party Act was passed by the House in 198 1 (as further explain below). 
5 These provinces were Suphanburi , Phang Nga, Krabi , Chaing Rai, Nakhon Sawan, Ang thong, Uthai 
Thani, Kanchanaburi, Kamphaeng Phet, Trat, Prachuap Khiri Khan, Trang, Yasothon, Nong Khai, 
Prachinburi , Nan, Uttaradit, Ratchaburi, Sakon Nakhon , Payao, Phetchabun, Samutprakam, Mae Hong 
Son, Surat Thani , Khon Kaen, Surin, Buri Ram, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phatthalung, Roi Et, Chaiyaphum, 
Ubon Ratchathani, Nakohn Phanom, and Loei (Matichon , 10 March 1979). 
6 The Interior Ministry's tasks of overseeing and administering elections were taken over by the 
independent Electoral Commission after the 1997 constitution. 
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concentration. 7 The total number of violent incidents was fifteen: ten were assassination 
attempts and the rest were clashes and ambushes. Most occurred during the pre-election 
period, rather than on the election day or afterwards- a pattern that has held in 
follo wing elections up to 201 1 (see table 4.2) . Nine people died and seven were 
wounded as a result. Among those killed, five were vote canvassers, three were 
government officers (who worked on the voting day), and one was a candidate. The most 
notorious case was the assassination of Chong Khlaikhlueng, MP candidate for 
Phetchaburi from the Kitsangkhom Party (see Chapter I 0). Apart fro m Chong, two other 
candidates in Lopburi and Nakhon Sawan had attempts made on their lives but 
survived. 8 
Profiles on perpetrators revealed significant changes from past elections. Some 
conservative candidates in rural areas mobilized groups of Village Scouts (reminiscent 
of I 976 state violence), to support their campaigns. These right-wing mobilizat ions 
concerned the government, thus the Interior Ministry issued an order to every provincial 
governor to ask Village Scouts to resign if they wanted to canvass votes.9 The 
government wanted to reduce the role of the ultra right-wing movements in the semi-
democratic era; indeed to stifle either right- or left-wing groups and insulate electoral 
competition from the influence of mass movement. The government feared polit ical 
linkages between political parties, politicians, and mass movements (as had happened in 
1975 and 1976) that gave rise to the popularity of socialist parties. Fo r the military-
bureaucratic elites, the ultra royal-nationalist groups were instrumental in crushing the 
student-labor-peasant alliance in 1976, but were genera lly viewed as dangerous if 
invo lved in electoral polit ics since they empowered the provincial bosses at the expense 
of the state. The traditional elites could not afford the privatization of right-wing 
forces .10 Moreover, these de-linkages were consistent with bureaucratic e lites' attempts 
to weaken the organizations and support bases of po litical pariies. Though the 
government succeeded in preventing the involvement of right-wing forces in the 
electoral race, they fa il ed to secure the voting from a communist attack. On po lling day, 
7 These provinces were Chi ang Mai , Chaing Rai, and Nan in th e north ; Phetchaburi , Bangkok, Kamph aeng 
Phet, Lopburi , Nakhon Sawan, and Phetchabun in th e central; Na kh on Si Thamm ara t, Pattani , Surat Thani, 
Trang, and Ya la i.n the south. 
8 See Matichon , 17 Apri l 1979: I, 12; 2 1 April 1979: I. Lopburi and Nakh on Sawan suffered from chronic 
electora l violence. The case ofNakh on Sawan is full y in vestigated in Chapter 8. 
9See Matichon, 30 March 1979: 3. 
10 In Prajak 2006: 1-33, I ex plain how th e Thai sta te mobil ized ri ght -wing movements in th e I 970s and 
demobi lized them in the post- 1976 chan ging politi ca l environment. See also Bowie (1997) on th e 
changing role of the vill age scouts in lliai polit ics; and Haberkorn (2 011 ) on th e progressive alli ance. 
102 
communist insurgents ambushed public officers and attacked the polling stations m 
several provinces where they were strong: Nan, Chiangmai, Trang, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, and Surat Thani. The clashes resulted in a few deaths and injuries. 11 The 
effects of the civil war between the government and the Communist Party of Thailand 
had clearly spilt over into the electoral arena and threatened electoral security. Attacks 
from rebel groups, as an attempt to disrupt the electoral process and destroy its 
legitimacy, were common in other countries under civil war situation. 12 Nevertheless, 
the greatest threat to safety in the 1979 election did not come from the communist 
guerrillas as much as the bosses' thugs and hired gunmen. Most violent incidents were 
executions by individual assassins (given full elaboration in the following section). 
The April 1983 election 
This election was held after prime minister Prem Tinsulanond dissolved parliament only 
a few weeks before the government's term ended. 13 There were 1,862 candidates from 
14 parties and independent groups competing for 324 seats, including former premier 
Kriangsak Chomanand and several retired military generals who formed their own party. 
The race was more competitive than that of 1979. Voter turnout was up by almost seven 
percent and media again reported that voters were enthusiastic. 14 
As it turned out, this election was more violent than previous ones, with 17 incidents, 
leaving 16 killed and 10 wounded (see table 4.2). Assassination remained the crime du 
jour, and involved walk-in or drive-by shootings by a lone or small team of gunmen. 
There was only one bombing, targeting two political party headquarters in Bangkok, and 
senior army officers believed men in uniforms perpetrated it (with the goal of 
exacerbating the conflict between the army and certain political parties). The police were 
never able to apprehend or even identify the culprits. 15 The election day itself was 
relatively calm compared to 1979, with only two vote canvassers shot dead. 16 
11 Matichon, 23 April 1979: l, l l; 26 April 1979: 3. 
12 In countries such as Pakistan, Iraq, Afghani stan Sir Lanka and Nepal , the insurgents have usually 
chosen to carry out the attacks on the election day to frighten th e voters, election observers, and poll 
workers. They have also aimed to send a political message, through violent acts, that they did not accept 
the legitimacy of the electoral institutions (Alston 20 I 0: 15-17). 
13 The army and some political parties pushed for changes in certain constitutional articles which would 
sustain the power of the senate and prevent the institutionalization of political parties. It was not surprising 
that some political party faction leaders preferred the factionalized party system as it served their interests. 
The arrny and its allies lost votes in the House but managed to put pressure on Prem administration to 
dissolve the parliament. Suchit and Pomsak 1984: 93-109. 
14 Matichon, 16 April 1983: l, 11; 19 April 1983: 10. 
15 Matichon, 27 March: l, 12; 28 March 1983: 3. 
16 Matichon, 19 April 1983: 10. 
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The victims' profiles were different this election. Election observer, government official 
and/or media personnel were not targeted; all victims were either candidates or their 
subordinates and supporters. Among those killed, twelve were vote canvassers, fo llowed 
by two candidates (one in Chiang Rai and one in Nakhon Sawan ), and two candidate 
supporters. It was clear that violent conflicts were now confined to the politicians' 
political networks. The common character of those slain was their involvement in i !licit 
activities (prostitution, gambling, smuggling, etc.) and/or businesses of natural resource 
extraction. 17 Vote canvassers who shifted their loyalty were also reported murdered (in 
Pathum Thani, for example). During the height of the campaign, many candidates sought 
government protection. 18 After the election, some winning candidates were targets of 
assassination by their rivals. There was no vio lent attack from the communist insurgents 
this time due to the movement 's collapse and defeat. In Nakhon Si Thanunarat, an 
insurgent strongho ld, local strongmen and their thugs emerged to take control of the 
territory left behind by the insurgents. Dominant political families became new bosses as 
well as new threats to election security. Interestingly, there was evidence that some ex-
guerrillas were recruited as hit men and given orders from politicians to eliminate their 
opponents; thus revealed changing opportunities of making money from their violent 
skills (see Chapter 9). 
Th e July 1986 election 
Due to inter- and intra-party conflict, prime minister Prem dissolved the House and 
called for a new election. After the poll, the legislative assembly elected Prem as prime 
minister for a third term even though he did not run as a candidate. The balance of power 
between the elected parliamentarians and traditional fo rces of power, namely monarchy 
and military, remained large ly the same und er the "semi-democratic" system with the 
palace and the army's favo rite premier at the helm. However, Prem's new cabinet was 
dominated by provincial business elites, followed by few technocrats and retired civi l 
servants, indicating the higher standing of the provincial bosses in the nat ional political 
17 See an interesting report about th e victims' "dirty background" and "shady bus inesses" (Matichon, 21 
April 1983: 5). 
18 Among tl1em were Ban.ham Silpa-archa and his Chart Thai Party's team members in Suphanburi who 
were guarded by five policemen throughout th eir campaign (Matichon, 7 Apri l 1983: 9) . 
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scene. 
19 Also, in this election, provincial bosses stepped into leading positions in all 
major parties, some even rising to party head (see the next section). 
Politicians and voters were even more enthusiastic about this election. This was reflected 
in the ten-percent increase in voter tum-out as well as the remarkable doubling of the 
numbers of candidates from 1,880 to 3,6 13 (the available seats increased only slightly 
from 324 to 347).20 The police operated nationwide to make voting safe by taking 
several measures, one of which was the suppression of gunmen during the election 
campaign. The police officers attempted to seize gangsters' weapons and arrest gunmen, 
and also closely monitored some local gangsters associated with influential candidates. 
The "Center for the Overseeing of Peaceful Order in the Election" was established. 2 1 A 
national list of mercenaries was made and the police found nearly 1,000 gunmen 
operating throughout the country. Provinces like Phetchaburi, Chonburi, Lopburi, 
Angthong, and Nakhon Sawan were identified as "hot spots," with high numbers of 
gunmen. It was reported that the "market price" for a hit man to kill a candidate was as 
high as 600,000 baht. 22 Despite having a tighter security plan, the authorities failed to 
prevent the hired, professional gunmen from executing their jobs. They, with bosses' 
thugs, were responsible for almost all of the violent incidents during this election 
campaign. The 1986 election had become the most violent election yet with 34 incidents 
(15 assassination attempts, 16 life threatening, and 3 brawls), 18 dead and 7 wounded 
(see table 4.2). Assassination attempts dominated the violence but were matched by 
various coercive, threatening methods- for example, home visits from mobsters; 
residences or offices being attacked at night; or cars being chased and attacked. 23 
19 The percentage of cabinet members who had background as merchants or businessmen in the Cabinet 
rose from 418 percent during 1983-1986 to 5 1. l percent during 1986-88 (Rangsan 1993: 2 10-2 1 I). 
'
0 The 1986 election 's voter tum-out was 6 1.43 percent, by then the highest voter tum-out ever. 
21 From thi s election onward, every government fo llowed the practice of creating an (ad-hoc) center 
(altl1ough with changing names) to oversee election security. The center was usually headed by a hi gh-
ranking poli ce, and was dissolved soon after th e election ended. See an interview of the senior police 
o ffi cer who was head of the Center in the 1986 election in Matichon, 7 July 1986: special page 3. 
22 Matichon , 22 July 1986: 2; for th e poli ce 's watch li st see Matichon, 3 June 1986: I, 16. Meanwhile, the 
vote-buying rate in thi s election , according to th e survey, was 100 baht per head. The winning candidates 
repon edly spent 12-20 million baht (per candidate) for vote-buying operation , includin g payment to vote 
canvassers (Phoemphong 1990: 122, 129-133 ; Som bat I 987). 
23 Matichon, l 6 July I 986: special page 3; Matichon , 26 July 1986: special page 3; Thai Rath , 27 Jul y 
1986 I, 2. 
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As for the victims, they were mostly vote canvassers: 15 vote canvassers were killed, 
while only one candidate was shot dead, followed by one hit man and one voter. 24 
During the campaign, some vote canvassers (in Koral, for example) received death 
threats from their own candidates if they failed to deliver the winning result. The Interior 
Minister Sitthi Jirarot said in an interview, "being vote canvasser is a path to death." 25 
Vote canvassers were killed for different reasons. In some cases they were caught 
between two opposing candidates and they were killed because they refused to work for 
no-one or because they chose to work for one candidate at the expense of the candidate ' s 
rivals. 26 Many vote canvassers were killed because they were "too good", the opposing 
team felt compelled to kill them in order to "weaken the candidate for whom the vote 
canvassers worked." A murder case in Phichit province was very revealing: authorities 
arrested three gunmen soon after the election as the police found evidence linking them 
to the murder of the Chart Thai Party's key vote canvasser. They confessed they were 
hired by a hit man agent who received a "killing order" from an opposing candidate; this 
opposing candidate had believed the targeted vote canvasser was key to his rivals ' 
electoral victory. 27 Some vote canvassers who performed poorly and failed to get their 
candidates elected were shot dead after the election. 28 Many of the vote canvassers 
killed, however, had shady backgrounds: they were involved in underworld activities, 
gambling, drug trafficking, or they were gangsters or former assassins themselves. 
The July 1988 Election 
Prin1e minister Prem dissolved the parliament and called for a new election on 24 July 
1988. After the election, no party was able to win a majority of seats, lead ing to a multi-
party coalition. Pressure from a group of professionals, intellectuals and democratic 
advocates forced Prem to tum down the offer to reassume the premier post, giving way 
to the election of Chatchai Choonhavan, head of the Chart Thai party. He was the first 
elected prime minister since 1976. 
" The MP candidate, a former provincia l councilor in Udonthani, was murdered at home by uniden tified 
gunman . A gunman , who murdered a vote canvasser in Prachin buri , was gunn ed down by police officers 
in Bangkok after he resisted arrest. And a voter in Suphanburi was shot dead by his own neighbor in th e 
violent fight on election day after he refused to vote in accordance with his neighbor ' s instruction . See 
Matichon, 23 May 1986: I , 16; Matichon , 25 Jul y 1986: 2; 77,ai Rath, 29 July 1986: 8 (respecti vely). 
25 Matichon , 15 Jul y 1986: specia l page 3; the quota ti on was from Matichon, 26 July 1986, 2. 
26 There were reports that in some provinces key vote can vassers were "bought" at th e rate of 30,000 baht 
(Matichon , 29 June 1986: special page 2). 
27 Thai Rath , 30 Jul y 1986: I. 2, 20. 
28 The u1cident occurred in Lopburi (Thai Rath , 29 July 1986: 8). 
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In this election, the degree and frequency of violence dropped slightly compared to the 
previous one (but was roughly the same as 1979 and 1983). There were 17 incidents (7 
assassination attempts, one coordinated polling station burning, one bombing, and 9 acts 
of physical intimidation), leading to the death of 7 and the wounding of 12 (see table 
4.2). Assassination remained the most popular method of violence. There was only one 
bombing, aimed at intimidating the candidate rather than killing him.29 On election day, 
a group of hooligans working for a local boss patrolled stations and intimidated rival poll 
workers. 30 The most spectacular incident on election day was the burning of seven 
schools in Narathiwat province; four of those burnt were polling stations. The police 
believed Malay-Muslim separatists were responsible, but there were no statements from 
insurgents and the police were not able to arrest anyone. 31 This was the first time, 
however, that authorities alleged southern separatists were perpetrators of election-
related violence in the far south region. Violence of this character has erupted 
intermittently on the election days in Narathiwat, Yala and Pattani, the three provinces 
plagued by violent struggles for autonomy. In spite of that, since 1983 the election days 
have been relatively peaceful as most violence occurs in the pre-election period. 
Apart from the incident in the southern border province, the chief perpetrators of 
electoral violence were professional gunmen. Even though the Police Chief had created 
incentives for his staff by offering bonuses for officers who suppress gunmen and/or 
seize illicit weapons during the election campaigns, the gunmen still managed to wreck 
havoc.32 Nakhon Si Thammarat was especially turbulent as vote canvassers who 
changed sides were murdered. Vote canvassers who failed continued to receive death 
threats.33 
The 1988 election was the first in which candidates were safe. There was only one 
candidate who received a bomb threat (as mentioned), but no candidates had their lives 
targeted. Rivals used violence against· their key vote canvassers and supporters. 34 The 
most spectacular case was a failed assassination attempt of Ang Thong province's most 
29The unknown culprits threw a bomb into a house of the Democrat Party candidate for Nakhon 
Ratchasima at night, leaving the house damaged but nobody injured (Matichon , 2 June 1988). 
30 The incident occurred in Pathum Thani, the central province which is notoriously contro1led by an 
influential the Hansawat dynasty (Matichon , 25 July 1988: 8). 
31 Matichon, 25 July 1988: 1, 2. 
32 The police bureau was alert immediately after the House dissolution. Several provinces were monitored 
closely for the movement of hit men, namely Chonburi, Phetburi, Lopburi , Kanchanaburi , and Pitsanulok 
(Matichon, IO May 1988: 2). 
33 Matichon, 24 July 1988: 20; Matichon, 6 May 1988: 1, 2. 
34 Five vote canvassers were murdered during the pre-election period. 
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influential boss Somchai Roekwararak, aka "Sia Yae," who supported fifteen candidates 
associated with different parties in twelve provinces. 35 On election day, five assassins 
riding a pick-up truck drove past the crowded polling area and fired M-79 grenades at 
Somchai and his wife while they left the polling booth. Two people who stood next to 
Sia Yia were killed; Sia Yia and his wife were injured, as were ten others. 36 The 
incident, shocking the public and hitting the headlines, was notorious fo r three reasons : 
timing, location and victims. Normally, assassinations take place before the election day 
and at a private place or less crowded area. More importantly, there was no 
consideration of ordinary voters who may have been close to the intended target. The 
indiscriminate manner of the killing made this episode a departure from the usual 
repertoire of electoral vio lence. 
The March 1992 election 
This election was held a year after the I 991 coup. Army leaders planned to maintain 
their power by appointing conservative legal experts to draft a new constitution that 
restored military power in the political system through the senate and an unelected prime 
minister. The constitutional drafters did not make any changes to the electoral system 
and political party Jaws, clearly wanting to keep the weak, factionalized party system 
which was easy to control. The changing international political environment plus 
Thailand's strong connection to the globalized economy, however, made it difficult or 
almost impossible for junta leaders to continue to govern the country without legitimate 
elect ions. Thereby they formed their own political party, called Samakheetham (United 
Dharma). The most crucial obstacle to their success was their lack of political skill in the 
electoral arena, which provincial business politicians completely contro lled . To win the 
election, they needed the support of influential provincial bosses, whose behavior was 
condemned as "crooked and co1Tupt" and used as a justification for the coup. Leading up 
to the election, the junta coerced many leading provincial bosses to join the 
35 Sia Yae was one of1he wea lthi esl and influential businessmen-turned poli1i cal bosses in the centra l and 
north east regions who owned constru ction , saw milling and logging. He rose 10 power in th e mid 1980s. 
He assum ed !he Chart Thai Party's execulive posts before res igning over confl ict wi1h other members. S ia 
Yae usua ll y supported ten to fift een candidates from differenl parties (even when affiliated with !he Chart 
Thai pany) in each elec1ion. With hi s vasl business and poli!i cal empire, he made as many enemies as 
fr iends. 
36Matichon , 25 Jul y 1988: I, 2. Even th ough Sia Yae survived this assassination anempt, he was murdered 
a yea r later in th e same kind of grenade attack . There were reports that hi s business and poli lical riva ls 
chipped in four milli on baht to hire profess ional assass ins lo kill him (see a ri veting accounl of Sia Yae's 
assassinat ion in Suri ya n 2001 : 8-58). 
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Samakheetham party in exchange for acquitting them on corruption charges. 37 These 
troubled bosses had no option but to join the party, and shortly afterwards their 
corruption charges were cancelled and their frozen assets were released. They combined 
the state machinery with provincial bosses' electioneering skills, networks and finances, 
the Samakheetham party won the election decisively. The party head, Narong Wongwan, 
a powerful boss from Phrae, who was supposed to become the new prime minister, had 
to withdraw from the candidacy because the U.S government alleged he was involved in 
drug trafficking. This paved the way for the coup leader General Suchinda Kraprayun to 
assume the post himself. Suchinda appointed many provincial business politicians to his 
cabinet, including Narong (Phrae boss), Banharn (Suphanburi boss), Sanoh Thienthong 
(Sa Kaeo boss), Yuth Angkinan (Phetchaburi boss), Sawat Khamprakob (Nakhon 
Sawan), and others. 38 In fact, his cabinet composition was no different from Chatichai ' s. 
By this, "the Junta," Pasuk and Baker summed up poignantly "had metamorphosed from 
the scourge of money politics into its patron."39 The bureaucratic elites and elected 
politicians were now power shareholders, with generals at the helm, in the business of 
extracting rents and privileges from the patrimonial state. 
The degree of electoral violence increased from 1988, returning to the same level as the 
1986 election. There were 28 vio lent incidents ( I 5 assassination attempts, 9 intimidation, 
3 fights, and one bomb), leaving 15 dead and 6 wounded; all 15 killed were vote 
canvassers (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). The coup leaders attempted to downplay the violent 
dimension of this contest, saying dismissively: "murder is a daily event in our country. It 
is nothing special. .. I believe this election will be the most free and fair election in 
history."40 The junta and media trumpeted the anti-vote buying campaign instead of 
focusing on the vio lence and security problem. The campaign highlighted the role of 
influential provincial politicians in making elections costly and dirty. It was 
understandable that the junta underemphasized coercion: first , the use of force by private 
actors reflected the lack of government capacity in overseeing elections, and; second, 
they were involved in employing coercive force to help their party candidates. Under the 
37 After the coup, the junta established a commission to investigate and prosecute top provincial politicians 
on corruption charges. During the investigation, their assets were frozen. 
38 Sanoh held a grudge against the coup leaders, saying they were more hypocritical and corrupt than 
politicians (Wattana 1995: 47-51). See my analysis of the political endeavors ofNarong in Chapter 7, 
Sanoh in Chapter 12, Yuth in Chapter 10, and Sawat in Chapter 8. 
39 Pasuk and Baker 2005: 244. 
40 Matichon , 24 January 1992: 2. The police also tended to dismiss the violent incidents during the election 
as non-political. On election eve, the police concluded all murder cases in the pre-election period had 
nothing to do with elections. They also stated all electoral law violations were only minor wrongdoings-
posters stea ling, libel, false accusation (Matichon, 21 March 1992: 2). 
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guise of anti-vote buying, a troop of so ldiers in several provinces conducted a vigilant 
operation searching the vehicles and raiding the campaign stages ofSamakheetham rival 
candidates.4 1 Their illegitimate interventions in the election campaign notwithstanding, 
military officers were not the main perpetrators of violence. The pattern of electoral 
violence remained largely unchanged: the provincial business politicians' subordinates 
and professional gunmen were chiefly responsible for the . direct violence and 
intimidation of their opposition. 42 
The military-backed Samakheetham Party experienced this personalistic violence as 
both perpetrators and victims. Some of the party's vote canvassers and candidates were 
killed and threatened. The prime case was a Chonburi vote canvasser, a village head and 
local businessmen, who worked for influential boss Somchai Kunpluem and was shot 
dead after he refused to canvass votes for other parties ' candidates. Somchai 's team 
admitted his loss weakened their electoral prospects.43 It was clear that being candidates 
or vote canvassers for the dominant party backed up by the army did not put them at a 
lesser risk than their counterparts. Due to the high frequency of assassination attempts 
pre-election, 216 candidates requested police protection. The police department ass igned 
two police offers per candidate to act as personal bodyguards until the election was over. 
As things turned out, the Samakheetham Party's candidates had asked for the most help 
(72 candidates), followed by those of the Chart Thai Party (35), the Democrat Party (31), 
and the New Aspiration Party (29). 44 Vote canvassers were vulnerable because the 
police said government did not have sufficient resources to protect every one of them; 
they sought comfort and financial protection from the private sector instead by applying 
for life insurance. Unfortunately, insurance companies had a strict policy of not doing 
business with vote canvassers. Some small companies, however, saw the market 
opportunity and offered insurance to precarious vote canvassers. 45 Clearly, the electoral 
competition in Thailand generated a wide range ofrelated business. 
" See, for example, the famous case in Lam pang, in which a group of I 00 soldiers obstructed the 
campaign of New Aspiration Party's candidates by claiming they wanted to search for illicit weapons 
(Matichon , 19 March 1992: I, 6). 
42 There were no violent acts committed by insurgents in the deep south in this election. 
43 This murdered vote canvasser had worked for the Kitsangkhom Party but joined his boss Somcbai in 
switching to the Samakheethem Party in this electi on. Accordin g to his family, two weeks before his 
death, severa l candidates from oth er parties approached him to work as a vote canvasser, and some of 
them were very angry when he turn ed down the offers (Matichon , 6 February 1992: I, 21; Matichon, 8 
February 1992: 2). 
44 On voting day, roughly 115 ,000 police official s were employed to oversee election security in all 
di stri cts nationwide (Ma1icho11 , 2 1 March 1992: 2). 
45 Matichon, 27 January 1992: 12. 
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Apart from vote canvassers, poll observers and journalists were now targeted for the first 
time. None of them were assassination targets, but they were intimidated and harassed to 
stop exposing the unlawful activities of many candidates. There was a case of a 
journalist in the north being harassed by a candidate's followers who accused the 
journalist of having a bias against their boss. 46 The intimidation of election monitors and 
observers was more serious. During the campaign, many of them were harassed by local 
tough guys to stop monitoring the campaign, and they were the main targets on voting 
day. The staff and volunteers working for Poll Watch were threatened in some provinces 
in the central and northeast regions when they tried to stop vote canvassers from vote-
buying and engaging in other forms of electoral malpractice. 47 The increased threat 
against poll observers could be attributed to the enhanced power of independent election 
monitoring groups, particularly the newly-created Poll Watch Organization. It was 
created in January 1992, and had a greater mandate, money, and manpower than its 
predecessors.48 One disadvantage of Poll Watch, however, was that because they were 
perceived as having more power, they became a new threat and thus were harassed. In 
subsequent elections, however, politicians knew how to deal with them more skillfully 
(by using more sophisticated methods of vote-buying) and spared them from the ordeal 
of harassment and intimidation. 
Meanwhile, the number of violent perpetrators showed no signs of decrease. Based on 
police records, the police chief identified 819 hired gunmen operating nationwide during 
this election. The police were concerned that young hit men had entered the assassin 
business and saw opportunities for making "huge and quick money" under the radar 
screen, as they were not yet on the police 's black list. 49 These assassins, according to 
police, had connections to "influential figures" who made a large sums of money from 
46 The incident occurred in Pichit, the province plagued with electoral violence stemming from the long-
standing conflict between two rival political families vying for power monopoly. The journa list was 
caught up in the tense environment (Matichon , 18 March 1992: 1, 2). 
47 A local election staff member at one polling station in Ratchaburi was pressured not to assume his 
duties on polling day so that he could be replaced by another commissioner closely connected to the 
influential candidate (Matichon, 11 March 1992: IO; Matichon, 23 March 1992: 4). Because of the 
intimidation, 28 poll observers from Poll Watch asked for police protection (Matichon, 21 March 1992: 2) . 
48 PollWatch was established as an independent body on 8 January 1992 by Prime Minister Anand 
Panyarachun to monitor the March 1992 election. It was an ad hoc committee with no legal jurisdiction to 
enforce the election law, but it had wide mandate, and was financially and logistically supported by Anand 
administration. See detailed study ofPol!Watch in Callahan 2000. See also PollWatch 's report (1994). 
49 Matichon, 28 January 1992: I, 24. 
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gambling, prostitution, smuggling, and other illicit businesses. They estimated that there 
were over 200 of them Jiving in different provinces. 50 
The September 1992 election 
This election was held in the aftermath of the military suppression of the 17-19 May 
1992 demonstration. The Anand Panyarachun caretaker government called for a new 
election in an attempt to restore order to Thai democracy. The legislative assembly 
amended some clauses in the 1991 constitution, most importantly the stipulation that the 
prime minister must be elected. Even though civil society and political reform 
movements strongly condemned the army and bureaucratic elites for the violent 
breakdown of democracy, they equally blamed the corrupt behavior of elected 
politicians- vote buying, corruption, rent-seeking, electoral fraud, etc- as root causes 
of the low quality of parliamentary democracy. In_competent and unscrupulous 
provincial business politicians were special targets ofreform. 51 
PollWatch was more active in September 1992 than in the previous March. The 
organization spearheaded the anti-vote buying and civic education campaign, which the 
media, urban business, and the Interior Ministry also supported . The political education 
crusade attacked the patronage system and provincial elites, and "docile" rural voters, as 
sources of electoral corruption. On 21 August the cabinet ordered the Interior Ministry to 
establish the Committee for Prevention and Suppression of Influential Figures in an 
attempt to curb the role of hired gunmen, contraband arms traders and other criminals in 
electoral campaigns. The po lice belie ved the committee's operations would make this 
election cleaner and more peaceful. 52 But the constabulary were wrong as the death toll 
in this election surpassed all previous records. Also, it was clear that , outside Bangkok, 
the political discourse regarding the May event and the civic education campaign had 
little effect on the electoral results. Many ex-Samakheetham Party members were elected 
to the House with ease. In addition, the Chart Thai Party led by Banharn, which media 
and urban intellectuals portrayed as a political evi l for supporting the junta during the 
crackdown, still performed extremely well in this election (finishing runner up with 76 
seats). 53 
50 Matichon , 16 January 1992: I , 24; Matichon , 19 March I 992: 2 1. 
51 For the development of and the politics of the reform movement, see Callahan 2005; Connors 2007. 
52 Thai Rath. 22 August 1992: I. 22. 
53 They lost ·to 1he Democrat P;rty by on ly 4 seats. And if there had not been intra-party conflict prior to 
the election, the Chart TI1ai Party would ha ve undoubtedly won this election. 
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The pattern of violence was exactly the same as in the March 1992 election: most violent 
incidents took place during the pre-election period and were attempted or successful 
assassinations. Vote canvassers were again the favorite target, and private gunmen the 
main perpetrators. There were 23 incidents in total (17 assassination attempts, two 
bombings, one polling station burning, one violent fight, and two acts of intimidation) 
with 24 dead and 8 wounded (see tables 4.2 and 4.3). The election day was also 
tumultuous (see table 4.4). Two polling stations were bombed and burned, there was a 
clash between soldiers and insurgents in the south, and Poll Watch staff in one province 
were intimi.dated by a candidate' s followers. There were no casualties on voting day. 54 
All 24 people who died in this election were key actors in the fight for votes: 20 were 
vote canvassers and four were gunmen. No candidates died in this election- only one 
was threatened at home. 55 Some vote canvassers who worked for two different parties 
were shot dead.56 Many of the assassinated vote canvassers held prominent public 
positions, but they were familiar faces in underworld circles as well. Most notable was 
the murder of Banbueng city mayor Suchai Thanawan, in Chonburi province. 
Nicknamed "white Chai," this local boss was brutally gunned down by assassins with 
heavy weapons when he was driving ( details in the next section). 57 
Security officers took desperate and excessive measure to suppress hit men, who, over 
time, seemed emboldened and multiplied in number. On 26 August 1992, the Saraburi 
Police executed four gunmen extra-judicially. The police alleged these four gunmen 
were involved in 16 murders in the central and northeastern regions, including the 
murder of a Chart Thai vote canvasser in the previous election. The gang leader was a 
former village headman from another province. The police also claimed these assassins 
were on a "political killing" mission~ Rayong, Chonburi and Chantaburi. 58 Even using 
this brutal method, the police succeeded in eliminating merely 0.5 percent of active hit 
men, clearly inadequate in dealing with the abundant supply of gunmen hired for 
electoral violence. 
54 Thai Rath, 14 September 1992, 1, 22, 25. 
55 This happened in the northeast province of Udonthani (Thai Rath, 11 September 1992: l 7). 
56 For example, a vote canvasser in Prachinburi who worked for both Chart Thai Party and its riva l Chart 
Pattana Party was gunned down (Thai Rath , 14 September 1992, I, 22, 25). 
57 Other notable cases took place in Nakhon Si Thammarat (see Chapter 9), Nakhon Pathom, 
Samutprakam, Prachinburi, and Ratchaburi (Thai Rath, IO August 1992: I, 7; 21 August 1992: l , 17; 30 
August 1992: I, 17 ; 31 August 1992: l , 13; 14 September 1992: 1, 22, 25). 
58 Thai Rath, 26 August 1992: l, 3, 17. 
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The July 1995 election 
This election was held in the wake of corruption scandals related to public land 
distribution, which destroyed the legitimacy of the Chuan Leekpai government. This 
election was a political showdown between two major parties : the Democrats and the 
Chart Thai Party. Ironically, Suphanburi boss Banharn Silapa-archa, a chief target of the 
reform movement, promised that his Chart Thai Party would push for political reform if 
elected. This was an attempt to clean his party's tarnished image of backwardness, 
corruption and narrow-minded provincialism. 59 Chuan's acting Interior Ministry revived 
the Committee for Prevention and Suppression of the Influential Figures, and Chuan 
presided over the committee himself. The primary objective of the committee, however, 
was suppressing vote-buying rather than dismantling influential bosses. Other political 
parties and the media criticized the committee as a Demo crat political tool used to 
weaken their opponents. The committee's operation task forces were divided into three 
teams, and senior police took charge of each: the first team was responsible fo r the 
southern region, the second team looked into the central, the east, and Bangkok, and the 
last team oversaw the northeast. Two out of three police offers appointed to lead the 
operation task fo rce were known as associates of the Democrat Party. 60 
The committee clearly targeted Chart Thai Party candidates, particularly in the provinces 
known to be Chart Thai's strongholds. Severa l Democrat rivals called this committee the 
"Gestapo of Thailand" after authorities investigated one opposit ion party candidate over 
land invasion cases in the middle of his campaign. 61 In another case, the special police 
raided Chart Thai Party's vote canvasser ' s house in Buriram in the middle of the night in 
search of vote-buying money (the politics behind and consequences of this incident are 
further examined in Chapter 11). Chart Thai Party secretary Sanoh Thienthong 
commented that the government manipulated the raid and the situat io n was "worse than 
the dictator" and ' \vorse than the Pao Sriyanond era of the late l 950s." 62 As mentioned 
ear li er, clear ly this was not the first time the ruling party manipu lated the state apparatus 
during the election competition-and it would not be the last (as will be seen in the next 
chapter). 
59 The Chart Thai Par ty won this election and Banharn established a comminee for politi cal reform, which 
eventuall y led to the new constitution (See Chapter 3). 
60 Matichon, 30 June 1995: 12; Matichon Sudsapda, 30 May-5 June 1995: 88-89; 20-26 June 1995: 91-92. 61 Matichon Sudsupda, 30 May- 5 June 1995: 88-89. 
62 Matichon, 30 June 1995: 12. See th e rol e of Phao Sriyanong, a di ctatorial police chief during th e 1950s, 
in Chapter 2. 
114 
State intervention notwithstanding, clashes between influential bosses (and their 
subordinates) remained a major cause of violent death in the campaign. There were 32 
violent incidents, which resulted in 7 dead and 14 wounded. The number of incidents 
and wounded victims were higher than in any previous elections with the exception of 
the 1986 poll. Though the death toll appeared lower than other past elections, if 
examined closely the assassination attempts were as high as in September 1992 (see 
comparison between each election in table 4.2 and 4.3). 
There was no separatist movement involvement in the election. Thugs and gunmen 
coerced vote canvassers as usual. Physical intimidation of vote canvassers abounded: 
rival candidates threatened them to stay neutral, withdraw or switch sides; a few 
received death threats after embezzling their boss 's campaign money; and some rivals 
harassed vote canvassers to not encroach certain territory. 63 Only two candidates were 
targets of violent attacks. There was one case of intimidation of a journalist in Pichit 
(stronghold of the Democrat Party), where tough guys coerced her to leave the province 
and confiscated her camera after she had taken photos of 200 special police operating 
secretly in the area. 64 PollWatch staff faced physical threats from the Chart Thai Party ' s 
henchmen in Buriram when they went to monitor the electoral district on the eve of the 
election day. 65 In addition, this election witnessed a new form of collective action-a 
post-election protest. In three provinces, a group of losing candidates ' supporters 
organized public protests against the electoral results, claiming there was fraud and 
misconduct in vote counting. These protesters, however, gathered for only a few hours 
and dispersed voluntarily without causing any trouble. 66 There was no spectacular or 
random public violence, but some provinces, notably Prae, Nakhon Sawan, and Buriram 
emerged as turbulent spots. In these provinces, prominent bosses fiercely competed with 
each other and used violent force and strong-ann tactics (see Chapter 7, 8, and 11 
respectively). 
63 See interesting cases in Songkhla , Chainat, Singburi, Nonthaburi, Rayong in Matichon, 6 June 1995: 13; 
Matichon, 8 June 1995: 3; Thai Rath, 9 June 1995: 3; Thai Rath, 22 June 1995: 2, 3 (respectively). 
64 Thai Rath: 21 June 1995: I, I 8. The province was largely controlled by a Democrat Party' s member but 
was constantly challenged by another political family. Journalist intimidation, which is usually rare, had 
happened once before in this province in the March 1992 election. 
65 Matichon, 3 July 1995: 11. The police rescued them from the area before any violence broke out (see 
Chapter 11 ). 
66 In Mukdaharn and Kanchanaburi , there were 100-500 protesters, whi le in Sukhothai the reported 
number was 2,000 (Matichon, 4 Jul y 1995: 10; 8 July 1995: 10). 
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The November 1996 election 
This was the last election before the promulgation of the new constitution, and it was 
held after Banharn, the premier, decided to disso lve the parliament instead of opting to 
resign. Three major political parties-the Chart Thai, the Democrat, and the New 
Aspiration Party (NAP) -expected to win the election. Since the Chart Thai Party of 
Banharn lost its largest faction to the NAP led by Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, its chance of 
winning dwindled. 67 Eventually, the NAP defeated the Democrats by two seats and 
successfully formed a coalition government. Chavalit became the third prime minister of 
Thailand since 1992. 
This election turned out to be the most turbulent and violent of the pre-1997 era. In total , 
there were 59 vio lent incidents, causing 18 deaths and wounding 34 (see table 4.2). 
Those 59 incidents were: 35 assassination attempts, 4 violent fights, 17 physical threats, 
2 bombings, and one case of arson of a polling station. 68 Vote canvassers took all hits 
from hired gunmen, rendering them "electoral war" causalities. Given the high demand 
for political killings, police estimated that the number of gunmen country-wide added up 
to 762 by the time the electoral campaign started.69 Considering the dead alone as a 
measure of violence is misleading as there seemed to be fewer than in the September 
1992 election. To gauge the full extent of violence, one needs to take other figures into 
account. The total number of vio lent incidents, in particular assassination attempts, was 
the highest for this election. The tally of wo unded was also high, double the last 
election's figure . Most injuries were the result of fa iled assassination attempts. If the 
gunmen had hit their targets those I 3 attempts would have produced a death toll 
surpassing past records (see table 4.3). 
The 1996 electoral contest was wrought with violence-in various forms-from 
beginning to end. Media and stakeholders pressured the caretaker government to prevent 
violence before the lives of political contestants and democracy itself were put in 
jeopardy. Banham visited "election hotspots" himself and ordered the police chief to 
67 The faction was named " Wan gnamyen" and was led by Sanoh Thienthong, an influential boss from Sa 
Ka eo province (see Chapter 12). 
68 Bot h Pol! Watch and the poli ce department, though, admitted violence in thjs election contest was high 
but presented low figures to the publi c. Poll Watch identified 7 dead and IO wounded without giving the 
tally on incidents, while the poli ce stated there were total 36 violent incidents involving cand idates and 
vote ca nvassers (9 success ful murders, 9 failed assassinations, and 8 intimidations). Thai Rath , 18 
November 1996: I , 17, 23. 
69 Most of them were concentrated in the central region. The information came from a Department of 
Poli ce press conference (Thai Rath, 7 October 1996: I, 18). 
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bolster local police against gunmen; he also asked the police to compile statistics of 
violence against vote canvassers during election campaigns. 70 Some political party 
leaders suggested the government register vote canvassers so authorities could monitor 
their activities. 71 
Despite these efforts the government failed to stop the violence. International media, 
notably the BBC and Reuters, commented that thls election was "the dirtiest and most 
violent since 1973." The leading national newspaper, Thai Rath, ran a headline one week 
before election day that stated, "The Dark Age of Election, Rampant Killings." Party 
leaders portrayed their cohorts as victims of violent crime and blamed their opponents. 
Former premier and Chart Pattana Paiiy head, Chatichai, called the election "barbaric," 
and blamed the government for failing to protect party members. 72 The NAP leader, 
Chavalit said: "Now the election is so bloody, full of shootings and killings. I feel hurt 
witnessing this, and want to beg all sides please do not use violence against each other 
otherwise the Thai people will lose faith in the political system." On another occasion, 
he requested his own party members not use "savage methods" because election 
competition is not "war making" 73 The situation deteriorated to the extent that electoral 
violence became a priority issue for the cabinet. The Interior Minister admitted that the 
election was "quite violent" but denied any responsibility. The premier Banharn said "I 
was well aware since I dissolved the House that the election competition would be more 
violent, as long as there is no political reform." 74 It is difficult to know whether he 
genuinely believed in what he said in the meeting, but what transpired showed us that 
the 1997 political reform did not diminish electoral violence, at least in the short term 
(see next chapter). 
There were many violence-ridden provinces in this election- some of them the usual 
hot spots, whereas others were new to these levels of conflict. Among them were 
Nakhon Si Thammarat (see Chapter 9), Sukhothai, Pichit, Nakhon Pathom, 
Chachoengsao, Phrae (see Chapter 7), Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, and Bangkok. 
Antagonism between rival candidates, who were both affluent and powerful, caused the 
70 Wattachak, 11 November 1996. Since, as mentioned, the Police were inclined to dismiss all violence 
during the election as non-political, they did not collect any official data on election-related violent 
incidents. 
71 Wattachak, I 3 November I 996. 
72 Thai Rath, 10 November 1996: I. 
73 See his comments in Thai Rath , 10 November 1996: 17, 22, and Sue Thurakit, 8 November 1996 
(respectively). 
74 Thai Rath, 12November 1996: I, 17. 
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violence. Vote canvassers were caught in the crossfire. An example was the murder in 
Chachoengsao of a vote canvasser who was a prominent provincial councilor and owner 
of a construction business. In past elections he had canvassed votes for two powerful 
political bosses, who always ran for the same party, making his work smooth. In this 
election, unfortunately, his two bosses stood for different parties ( due to their recent 
serious disputes), forcing him to choose sides. This eventually proved fatal, which partly 
explains the tumult in Chachoengsao in the 1996 election. 75 
Bangkok also bears closer examination. Since 1979, electoral campaigns in Bangkok 
mainly involved brawling, fighting, poster vandalism, and physical intimidation. Given 
its large population and number of electoral districts, violence in Bangkok was relatively 
weak compared to other provinces. 76 Generally, Bangkok is not "dangerous" during 
elections; assassinations and shootings had not been common in the capital city as was 
the case in other parts of the country. The Metropolitan police chief told cabinet that 
electoral competitions in Bangkok were "not as vio lent as other provinces because 
Bangkok candidates had no culture of 'patronizing' gunmen."77 His explanation was, in 
fact, wrong, but what he said about the character of Bangkok candidate was right (see 
next section). The increase in violence in the Bangkok election in 1996 was a result of 
boss-type candidates' entering into politics. A close investigation reveals that vio lence 
was concentrated in one district, in which both parties fie lded candidates from the 
criminal syndicates. One candidate, in fact, was a famous local boss involved in a wide 
range of illegal business, including hiring gunmen. 78 The involvement of local bosses in 
politics changed the whole dynamic of electoral competitions in certain districts of 
Bangkok in the 1996 election. 
75 Thai Rath, 8 November 1996: I , IO; Thai Rath, 11 November 1995: 23. 
76 In th e 1996 election, Bangkok had 37 MP seats, whereas the average number of MP seats per province 
was 3 to 5. 
77 Thai Rath, 12 November 1996: 17, 23. 
78 In the end, thi s candidate, who ran for th e Democra t Party, won the electi on amid public disapprova l of 
how a "clean image" party like th e Democrat could recruit someone of hi s ilk in the first place. A yea r 
later he was charged by the po lice for masterminding th e murder of another Democrat MP 's moth er, who 
had been killed on 6 September 1997. The case proceeded to court, and on 18 September 20 I 2 the 
Supreme Court upheld th e Appeal Cou11's death sentence for this former Democrat Party MP for 
Bangkok and his aide (Matichon , 18 Septem ber 20 12; " Death Pena lty Upheld for Ex -MP,"' Bangkok Post , 
19 September 20 12). 
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Electoral violence, 1979-1996: methods, perpetrators, victims and timing of electoral 
violence 
A clear pattern of electoral violence had developed in Thailand over the period 1979-
1996. In terms of methods, perpetrators chose assassination, amounting to more than half 
the total violent incidents. Assassination was followed by physical intimidation, for 
example, shooting into the victims ' houses at night. Other modes of violence, such as 
fighting, attacking, bombing or burning were witnessed occasionally (see table 4.2 and 
chart 4.1 ). The random or indiscriminate use of violence in the public areas, targeting a 
large crowd, was absent, except for two unusual cases in 1988 and in 1996. 79 Violent 
acts were mainly pre-meditated and politically motivated, rather than spontaneous, 
opportunistic or emotionally-induced. Local thugs and hired gunmen who worked for 
influential politicians carried out most attacks. Thugs and mercenaries were responsible 
for most causalities, injuries, and threats. However, communist and separatist insurgents 
engaged in violence sporadically. Violence from communists appeared only in 1979 and 
1983 and then disappeared, while threats from the separatists stretched over a longer 
period but were less salient, causing little damage and mainly confined to the three 
southern provinces (Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat). 
Victims also fell . into distinct categories. Vote canvassers were singled out as the 
primary target of intimidation and killings. Vote-canvasser assaults accounted for as 
high as 84 percent of the total victims, compared to other election-related personnel-
candidates, journalists, poll workers, gunmen, and ordinary voters-who took a small 
share of 4-5 percent each (see table 4.3 and chart 4.2). The violence occurred at 3 
distinct times: 82 percent before the election, 16 percent on election day, and only 2 
percent in the post-election period (see table 4.4 and chart 4.3).80 The pre-election 
period, or campaigning, is the most dangerous time in Thailand's election cycle. As to 
the degree of violence, data collection found no linear progression across time from low-
level to higher-level of violence, or vice versa. Rather the data show an ebb and flow, in 
a narrow range, in the number of vio lent incidents and causalities. The lack of sharp 
79 Recall the 1988 election, the attempt to kill Ang Thong province ' s most influential boss, Sia Yae. Five 
gunmen open fire into the crowd, killing 2 and injuring 10. In 1996, in Bangkok, two mobsters connected 
to one candidate shot into a crowd in two isolated incidents, which led to a total of 8 wounded (see the 
1996 election). 
80 However, the seemingly low number of violent incidents in the post-election period must be perceived 
with a caveat. Many post-election violent incidents did not take place within the first month after election 
day. If we take the post-election violence over a longer period of time, the number of incidents would be 
larger. However, my data is not available for this longer time frame. 
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fluctuation in the degree of vio lence is attributed to the absence of major structural and 
institutional alterations in the period 1979-1996, whether (patrimonial) state structure, 
central-local relations, or electoral and party system. When the major changes came into 
effect after 1997 and 2006, the country witnessed much greater fluctuation in electoral 
violence (as examined in Chapters 5 and 6). 
In conclusion, from 1979-1996, the prototype of electoral violence in Thai national 
elections was an assassination perpetrated by a lone mercenary or team of gunmen, hired 
by provincial bosses, targeting vote canvassers during the election campaign. This type 
of violence is located on the border between a "purely individual violent act" and 
"co llective violence," since it involves only a few perpetrators and involves a low level 
of coordination between personnel. It is not a purely individual vio lent act because 
gunmen commonly act on behalf of others, and the act requires a certain degree of 
planning (elaborated in the next section).8 1 Provincial bosses specify the victim's rank 
and hire the perpetrator. The pattern of electoral violence in Thailand is different from 
that in other countries (Zimbabwe, Iran, Kenya, Nigeria) which breaks out in mass or 
collective violence, notably riots, coordinated destruction, public looting, scattered 
attacks, and sometimes even deadly civil war (see Chapter 1 ). As exp lained in the 
previous chapter, to understand the distinct style of electoral vio lence in Thailand, one 
needs to focus on the local factors, mechanisms, and processes. The local conditions 
explain why some provinces are more prone to electoral violence than others. 
81 By making this distin ction, 1 employ Charl es Till y's working defin ition of "co ll ecti ve violence," by 
which he mea ns socia l interaction th at " infli cts phys ical damage on person and/or objects ... [,] in vo lves at 
least two perpetrators of dam age; and results at least in part from coordin ati on am ong persons who 
perform the damaging acts. " Thi s defini tion of "coll ecti ve violence," Till y explains, "exc ludes purely 
indi vidual action, non materia l dam age, accidents, and long-term or indi rect effects of such damagin g 
processes as dump ing of lox ic waste" (T il ly 2003: 3-4). 
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Table 4.2: Election-related violence in national elections, 1979-1996 
Election Violent incidents Death Wounded 
dates toll 
assassination fights , physical bombings burnings total total total 
attempts brawls, intimidation 
scuffles 
22/4/1979 10 3 2 0 0 15 9 7 
18/4/1983 14 0 1 1 1 17 16 10 
27/7/1986 15 0 19 0 0 34 18 7 
24/7/1988 7 0 9 1 1 18 7 12 
22/3/1992 15 2 10 I 0 28 15 6 
13/9/1992 17 0 3 2 1 23 24 8 
2/7/1995 17 1 13 1 0 32 7 14 
17/11/1996 35 4 17 2 1 59 18 34 
Total 130 10 74 8 4 226 114 98 
Chart 4.1 : Methods of electoral violence in national elections, 1979-1996 
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Table 4.3: Deaths related to violence in national elections, 1979-1996 
Election Dead victims 
dates 
vote candidates journalists, poll gunmen voters Total 
canvassers administrators 
and observers 
22/4/ 1979 5 1 3 0 0 9 
18/4/1983 12 2 0 0 2 16 
27/7/1986 15 1 0 1 1 18 
24/7/1988 5 0 0 0 2 7 
22/3/1 992 15 0 0 0 0 15 
13/9/ 1992 20 0 0 4 0 24 
2/7/1995 6 0 I 0 0 7 
17/11/1996 I 8 0 0 0 0 12 
Total 96 4 4 5 5 114 
Chart 4.2: Dead Victims of electoral violence in national elections, 1979-1996 
journalist s, poll 
candidates 
4% 
vote rs 
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Table 4.4: Timing of election-related violent incidents in national elections, 1979-
1996 
Election Timing of violent incidents 
dates 
pre-election election day post-election total 
( I month after 
election day) 
22/4/1979 8 7 0 15 
18/4/1983 13 3 I 17 
27/7/1986 31 3 0 34 
24/7/1988 14 4 0 18 
22/3/1992 26 2 0 28 
13/9/1992 17 6 0 23 
2/7/1995 26 5 1 32 
17/11/1996 50 6 3 59 
Total 185 36 5 226 
Chart 4.3: Timing of electoral violence in national elections, 1979-1996 
The next chapter examines the changing structures, rules and politico-economic 
landscapes at the national and local settings in the period 1997-2011 , and explains how 
these changes affect the patterns and frequency of electoral violence. 
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Chapter 5 
The rise and fall of electoral violence: 
Changing rules, structures, and power landscapes, 1997- 2011 
This chapter examines how patterns of electoral violence were shaped by the economic 
crisis of 1997, the new rules of the game as embodied in the 1997 constitution, 
decentralization, and the rise of the Thai Rak Thai Party and Thaksin. It also looks at the 
Thaksin government's war on drugs and the elimination of"influential people," the 2006 
coup and the subsequent polarization of Thai society, the changing roles and status of 
provincial elites, and the emergence of the Yellow Shirt and the Red Shirt movements 
and their effects on electoral politics. The main focus is on the combination of factors 
that led to increasingly widespread violence in the 2001 and 2005 elections, and the 
decrease in electoral violence in 2007 and 201 I. The major goal is to identify the 
mechanisms, patterns, and consequences of violence in electoral politics and why it 
erupted in 2001 and 2005 and dissipated in 2007 and 2011. 
National political restructuring and local power reordering 
The period from 1997 to 2011 was highly transformative and turbulent for Thai politics 
and society. Within one decade, there were five elections (including the nullified 2006 
election), six prime ministers, two constitutions, one military coup , and countless violent 
clashes between state security forces and color-coded mass movements which led to a 
large number of deaths and injuries. Parliamentary democracy and electoral institutions 
underwent a dramatic change. Initially, the new constitution and political reform 
produced a strong and stable civilian administration and political party structure. 
Programmatic politics and policy-based campaigning played increasingly important 
roles in sh;ping electoral outcomes, even though the particularistic elements of 
patronage, pork, personality, and coercive force still existed. Political party and electoral 
institutions were, more than ever, strengthened and meaningfully connected to a 
majority of the electorate. Direct elections at the local level enabled by decentralization 
helped created stronger linkages between the electorate and elected politicians. 
However, the military coup in 2006 derailed the legitimacy and development of 
parliamentary democracy. The traditional royal-military-bureaucratic power alliance, 
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which lost its power but had no willingness to participate in electoral competition, 
employed an old-fashioned, coercive tool (the coup) to capture state power and 
overthrow the popularly elected government. The 2006 coup profoundly transformed 
Thai polit ics; it polarized the country, exacerbated political divisions, and radicalized 
political participation. As a result, electoral competitions were infused with ideological 
contestation, rather than only particularist ic or programmatic campaigns. The changing 
rules, landscape and power structure of Thai politics at the national level strongly 
effected local political settings-the balance of power between political groups and 
fam ilies, and between national parties and local bosses. And the political changes at the 
local level, structured by national dynamics, shaped the supply and demand of coercion 
and electoral violence witnessed in this period. 
To understand the peaks and troughs of violence in this period, it is necessary to 
examine political and institutional changes at the national level aild how these affect 
local power structures. Four national-level factors contributed to the transformation of 
Thai politics from 1997 to 20 11: the 1997 constitution and its newly designed electoral 
system; the implementation of decentralization and its empowerment of local elective 
posts; the rise of the strong populist party and Thaksin Shinawatra; and the 2006 military 
coup. 
The new electoral administration and system and the 1997 constitution: changing rules 
and unintended (violent) consequences 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the political reform movement began after the 1992 May 
bloodshed. The reformists defined money politics and vote buying, as well as weak 
coalition government, as the core problems of Thai politics. Just as importantly, they 
viewed the provincial businessmen-cum-politicians as the main culprits for the 
problems. Journalists and academics deplored rural po liticians, accusing them of using 
"dirty" money to buy votes from rural poor, uneducated voters. They were accused of 
plundering publi c resources to win elections and to gain personal benefits. Immediately 
after the econornic cris is of July 1997, the push for political reform ga lvanized vita l 
support from the urban middle class, civil society, and business elites as they blamed the 
crisis on incompetent government run by ru ra l polit icians. Three months later, in 
October 1997, the legislative assembl y passed a new constitution. The primary goals of 
the new constitution were twofold- to create a capable and stab le government and 
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eradicate vote buying and money politics. 1 The unspoken goal, however, was to prevent 
provincial politicians (nakkanmueang bannok) from assuming power, as had occurred 
earlier in the 1990s. 
To curb the power of provincial and money politics, the constitutional drafters 
redesigned the electoral system, election administration and rules over party 
organization.2 The new constitution replaced the Ministry of the Interior with an 
independent body, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT), tasked with 
administering and overseeing electoral processes. The ECT was mandated to investigate 
violations of electoral law and misconduct, and it had the power to counter electoral 
fraud by disqualifying candidates before or after voting day. 3 These sweeping powers 
effectively made the ECT one of the key players shaping electoral results-and 
effectively a gatekeeper to the House. Especially in the first election held under the new 
constitution, in 2001, the ECT' s lack of experience and capacity, combined with unclear 
rules and mismanagement, became sources of conflict (see next section). 
Apart from creating the ECT, the 1997 constitution adopted several new organizations, 
mechanisms, and rules, For the first time in history, it set forth that senators be elected 
directly rather than being appointed. Voting was compulsory for all eligible voters and 
party switching, a popular practice among Thai politicians, was res!ricted. However, the 
most far-reaching reform was a major overhaul of the electoral system. As part of an 
attempt to facilitate coherent political party and party-oriented politics, it replaced the 
block-vote system (used under the 1978 and 1992 constitutions) with a mixed-member 
or two-tiered system. 4 Out of five hundred House seats, four hundred seats were elected 
from single-seat districts on a plurality basis ( or first past the post, FPTP), and another 
one hundred seats were elected from a single nationwide district on a proportional basis. 
All political parties had to submit a list of candidates for voters to consider and those on 
1 For detail on the political reform movement and the 1997 constitution, see Cal lahan 2005; Connors 1999; 
Sombat 2002; McCargo 1998; Chaiwat 2000; Kuhonta 2008. 
2 See Hicken 2007: 145-159: the Database for TI1ailand ' s Constitution Drafting Assembly Records 1999; 
Chaiwat 2000. 
3 This was known as "giving the yellow or red cards" to the candidates. The yellow cards would be given 
in a case in which the ECT found evidence of candidate's electoral misconduct but not a direct link. The 
red card would be delivered when the ECT had evidence directly linking the candidate to electoral 
violations. After issuing yellow or red cards to the candidates, a new round of elections must be held in 
districts in which winning candidates were disqualified. A candidate with a yellow card could run again 
for election, while candidates with red cards could not. Some districts even had to hold multiple rounds of 
elections if when misconduct repeatedly occurred (see Organic Law on the Election of Member of the 
House of Representatives and Senators 1998 in Thiraphon et al. 1998). 
4 Hicken 2007: 154. 
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the party list were ranked in order. Each candidate had to decide whether they ran for a 
constituency or a party list seat, and each voter cast one vote for their district 
representative and another for a party list. The constituency and party list votes were 
calculated separately and had no effect on each other. The introduction of a party-list 
system aimed to provide an opportunity fo r technocrats, businessmen, professionals or 
basically non-provincial boss-type candidates to enter politics without electioneering. It 
also aimed to strengthen party building and party identity. 
The drafters believed that changing to the FPTP system would reduce vote buying; 
because districts were smaller, they reasoned, candidates would be able to cultivate close 
relationships with their constituents without dispensing particularistic material benefits, 
or cash. The goal was also to allow non-affluent but quality candidates to compete with 
influential bosses. Another advantage of the FPTP system, claimed by the drafters, was 
its lack of intraparty competit ion (which typically occuned in the block vote's multiple-
seat districts). 5 Despite the advantages of the FPTP system on party building and vote 
buying reduction, it created negative unintended consequences. It intensified electoral 
conflict in many provinces. 
In general, there were no direct causal links between the FPTP system and the frequency 
of electoral vio lence; no study demonstrates or proves that the adoption of this 
straightforward electoral system leads to more electoral violent confli ct. 6 Nevertheless, 
the sequence and context of the introduction of FPTP vot ing in Thailand encouraged 
greater levels of violence. It is critical to emphasize that the FPTP was taken up after 
Thailand 's long standing use of the block-vote system. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the 
block-vote system helped diminish the intensity of electoral competitions by allowing 
strong candidates to avoid head-on confrontation wi th each other as it was unnecessary 
to win the most votes to get elected. For example, in a two-seat district with two rivals 
standing, both of them could co llect just enough votes to win the first and second 
position to get elected . In the FPTP system, the compet ition becomes a zero-sum-game 
5 See consti tutional drafters ' arguments and debates in Thawinwadi et al. 1999. However, evidence from 
oth er coun tries shows that smaller districts mi ght in fact facilitate vote-buying as the number of votes 
needed to win is fewer. Also a s ingle-seat di stri ct is stil l basica ll y a candidate-centered electoral system, 
generating strong incenti ves to cultivate personal suppon networks (Hicken 2007: 47-60). The electi ons of 
200 I and 2005 demonstrated that these cavea ts had a certain merit. 
6 The FPTP is widely considered th e "s implest form of plurality/majority system. in which th e winning 
candidat e is simply th e person who wi ns most votes" (Reynolds, Reilly and Elli s 2005 : 35). See genera l 
discussion of th e advantages and disadvantages of FPTP system in Birch 2005: 281 -3 01 ; Colomer 2004; 
Fa rrell 2001. On di scussion of electoral system choice and con0i ct, see Reill y 2001 ; Sisk 1996; Lijphart 
2004 ; Horowitz 1993. 
128 
as there is only one winner per district- only the strongest boss could go to the House. 
Theoretically, the best way for the boss to escape defeat is to avoid running in the same 
district as their main rival, but this is not an option for everyone. After competing under 
the same electoral system for decades, each political boss or family had successfully 
established their own political stronghold, usually their hometown or business 
headquarters. Running in new districts means rebuilding vote bases and cultivating new 
personal support networks-tasks that normally take years to accomplish. Therefore the 
implementation of the new electoral system aggravated existing local conflicts among 
influential bosses and made elections more prone to violence, precisely in districts in 
which redrawn electoral boundaries pit two rival bosses against each other. Since the 
political reformists were primarily focused on vote-buying, they overlooked the violent 
consequences of the newly-adopted system and prepared no plan to mitigate conflict. 7 
While the new electoral system was implemented nationwide, not every district faced 
violent competition. The FPTP intensified political cleavages but was not a direct cause 
of electoral violence. The real causes resided in local settings-existing local political 
arrangements and the ways in which each political boss responded to the changing 
institutional rules. 
Decentralization: diffusion of power and new conflict terrain 
If democratization in the 1980s provided opportunities for leading provincial 
businessmen to gain access to public resources, rents and political power through 
election to the national parliament, decentralization and direct local elections of the late 
1990s opened up the same oppo1iunities for petty bosses and local strongmen at the local 
level. 
Proposals t~ decentralize Thailand ' s state administration gained political momentum and 
became a top reform priority after the bloody May 1992 crackdown on protesters. 
Although a proposal for decentralization met strong resistance from the Ministry of 
Interior and. some conservative politicians, political demands from academics, NGOs, 
grassroot movements, local civil society and middle class groups channeled through the 
7 In the 2001 , 2005, and 2007 elections, the ECT focused entirely on vote buying and electoral fraud , and 
turned electoral security over to police. It was not until the 2011 election, after electoral violence had 
become a major concern and taken seriously by the ECT, that the ECT office cooperated closely with the 
police toward the goal of making elections safe. Interview, two senior ETC officers, Bangkok, 8 June 
2011; interview, senior police officer overseeing election security, 9 June 2011 and 25 July 2011. 
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public media had an impact on policy makers and political parties. During the September 
1992 election, all major parties, including the Democrats who later won the election, 
included decentralization in their election campaigns. The coalition government led by 
Chuan Leekpai, the Democrat party leader, however, compromised with the 
bureaucracy, and failed to push for the progressive plan on decentralization. 8 With the 
enactment of the Tambon Council and Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO) Act 
in 1994, however, the process of local goverrunent reform and decentralization was 
starting to begin in any case. Tambon councils and TA Os gained autonomous status by 
this law, even though the executive head of the TA Os was not directly elected. Despite a 
number of shortcomings, this law was a catalyst for the modest measures of 
decentralization put in place at this time. 9 Modest though they may have been, they had 
long been blocked by the establishment in the Bangkok-based bureaucracy. 10 
A significant turning point fo r local goverrunent and decentralization reforms took place 
in 1997, with the promulgation of the new constitution stipulating decentralization as a 
national policy. According to the constitution, the state shall give autonomy to localities 
in accordance with the principle of self-government and the will of the people. Local 
government organizations shall have autonomy in laying down policies for their 
governance, personnel and finance administration and shall have their own powers. 11 As 
a result of the new constitution, several acts related to local administration 
empowerment were modified and enacted. Since 1994 a new stratum of local 
government had been created at three levels: sub-district (tambon), muni cipality 
8 Thi s included the na tionwide direct election of provincia l governors. Democrat Party members viewed 
this as a radical form o f decentra liza tion , and strongly opposed those from civil society and the academia 
who advocated for it (Thane! 2002; Praphat 1998) . 
9 Some scholars have traced decentra li zation effor ts back to the 1933 Municipal Act (th e Thesaban Act), 
an d the 1955 and 1956 Acts that effectively establi shed provincial coun cil and tambon coun cil as local 
governm ent offi ces. These acts, however gave very limited power and mandate to the established local 
offi ces. The number of offi ces crea1ed by the act was also staggeringly low. Until 1994, th e local 
government units largely remained under th e control of the Int erior Ministry an d offi cials appointed by the 
central government. 1n a nutshell , it was a devoluti on of centra l government power, not decentralization. 
The direct election of Bangkok governor, first held in 1978 , was an excepti on as, until 20 11, it was the 
only province that elected its own governor. For historical background of decentraliza tion, see Thanet 
2002 : Achakorn and Chandra 20 11: 54-75; Nagai, Funatsu, and Kagoya 2008; Arghiros 2001; Yiengrat 
2008. For in sight fu l comparati ve hi storical analysis of how decentral ization processes in Tha il and and th e 
Philippin es had different causes and consequences in connection to state structure, see Hutchcroft 2004, 
2007. 
'
0 Looked at from a broader perspeclive, the decentraliza ti on program implemented in Tha iland in th e late 
1990s was rath er ca u1ious and tim id. As Hutchcroft (2004 : 3 15-3 16) notes, "Bangkok bureaucrats ha ve 
had considera ble success in fending off the demands of th ose who want to increase th e autonomy of loca l 
governm enta l un its." "So strong," he adds " is the impulse toward centra l rul e th at proposa ls for th e di rect 
election of governors (a practice found in th e Phi lippin es for nearly a century) have been denoun ced as 
attempts to rip the country asunder." 
11 See articles 282 to 290 of th e 1997 Constituti on; Nagai, Funatsu, and Ka goya 2008: 1-5. 
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(thesaban), and province (changwat). The executives of these local administrative 
offices then were elected by their legislative councils, and the ex officio posts for 
government officials (provincial governor, district chief, kamnan) were abolished. For 
example, the 1997 Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) Act created a serious 
impact on the role of provincial governor. The Act stated that the PAO was composed of 
legislative and executive bodies: the provincial council consisted of between 24 and 48 
directly elected members depending on population numbers, and the executive body 
consisted of a chairman who was elected by council members. The governor was no 
longer the chairman of the PAO. At the sub-district level, similarly, the kamnan was also 
no longer the chairman of the TAO. A further significant step occurred in 2003 when the 
laws relating to the PAO, the municipality, and the TAO were amended, stating that the 
executive heads of all of these local government organizations were to be directly 
elected by local people. Direct elections strengthened the power of local executive 
positions and enhanced the legitimacy of the organizations across the board. 12 By 2011, 
the number of local government organizations rose to 7,853, divided into 76 P AOs, 
2,266 municipalities, and 5,509 TA Os, and two special administrative units (Bangkok 
Metropolitan Administration and City of Pattaya) . 13 The number of local elective. posts 
has multiplied since then. 
Decentralization increased the mandate, duties, personnel an_d budget of local 
administrative organizations. According to the 1999 Decentralization Act, local 
government organizations had the authority to collect revenues from several kinds of 
local taxes. Jn addition, this act set the fiscal decentralization target of increasing the 
percentage of local government organization expenditure to at least 20 percent of total 
national expenditure by 2001, and to at least 35 percent by 2006. 14 To give but one 
example of fiscal reform, the share of national public revenue allocated to local 
government organizations increased from 7.13 percent in 1996 to 23.50 percent in 2005, 
12 At the same time they diminished the power of the local-level government officials, notably kamnan and 
provincial governor. See Arghiros (2002) and Bowie (2008) on the changing relationships between th e 
representational and administrative structures in Thai provinces after decentralization. 
13 Both the municipality and TAO were sub-district-level administrative units; their differen ces were based 
on levels of collectible revenue. Any TAO collecting revenue more than the minimum standard is 
upgraded to municipality. Over time, the number ofTAOs diminished in relation to the mw1icipality. The 
municipality was divided into three levels-city, town and sub-district- decided by location, revenue and 
population. The higher the level , the more budget support they received from government By 2012, there 
were 29 city municipalities, I 67 town municipalities, and 2,070 sub-district muni cipalities . See the 
Department of Local Administration, Ministry of Interior website at 
http ://www.dla.go.th/work/abt/index. jsp (accessed on 22 December 2012). 
14 The government at that time, however, failed to meet th is requirement. 
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and the total revenue raised by the P AOs, TAOs, and municipalities increased from 40 
billion baht in 1998 to 130 billion baht in 2005 , an average annual increase of 19 
percent. 15 Local government organizations controlled a large budget, thus giving more 
power to those who held positions within them. 
The administrative control over government largesse had contradictory effects on local 
development. On the one hand, it provided greater resources for local infrastructure and 
welfare. On the other hand, it provided a larger pool ofrents for corrupt local politicians. 
The constitution and laws relating to decentralization were concerned with empowering 
local governments relative to the national government, but they failed to establish a 
capable "rational-legal" state apparatus to underpin the fledging local democracy. With 
the lack of careful and well-crafted capacity-building programs, patrimonial features 
arguably were exhibited more strongly at the local levels due to poorly established local 
state infrastructure and weak monitoring mechanisms. Under these conditions, the 
bosses who were able to capture local government power had almost complete control 
over the allocation of rents and patronage (local government licenses, contracts, 
concession). 
The rent-seeking activities of locally elected politicians were all-pervasive. The most 
common was the local construction contractor-turned-local politician who used his/her 
position to deliver contracts or licenses to their families, business allies, or any 
entrepreneurs willing to pay a bribe. In addition, many elected politicians coerced local 
officials and/or recalcitrant businessmen to comply with their unlawful politico-business 
transactions. Accounts of local bosses enriching themselves through dishonest methods 
were abundant (see all case studies). In no time, media were calling local ad ministrative 
offices "the contractor assembly" (sapha phurapmao) or "the hoodlum assembly" 
(sapha nakleng). 16 The prime example of the local administrative organization's 
patrimonial feature manifested in a tambon of Buriram province, that shall remain 
unnamed. After winning the TAO chairman position, the local boss (whose brother was 
a prominent MP) approved a budget to build a new TAO office located right next to hi s 
15 Achakom 2007: 55. 
16 In only the first round of local elect ions un der decentralization Acts, reports of violence and corruption 
in local offices overshadowed th e excitemen t of new local democracy. With an increasing number of 
scanda ls, Office of th e Nati ona l An ti -Corrupti on Commiss ion and Office of the Auditor General of 
Tha iland mon itored loca l spending closely because there were no equ iva lent loca l bodies. By th e mid 
2000s, the local government's (lack of) good governance and transparency became national concerns. See, 
Orathai 2003; Kovi t 20 IO; and see lengthy report regarding the public lament on "the contractor or 
hood lum assembly' ' in Prachakhom Thongthin , I :5 (16 July- 16 August 200 1): 40-84. 
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house. He spent most of his time running office from home; meetings were also often 
conducted at home. Since he was TAO chairman for a long time (from 1995 to 2012), all 
officials adjusted to his style of resident-governing and the private came to overwhelm 
the public, both literally and figuratively. It was no coincidence that, over time, his 
house grew larger and was beautifully decorated, while the TAO office was left in an 
abject condition. 17 The situation observed in this TAO is an exemplar of Max Weber's 
description of patrimonial office as a "ruler 's household." 18 
Decentralization, thus, created new sources of wealth and power at local levels. It 
equipped local politicians with greater power, status, and significance in the political 
system compared to the past. Decentralization opened up a new political market and 
created a new terrain of local competition. No single political group or individual had 
control over the newly-created local political posts, which drew forth various kinds of 
new entrants. Local businessmen, teachers, lawyers, NGO activists, journalists, retired 
officials (especially kamnan and village headmen), policemen, bank managers, and 
gangsters were keen to run for office. Nevertheless, regardless of their original careers, 
most of them turned to rent-seeking business'es (mainly construction business) after they 
were in office. The national pattern of wealth and power accumulation prevalent from 
the 1980s onward was reproduced locally at the tum of the new century. In no time, 
however, provincial elites realized it was crucial to strengthen their.networks by linking 
local and national spheres. They thus involved themselves more directly in the local 
elections and devoted more attention to their downward relationships with local 
politicians. The changing power landscape similarly compelled all major political parties 
and heads of factions to invest more resomces in building local power bases to buttress 
their national political standing. As a result, parties, political factions and families 
sought to place their allies, family members or supporters in local governments. Local 
elections fo1med a new front of political competition and the stakes were high. They 
17 Personal observation and interview, TAO senior official, Burirarn, 21 October 20 I 0. This TAO was 
rnediurn sized with an annual budget of 19 million baht. The TAO lacked basic facilities found in other 
Thai offices; staff needed to wash dishes in a water pond nearby. The chairman ' s house was gigantic and 
well maintained like an upper-middle class residence usually found in Bangkok. The chairman told his 
followers that he planned to rw1 for one or two more times and then "give" the office to one of his children 
(see more details on Bur iram ' s politics in Chapter 11). It is interesting to note that during the absolute 
monarchy (Rama V- RarnaVII, 1868-1932), many senior civil servants administrated their deparrments 
from their residences. This practice continued in the early years of the People 's Party regime after 1932 
(Nakharin 1992). 
18 As Weber (1978, vol. 2: 1 0 13) noted, "Originally patrimonial administration was adapted to the 
satisfaction of purely personal , primarily pri vate household needs of the master. " 
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brought national and local politicians together working for mutual benefit. The linkages 
between local and national politics were stronger than ever before. 
Decentralization produced few mitigat ing effects on electoral vio lence. Some MPs 
switched, and decided to run fo r local offices with large budgets and manpower. Their 
decision to not run in national elections helped lessen conflict in some MP ' s electoral 
districts. 19 Furthermore, for some dominant political dynasties, decentralization helped 
alleviate intra-clan conflicts as it provided more seats in which clan patriarchs could 
place their members. Certain powerful clans, for example in Phetchaburi (Chapter 10) 
and Sa Kaeo (Chapter 12) divided the political territory- House of Representative, 
PAO, municipality, TAO-among clan members to avoid family feuds or unnecessary 
confrontation. Power-sharing was, at any rate, difficult to sustain; it was the exception 
rather than the rule, working successfully only in provinces dominated by one clan. 
Overall, decentralization exacerbated rather than mitigated provincial electoral conflict. 
It disrupted local political order and made power structures more fragmented , 
complicating the po litical bosses' attempt to monopolize provincial power in three 
crucial ways. First, after 1997, the established provincial elites had to compete with both 
old rivals and new local players for provincial control. Many new actors did not have 
close ties with established bosses nor were they connected to influential political 
networks or dynasties. Many of them came from humble backgrounds. Without 
decentra lization, their political mobility would have never been possible. Their political 
entry disturbed existing clientelistic relationships and opened up possibilities for new, 
independent power centers. Savvy political upstarts challenged old bosses and politica l 
fam ilies who gradually lo st their grip on power. 20 After the 2000s, new political fami lies 
appeared in several provinces. The conflict between old and new elites was fi ercest 
when the newcomer attempted to topple the existing bosses and monopol ize territory. 
The end results of this power struggle were violent electoral wars. 21 
19 For exa mple, the case of Phetchaburi boss and severa l times MP, Yuth Angk.inan, who had been a 
longstanding city mayor of Phetchaburi since th e late 1960s. In th e ea rl y 1980s, when the nationa l 
par liament was revived, he ran for MP and took on ministerial posts in the 1990s. After decentra lizati on, 
he ran for c ity mayor aga in as he sought to control the municipali ty's growing budget and avoid 
con fron lation with hi s nephew who was standing for MP electi on (see more detai ls in Chapter 10). For a 
list of MPs who swi tched to loca l electi on after decentralizati on, see Prachakhom Thongthin, 3: 3 1 
(Sep tember 2003): 58-60. 
20 lt should be emphas ized th ough that the "old bosses" were not reall y old , as their power dated back Io 
onl y the mid-! 970s (see Chapter 3). 
2 1 Nakhon Sawan (Chapter 8) is th e archetypa l case of this poli tical dynamic. 
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Second, decentralization shook up the relationship between patrons and key vote 
canvassers. Many vote canvassers turned against their bosses because their superiors did 
not support their running in local elections. In general, Thai politicians preferred their 
own family members to aides when it came to political succession. Even though many 
key vote canvassers were more qualified and experienced than relatives, bosses did not 
nominate them for candidacy. Even in cases in which bosses supported their vote 
canvassers in local politics, problems still occurred over the number of seats avai lable 
and too many canvasser candidates; this led to conflicts among aides within the same 
personal network. As a result, there were numbers of ambitious vote canvassers who 
failed to secure political support from their bosses. These disgruntled brokers severed 
ties with their patrons and decided to build their own political fortunes elsewhere. Their 
chances of winning elections were high as they had such strong influence over the vote 
base of their former bosses. The post-1997 elections witnessed an increase in political 
betrayal, defection, and realignn1ents in local personal networks. And, as explained in 
Chapter 3, when disloyalty arose, the bosses had no hesitation employing violence to 
reconsolidate their empires. Electoral battles between political bosses and their former 
vote canvassers were thus hostile and prone to violence.22 
Third, decentralization and direct local elections created intra-party conflict. In each 
province, influential MPs sought to field their trusted people in lo_cal offices to assure 
their national election victory, even though they often had to compete with other MPs 
from the same party. Moreover, every national politician acknowledged that control over 
local posts led to greater political leverage within party politics. Before 1997, prominent 
MPs strove to be heads of large factions so that they could negotiate fo r cabinet seats. 
With decentralization, they faced an even more challenging task. Controlling only MPs 
was no longer sufficient. To ensure hegemonic po wer within the party (which would 
lead to a ministerial post) , they first had to control their province (which by then was 
splintered into several electoral territories). This explained why MPs from the same 
party pitted their candidates against each other in local elections. Intra-party competition 
was as aggressive as inter-party fighting . The intra-party political struggles were 
particularly fierce in provinces in which the party brand carried significant value. For 
instance, in the southern region, a Democrat stronghold, Democrats competed against 
22 This phenomenon was also found prior to I 997 in severa l provi nces . See Chapter 7 (Phrae), Chapter 8 
(Nakhon Sawan), and Chapter I J (Buriram) for accounts of clients-turned-patrons and violen t struggles 
between leadin g vote ca nvassers and th eir bosses. 
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one another fiercely in the PAO, mayor, and TAO elections. Intra-party electoral 
vio Ience broke out in several campaigns. 23 Internal competition happened within 
Thaksin 's Thai Rak Thai Party too after it became highly popular. Since 2001, TRT 
candidates have stood against each other in local elections, particularly in the north and 
northeast. In 2004, when TRT was at its peak, cut-throat competition between TRT party 
members occun-ed in 31 provinces (out of 47 provinces that their backed candidates 
won) fo r the PAO chairman elections. 24 
After decentralization, elections at the local level in several provinces started to involve 
vio lence. As the national and local elections became more connected, violence from one 
sphere easily affected and contaminated the other. These patterns are discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter. 
The rise of the populist party: New political actors and the goal of political 
monopolization 
The economic crisis and the new constitution created strong incentives as well as 
opportunities for national-level capitalists to form political parties and capture state 
power. The emergence of the Thai Rak Thai Party and its participation in national 
elections after 2001 dramatically changed the landscape of Thai electoral polit ics. The 
TRT introduced party-based and relatively more policy-oriented politics, a new style of 
electoral campaigning, and the ambitious goal of creating a single-party govermnent. 
Electoral competition thus changed along with the relationship between the political 
parties and provincial bosses. The political changes brought about by the TRT placed 
provincial elites in a new socio-political enviromnent, forcing them to adjust their 
strategies accordingly. 
Thaksin Shinawatra (1950-), a telecormnunication business tycoon-turned politician, 
founded the Thai Rak Thai Party in 1998. Thaksin was born in Chiang Mai of a 
prominent business family, so me of whose members had successful political careers. He 
23 See, for example, the viol ent competition between the Democrats in Nakhon Si Thammarat in tl1 e 2008 
and 20 10 PAO chairman elections (Chapter 9). 
24 During the campaign, the antagonism between competing factions was severe as every team claimed 
they had Thaksin ' s an d th e TRT's support . The party comm ittee, including Thaksin, decided to intervene 
by announcing that the party did not officially endorse any loca l candidates. All contenders need to run 
independently. After the election , th e party sen ior advisor Sanoh Thienthong, Sa Kaeo boss, lamented that 
direct local elections "have weakened every po li tical party beca use every leading MP wants to field th eir 
own people" (Naew Na , 14 March 2004). For more details regarding intra-party con fli cts in loca l elections 
in Prachakhom Thongthin, 2: 15 (16 May- 15 June 2002): 51-53; 3: 26 (April 2003): I 10- 11 3; 3: 33 
(November 2003): 24-79; 3: 35 (January 2004): 55-62; 3: 36 (February 2004): 14-87. 
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was a police officer until 1987, after which he was a full time businessman making a 
considerable fortune after obtaining government concessions over mobile phone and 
satellite networks. Similar to other leading businessmen, his connections with top 
officials in the military and the bureaucracy as well as leading politicians helped his 
business and gave him protection. By the mid 1990s, he became a rising star 
businessman and an advocate for economic and political reforms. He launched his 
political career after the Bloody May 1992 event by accepting an invitation to join 
Chamlong Srimuang ' s Phalang Tham Party, eventually becoming Phalang Tham Party's 
head. His political experience with the party did not go well; the party split into factions 
and presented no chance of winning the elections. The party's clean, professional image 
affected few voters and its popularity did not go beyond Bangkok. Thaksin deserted the 
party after the 1996 election. 25 
After the 1997 economic crisis and the promulgation of the new constitution, Thaksin 
launched the Thai Rak Thai Party, aiming to be the first prime minister elected in the 
post-reform era. The 1997 crisis, as explained by scholars, created strong incentives for 
prominent capitalists, including Thaksin, to directly capture state power. "Business was 
shocked by the severity of economic slump, and by the refusal of the Democrat Party 
government (1997-2001) to assume any responsibility for defending domestic capital 
against its impact," Thani and Pasuk explain. "The growing role of the stock market as a 
generator of wealth and the increased globalization of business raised the potential 
returns from holding the office of prime minister."26 Thaksin led a group of national-
level capitalists, who were not severely damaged by the crisis, in pursuing a high-risk 
high-return path of direct ownership over their own party, rather than building 
clientelistic relations with leading bureaucrats and politicians or sponsoring other 
people 's parties. 27 The new electoral and party system, as explained above, was designed 
to· promote strong executive power and large political parties. This, in tum, facilitated 
their political ambitions. 
25 The Phalang Tham Party was founded in 1988. Its major vote base was the urban middle classes in the 
capital. At its peak in the March 1992 elections, the party won 41 seats nationwide (32 of which were in 
Bangkok). But it managed to obtain only 1 seat in the 1996 election, and Thaksin resigned as party head 
when the voting was over. On the origin and development of the Phalang Tham Party, see Sombat 1989; 
Su thin I 996. 
26 Thani and Pasuk 2008: 255 , 256. 
2 7 Thani and Pasuk 2008: 257, 258 , Ockey 2003. By comparison, the provincial-level businessmen had 
pursued a more risky path. As discussed in Chapter 3, a large number of provincial business entrepreneurs 
had had active involvement in electoral politics since the late 1970s, and, by the 1990s, some of them had 
direct control over political party (Banham Silpa-archa was the best example). 
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The TRT was highly successful in both the 2011 and 2005 elections. A number of 
sh1dies have explained Thaksin's pofaical success. 28 I will focus specifically on the 
impact of Thaksin and his party on local power structures and provincial bosses ' 
political strategies as they affected the changing demand and supply of electoral 
vio lence. Thaksin's political project and the TRT reshaped local political settings in 
three significant ways: changing the balance of power among political bosses and 
families in each province; intensifying extant conflicts among them; and making 
provincial bosses' soc ial and po litical standings more vu lnerable. 
Thaksin had a different strategy from other political oligarchs of the pre-1997 period. 
Rather than trying to win a plurality of votes and sharing power with other leaders in a 
multi-party coalition, he sought to win an absolute majority of votes and form a single-
party government. In other words, he and his party strove for monopolistic control 
instead of the more conventional mode of sharing power. To achieve this goal, he 
reached out to establish political al liances with prominent provincial bosses in all 
regions. Phalangtham Party's failure in the early 1990s had taught him that elections 
were won outside Bangkok. TRT recruited, as core members responsible fo r formulating 
party strategies and policies, technocrats, bankers, academics, businessmen, retired civi l 
servants, judges, activists, and fo rmer student leaders. But when the election approached, 
Thaksin called upon a different type of person- the provincial political lord . The most 
important were bosses from Phrae and Sa Kaeo, Narong Wongwan and Sanoh 
Thienthong. Both were old-fashioned, anti-reformists who controlled two of the largest 
factions in the country. 29 The public decried the inclusion of these two (and also other 
upcountry godfathers), saying they tainted the party image. Thaksin disregarded the 
criticism. 
As a practical businessman-turned-politician, Thaksin persistently fielded top bosses in 
constituency seats on the understanding that the FPTP electoral system was, by and 
large, a candidate-centered system. The TRT party ran a complementary two-pronged 
campa ign strategy-a party- list centered campaign fo r the party-list seats and a 
28 On studi es of Thaksin 's and th e Thai Rak Tha i party's political successes and pitfa ll s, see Pasuk and 
Baker 2008, 20 10; McCargo and Ukrist 2005; McCargo 2002; Siripan 2005; Ockey 2003, 2004, 2005; 
Hicken 2006, 2007; Nelson 2002 , 2007; Tamada 2008 ; Kasian 2006; Thongchai 2008; Somchai 2008; 
Matichon Editoria l Team 2006. 
29 Narong controll ed large numbers of MPs in the North, while San oh controll ed the central and north east. 
Both factio ns combined had more than one hundred MPs. For political background on Naron g, see 
Chapter 7; on San oh , see Chapter 12. 
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candidate-centered campaign for constituency seats. Electoral results from many districts 
demonstrated that the popularity of the party's policies boosted the candidates' standing 
and assisted their win. 30 It was clear, however, that the personalistic strategies did not 
entirely disappear in post-1997 politics. TRT candidates who belonged to eminent 
political clans relied on both the party brand and their family networks. What was new 
was Thaksin and TRT's direct intervention in altering the balance of power among 
provincial politicians. Their large financial and political support bases helped bosses 
allied with the TRT to gain the upper hand over rival bosses. The political struggle for 
monopoly was less daunting for the TRT-supported bosses. Those provincial bosses who 
refused to cooperate with the TRT, on the other hand, faced difficulty. Some of them, 
indeed; struggled for their political survival. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the political 
dynamic of fighting for monopoly and survival between bosses usually produced violent 
outcomes. Only in provinces in which all powerful bosses agreed to unite under TRT 
that the elections were peaceful. Otherwise, the intervention of the TRT and Thaksin 
created violence. For example, peaceful scenarios occurred in Nakhon Sawan and 
Buriram in the 2005 election when all bosses worked together under the TRT. Both 
provinces, however, had violent elections in 2001 . Phrae and Nakhon Si Thammarat 
faced electoral violence in both the 2001 and 2005 elections because the TRT failed to 
gain local bosses ' unanimous support. 
Thaksin and his party also disrupted existing local political markets. TRT's massive war 
chest and popular policies attracted many politicians and vote canvassers. There was 
large-scale migration to the TRT during the run-up to the 2001 election. 31 The TRT's 
forceful entry into the unstable, volatile local political market intensified political 
divisions and weakened the extant patron-client relationships. Vote canvassers were 
quick to notice the changing political sunounding and voters' mood. As a result, most of 
them wanted to support the TRT. Things went smoothly in cases when their bosses 
agreed to run under the TRT, but conflict arose when bosses refused Thaksin ' s offer. 
Many vote canvassers defected. The fragile clientelistic relationships broke down, and 
violence erupted. TRT's efforts to build a strong political machine in a short period of 
time aggravated political divisions. The volatile situation continued and intensified in the 
30 In the 200 J and 2005 elections, several of TR T's less influential candidates were able to defeat powerful 
bosses because of the party-policy package. The 2001 election in Buriram is a good example (Chapter 11). 
31 Also, the constitution stipulated that the 2001 election was the last in which politicians were allowed to 
be a party member for less than 90 days before the election. A large number of politicians took advantage 
of this regulation. After this election , the 90-day party membership rule would be enforced, greatly 
benefiting Thaksin 's party. 
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lead up to the 2005 election, when the TRT brand was at its peak and Thaksin 
announced his party's ambition to win 75-80 percent of parliamentary seats (instead of 
nearly 50 percent as in 2001) and form a single-party government.32 The number of 
politicians intending to run under the TRT banner exceeded the number of available 
seats in each province. Therefore many people were denied party support, including 
several former TRT candidates. The TRT replaced several old candidates with new ones 
more likely to win. Some newly-recruited candidates were, in fact, formerly enemies of 
the party in the 200 I election. Because of a high turnover of party nominated candidates, 
the political market in each province remained highly unstable and fluctuating. In sum, 
the 2005 electoral competition was fraught with defections, betrayals, and intra-perso nal 
network conflicts that led to a large number of violent incidents. 
Last ly, the rise of Thaksin and the populist Thai Rak Thai weakened the political 
standing of provincial godfathers. After winning in a landslide in 2001 and becoming a 
highly popular leader, Thaksin pursued a bold strategy to domesticate the power of 
leading provincial political bosses both within and outside his party. Within TRT, 
Thaksin sidelined factional leaders since he did not want any bosses to have too much 
control over party members. Thaksin played the classic game of divide and rule by 
pitting factions within his party against each other so that no single boss posed a threat to 
government stability or his supremacy. Prominent cabinet members mainly came from 
his inner circle, were family-connected allies, or technocrats and professionals, and 
Thaksin frequent ly rotated or reshuffled his cabinet members. With less access to 
ministerial posts and thus rent allocations, the position of provincial bosses significantly 
declined under the Thaksin administration. Certain disgrunt led bosses expressed their 
grievances and mounted an-intra party campaign against Thaksin 's strong rule, but they 
gained insufficient support from public and party members. People discred ited their acts 
as old-style, self-serving politics. 33 
Furthermore, Thaksin cap italized on the popularity and success of the "war on drugs" 
32 In the 2001 election, the TRT won 248 out of 500 sea ts (48 party-list and 200 constituency seats) so 
Thaksin needed to invite other parties to form coa lition government. In the 2005 election , he aimed to win 
an absolute majority, eventually succeeding as the TRT won 377 ou t of 500 sea ts (75 percent). They thus 
became being the first party in Tiia i history to establi sh single-party governmen t. Data based on Election 
Commission 200 1 and 2005. 
33 See th e confl ict between Thaksin and prominen t factional leader San oh Thienthong in Chapter I 2. 
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policy to implement the "war on influential people."34 The government launched this 
policy on 20 May 2003, seeking the suppression of influential figures who were accused 
of obstructing his campaign to combat drugs, poverty and corruption. In his policy-
launching speech, Thaksin explained the urgency and necessity of this policy, 35 
We need to go back to John Locke's social contract theory, postulating 
that the foundation of democracy is the people coming to live together 
under the state, which has representative government, and bureaucracy, 
enacting rules and regulation to guarantee that people can live peacefully 
and preventing the strong from oppressing the weak. What we are aiming 
to do is establishing true democracy ... which is democracy without 
brokers. Influence must be eradicated. I want to use this opportunity to 
destroy [the influence] system so the political party can truly belong to the 
people. 
He proceeded to explain what he meant by the term influential people (yhu mi 
itthiphon): "my definition is simple, influential figures are the ones who use gunmen or 
officials or political power to harass and oppress people for their own illegal interests." 
Whereas, "in the past influential figures were subordinates to officials but then they got 
stronger and became officials' bosses. " 36 Then Thaksin identified l;iired gunmen, illegal 
gamblers, smugglers, drugs and human trafficking, illicit loggers, and illegal 
construction bidders as the policy's primary targets. He then asked all influential figures 
to stop emiching themselves from the illegal and/or underground economy, otherwise 
the govermnent was going to employ strong-aim tactics to stop them: "government 
cannot give license to people to do bad things .. I can assure you that I will be just. My 
party members also have to be under the rules of equal protection under the same law .. 
I had no necessity to do this for political gain." On another occasion, in his weekly 
"meet the prime minister" television program on 13 December 2003 , he asked 
government ~fficials to undertake tough action against national and local mafia-cum-
politicians, "You have to adhere strictly to the law. If someone claims they ai·e friends of 
34 Between February and May 2003 , the Thaksin government launched a countrywide campaign against 
drug dealers. Within four months, 2,598 alleged drug offenders were shot dead in apparent extrajudicial 
killings; many of those killed were on "blacklists" prepared by police and local government agencies, who 
used these lists to settle persona l disputes and score political points (Human Rights Watch 2007: 329-334). 
35 Thaksin delivered this speech on 20 May 2003 at the Royal Police Club, Bangkok, to a group of 
provincial governors, police chief, and high-ranking officials. See the full speech in Departrm;nt of 
Provincial Administration 2003: 3-8. 
36 Department of Provincial Administration 2003: 4, 7. 
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the government party or powerful figure, you do not have to listen to them. Just ignore 
them".37 
Like the war on drugs, the war on influential figures had massive support from the Thai 
public as they thought it tackled a social problem that gravely affected their livelihoods 
and safety. 38 Immed iately after Thaksin ' s speech, the government set up the national 
commission fo r the suppression of influential people (presided over by deputy prime 
minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh), fully mobilizing all important state agencies to 
support this policy: the Interior Ministry, Ministry of Justice, police and military fo rces, 
Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), Special Branch police, National 
Security Council, National Intelligence Agency, and Office of the Narcotics Control 
Board. The center fu rther identified fifteen subcategories of "influential people" 
consisting of drug traffickers, illegal construction bidders ( using fo rce to intimidate other 
bidders); protection/extortion gangs (involved in hired motorcycles, shop and factories, 
highways and public service); illicit goods smugglers; gambling den owners; sex trading 
mafias; human traffickers; natural resources plunderers; hired gunmen; debt collecting 
gangs; contraband arms traders, and fraudsters (targeting foreign tourists and domestic 
workers). The authority divided the influential people into three levels- village, 
provincial, and national. The national- level mafia was considered the most dangerous, 
beyond the capacity of the provincial bureaucratic apparatus, and thus required the 
emp loyment of the national-operated task forces.39 
Provincial governors and police chiefs implemented this policy. They were responsibl e 
fo r making lists of provincial influential peop le and submitting it to the nationa l center. 
The process oflist making was full of confusion, lobbying and political maneuvering. In 
almost every province, the provincial governor and police chief applied different criteria 
and attempted to outperform one another. Hence each unit came up with their own list 
and reported it separately to the nationa l ·commission. In some provinces, bosses lobbied 
and/or coerced the authorities to remove their name fro m the list in exchange for 
benefits. Some corrupt officia ls also deleted the names of provincial godfathers, who 
37 Quotation came from Departmen t of Provincia l Administration 2003: 4, 6; and Daily News, 14 
December 2003: I, 2 (respectively). 
38 Accordin g to tl1 e survey conducted by th e National Statisti cs Offi ce in 2003 and 2005, More than 86.5% 
of respondents were sati s fi ed with the governm ent 's campai gn to suppress influential fi gures (National 
Statistics Office 2005: I 5). 
39 See more deta il s in "gu idelines for th e suppression of influential peop le" Department of Provincial 
Administra ti on 2003: 27-28 , 3 1. 
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were their friends, and put their enemies' names on the list instead. 40 
The first lists complied by provincial offices, released on 9 June 2003, indicated that 
there was a total of 813 influential people nationwide, 61 of whom were government 
officials). The suggestion that 32 provinces were without influential bosses, was widely 
criticized. Political observers said number of people listed was too low, and it was 
inconceivable that bosses did not exist in 32 provinces, notably notorious Chonburi, 
Phrae, Ratchaburi, and Ang Thong. 41 The public also commented that no "mafia police" 
or "mafia soldiers" were on the list. 42 Thaksin was furious with the original list, saying 
the number was too low and some obvious names did not appear on it. "It reflected that 
provincial governors were either afraid or under patronage of big mafias," he 
commented. He asked for a new list and threatened to demote local officials who failed 
to implement this policy effectively; moreover, he promised to command the operation 
in those provinces himself. 43 With strong political will from the prime minister, 
government officials carried out this policy forcefully. Two weeks later, the national 
commission came out with an updated list, increasing the total number of influential 
people to 2,700.44 
Even though this was national policy covering the vast scope of criminality in Thailand, 
in practice it was a selective provincial-based operation, with the ultimate aim of 
eliminating or weakening the political networks of provincial strongmen. This political 
agenda became obvious when the commission developed specific strategies to suppress 
the "dark influence" and actual targets. The commission explained it would suppress 
those "who acted above and against the law and operated as a network," rather than 
targeting petty criminals. According to the commission, influential networks comprised 
40 Journalists reported powerful bosses in some provinces paid IO million baht to high-ranking officials. 
The Interior Ministry did not confirm but neither denied the possibility of the bribe as well (Krungthep 
Thurakit, 12 June 2003: 9, 16; Daily News, l3 June 2003: I, 14). See also other reports concerning the 
politics of list-making in Manager, 12 June 2003: 14-15; Thai Rath, 6 July 2003: 9, 18; Thai Rath , 7 July 
2003: l,9;Matichon,9July2003: I, 15; Thai Rath, IO July 203: I, 16, 19. 
41 Provinces with the highest number of influential people were Kancbanaburi, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
Mukdahan, Trang, and Chiang Rai (respectively). Out of 813 figures, most of them were connected to 
illegal gambling, drugs trafficking, hired guns, and natural resource exploitation. See the complete list in 
Matichon, 10 June 2003: 1, 12. 
42 Matichon , 3 July 2003: J, 16. On mafia police and soldiers, see Chapter 3. 
43 Eventually, his government demoted and transferred some provincial governors and police chiefs out of 
their areas. In Phang Nga province, a Democrat Party stronghold, both the governor and the police chief 
were transferred as they came up with only two names of provincial bosses (Thai Rath, IO July 2003: I , 
16, 19). 
44 The number of influential people increased in every province. For example, in Phrae, it rose from zero 
to 50, and in Buriram it rose from 14 to 45 (Matichon , 24 June 2003: I, 15). 
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of three components: gang leaders/bosses; "troops" or "tools" (hired gunmen, 
hoodlums); and supporters (corrupt government officials) .45 
In a nutshell, the "war on influential people" was Thaksin's political attempt to demolish 
the political and coercive infrastructure of provincial bosses. It targeted both the local 
demand for and supply of electoral violence. Moreover, it aimed to destroy the economic 
base of provincial bosses by suppressing the illegal economy, and in the process enhance 
the popularity, legitimacy, and revenue of the government. For example, while 
suppressing illegal casinos and underground lotteries, the Thaksin government increased 
government lotteries and legalized the online lottery. As a result, government co llected 
more revenue and used the money for charity and poor student scho larships, boosting 
Thaksin's populism. 46 On 3 November 2003, Thaksin presided over the student 
scholarship-giving ceremony, and he was crying while giving an emotional speech, 
My heart has two sides. For bad people, I am will to do anything to 
eliminate them- an eye for an eye. I shed no tears when hundred drug 
dealers died. But for the poor and destitute, I am ready to help them 
wholehearted ly so they can stand up and live their lives ... We have Jet 
mafia and bad people exploit our society for so long. Today we 
[government] have to bring all sinful deeds to the surface and then we will 
return all money from these activities back to poor people. 47 
The real intent of the policy was to weaken political brokers and/or intermediaries so 
that Thaksin ' s TRT party cou ld relate directly to voters. If the policy succeeded, Thaksin 
could gain control over provincial MPs both within and outside his party. It was a 
po litica l strategy to undermine his political enemies, fo rce opposition members to join 
the TRT, and tame recalcitrant TRT factional leaders. By bypassing local brokers, 
Thaksin could rely on party policies, branding, and the party machine to win votes, 
instead of local personal networks. Undoubtedly, the populist tycoon changed the system 
to serve his ambit ious, persona l goa ls. In the process, however, this policy campaign 
helped bring forth a po litical transformation from provincial-boss dominated, factional 
45 I translated " troops" from Thai word "kongkamlang' and " tool" from "khrueangmue." Both words were 
used emphati ca lly in th e commiss ion's document. See the comm iss ion 's strategies in Department of 
Provincial Administra tion 2003: 24-25. 
46 See Chitti et a l. (2007) and Ph irom (2007). 
47 Daily Manager, 4 November 2003: 14-15 . 
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politics to party-dominated, policy-oriented politics led by a populist leader. 
Therefore it is only partly correct to understand the war on influential people as 
Thaksin's attack on his political opponents. 48 This policy was more ambitious-it was 
part of his larger political project ofreorganizing power structures and monopolizing the 
political market. Thaksin's policy targeted powerful figures, notably political bosses and 
their key vote canvassers from all political parties, including TRT. The areas targeted 
were provinces dominated by opposition parties and the provinces controlled by TRT 
MPs who appeared to be too independent. Police were active in many southern 
provinces, notably Nakhon Si Thamamrat, Trang, Surathani, Satun, Phang Nga, Phuket, 
Democrat Party strongholds.49 Suphanburi, the stronghold of Banharn Silapa-archa 
Chart Thai Party' s head, was also targeted. A task force of 200 policemen raided 15 
houses, seized weapons and arrested three people on charges of possessing firearms. All 
those arrested were Cha1i Thai Party's vote canvassers. In Samutprakarn, police arrested 
a number of local politicians and seized heavy weapons; most of those arrested were 
connected to the Atsawahem family, a powerful political dynasty who had dominated 
the province for decades. 50 But the two provinces which were the commission' s main 
focus were Phrae and Kanchanaburi, the two polarized provinces that the TRT had 
struggled to monopolize. In the 2001 elections, the Democrat Party fiercely contested the 
TRT's attempt to grab all seats in these two provinces but neith,er gained monopoly 
control. 51 
Thaksin chose Kanchanaburi as the pilot province for his campaign, saying it contained 
the highest number of mafia, hired guns, illegal arrns traders, natural exploiters, and 
protection racketeers . "We are going to wipe out all of them [influential people]," said 
the Defense Minister, "in Kanchanburi, mafia are connected and backed up by MPs. We 
48 This conventional wisdom was widely shared among political pundits, journalists, NGO activists, public 
intellectuals and academics. See Nation Sudsapda (2-8 June 2003): 16; Matichon Sudsapda (27 Jun e- 3 
July 2003): 14; Matichon Sudsapda (11- 17 July 2003): 9. 
49 In Phang Nga, the leading Democrat 's brother was named an "influential" figure. TI1e Democrats said 
there were political motives behind the list to discredit their party member. They also claimed the TRT 
contacted many politicians in Phang Nga to run for the TRT in exchange for their names being removed 
from the blacklist. The government also demoted some senior officials in Phang Nga, saying they failed to 
implement the policy (Matichon , 9 July 2003: 1, 15; Thai Rath, 10 July 2003: 1, 16, 19). 
50 Banham and other Chart Tha i's Suphanburi MPs were furious at the attack. One Chan Thai MP said he 
agreed with government policy but disapproved of the way the government used this campaign to destroy 
its political opponents. While be admitted that some Supbanburi provincial councilors were in volved in 
drug trafficking, he claimed that all the arrested Chart Thai ' s vote canvassers had clean criminal records 
(Kham Chat luek, 8 July 2003: 1, 16; Thai Rath, l October 2003, 1, 19). 
51 1n Phrae, the Democrats gained one seat, while the TRT won two. In Kanchanaburi, the Democrats won 
three seats, left two seats for the TRT (ECT 2001). 
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will beat them up. Believe me, the locals will not vote for them in the next election." 52 In 
early July 2003, police conducted house raids on two leading Democrat MPs, Pracha 
Phothiphiphit and Paiboon Pimphisitthawon, accusing them of being involved in the 
murder of TRT's key vote canvassers. Both were former kamnan-tumed-businessmen 
who had risen to power by enriching themselves from business enterprises. They were 
respected and feared among the tough guys and underworld community in Kanchanabui. 
After the 2001 election, many vote canvassers were murdered in the province over 
conflict between these two kamnans and the TRT members.53 Knowing they were 
dealing with influential bosses, the government also used certain legal tools 
(prosecutions for money laundering, tax evasion, etc.) to supplement the use of tough 
force. In early October, the police issued arrest warrants for Pracha and his wife on 
charges of using coercive force against other contractors in construction bidding and also 
accused them of being mafia leaders. Fearing he was next in line, Paiboon sent a signal 
to Thaksin that he wanted to make a political deal. A few months later, Paiboon went to 
greet Thaksin and other ministers when the cabinet had a special meeting in 
Kanchanaburi. In front of journalists, Thaksin told Pai boon, "Do not worry. You will be 
an opposition member for just a little while. " 54 In the 2005 election, Paiboon abandoned 
his teammate Pracha, switching to TRT and helped them defeat the Democrat Party. 
Meanwhile, Pracha and his wife were convicted and given 5-year sentences for 
manipulating bidding, and their assets were seized by the authorities. 55 
The campaign targeted many other boss-style politicians or those affiliated with po litical 
bosses. At the campaign 's peak from May to December 2003 , many prominent 
godfathers found themselves embattled. Some of them were put under investigation, 
arrested and/or convicted, some mysteriously disappeared or went into exile, and a few 
of them were shot dead by unknown assassins. The media called 2003 "the year of the 
godfathers' obliteration." 56 In the end, most of the embattled bosses decided to move to 
TRT.57 A Democrat female godmother and Phrae MP, Siriwan Pratsachaksattru, put up a 
52 Daily Manager, 3 Jul y 2003: 15. 
53 From 200 I to 2003 (before the war on influen tial peop le), at least six loca l politicians were shot dead in 
Kan chanaburi (Dokbia Thurakil, 4 July 2003: I, 11). 
54 Khao Sod, 29 January 2004. 
55 Khao Sod, 2 I October 2005. La ter in 2007, however, he and his wife were acquitted by th e Appeal 
Court (Manager, 25 September 2007). See fu rth er detail s of Pracha· s political life in Sanya lak 2003. 
56 Khao Sod, 29 December 2003. There was wide specul ation that th e murders of th e two most powerful 
bosses in Saraburi and Samutsongkram stemmed from an "officia l" order as two of them were on the 
govenun ent blacklist. The rumors of the blackli st made many provincial bosses keep a low-profile. 
57 Two remarkable cases were karnnan Poh and Newin Chidchob of the Cha rt Thai Party. Kam nan Poh , or 
Somchai Khunpluem, perhaps th en Lhe most famous godfa1her of Thailand, had all eged ly been involved in 
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strong fight against Thaksin and his campaign. She was a major obstacle to TRT's effort 
to achieve a power monopoly in Phrae, and the TRT made use of the war on influential 
people policy (among other political tools) to weaken her power base. Political warfare 
between them turned highly violent (see Chapter 7). When the Democrats came out to 
· defend Siriwan and Pracha, Thaksin retorted, 
The Democrat party should not protect the wrongdoers. If a party sponsors 
godfathers, the party faces a problem. The TRT party is no exception. If any 
members acted like godfathers and did not stop, they would be punished. I would 
not keep them in the party. 58 
To the surprise of many, Thaksin largely kept his promise. In many TRT strongholds, 
police searched TRT vote canvassers' houses and a.JTested local politicians who were 
political aides ofTRT's MPs. 59 By the end of 2003 , Thaksin had succeeded in asserting 
absolute control over all leading bosses in his party. He became the boss of bosses. His 
aggressive policy tools, though controversial, were effective. His government continued 
to suppress influential people in 2004, but in a less spectacular fashion. Police 
revitalized the operation a few weeks before the February 2005 general election, 
focusing on suppressing local bosses and gunmen (especially in the south), justifying it 
as an attempt to make the election free, fair, and peaceful. 60 When _campaigning started, 
all opposition parties and bosses were already demoralized as they struggled to protect 
their fragile political territory. Thaksin and his party machine, by contrast, entered the 
2005 election with confidence and emerged resounding winners. The 2005 election was 
far from peaceful. The national political struggle shaped local political dynamics by 
turning competition in many districts into electoral warfare pitting those seeking to 
assert a monopoly against those seeking to protect their turf. 
many murder cases in Chonburi but had never been prosecuted. Various political parties and candidates 
had sought his political support, including the TRT, but he chose to support the Chart Thai Party after the 
1995 election and swept all seats in Chonburi for Chart Thai in almost every election, including in 2001 
when his team won 6 seats and left only 1 seat for the TRT. During the war on influential people, police 
charged him with masterminding the murder of a local businessman, and for corruption in the purchase of 
public land. 111ese charges clearly prompted kamnan Pob and his family to move to the TRT and helped 
TRT grabbed all seven seats in the 2005 election (Kham Chat Luek, 4 January 2004: I, 2; "Rocking 
kamnan Poh, shaking Chonburi political base," Prachakhom T110ngthin , 3: 26 (April 2003): 18-20, 26-28, 
40-44, 58-59, 110-113, 124; "Cou1i seizes kamnan Poh 's Bl Sm bail," Bangkok Post, 29 November 2011. 
For Newin, see Chapter I I. 
58 Krungth ep Thurakit, 8 July 2003: 13-16; Matichon , 8 July 2003: 15. 
59 Nakhon Fathom and Chiang Rai were two primary cases (Matichon, 10 July 2003: l, 15). 
60 The policy campaign also continued after the 2005 election, but its focus bad shifted to urban mafias, 
notably in Bangkok, rather than rural godfathers (Siam Thurakit, 6 April 2005: 10; Post Today, 6 April 
2005: AS; "Mafia businesses on street," Thai Rath, 18 April 2005: 1, 5). 
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The Thaksin administration "{as the first in modern Thai history to attempt to 
domesticate and eliminate local bosses who had, for many decades, acted as political 
intermediaries in the Thai political system. Past governments, both dictatorial and 
democratic regimes, either had no political will, legitimacy or capacity to pursue this 
goal. As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the military-led governments (1947-1973 , 
1991-1 992) lacked determination to suppress the local strongmen, The army leaders 
never perceived provincial bosses as political threats, as all provincial bosses were 
relatively weak in comparison to the army. Also, they needed provincial bosses to 
assume the role of political broker for the 1nilitary-supported parties. Semi-democratic 
and civilian administrations in the 1980s and 1990s led by Prem Tinsulanond, Chatichai 
Choonhavan; Chuan Leekpai, Banharn Silpa-archa, and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh would 
have never dreamt of using such a strategy as it would have destroyed their fundamental 
powerbases. For Thaksin, by contrast, provincial bosses posed a threat to his populist 
party-building and he knew that his electoral success would be more sustainable without 
reliance on local godfathers. The implementation of this policy reflected the emergence 
of a new type of politics and a new relationship between Thaksin, who was a national 
businessman-cum-populist party leader, and provincial businessmen-cum-politicians, 
Ironically, precisely by the time Thaksin had achieved his monopolistic control over 
electoral politics, he had rendered himself vulnerable to another sort of threat. His royal-
military-bureaucrat ic opponents understood that the only way to unseat Thaksin was by 
non-electoral, extra-parliamentary means. The monopolistic political market created the 
realization among his enemies that it was impossible to defeat him in electoral games. 
All major opposition parties boycotted the 2006 general election. In September 2006, the 
royal-military alliance staged a coup to topple Thaksin. This historic coup transformed 
Thai politics into a new era, and once again changed the political landscape at both the 
national and local levels. 
The 2006 coup aftermath: the militarization and ideological slruggle of Thai polilics 
While the landslide 2005 election victory and single-party government brought self-
co nfidence and po litical aggrandizement to Thaksin, it generated fear and perturbation 
among his opponents. Since 200 I, Thaksin and his party had succeeded in undermining 
riva l political parties' power bases and provincial politicians' territorial power. But 
Thaksin had not been able to subvert extra-parliamentary forces, in particular the royalist 
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networks and the military-an alliance constituting the most formidable sources of 
traditional power in the Thai polity. 
Soon after the 2005 election, those opposing Thaksin (business rivals and personal foes , 
NGO activists, journalists, academics and professionals, human right defenders, 
bureaucrats, and the urban middle class) joined forces against his government. By early 
2006, Thaksin's legitimacy was eroded by his controversial business dealings, and the 
anti-government movement led by media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul and Maj. Gen. 
Chamlong Srimuang gained crucial momentum. 61 In an attempt to revitalize his 
legitimacy, the embattled prime minister dissolved parliament and called for a snap 
election in April 2006. All main opposition parties (the Democrat Party, the Chart Thai 
Party and the Mahachon Party) decided to boycott the election, leaving the TRT party 
running unopposed. Political party leaders claimed that Thaksin no longer had 
legitimacy and the snap election was only Thaksin's attempt to dive1i public attention 
from his business scandal. The sudden dissolution, they argued, also left opposition 
parties no time to prepare for an election campaign. 62 After the release of the election 
results, showing that the Thai Rak Thai Party won 460 of the 500 seats, anti-Thaksin 
leaders declared that they did not accept the results and "would go on rallying until 
Thaksin resigns and Thailand gets a royally-appointed prime minister. "63 The political 
situation reached an impasse. 
Unexpectedly, on 25 Apri l 2006, the king gave speeches to groups of senior judges from 
the Administrative and Supreme Courts, questioning the democratic nature of the Apri l 
general election. He commented that dissolving parliament and calling a snap election 
(within thirty days) might have not been correct in the first place. At the end of his 
speeches, the king called on the judges and those from the Constitutional Court to work 
together to resolve the current political crisis.64 Certainly, the king's speeches 
constituted royal intervention in the midst of the crisis. Two weeks later, the 
61 In January 2006 Thaksin 's family sold its shares in Shin Corporation, a big telecommunication 
company, to Temasek Holdings of Singapore for US$! .88 billion. His family gained an enormous profit 
from this deal and paid no tax, which is legal under Thai law. The "tax evasion" issue, however, sparked a 
series of angry demonstrations in Bangkok. 
62 However, the real reason for the boycott was opposition parties' belief that they were going to lose to 
the TRT again. "Opposition to boycott election," Bangkok Post , 26 February 2006. 
63 http: //nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/read.php?newsid=3 0000759 
64 See the king's full speeches in Matichon, 26 April 2006; Krungthep 17wrakit, 26 Apri l 2006. 
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Constitutional Courts nullified the April 2006 election, and ordered a new election. 65 
The Thaksin cabinet decided to hold it on 15 October 2006. This scheduled election 
never took place. 
On 19 September 2006, a group of anny leaders staged a coup, the first in fifteen years. 
The timing of the coup was significant; it occurred a month before the proposed election. 
The coup makers clearly wanted to halt the electoral process. In this sense, the 2006 
coup fits the definition of electoral vio lence as "an act or threat of coercion, intimidation, 
or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process, of which violence may be 
employed to influence the process of elections - such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or 
derail a poll. "66 It was the first time in Thai history that the coup was carried out with the 
intention of directly interfering in the electoral process. 67 The post-1997 style of 
electoral politics had become a major threat to the royal-military alliance's standing. The 
alliance could not beat Thaksin and his political machine at an election. Thai elites, 
thereby changing the mode of the game, staged a coup to eliminate Thaksin. The 
consequences of the coup were drast ic. From 2006-20 11 , political contestation moved 
from the electoral arenas to the street. This changed the mode of conflict and the pattern 
of political violence, as state and street violence took the place of electoral violence. 
Many pundits and coup-supporters praised the 2006 coup for its bloodless nature. As 
political events unfolded, however, it was clear that this coup was the most vio lent in 
Thai history, in terms of its subsequent implications. The coup led to a large number of 
deaths and injuries as it exacerbated conflict, deepened political polarization, and created 
widespread confrontation between security forces and demonstrators and among 
opposing groups of protestors. Looking at the political phenomena Thai society has 
witnessed since the coup, one can see the emergence of many different forms of 
violence: the growth of militant social movements (both the Yellow and the Red Shirts); 
the use of gangs and thugs in political confrontation ; the presence and invo lvement of 
paramilitary forces (either affiliated with the movement or acting independently) in 
protests; violent clashes between protesters affi liated with different movements; the 
resurgence of the politicized army and its vio lent suppression of citizens; the selective 
65 The Constituti onal Court based its ruling on a techni ca l problem with the votin g process, saying that th e 
posit ion of vote booths vio lated voter's privacy (Matichon, 8 May 2006). 
66 The defin ition is drawn from Sisk 2008, 5-6, emphasis added ; see also Fischer 2002. 67 Previous coups were either conducted to settl e confli ct among ri va l facti ons wi thin th e am1y or to unseat 
the governm ent from the admini stration. None of th em directly interfered with th e electora l process (see 
Chapter 2 and 3). 
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use of force by security groups in dealing with protesters; the use of snipers by the army 
to kill protesters; the assassinations of mass movement leaders in broad daylight under 
the emergency decree; the assassination of rogue soldiers; assassination attempts and 
intimidation of privy council members, prime ministers, judges, and election 
commissioners; bombings in the capital targeting government buildings and the protest 
sites; the wide use of war weapons on all sides of conflict (Ml 6, AK-47 and M79); and 
conflict within the army and between the army and the police. 
The April-May 2010 military crackdown, when the government ordered the army to 
suppress the Red Shirt demonstration led by the United Front for Democracy against 
Dictatorship (UDD) who occupied some areas of central Bangkok between March and 
May 2010, marked the culmination of political violence. The confrontation between the 
military and the Red Shirts around the perimeter of the protest site ended up in the 
vio lent crackdown on 19 May 2010, killing 94 people and wounding thousands. 68 
The locations, methods, perpetrators and victims of violent incidents in the post-coup era 
indicate a new pattern of violence in Thailand. The army has returned to the political 
theater as the main actor, committing the most violent acts and being responsible for a 
high proportion of the death toll. The April-May 2010 crackdown represented the most 
violent political suppression in modem Thai history, with an official_death toll exceeding 
those of the three previous political crises: the student-led uprising in 1973 , the massacre 
in 1976 and the pro-democracy demonstrations in 1992.69 The resurgence of state 
vio lence since the 2006 coup is detrimental to the progress of parliamentary democracy 
as it works directly against electoral institutions. In the past (as discussed in Chapter 2) , 
state violence had been prevalent during the military dictatorial regimes from the 1950s 
to 1970s, in which state agents illegitimately acted against political dissidents and 
enemies. During the mid 1980s, however, the practice of state violence had been 
gradually taken over by private killings among politicians and local bosses competing 
for control o~er the socio-economic resources within a given territory, and for the MP 
positions. Candidates ' use of vio lence was aimed at winning elections, not disrupting or 
68 For accounts of violent confrontation, clashes, and crackdowns occurring post-coup, see International 
Crisis Group 2010; Wassana 2008, 2009, 2010, 201 I ; Nostitz 2009; Sopranzetti 2012. 
69 Based on official records, there were 77 people killed in 1973 , 43 in 1976 and 44 in 1992. The actual 
death tolls of these incidents are, however, believed to be much higher. For the protest from 12 March to 
19 May 2010, official figures put the death toll at 89 people and about 1,800 others injured. However, the 
death toll collected by the independent group of academics and NGOS, People' s Information Center, is 94 
people. See People' s Information Center 2012. 
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destroying the electoral process (see Chapter 3). It was violence in the realm of electoral 
competition, and respectful to electoral democracy. 
When state violence was revitalized after the 2006 coup, it was not directed against 
individuals as was the case in the past; rather, it was targeted against political forces and 
inst itutions that underpin electoral democracy. If from 1979 to 2005 electoral vio lence 
stemmed from the vulnerability of political bosses, the post 2006 coup violence 
stemmed from the vulnerabi lity of traditional el ites and the erosion of their power. 
Unelected elites resorted to violence to reconsolidate their power and undermine their 
opposition. First of all , the 2006 coup overthrew the popularly elected government and 
prevented an election. Second, the military-backed Abhisit government (2009-2011) 
used violence to suppress the electorate ' s political demands and to derail the electoral 
process. 
Before resoriing to violence, Thaksin's opponents had tried legal avenues to undermine 
Thaksin 's political networks. On 30 May 2007, the Constitution Court delivered a 
ruling dissolving the Thai Rak Thai Party and banning 111 executive party members 
from any involvement in political affairs for five years. The judges found some TRT 
party executives guilty of violating the electoral laws in the Apri l 2006 election. 70 The 
TRT members created a new party ca lled Palang Prachachon (People 's Power Party-
PPP) led by veteran politician Samak Sundaravej to stand in the 2007 election. Running 
on a populist policy platform and Thaks in 's popu lar ity, the PPP was v ictorious and 
formed a coalition government. However, on 9 September 2008, the Constitutional 
Court delivered a controversial decision disqualify ing Samak from the premiership. 7 1 
The majority of the PPP and the coalition parties then voted for Somchai Wongsawat, 
Deputy Prime Minister and the brother-in-law of Thaksin to be the new premier. 
Somchai stayed in power for only three months and was forced to step down in the 
middle of the Yellow Shirt 's airport occupation, after the Constitutional Court passed a 
70 The cou rt ruled thal TRT's leading members hired certain small part ies to run in th e Apri l 2006 election 
to make the electi on appear competit ive and legitimate (Thai Rath, 3 1 May 2007: I). 
71 According to tl1e court rulin g, Samak, by performing in a TV cookin g show while he was prime 
minister, acted in breach of Secti on 267 of th e 2007 constitution " prohibiting the Prime Mini ster and 
Min isters from havin g any positi on in a partnership, a company or an organization carrying out business 
with a view to sharing profits or incomes or be in g an em ployee of any person" (see th e 2007 constitution). 
The court ruling led to public debate and wide criticism (Matichon, 9 September 2008: !). 
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ruling dissolving the PPP on charges of electoral misconduct. 72 Immediately after 
Somchai stepped down, military leaders forced some of Thaksin's allies to switch sides 
and vote for Abhisit. 73 
In the end, these various legal measures failed to undermine Thaksin and his network of 
support, as the Red Shirt movement emerged to support Thaksin's allied parties and 
oppose the junta-backed government. The Red Shirts were a cross-class political 
movement of elements of the electorate, frustrated at how their elected government had 
been toppled, their choice of political party dissolved, and their electoral rights deprived. 
In 2009 and 2010, hundreds of thousands came to Bangkok to ask for the dissolution of 
the House and a new election from Abhisit, whose rise to power they deemed 
illegitimate. The protesters wanted to go to the ballot to exercise their basic political 
rights; they were not pursuing armed struggle or calling for the overhaul of the political 
system. Viewed this way, Abhisit's deployment of tanks and troops (with the tacit 
support of traditional elites) to suppress the demonstrators had two implications: to 
silence the voice of urban and rural mass electorates and to delay the re-establishment of 
electoral democracy. Collusion between the civilian administration of Abhisit and the 
traditional elites departed from previous patterns of repression. The civilian government 
authorized and carried out the crackdown and the government was able to maintain their 
power even after committing mass murders. 74 In the post-2006 co4p era, the traditional 
elites and the Democrat Party had become indispensible political partners. 75 
Post-coup killings were more spectacular and public, in stark contrast to the secretive 
(but simple) nature of electoral vio Jenee among politicians. 76 The new mode of violence 
included the use of heavy weapons; the deployment of snipers; drive-by shootings; the 
use of car bombs and rocket-propelled grenades. Electoral killings normally happened in 
72 Like its predecessor the TRT, all 109 executive members of the PPP were banned from politics for five 
years . Besides the PPP, the Constitutional Court also dissolved the two other parties, including the Chart 
Thai Party ofBanham Silpa-archa (Thai Rath , 2 December 2007: 1, 16). 
73 See details in Wassana 2010: 58-62, 142-148, 449-454. 
74 In 1973 and 1992, the crackdowns were carried out by the military-dominated government. Military 
prime ministers in both events had to step down from power after the bloodshed. The 1976 massacre was 
undertaken by an army faction (with the support of right-wing forces) and constituted a pretext for the 
army to topple the then civilian government. 
75 As mentioned above, the establishment of the Abbisit government was itself made possible by the 
intervention and manipulation of the royal-military-bureaucratic alliance. 
76 As explained, Thailand's electoral murders are usually perpetrated by a two gunmen hit team. The Thai 
situation is simple compared to methods of targeted killings found in other countries. These include booby 
traps, drive-by shootings, improvised explosive devices, lone gunman, kidnappings, masked attackers, 
motorcycle hit teams, poisoning, ruse/disguise, snipers, edged weapons, suicide bombers, and three-to 
five-gunmen hit teams. See McGovern 2010. 
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remote areas ( even if the ultimate aim was seizing a slice of politica l 
•J nal level) . The new type of killings happened in the capital city, not 
langkok was repeatedly the stage for violent clashes between the 
J the state apparatus. While electoral violence is decentralized, state 
e is centralized. 
,test episode of political violence more complex and worrying was the 
>rce by social movements. Both the Yellow and Red Shirts rhetorically 
unitment to non-violent struggle, but some of their actual practices 
.1ciples of non-violence. One of the (notorious) novelties of both 
he use of hired thugs and gangsters to take care of security. Many were 
niformed men who had military training. These paramilitary units were 
: security guards for the movements and their top leaders. The 
1 of both movements was provocative and confrontational. It was true 
{ellow and Red Shirt protesters were unarmed and conunitted to non-
but the presence of armed elements weakened the legitimacy of the 
made them prone to militarism and violent clashes. The intensified 
ry conflict in the forms of violent interactions between the opposing 
the state overwhelmed the country's political li fe and weakened 
10 cratic processes. 77 
Jlitical violence over the past few years have been mostly protesters, 
:, and government offic ials, not politicians. In fact , no single politician 
lit of the recent chaos. This refl ects the minor or diminishing roles of 
po litical parties and parliament in the current crisis. They have 
the scene, most of the time merely bystand ers. Some politicians were 
in the co nflict , but as members of the movement, not as MPs. 78 
iad an·uncomfortable relationship with the mass movements (both the 
Red Shirts). There was some evidence of political parties tacitl y 
novements by giving them resources for mobilization, but most 
o distance themselves fro m extra-parliamentary politics. There were 
,inrn ltuous period of the Thai democrati c ex perim ent from 1973 to 1976 show us th at 
eak and ineffective semi-democratic state, a violentl y polarized and confrontati onal 
tabilize or even undennin e parliamentary democracy. See the argument in Prajak 
were Somkiat Pongpaiboon of the Democra t Party, leader of the Yell ow Shirts, and 
of Pheu Thai Party, the Red Shirt leader. 
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also internal debates within the Pheu Thai and Democrat Party on how to establish an 
appropriate relationship with the movements. 79 After 2006, the Pheu Thai and the 
Democrat Party realized that the Red Shirt and the Yellow Shirt movements ' political 
supports were key to their respective electoral victory, but they did not want the social 
movement to dominate the party ' s direction and decision making. Tension between 
parliamentarians and political movement leaders thus existed throughout this period. 
However, the tension manifested in varying degrees from one province to another, 
therefore having different effects on the provincial electoral competitions. In strong 
Yellow Shirt provinces, one could observe a strong alliance between the Yellow Shirts 
and the Democrats. The Red Shirt movement was strong in the north and northeast, 
therefore most Pheu Thai MPs attempted to establish a good relationship with them. 
Only a few provincial bosses, notably those who had established monopoly power in 
their territories, did not need the movement ' s support; still, even these bosses had to 
avoid a hostile relationship with activists who transformed themselves into political 
brokers. Any bosses who pitted themselves against the color-coded movement dominant 
in their respective bailiwicks faced a challenging task and risked being defeated at the 
election. 80 
From 2006-2011 , the two most formidable forces in Thai politics were the colored mass 
political movements and the army. Politicians and political parties,. as explained above, 
had been marginalized in this era of street politics. The establishment had weakened the 
parliament and electoral democracy through army interference, judicial activism, and 
reactionary social movements. An unelected elite minority had asserted extra-
constitutional power over the political system. With the frequent dissolution of political 
parties, the truncation of political space and the deprivation of voting rights, frustrated 
elements of the electorate had no other option but to engage in mass mobilization. 
Fundamentally, the eruption of street violence was a by-product of the royal-army 
alliance's interference in electoral politics. The violent clashes between social 
movements a"ud the military forces were non-electoral violence that had led Thai society 
to an impasse and a continued cycle of violence. Nearly everyone felt unsafe in this 
79 Interview, Pheu Thai MPs and the Democrat Party's MPs, Bangkok, July and September 20 I 0. 
80 See Chapter 12 (Sa Kaeo) as an example of how the local provincial boss kept his distance from mass 
movements. And see Chapter 11 (Buriram) for power contestation between a powerful political boss and 
mass movements in the 2011 election. 
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political environment. 8t To paraphrase Benedict Anderson, it was "violence without 
progress." 
The struggle between the establishment and those aligned with ousted Prime Minister 
Thaksin has deeply transformed Thai politics. Overall, it has made political struggle 
more ideological. Electoral competition is no longer dominated by particularistic 
campaigns, but is instead infused with ideological and programmatic debate. Voters 
have different political stances and ideas regarding democratic values. They consider 
issues of the rule of law, the constitution, judicial activism, court decisions and they 
question the legitimacy of the coup and royal-army political interference, military 
suppression, and the nature of Thaksin ' s rule. These differing values and ideas affect 
voting. Color-coded politics and id eo logical conflict at the national level overrides 
personal conflicts among political bosses/families at the local level. With this changing 
mode of conflict, the demand for assassinations during election campaigns has decreased 
(though not entirely disappeared) as killing one individual candidate or vote canvasser 
could not substantially alter election results. 82 This is the background to the 2007 and 
20 11 elections, which, as noted above, involved less electoral violence. 
To sum up, from 1997-2006, three major national-level factors- the 1997 constitution 
and its newly designed electoral system, the decentralization process, and the rise of a 
strong populist party and Thaksin-transforrned local political structures and power 
balances. They unsettled the existing local political order. Consequently, the demand fo r 
and supply of electoral vio lence increased, as witnessed in the 2001 and 2005 elections. 
After 2006, because of the coup, political settings at the national and local level s 
underwent another major change. The royal-military intervention in the electoral process 
combined with growing ideo logical po litics to decrease the demand fo r violence and 
bring the decline of electoral violence in the 2007 and 20 11 elections. The next chapter 
looks back over the patterns of electoral violence observed in the four general elections 
held in 2001, 2005 , 2007, and 2011. 
81 A retired general, who was a classmate of Gen Anupong Paochinda, a coup leader and form er 
commander in chief (2007-20 I 0), to ld me that powerful fi gures, including Prime Minister Abhisit, Deputy 
Prime Mini ster Suth ep, Newin Chidchob (the de fa cto head of Bhumjaitha i Party), and Gen. Anupong, 
Gen . Sonthi Boonyara tglin (a form er coup leader), had been very carefu l with their schedul e and travel 
pl an as they had been afraid of assassination attempts. int ervi ew, former army general , Bangkok, 12 
February 20 11. 
82 See, in pa rti cula r, Chapters 10, 11 , and 12 for th e miti gating effect o f ideological strugg le on electoral 
violence. 
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Chapter 6 
Violence in Thai elections, 1997-2011 
This chapter analyzes the changing trends and characteristics of electoral violence in 
Thailand from the national election of January 2001 to that of July 2011. It provides 
statistical data on and analysis of the ebbs and flows of violence in national election. 
Data show that the 2001 and 2005 elections were the two most violent elections in 
modern Thai history by all measures: the number of incidents, death toll and injuries. 
Meanwhile, the intensity of electoral violence significantly dropped in the 2007 and 
2011 elections. 
General patterns of electoral violence, 1997- 2011 
The January 2001 election 
The 2001 election, organized after Democrat Party leader Chuan Leekpai dissolved 
parliament on 9 November 2000, was the first held under the 1997 constitution. In 
accordance with the new system, political parties now competed for 500 seats in the 
House of Representatives, divided into 400 seats from single-member constituencies and 
100 members from the nation-wide party list on a proportional basis. The newly founded 
TRT party led by Thaksin campaigned on a populist platform, and won in a landslide 
victory both on the constituency (200 seats) and party list votes (40.6%, 48 seats), and 
thus had a clear mandate to form a coalition government. The Democrat Party, the 
runner up, gained only 97 constituency seats and 26.6 percent of party list votes (31 
seats). 
With the new constitution, scholars and political analysts expected electoral misconduct 
would diminish due to the new rules of the game. But, as explained in Chapter 3, the 
reformers' obsession with reducing the prevalence of vote buying made the competition 
more confrontational and violent. Also , the optimistic view of those scholars discounted 
other important factors , notably decentralization and the emergence of political ambition 
for the creation of a single-paiiy system, in raising the stakes at election time. All these 
factors combined led to a high degree of violence in the 2001 election, surpassing every 
past election. In total, there were 81 violent incidents, killing 26 and wounding 84. 
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Those 81 incidents were: 39 assassination attempts; 7 violent fights and attacks; 26 
instances of physical intimidation ; 7 bombings, and 2 polling station burnings. Vote 
canvassers were the primary victims of violence. 
Assassination remained the most popular way candidates eliminated political threats. 
Before the start of the 2001 campaign, there were already signs that there would be 
many assassinations, In December 1999, the Democrat MP for Buriram, Panawat 
Liangphongphan, was shot at close range by gunmen. He survived but was seriously 
injured. Severe conflict with political rivals over an overlapping vote base prompted the 
attempt on his life (see Chapter 11 for more details). The shooting escalated fear among 
candidates and their supporters. Many of them bought bullet-proof jackets and hired 
more personal bodyguards. Nevertheless, several of them insisted that they would not 
step up their security because it made them look "weak and helpless" in the eyes of 
voters, and some complained that the government failed to protect them: "how could 
politicians give protection to those who voted for them if they themselves are afraid to 
die", and " if every politician was under fear they would be killed, how can Thai politics 
move forward. " 1 Regardless of the complaint, the general fear among politicians led to 
an instant boom of security-provision businesses- bullet-proof automobile and attire, 
life insurance, and personal bodyguards and hired guns. 2 Candidates were not just being 
paranoid, as the single-member district and changing electoral districts' boundaries gave 
rise to direct confrontation between rival bosses in many provinces, leading to the 
violent deaths of several vote canvassers. 3 The entry of TRT and electoral boundary 
remapping contributed to widespread party-switching among candidates and vote 
canvassers. Many vote canvassers became assassination and intimidation targets after 
they defected. 4 Moreover, violent conflicts over direct local elections (resulting from 
decentralization) spread into the nat ional level. Many major local elections were held 
nationwide in 2000: 2,493 TAO elections in January and June; 26 municipality elections 
on 29 January; 74 PAO elections on 5 February; and the Pattaya city election on 12 
1 Manager Daily, 4 January 2000: 14-15. 
2 Four major companies !hat produced bullet-proof jackets said that the order signifi cantly increased after 
the Panawat 's shooting. Most customers, they noted, were candidates in provincia l areas, members of the 
three maj or parti es (the New Asp iration Party, Thai Rak Thai and Democrat) . The price of the bullet-proof 
jackets ranged from 15,000-70,000 baht (500-2,330 USD) (Krungthep Thurakit , 24 January 2000: 17; Thai 
Rath , 21 December 2000: I, 5). 
3 For exampl e, in Phayao, Lopburi , Kanchanaburi (Krung/hep Thurakit , 16 November 2000: 21-22; 
Krungthep Thurakit, 2 January 200 I : 17- 18). Phrae was one of the most violent provinces because two 
prominen t bosses competed in tl1e same di stri ct (see Chapter 7). 
4 See cases in Nakhon Ratchasima and Ratchaburi (Matichon , 23 November 2000: 29; Thai Rath, 9 
December 2000: I, I 9). 
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February. Many vote canvassers ran for local posts and had vicious fights with their 
opponents. In national election campaigns, some vote canvassers and their rivals went on 
to support different MPs, escalating old hostilities. Chief examples were the murder of 
the New Aspiration Party 's vote canvasser and the TAO head in Phetchabun; the 
assassination of a TAO councilor in Chumphon and killing of a failed candidate for 
TAO council in Nakhon Ratchasima.5 It is difficult or, in fact, pointless to find a clear-
cut distinction whether the murder of any vote canvasser was motivated by local or 
national electoral conflicts. After decentralization, as argued in Chapter 3, national and 
local politics were closely intertwined. 
Electoral violence also took new forms in the 2001 competition. Vote canvassers and 
losing candidates in several constituencies led mass violent protests after the elections to 
disrupt vote counting and reject the results. Only 33 (out of 77) provinces escaped 
unruly protests. The two most violent took place in Songkhla and Satun in the south. In 
Songkhla, violent clashes between police and protestors led to nine injuries (four 
policemen and five protestors) and four arrests; the governor also declared a curfew. In 
Satun, 500 police officers clashed with 7,000 protestors, and angry protestors threw 
stones at the police, burned cars and motorcycles, and attacked polling stations, resulting 
in a large number of injuries. In response, the police used tear gas to disperse the crowd 
and arrested 10 protest leaders.6 The interim government had to deploy military force to 
control the situation. Post-election protests lasted for two weeks- initially in the 
provinces, and later in Bangkok in front of the National Election Commission of 
Thailand (ECT) office. Many grievances drove these protests. Candidates and their 
supporters believed that local election officials were biased. Local election 
commissioners in some provinces were incompetent and made mistakes, thus 
exacerbating the situation. In some cases, protests erupted because voters did not have a 
clear understanding of the new electoral procedures. As discussed in the previous 
section, the introduction of both a completely new electoral administration and a 
completely new electoral system confused many people. The ECT's power to disqualify 
candidates was most controversial. Nevertheless, several protests took place simply 
because losing candidates did not accept the electoral results, especially in districts in 
which the margins were small. Moreover, there were reports of vote canvassers acting as 
5Matichon , 12 October 2000: 21; Krungthep Thurakit, 20 November 2000: 13, 17; Daily News, 22 
November 2000: 1, 20. 
6 See details in Matichon , 8 January 2001: I , 14, 29; 10 January 200 1: I , 2, 20; II January 2001: 1-2; 
Krungthep Thurakit, I 6 January 2001: 17-1 8. 
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provocateurs. Some vote canvassers, who failed to deliver votes to their candidates, tried 
to make up fo r their failure by organizing protests to subvert the results. 7 
The 2001 election was the most unruly in Thai history, up to that point, containing 
fam iliar patterns of violence as well as some new trends. Hired gunmen were still the 
main perpetrators, and vote canvassers were the primary victims. The most common 
form was pre-election targeted killings. However, new actors and new types of violence 
emerged. Political supporter groups' collective violence appeared alongside the old 
pattern of discreet assassination. Post-election violence increased, accounting for 20 
percent of the total. Overall, the higher degree and changing pattern of electoral vio lence 
demonstrated the greater significance of electoral democracy and elective posts for 
electoral stakeholders and general voters. Mass violence also reflected the evo lving 
relationship between the party, the candidate, and the masses. Political parties sought 
mass support and organized mass mobilization in order to protect and strengthen the 
party's political interests. 
The 2005 election 
The 2005 election was held after the Thaksin government fini shed serving its first full 
term. There were only 4 major parties contesting in this election, the TRT led by 
Thaksin, the Democrats led by Banyat Banthatthan, the Chart Thai Party of Banharn 
Silpa-archa, and the newly created Mahachon party led by academic-turned-politician 
Anek Laothamrnatas. Indicative of the conso lidation of the party system at this time, 
many other medium and small parties who had run in the previous election had dissolved 
and merged into the TRT. 
Vio lent acts against vote canvassers occurred relatively early in the elect ion campaign as 
the election date had been announced a few months in advance. The degree of violence 
in this election was nearly as high as the previous one, although there was a decrease in 
the number of injuries. In total, there were 77 violent incident s, causing 30 deaths and 
injuries to 16 people. Those 77 incidents were: 44 assassinat ion attempts; 3 violent fights 
and at tacks; 25 instances of physical intimidation; 3 bombings; and 2 polling station 
7 See th ese reports in Thai Rath , 20 January 2001: I, 5; Krungthep Thurakit, 20 January 2001: 9- 12. 
Although journ alis ts had no solid evidence to prove this assumpti on, we can not rule out the possibility. 
Aft er all , vote canvassers were politi cal entrepreneurs who made use of all ava il able methods to bring 
advant ages to th e people for whom th ey worked. 
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burnings. Given the number of deaths, the 2005 campaign was the most deadly election 
in Thai history. 
As in the 2001 election, assassination and physical intimidation topped the list of violent 
tactics. Unlike the 2001 election, however, there were no post-election protests in 2005 
and thus bombings and burnings (of buildings or properties) were rare. There were many 
reasons for the peaceful situation after the voting. First of all, the election commissioners 
were more discreet in exercising their authority, especially in disqualifying candidates. 
In addition, the ETC put in place a more effective and clearer set of regulations, 
guidelines, and mechanisms regarding vote counting and election dispute resolution and 
complaints adjudication. Voters and vote canvassers also learned how to resort to (and 
manipulate) legal channels to rectify their situation.8 Ever since 2001, political bosses 
had become adept at adjusting to the electoral administration and rules, and some were 
powerful enough to bend them to serve their political interests. 9 The absence of public 
protests explained the sharp decline in the numbers of injured. However, election 
commissioners were targets of intimidation in some cut-throat districts. 10 
Vote canvassers, as usual, were the chief victims of assassination and intimidation. It is 
striking that almost all murdered or assaulted vote canvassers were local administration 
(TAO, municipality, PAO) officials. This reflects the fact that, by 2005, vote canvassers 
had transformed themselves into formally elected politicians, positions that came with 
greater wealth and power but higher risks. As mentioned, Thaksin 's war on influential 
people since 2003 had backed local vote canvassers into a corner. During the 2005 
election campaign, police stepped up "the war" by searching several vote canvassers' 
houses, seizing their weapons, and issuing arrest warrants. Confrontation between 
security officers and vote canvassers was a feature of this election. Nevertheless, in 
provinces in which all prominent bosses united under the TRT, the situation was calm; 
competing bosses temporarily held back their old grievaflces and worked together to 
avoid being considered "influential people." The situation was turbulent in provinces in 
which the TRT confronted insubordinate bosses, notably Phrae, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
8 The ECT 2008; Pan ya 2007. 
9 The provincial bosses who had establi shed monopolies were able to influence the electoral process by 
placing their trusted people in the local election commission as well as in the polling station committee 
(See Chapters 10 and 12). 
10 On 23 January 2005, gunmen shot a local ECT staff in Yala, and some offenders threw beer bottles into 
the ECT chairman 's house in Kanchanaburi on 30 November 2004 (Kham Chat Luek, 24 January 2005: 5; 
Matichon , 1 December 2004: 10). 
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Ayutthaya, Nakhon Ratchasima, Phichit, Saraburi, Nakhon Fathom, Narathiwat, and 
Yala. Both TRT's bosses and their rivals employed violence against each other in the 
election campaign. In Phrae (Chapter 7), for example, the TRT attempted to crush the 
Democrat' s godmother and establish their own monopoly, while the godmother 
struggled to save her last stronghold. In Nakhon Si Thammarat (Chapter 9), the 
Democrat' s political capital, the TRT attempted to invade their rival's fortress. A 
number of vote canvassers from both sides lost their lives in these electoral wars. Apart 
from Phrae and Nakhon Si Thammarat, Ayutthaya became a voting hot zone after four 
TRT vote canvassers were murdered (in separate incidents). The most high-profile case 
took place on 11 January 2005 when a top PAO councilor and businessman who 
canvassed votes for the · TRT candidate was shot dead while driving home. The 
assassinations brought an outburst from Thaksin as they undermined his candidate ' s 
power and challenged his national campaign on mafia and gunmen. Thaksin commented, 
Ayutthaya is very close to Bangkok, but barbaric people still exist. Those 
barbaric men must not stay alive .... after the election I will definitely liquidate 
all influential mafias and gunmen. I promise I am going to do it. I cannot allow 
these people to reproduce themselves. Everyone must be under the law. 11 
Soon after Thaksin's speech, the police arrested two suspected gurunen- both were 
teenagers who claimed one TAO councilor paid them 50,000 baht to do the job. 12 The 
police sped up the investigation and one week before voting day they issued an arrest 
warrant for the Mahachon Party's MP candidate for Ayutthaya, Surachet Chaikoson, on 
the charge of rnastenninding the murder. Surachet denied the allegation. Mahachon 's 
leading members also came out to guarantee his innocence, and believed that the police 
investigation was politically motivated. The whole incident, however, crippled the 
candidate's campa ign as well as Mahachon 's credentials. 13 It was unprecedented that the 
poli ce were able to apprehend and/o r charge the suspected gunmen, let alone the 
cand idate, during an election campaign. Thaksin's reaction and the police action on the 
murder case of TR T's Ayutthaya vote canvasser were criticized by other parties' leaders. 
11 Kham Chat !uek, 12 January 2005; Khao Hun, 12 January 2005. 
12 Several young, new hired guns were reportedly active in this election , in di cating that the war on 
infl uential people and gunmen had wiped out some established hired guns and left room for rookies. 
" In the end , Surachet lost to the TRT contender. In 2007 , he abandoned Mahachon and ran under 
Thaksin·s allied party ba nn er and won th e election . The offi cers eventually dropped tJ1 e charges aga inst 
him. For deta ils of the case, see Khao Sod, 15 January 2005: I, 11; 2 1 January 2005: I , 15; 29 January 
2005: I , 14; 30 January 2005: I, 15; 31 January 2005 ; I , 18; Matichon Sudsapda, 4- 10 February 2005: 97. 
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The Democrat leader Banyat commented that Thaksin had double standards because the 
government did not give the same level of attention to the deaths of other parties' vote 
canvassers: "He [Thaksin] only cares when his own people are killed ... but when people 
of other parties die he does not give a damn. By doing this, people will condemn rather 
than praise [the government]." 14 In a similar vein, Anek, the leader of Mahachon 
. remarked, 
I do not understand. When candidates or vote canvassers of other parties 
are shot dead, the police have never been able to catch the culprits. But 
in Ayutthaya, only a few days after TRT's vote canvasser was shot, the 
police arrested [the gunmen] ... . The [caretaker] government helps the 
TR T's candidates gain most advantage and benefits .... If the TRT won 
400 seats, I think Thai people shall not go cast their votes in the next 
election. Let them be the permanent government. 15 
In contrast to the turbulent pre-election campaign, the 2005 election day was relatively 
peaceful. The officials recorded few incidents of intimidation and vandalism. The 
election result was accepted without disruption. Nobody was shot or wounded. Thaksin 
and his TRT party won decisively with 377 seats, but there were clear hints that Thai 
politics was headed toward a tumultuous and more ideological struggle. 16 One small 
indication of this is the incident that occurred in Khon Kaen, in which officials found 
many leaflets distributed to the locals on the eve of election day, accusing Thaksin of 
"having ambitions to be the president." 17 In Thai cultural politics, accusing someone of 
aspiring to be a president contains a deep political meaning of characterizing that person 
as anti-monarchist. It was a serious political charge. 
Th e December 2007 election 
The 2007 election was the first electoral contest after the September 2006 coup, and it· 
was held under the new constitution. Thaks in 's allies formed a new party called the 
Palang Prachachon Party (PPP) to compete with existing parties (the Democrat and 
14 Khao Sod, 13 January 2005: 10. 
15 Daily News, 3 1 January 2005: I , 18. TI1is was a strikin g remark as if Anek could foresee the pol itical 
future. Hi s party, including all other major parti es, boycotted th e 2006 election and left the TRT to run 
unopposed. 
16 The Democrats won only 96 seats (52 from the south), the Chart Thai won 26, and the Mahachon 
grabbed onl y one seat. 
17 Krungthep Thurakit, 7 February 2005: 6. 
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Chart Thai) as well as several new parties led by fonner TRT faction leaders who had 
left Thaksin after the 2006 coup. This election took place under the interim government 
whose prime minister, Surayud Chulanont, was appointed by the coup leaders. Martial 
law had been declared immediately after the coup, and as of election time it remained in 
effect in 26 (out of the 77) provinces. Most provinces under martial law were located in 
the north and northeast, Thaksin's political strongholds. 18 This election was thus clearly 
more than the usual competition among rival political parties and provincial bosses; 
rather, it was a showdown between the anti-Thaksin movement of the junta and military-
installed government and the Thaksin-supported political networks led by PPP. 
Despite the competition's high stakes, the degree and frequency of electoral vio lence in 
the 2007 election were down sharply compared to 2001 and 2005. In fact, the 2007 
election stood out as one of the most peaceful electoral competitions in Thai history. In 
total, there were only 23 violent incidents, causing 10 deaths and 4 woundings. The 23 
incidents were: 14 assassination attempts, I violent fight, 7 instances of physical 
intimidation, and I burning of a polling station. There were no bombing during the 2007 
election. More than 80 percent of incidents occurred in the pre-election period in the 
form of assassination targeting vote canvassers. In this sense, the 2007 violence pattern 
was not different from the previous two elections; instead, it was the low intensity of the 
use of violence that set it apart and called for explanation. The 2007 election's total 
numbers of violent incidents set the lowest record since 1988 ( and was only slightly 
higher than the 1979 and 1983 elections). Its number of casualti es was the lowest since 
1976. The geographical area of violence was another feature that made this election 
distinctive. Nearly half the assassination attempts (6 out of 14) and casualties (4 from 
10) were situated in the three southern border provinces, while other notorious hot spots 
were peaceful. 19 The level of violence witnessed in the three southernmost provinces in 
this election was in keeping with past patterns there, but the sudden absence of vio lence 
in other regions made the Deep South look more violent than usual. 
The low intensity of vio lence was not caused by the provincial bosses' lack of 
motivation to defeat their enemies. Political ambition still existed, as well as threats, 
18 Except three provinces in die troubled Deep South (Pa nani , Yala, and Narathi wat), and three other 
upper-south provinces (Ra nong, Satun, and Songkhla). See th e li st in ANFREL 2007: 73. 
19 On 6 November 2007, gunmen shot dead two Yala Democra t MP. On 21 November 2007, in 
Narathiwa t, hi t men used heavy weapons to kill Ph eu Pandin 's vote canvasser. Three days later, three 
gunmen shot Pheu Tha i's key vote ca nvasser in Yala (Naew Na, 6 November 2007; Matichon, 21 
November 2007; Krnngthep Thurakit , 24 November 2007). 
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disloyalty, and animosity. Conflicts among local bosses and factions still ran deep. The 
difference, however, came from the fact that rival bosses just did not have the same 
opportunity to exercise their muscle. The underlying causes of the relatively peaceful 
atmosphere of this election were the severe restrictions on campaigning imposed under 
martial law and the heavy interference of the military in the conduct of the election. 
Security officials used martial law to disperse rallies, search candidates and their vote 
canvassers' houses, stop vehicles and detain party supporters. A report by the Asian 
Network for the Free Election (ANFREL), an international election-monitoring body, 
concluded that the existence of martial law "undoubtedly created a climate of fear where 
freedom of expression and assembly was curtailed. "20 
The interference of the army in this election was abundantly clear. General Sonthi 
Boonyaratklin, a coup leader and deputy prime minister (in charge of security), made 
several public comments against Thaksin and his allied party, the PPP. The widely 
shared public perception of the army's interference in the election was made clear when 
the media revealed the plan approved by the Council for National Security (CNS) 
chaired by General Sonthi, to prevent Thaksin and the PPP from winning the election. 21 
General Sonthi himself was criticized for his role as chair of a government panel set up 
to tackle vote buying. Given his position as a coup leader, his new position had an 
obvious conflict of interest. Moreover, the independent monitoring body found evidence 
of military interference in the electoral process in many districts. 22 For example, in 
Chiang Rai, army personnel were told by their commanders to vote for the main rival of 
PPP. Also, in the same province, the police searched 50-100 houses of the PPP's vote 
canvassers while leaving other parties ' supporters alone. Human Rights Watch 
documented a case in Lamphun where police arrested three individuals suspected of 
carrying arms and patrolling a candidate' s house. Later the police officers found out that 
those suspe~ts were soldiers from the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) 
who were sent by their chiefs to monitor movement of that PPP candidate. 23 Several 
northern and northeastern regions vote canvassers said the army interfered in electoral 
competition, undermining the PPP's campaign: the military instructed voters to vote for 
'
0 ANFREL 2007: 3 1. 
21 See details of the plan in ANFREL 2007: 29-30. 
22 The information I collected from my field research in six provinces (in different regions) identified the 
same phenomenon. See, especially, the analysis on Phrae (Chapter 7) and Buriram (Chapter 11), where 
army interference was strongest. 
23 Human Rights Watch, "Thailand: Mi litary Interference Undermines Upcoming Elections," 20 
December 2007; ANFREL 2007: 74. 
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certain candidates, threatened and blocked the PPP 's vote canvassers, and allowed other 
party' s vote canvassers to carry on regardless.24 After the election, many PPP 
opponents- surprised at winning-attributed their victory to army support.25 
The peaceful December 2007 elections can be attributed to the military-installed 
government and coup leaders controlling and dictating election processes. Unlike the 
provincial bosses who continued to carry out assassinations by professional hired guns, 
state security forces did not eliminate candidates or vote canvassers. Rather, they 
suppressed and terminated their political activities. State coercion effectively stopped or 
at least inhibited the market for electoral violence. This explains why the southern 
border provinces were the most dangerous in this election. In other elections, in which · 
the market of violence functioned normally, violence occurred in every region brought 
about by existing conflicts among bosses. In this election, while the demand for violence 
in other regions stopped unnaturally, confl_ict in the south continued as usual because the 
anny could not assert its control there. Also , under martial law, aggrieved voters did not 
dare protest the junta-installed ECT decisions. 26 Nevertheless, the lack of violence (or 
angry protest) was an unintended consequence of army interference. The army's central 
aim was to preventing Thaksin 's allied party from returning to power. 
The decline in the number of violent incidents in the 2007 elections cannot be used as an 
indicator of the positive development of parliamentary democracy in Thailand. On the 
contrary, fewer incidents represented a legitimacy crisis of democracy and electoral 
politics. More importantly, the lack of intense violence during the 2007 election 
indicated something else entirely, namely that electoral politics was not the forefront of 
political struggle. Even though members of the royal-military alliance interfered in the 
electoral process, this longstanding unelected traditional power fa iled to recoup power 
lost since 2001 . Thaksin and his political machine stayed strong and popular, gaining 
votes in tlieir strongholds and winning a clear majo rity in the House. The anti-Thaksin 
coalition resorted to non-electoral violence to unseat him. What Thai society witnessed 
after the 2007 election were among the most violent and chaotic scenes of modern Thai 
24 Interviews, severa l vote canvassers, Phrae and Buriram, January and September 20 I 0. See fu ll detail s in 
Chapters 7 and I I. 
25 See, in particular, the cases of Democrat cand idates in Nakhon Sawan (Chapter 8). 
26 All three PPP 's winn ing candidates in Buriram 's constituency I, stronghold of the PPP, were g iven red 
ca rds (d isqualificati on) by th e provincia l ECT. One provincial ECT member sa id to me th at the decision 
was supported by th e coup makers and it was part of a de li berate strategy to wea ken Thaksin 's pol it ical 
network (see Chapter 11 ). 
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history (as explained in the previous chapter). In essence, the violence had shifted from 
the electoral arena to the non-electoral sphere; from the ballot box to the street. 
The July 2011 election 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Thai national politics was in upheaval after 2007. 
Violent street clashes, mob confrontations, occupations of government and business 
buildings, and military crackdowns dominated political life. In the wake of the April-
May 2010 crackdown, political commentators and media expressed concern over the 
deep polarization and hostility between the pro- and anti-Thaksin forces, even 
suggesting this might lead to civil war.27 
A significant development took place on 11 March 2011, when Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva announced that he was going to dissolve parliament and hold a general 
election. According to reports, Abhisit seemingly believed that going to the polls early 
would be more advantageous to his party and coalition partners as they had recently 
passed the annual budget and still controlled the state apparatus. The Democrat leader 
also wanted to avoid further confrontation with Red Shirt protesters, whose anger and 
frustration over his role in the April-May 2010 brutal crackdown remained. This was the 
context in which the 3 July 2011 election took place, with wounds from the crackdown 
still fresh and society deeply divided by political turmoil. Altho1,1gh several civilian 
governments had taken office since the 2006 coup, the military still dominated the 
country' s political system. Mass protests on both sides of the political divide disrupted 
economic activity and made it difficult for governments to implement important reforms. 
Against this background of continuing crisis, many observers questioned the election's 
potential to bring peace and stability to Thailand. Some thought it would exacerbate the 
conflict and lead to even more violence. Tellingly, members of the Election Commission 
asked the caretaker government to declare a state of emergency to cover the election 
campaign, as they expected violence of a kind that would be impossible to manage 
within the regular legal framework. 
Yet the 2011 election was held without violent disruption or derailment. The frequency 
and degree of electoral violence were higher than those of the 2007 poll but lower than 
in the 2001 and 2005 elections. The number of assassination attempts and casualties was 
also lower than in many past elections. In total, there were 56 violent incidents, causing 
27 Matichon, 27 February 2011 , "Elections show signs of violence," Naew Na, l March 201 I:~-
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14 deaths and 16 woundings. The 56 incidents were: 20 assassination attempts, 12 
violent fights and attacks, 16 instances of physical intimidation, 8 bombings, and 0 
burning of po lling station. 
With the lifting of martial law and the absence of heavy army interference, the demand 
for and supply of electoral vio lence rebounded. 28 After the temporary suppression of 
conflict among provincial notables in the 2007 election, provincial bosses were free 
again to hire guns to eliminate their local political opponents. The 201 1 election saw the 
reactivation of tensions and they came earlier than usual in the electoral cycle- not 
waiting for the dissolution of the House in May, but emerging as soon as Abhisit called 
elections in March. Patterns of violence fell back to nonnal- hit men assassinating vote 
canvassers during the election campaign. All targets of assassinations (except one), 
including 14 murdered victims, were key vote canvassers working for influential 
candidates.29 The most prominent was the murder of Lopburi PAO chairman Suban 
Chiraphanwanit. On 16 June 2011, in broad daylight in central Bangkok, gunmen shot 
Suban dead and wounded his wife and secretary. Suban was an influential political boss, 
patriarch of one of the most powerful Lopburi political dynasties and brother of the 
Bhumjaitai Party' s MP candidate. Suban's political ambitions earned him many local 
political enemies, many keen to eliminate him before he could monopolize power. 30 The 
police were able to arrest the suspected gunmen, who confessed they had been hired by 
Suban ' s political enemies for an estimated 1 million bah!. Professional gunmen were 
perpetrators in most cases, and it was strictly business as usual. Even as Thai po litics 
became more ideological, hired gunmen maintained their non-partisan trademark, killing 
victims regardless of political or party identification. 31 
Even though the absence of heavy army interference reactivated the electoral murder 
market, the degree of vio lence in 2011 was as not high as that of the 2001 and 2005 
elect ions. First of all, there were no vio lent mass protests before or after vot ing. Both the 
28 Am1y leaders were more cautious in interfering in this election, as the medi a had exposed their 
unscrupulous practices of intimidating vote ca nvassers and voters in 2007. They could onl y comment 
pu bli cly, persuading voters not to vote for Thaksin 's alli ed pa11y. An impli cit order tliat subordinates vote 
for tl1e Democrat Party was also di sobeyed (Wassa na 2012: 23-68). 
29 The exception was the a ttempted murder of Pracha Prasopdi , Pheu Thai ' MP cand idate for 
Samutprakam, on IO May 201 1. He survived but was seriously injured (Thai Rath , 11 May 20 11 : 1 ). 
Jo Int erview, pro1ec1i on racket owner , Bangkok, 6 Apri l 2012. 
J I This is evidenced by th e fact that the same team of gunmen who killed Suban of th e Bhumjaitai Party 
was al so responsible for th e murder attempt on Pracha Prasopdi a leading member of th e Pheu Thai Party. 
A lthough tl1 e two parti es were ri va ls, their leaders were victims of the sa me group of assassins (Th ai Post , 
26 Jun e 2011 ; Thai Rath , I July 2011). 
168 
Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt movements, for different reasons, refrained from violence 
during the election campaign: the Yellow Shirts conducted a "vote-no" campaign, 
persuading voters not to cast ballots for any party nor be involved in electoral processes 
at all, while the Red Shirts were aware that the army could use any violent troubles as 
justification for the intervention. 32 Therefore street violence, which had dominated Thai 
politics for several years, did not spill over into the electoral arena. There were reports of 
only a few minor scuffles and brawls between parties' supporters. Furthermore, Pheu 
Thai and Democrat candidates were able to campaign in their opponents' territories 
safely without opposition supporters interrupting them. 33 
More importantly, political polarization and the ideological nature of politics produced 
positive effects on voting behavior and polling conduct. Ideology overshadowed 
personal conflict or family feuds between rival provincial bosses. Party stance, policy 
packages and political ideology shaped voting behavior. The ideological contest between 
anti- and pro-Thaksin movements dominated the 2011 general election. Especially in the 
provinces in which the Yellow Shirts or Red Shirts were strong, their members readily 
volunteered to assist campaigns, in the process replacing the old money-driven, 
entrepreneurial vote canvassers. With conflict battle lines drawn on ideological lines, 
hired gunmen were in less demand. For these reasons, the election in many (formerly 
volatile) provinces went undisturbed.34 This partly explains the geography of electoral 
violence. In 2011, violent incidents and casualties were concentrated in the central 
region (notably, Ang Thong, Lopburi, Pichit, Saraburi, Ratchaburi). These provinces did 
not harbor any strong mass political movement (either Red or Yellow), 35 and thus 
remained dominated by personalistic, candidate-centered campaigns. Powerful bosses in 
these provinces still relied on private killings to maintain political control over their 
adversaries. In contrast, electoral competition in the north and northeast (the center of 
the Red Shirt strength), and the southern region (the bastion of the Yellow Shirts) were 
32 lnterview, Red Shirt leader, Bangkok, 26 June 2011. On the "vote-no" campaign, see the interview with 
Yellow Shirt leader Pipob Thongchai in ASTVManager, 3 June 2011. 
33 The most "violent" acts directed towards Yingluck and Abh isit were: an egg throw at Yingluck in 
Bangkok on 28 May 2011 , and negative banners condemning Abhisit for his role in the April-May 2010 
crackdown (Khao Sod, 29 May 2011 and 19 Jun e 20 11 ). 
34 It was in Buriram where ideologica l politics brought the most dramatic peaceful transition (see Chapter 
11). 
35 On the emergence and development of the Red and Yellow Shirt movements and their main locations, 
see Apichart et al. 2012; Keyes 2012; Naruemon and McCargo 2012. 
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relatively peaceful. 36 Thai electoral politics and its pattern of violence was now in a state 
of transition. New elements had emerged, but they did not entirely replace old ones. The 
use of privatized murder by the boss was a remnant of the past political order, but this 
phenomenon will not cease until personalistic politics-fighting over the spoils of 
governance and illegal economic activities-are completely eradicated. 
Electoral violence, 2001-2011: actors, patterns, and the market 
The pattern of electoral violence witnessed in Thailand over the period 2001-2011 was 
not dramatically different from that of the period 1979-1996. In terms of methods, 
perpetrators still prefer assassination, amounting to half the total incidents. Physical 
intimidation was the second most popular violent method. However, clashes and 
bombings increased. Violent protests of the 2001 election and brawls between party 
supporters in 2011 explains the increase in these two modes of violence (see table 6.1 
and chart 6.1), reflecting a higher invo lvement of the masses in electoral vio lence. 
As for victims, vote canvassers were still the primary target of intimidation and killings. 
Vote-canvassers accounted for as many as 97 percent of those killed in the period 2001 -
201 1, more than the corresponding figure (83 percent) for the period 1979-1 997. Other 
personnel took a small share (1 percent each), except candidates who were completely 
safe (see table 6.2 and chart 6.2). Several voters, officials, and poll administrators were 
injured as a result of threats or fighting, but they were not murder targets. We can 
conclude that, over time, vote canvassing has become the most dangerous election 
occupation. Eighty-six percent of vio lence still occurred before elections, but the post-
election period was more violent than election day. This is in contrast to the period of 
1979-1997 , when election day was more turbulent than the post-election period (see 
table 6.3 and chart 6.3). With no threats from communists or southern separatists, voting 
days were relatively peacefu l. Vote counting chaos in 2001 increased post-election 
violence. As to the degree of violence, data shows a progression from a high-level in the 
2001 and 2005 elections to a low-level in 2007 and 2011. Compared to constant levels of 
violence from 1979 to 1997, there was sharp fluctuat ion in this period. Major structural 
and institutional changes that came into effect after 1997 ( constitution, electoral and 
36 Except th e three southernm ost provinces who had only a few violent incidents. Perpetrators shot dead 
one vote ca nvasser in Yala, one in Pattan i, and wounded one vote ca nvasser and two official s in 
Narathiwat (Thai Rath, 28 Jun e 20 1 I; Post Today, 3 Jul y 20 11 ). 
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party system, decentralization, civil-military relations, and political party-social 
movement linkages) caused these ups and downs. 
In conclusion, from 2001 to 2011 , electoral violence in Thailand's national elections 
took the form of provincial bosses hiring gunmen to assassinate vote canvassers in the 
period prior to the election. However, sweeping political changes in 1997 and 2006 
affected the electoral violence market. From 2001 to 2005, demand for violence 
increased because bosses' provincial power monopolies were at stake. National factors, 
particularly the entry of Thaksin and his populist party, sharpened existing political 
conflicts and changed the power balance between rival bosses. Thaksin's ambitious goal 
of monopolizing the political market raised the stakes of electoral competition, forcing 
bosses to employ fierce tactics to defeat their competitors. The situation changed after 
Thaksin was toppled. From 2006 to 2011, the demand for violence decreased as military 
intervention and ideological politics stifled and marginalized provincial bosses. 
As a result of demand fluctuating, the supply of violence changed accordingly. In 
exclusive interviews, gunmen agreed that 1998 to 2006 was the golden age of the hired 
gun business.37 Hired guns' agents were extremely busy, recruiting new hit men to meet 
soaring demand. The "war on influential people" did not reduce market demand; on the 
contrary, the war stimulated demand. Like other illegal trades, _as long as there is 
upsurge in demand, entrepreneurs ensure no shortage in supply. The Thaksin 
government ' s policy of gunmen suppression eradicated many experienced gurunen 
(through arrests or extrajudicial killings) , but, overall, it did not decrease the supply of 
violence. Before Thaksin' s policy, there were 800-900 hired gunmen working 
nationwide. There were 151 hired-gun dens scattered in every region, concentrated in 
Phetchaburi, Nakhon Pathom, Kanchanaburi, Ratchaburi, Suphanburi, Prachuap Khiri 
Khan, Sami_it Songkhram, Samut Sakhon, Prachinburi, and Trat. After suppression, 
gunmen dens1 locations changed; assassins moved to new areas to escape police 
suppression, notably Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Tak, Buriram, Lopburi, Bangkok, N akhon 
Sawan, Samut Prakarn, Chonburi, Sa Kaeo, Chumporn, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
37 Information based on a range of anonymous interviews: gunman, Chonburi, 14 August 2012; protection 
racket owner, Bangkok, 6 April 2012; local bosses and gunmen, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 21 and 30 
January 2010; local boss and gunmen ' s agent, Nakhon Sawan, 4 and 5 September 20 10; senior police in 
the Crime Suppression Division , Bangkok, 11 April 2012; two local police officers, Phetchaburi, 17 April 
2012. In addition, see Chaiwat 201 I ; Research and Development Division of th e Royal Thai Police 
Department 2004, 2005 (unpublished). 
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Phatthalung, and Trang. 38 The gunmen's migration reflects the high mobility of the hired 
gun business (as discussed in Chapter 3). The authorities clearly failed to stifle 
mercenaries as the total number rose to over 1,000. In fact, the government 's 
suppression escalated the price of assassination and thus provided incentives fo r people 
to enter the mercenary business. During the Thaksin administration, the market price for 
gunmen to kill a TAO head was 300,000-400,000 baht; provincial councilor 500,000-
600,000 baht; PAO head 1 million baht; and MP 1 to 5 million baht ( depending on 
degree of the MPs political influence).39 Consequently, the price encouraged young 
hoodlums, the unemployed, and moonlighting officers to step into the business to 
replace hit men who had been slain . The number of independent gunmen rose. Some 
muepuen daorung (rookie gunmen) formed small dens comprised of three to four 
members, offering a cut-price service. Many bosses preferred to use rookies because 
they were not on the police "watch list. " In the south, after some prominent gunmen 
were arrested, high-ranking police officers stepped in and ran hired-gunmen dens, 
competing with gangsters. Cut throat business led to intra-den bloodshed as so me 
mercenaries wanted to eliminate their business competitors. The violence market in the 
2000s became more competitive, fragmented, and disorderly.40 
As mentioned above, the demand fo r electoral vio lence slumped after the 2006 coup. 
Hired gunmen and their agents sought new jobs; some became full time drug dealers, 
business enforcers, debt collectors, private security guards, or extortionists. Aft er the 
coup though, ideological struggles and street violence created new work fo r 
mercenaries-they became security guards fo r the Yellow Shirt and/or Red Shirt 
movements or provided protection to protest leaders. Some of them were paid to 
instigate vio lence in public to destabilize governrnents. 41 Vio lence entrepreneurs and 
38 Interview, senior police in the Crime Suppression Division, Bangkok, 11 April 20 12. For data on the 
number of gunmen before the "war on infl uentia l peop le", see the Research and Development Divi s ion of 
the Royal Thai Police Deparanent 2004, 2005 (unpublished). 
39 A gunm an who used to work with an influential boss in tl1 e east told me that he received 3 million baht 
for assassinating a prominent MP. It was th e highest-paid job he had ever done. Norm all y, he would be 
paid 300,000-800,000 baht for each murder. Another gunman workin g in the south gave me si mi lar 
figures. Interview, gunman, Chonburi, 14 August 2012; u1terview, gunmen , Nakhon Si Thammaral , 30 
January 20 I 0. 
'
0 Some experienced hired gunm en and hired gun ' s agents lamented the entry of th e rook ie gunm en into 
th e business, saying the youn g gunm en were amateur, reckl ess, d isrespectfu l of other people's turfs, and a 
destabilizing force in the market. For exampl e, young gunm en cut the price of TAO murder from 300,000-
400,000 to only 50,000-60,000 baht. Interview, gunm an, Chonburi, 14 August 20 12; interview, protection 
racket owner, Bangkok, 6 April 2012. 
41 A Bangkok-based protection racketeer provided security to Red-shirt demonstrations, and a former 
gunman from Nakhon Si lliammarat acted as body guard for Yellow Shin leaders. Interview, protecti on 
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j Election 
dates 
6/1/2001 
6/2/2005 
23/12/2007 
3/7/201 1 
' Total 
violence specialists found new business opportunities and new clients in the era of crisis. 
Table 6.1: Election-related violence in national polls, 2001-2011 
Violent incidents Death toll 
assassination fights , physical Bombings burnings total total 
attempts clashes, intimidation 
brawls, 
scuffles 
39 7 26 7 2 81 26 
44 3 25 3 2 77 30 
14 I 7 0 1 23 10 
20 12 16 8 0 56 14 
117 23 74 18 5 237 80 
Chart 6.1: Methods of electoral violence in national elections, 2001-2011 
burnings 
racket owner, Bangkok, 6 April 201 2; interview, gunmen, Nakhon Si Tharnm arat, 23 and 30 January 
2010. 
173 
Woun 
total 
84 
16 
4 
16 
120 
Table 6.2: Deaths related to electoral violence in national elections, 2001-2011 
Election Dead victims 
dates 
vote candidates journalists, poll gunmen voters 
canvassers administrators and 
observers 
6/1 /200 1 25 0 0 1 0 
6/2/2005 28 0 1 0 I 
23/ 12/2007 10 0 0 0 0 
3/7/201 1 14 0 0 0 0 
Total 77 0 1 I I 
Chart 6.2: Death related to electoral violence in national elections, 2001-2011 
observers 
1% 
174 
Total 
26 
30 
10 
14 
80 
Table 6.3: Timing of election-related violence in national polls, 1979-1996 
Election Timing of violent incidents 
dates 
pre-election election day post-election Total 
(from House (1 month after 
dissolution to election day) 
election day) 
6/1/2001 65 0 16 81 
6/2/2005 74 2 I 77 
23/12/2007 19 I 3 23 
3/7/2011 46 2 8 56 
Total 204 5 28 237 
Chart 6.3: Timing electoral violence in national elections, 2001-2011 
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Part ill: The Geography of Electoral Violence, 1975-2011: 
Case Studies of Three Violent and Three Peaceful Provinces 
Nationally determined factors, such as state structures, electoral and party systems, and 
the impact of decentralization, help to explain the changes in the degree and modes of 
violence but are not sufficient to explain the geography of violence. As mentioned, 
electoral vio lence in Thailand is not evenly distributed across the country. A good 
explanation needs to be able to identify the local factors that make some provinces 
especially prone to violence. Rather than merely looking at the macro-political picture at 
the national level, my research now turns to an exploration of micro-sociological 
conditions and micro-political processes at the provincial level. Building on the analysis 
of the general pattern of electoral violence from the late 1970s to the late 1990s (in 
Chapter 4) and from 2001 to 2011 (in Chapter 6), Part III provides a broad picture of the 
geography of electoral violence in Thailand from the election of 1975 to that of 2011. 
To begin, it is important to look at the statistics on electoral violent incidents and 
casualties in provincial areas. 
Table III.I: Top 16 most violent provinces in Thai elections: number of incidents, 
1975-2011 
Rank Province Number of 
incidents 
1 Nakbon Si Thammarat 26 
2 Bangkok 24 
3 ·Narathiwat 20 
4 Nakhon Sawan 19 
5 Phrae 18 
6 Nakhon Ratchasima 17 
7 Lopburi 15 
8 Pichit 15 
9 ChiangRai 14 
10 Kanchanaburi 13 
II Chonburi 13 
177 
12 Nakhon Fathom 13 
13 Samutprakarn 12 
14 Yala 12 
15 Ayutthaya II 
16 Chiang Mai 11 
Source: author' s data 
Table 111.2: Top 15 most violent provinces in Thai elections: number of casualties, 
1975-2011 
Rank Province Number of casualties 
(deaths/injuries) 
I Satun 51 (1/50) 
2 Nakhon Si Thammarat 25 (22/3) 
3 Bangkok 20 (5/15) 
4 Chainat 18 (8/10) 
5 Pichit 18 (6/12) 
6 Nakhon Sawan 16 (8/8) 
7 Yala 15 (13/5) 
8 Lopburi 15 (10/5) 
9 Songkhla 15 (5/ 10) 
10 Ang Thong 15 (3/12) 
11 Narathiwat 14 (717) 
12 Chiang Rai 13 (8/5) 
13 Prachinburi 12 (1 2/0) 
14 Saraburi 12 (8/4) 
15 Kanchanaburi 12 (6/6) 
16 Phrae 10 (8/2) 
Source: author 's data 
Tab le III.l shows the J 6 most violence-prone provinces measured by number of 
incidents. These provinces are located in all regions (three from the north , two fro m the 
lower-north , seven fro m the centra l, three in the so uth, and one in the northeast) . 
However, the national data ind icates some high-frequency pro vinces do not ho ld high 
casua lti es ; fo r examp le, Samul Prakam reco rds only 2 deaths and 3 injuries; Nakhon 
Pathom 4 deaths and I injury; and Bangkok which witnessed 24 incidents (the co untry's 
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second-highest) but only 5 deaths. 1 In contrast, some low-frequency provinces harbor 
large numbers of dead and wounded. When vio lence was measured in terms of 
casualties, the provinces rank differently as shown in Table III.2. There are six 
additional provinces on the list: Satun, Chainat, Songhkla, Ang Thong, Prachinburi, and 
Saraburi. The number of injuries in Satun is well above average because of one 
particular incident in the 2001 election, in which protestors clashed with the po lice (see 
discussion of the 2001 election). Not counting this incident, Satun is relatively peaceful. 
Chainat is another peaceful province whose results have been skewed by one violent 
incident in the April 1976 election, in which a heavy bomb caused eight deaths and ten 
woundings (see Chapter 2) . 
If we compare the two tables, only ten provinces appear in both categories (as 
highlighted in table III.2): Nakhon Si Thammarat, Bangkok, Pichit, Nakhon Sawan, 
Yala, Lopburi, Narathiwat, Chiang Rai, Kanchanaburi, and Phrae. These provinces are, 
by all measures, the top ten most violent locations when it comes to Thailand's electoral 
competition. These hot spots vary in a) population (and thus the number of MPs); b) 
level of economic development and per capita income; c) homicide rate; and d) 
prevalence of hired gunmen. 
Based on population, Bangkok, the country's most populous provil}ce, had 33 seats as of 
201 1, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, the most populous province in the south, had 9 MPs. 
Phrae, Yala, and Pichit, fairly small provinces, had only 3 seats up for grabs. Therefore, 
the general beli ef that a large province creates greater violence does not hold .2 In terms 
of economic development (measured by gross provincial products-GPP), and income 
(measured by GPP per capita), data show no relationship between these economic 
factors and degree ofviolence.3 The list of violence-prone provinces ranges widely from 
the richest to the poorest. The capital Bangkok has the largest GPP and GPP per capita. 
Nakhon Sawan's GPP ranked the second in the norihem and upper-central regions. 
Phrae, at the other end, was the second-poorest province in the north and one of the 
1 Most violent incidents in Bangkok were minor brawls, fighting, and intimidating acts between opposing 
vote canvassers, rather than assassinations. 
2 This belief is common among police and electi on commissioners. Interview, police officer at criminal 
suppression division, Bangkok, 11 April 2012; police officers overseeing election security, Bangkok, 9 
June 20 11 and 25 July 2011; Nakbon Ratchasima election commissioner, Nakhon Ratchasima, 3 
December 201 0; national election commissioner, Bangkok, 8 June 2011. See also Nipon and Su wan 1990; 
Worawan et al 2000; Chaiwat 2011. On the number of MP seats, see Election Commission of Thai land 
20 12. 
3 I already discussed in Chapter I about the argument made by some scholars linking politica l violence to 
the level of economic development. 
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country's least-developed provinces (GPP ranks 68 th and GPP per capita 65 th). Other 
provinces rank in the middle. 4 
The notion that provinces most prone to electoral violence are the ones normally plagued 
by ordinary crime is also incorrect.5 According to national data on homicide, the top 
provinces for murder are: Songkhla, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Chonburi, Surat Thani, 
Chiang Mai, Nakhon Fathom, Nakhon Ratchasima, Trang, Suphanburi, and Khon Kaen 
(by ranking). 6 Only two provinces (Songkhla and Nakhon Si Thammarat) appear to have 
both high homicide rates and high numbers of election-related murder. Many provinces 
notorious for criminal murder witness peaceful elections, and vice versa. Ordinary crime 
and political crime do not overlap. Political crime has a different logic and modus 
operandi (see further discussion in Chapter 10).7 
Also, concentrations of hired gunmen do not match the locations of electoral violence. 
Several electoral-violence provinces are not hubs for hired-gunmen. On the other hand, 
some provinces known as mercenary "capitals" do not experience high levels of 
electoral murder. Phetchaburi, Thailand's gunmen capital, is a prime example of a 
province with large supplies of violence but low levels of electoral vio lence; Sa Kaeo 
manifests a similar pattern (see Chapter 10 and 12). As discussed earlier, electoral 
violence occurs according to the demand, rather than the supply side of violence. 
In regard to the list of peaceful provinces, data identify the ten most peaceful areas : Mae 
Hong Son, Maha Sarakham, Nong Bua Lamphu, Sakhon Nakhon, Trat, Sa Kaeo, 
Ranong, Samut Songkhram, Phuket, and Phang Nga. One is located in the north, three in 
the northeast, three centrall y, and three in the south. Like their violent counterparts, 
these untroubled provinces vary in population size, level of development, murder rates, 
and prevalence of hired gunmen. On population, for example, Mae Hong Son and 
4 T11 e GPP and GPP per capita fi gures are based on th e 2010 national data coll ected by Na tional Economic 
and Social Development Boa rd (20 12). 
5 This notion is widespread among th e poli ce and crimin ologists. See, for example, the Research and 
Deve lopment Division of the Roya l Thai Police Deparbnent 2004, 2005 (unpubli shed) ; Nipon and Suwan 
1990; Worawan et al 2000; Nattawi t 2000. 
6 Data based on poli ce records from 1988-2003, the Research and Development Division of th e Roya l 
Thai Poli ce Depa rtm ent 2005: 2. 
7 On thi s point, Ya la and Narath iwa t provide chall enges. These two provinces loca ted on th e south ern 
borders have long suffered from separatist confl icts. Separat ist violence occasionall y spill ed over to 
electoral conducts on vot ing day. But, beyond voting day, it is difficult to conclude whether violence is 
mot ivated by separati st struggle or riva lry between loca l bosses because th e modus operandi is the same as 
what is found in other provinces (i.e. assass inati on by gunm en targeting vote canvassers). 
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Ranong have only 234,000 and 190,000 residents (respectively) and 1 MP seat, while 
Maha Sarakham and Sakhon Nakhon have 1,028,000 and 1,155,000 residents and 5 and 
7 MP seats (respectively). The list of peaceful provinces also ranges widely from the 
richest to the poorest. As a world-famous tourist destination, Phuket is one of Thailand ' s 
richest provinces, as their residents' income is the highest in the south and among the 
country' s top ten. Nong Bua Lamphu, at the other end, was the second-poorest province 
in the northeast and one of the country's least-developed provinces (GPP ranks 73 th and 
GPP per capita 76th).8 On coercive resources, several provinces, including Trat, Sa Kaeo, 
and Samut Songkram, have been known as hubs for hired-gunmen but, clearly, they do 
not experience electoral murder. 9 
Table 111.3: Top 10 most peaceful provinces in Thai elections, 1975-2011 
Rank Province Degree of violence 
(incidents/deaths/injuries) 
1 Mae Hong Son 0/0/0 
· .. 
2 Maha Sarakham 0/0/0 
3 Nong Bua Lamphu 0/0/0 
4 Sakhon Nakhon 0/0/0 
5 Trat 1/0/0 
6 Sa Kaeo l/0/l 
7 Ranong 1/0/1 
8 Samul Songkhram 1/1/0 
9 Phuket 1/ 1/0 
10 Phang Nga 1/ 1/0 
Source: author 's data 
In conclusion, population size, provincial economic development level, gunmen 
prevalence, and homicide rates do not determine the frequency and location of electoral 
violence. Th~ following six chapters present sub-national comparisons of six provinces 
(three violent and three peaceful) to demonstrate the factors , political processes, and 
mechanisms leading to the geographical variation of electoral violence in Thailand. 
Based on extensive micro-level research, they show how the geography of electoral 
violence is shaped by local power structures and political economies of elite 
8 National Economic and Social Development Board 20 I 2. 
9 Interview, crime reporter, Bangkok, II April 2012; police officer at criminal suppression di vision, 
Bangkok, 11 April 2012. 
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competition. A boss or political-family power monopoly creates conditions for orderly 
elections. Monopolies are difficult to establish and maintain, but are highly rewarding 
when attained. Monopolies can be achieved in both large and small provinces, 
depending on several factors. To be sure, it is easier for political bosses to monopolize a 
tiny territory. This partly explains the lack of violence in five small provinces- Trat, 
Phang Nga, Mae Hong Son, Ranong, and Samu! Songkhram- with only one seat 
contested. But it is not the size per se that explains peaceful elections; provinces with the 
same number of seats do not necessarily have the same consequences. For example, both 
Phrae and Sa Kaeo have three seats at stake, but electoral competitions in Phrae are 
highly turbulent while elections in Sa Kaeo are peaceful. The factor that makes these 
two provinces different is the absence (or presence) ofa monopoly. Another example is 
Nakon Si Thammarat and Buriram, two populous provinces with nine seats for election. 
As data show, Nakhon Si Thammarat is one of the most dangerous voting places in the 
country; Buriram was troubled with violence for a brief period but managed to hold 
peaceful elections after one political clan monopolized the province. 
Lack of monopoly (polarized and/or fragmented power structures) therefore facilitates 
conditions for vio lent power struggles. To be precise, personalistic fighting between 
rival bosses, when a power monopoly is at stake, generated the most violent situations. 
In contrast, when boss-type candidates compete with non-boss politicians, violent tactics 
are less likely to occur as bosses are not threatened and can win by other means (see 
Chapter 3). And, as discussed in Chapter 5, ideological or programmatic political 
struggles also help mitigate the use of violence in election campaigns. This occuned 
when political bosses were pitted against the state security and political party machine 
instead of their business-political enemies. 
Geographical variation (I): violent provinces 
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 examine three provinces that have endured chronic violent 
elections: Phrae, Nakhon Sawan, and Nakhon Si Thammarat. I analyze these provinces 
in-depth because, though the macro-level study explains the broad impacts of state 
structure, electoral system, democratization, and decentralization on the degree of 
electoral viol ence, it cannot tease out the specific causal mechanisms by which violence 
occurs. In-depth case studies provide us with more richly textured understanding of how 
electoral violence is organized and what motivates it, as well as who perpetrates vio lence 
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under what circumstances, against whom, and in what sequence. Each province 
represents different set of economic opportunities and political environment in which 
political actors operate. My subnational comparative study explores Thai provincial 
economic and political structures, and demonstrates how national and local powers 
interact. It is important to acknowledge the presence of violence in Thai politics, without 
exaggerating its temporal or geographical scope. What I attempt to do is to understand 
why and how political actors use violence to win political contestation in some cases but 
not in others. 
Provincial bosses and their families deploy violence as a strategic tool to consolidate 
power, bringing them wealth, social prestige and political protection to varying degrees. 
The paths to power take different directions according to social, economic, and political 
structures. New groups eliminate and weaken local elites who fail to adjust to new 
environments. Fundamentally, the balance of power in Thai provincial politics can take 
three forms: monopoly, polarization, and fragmentation . Monopoly, under which one 
individual or clan controls the province, is rare; only a few provinces have been 
monopolized, including Suphanburi and Sa Kaeo. Polarized provinces, in which two 
rival groups compete, and fragmented provinces, in which multiple factions strive 
against one another, are more common. Polarized and fragmented power landscapes are 
prone to confrontational, fierce electoral conflict. 
Phrae, Nakhon Sawan, and Nakhon Si Thammarat all have different socio-economic 
characters and represent differing types of political cleavages. Located in the north, 
Phrae is a small province both in population and area, and has a fairly low-level of 
economic development. Most people work in agriculture, handicraft, or small-scale 
manufacturing. Since the 1990s, the province has been divided between two camps of 
business elites, each enriching themselves from the same type of economic activities 
(natural resource extraction and illegal businesses) and vying for the same constituents. 
Long-standi~g fierce political struggles between the two have made electoral 
competition cut-throat and violent. Phrae is an archetypical inter-clan battle. 
Located in central Thailand, a hub of trade between central and northern regions, 
Nakhon Sawan is a medium-sized and well-developed province. It has a large, affluent 
urban sector, vibrant entrepreneurial culture and a particular substantial Sino-Thai 
business conununity. On the other hand, rent-seeking activities and underground 
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businesses have thrived in Nakhon Sawan and are integrally connected to political 
bosses who use public offices to protect themselves and their allies. But no one group 
has ever been able to establish their political dominance in Nakhon Sawan, making the 
province one of the most politically-divided in the country, a "rainbow" territory. The 
fragmented power structure overrides the province's positive features, making Nakhon 
Sawan an election hot spot. 
The last case, Nakhon Si Thammarat, is a very large and populous coastal province that 
has, since ancient times been a center of Buddhist culture in the southern peninsula. Like 
Phrae, most residents make their living from agriculture. But the province is notorious 
for illegal smuggling, drug trafficking, and protection racketeering. Local bosses who 
control these unlawful businesses have been actively invo lved in election campaigning 
as vote canvassers and/or candidates. Nakhon Si Thammarat is a highly fragmented 
political territory, witnessing both inter- and intra-party conflict, mostly ending in 
violence. 
In summary, these three provinces are varied in locations, areas, population sizes (which 
detennines MP seats), and levels of economic development and income (see table III.4). 
But they all have the common attribute that make them prone to electoral violence: a 
lack of monopolized power structure in combination with the struggle for domination 
between rival bosses. 
In each chapter, I examine the root causes of electoral conflict and violence by looking 
at provincial political-economic attributions; tracing historical political development, 
and the fonnation of provincial elites, factions , networks, and dynast ies; analyzing 
patterns of political contestation and monopolization, changes of power balances, 
shi ft ing allegiances, electora l campaign strategies, and the timing and location of 
electoral vio lence. 
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Table IIJ.4: Comparison of three violent provinces (Phrae, Nakhon Sawan, and 
Nakhon Si Thammarat) 
Province Region Area Population MP GPP* 2010 GPP Per 
(2010 census) seats (Millions of Capita 
(2011) Baht) 2010 
(Baht) 
Phrae North 6,538 km2 517,000 3 19,840 38,375 
(inland) 
Nakhon Central 9,598 km2 1,154,000 6 80,836 70,035 
Sawan (river 
basin) 
Nakhon Si South 9,942 km' 1,731,000 9 155,862 90,033 
Than:unarat (coastal) 
Source: The National Statistics Office of Thailand (201 O); National Economic and 
Social Development Board (2010) 
* GPP= Gross Provincial Product 
Geographical variation (II): peaceful provinces 
As explained in Chapter I , to explain electoral violence, one cannot examine only 
violence-prone provinces because factors that appear to account for violent cases might 
also appear in the peaceful ones. Therefore 1 compare violent with peacefu l pro vinces to 
indentify factors that exist in all violent cases but are absent in peaceful ones. I 
investigate three relatively peaceful provinces-Phetchaburi, Buriram, and Nakhon Si 
Thammarat. These provinces are chosen because they illustrate contrasting historical 
trajectories in their degree of electoral violence. Sa Kaeo has been abso lutely peaceful at 
both national and local elections throughout history. The other two provinces, 
Phetchaburi and Buriram, experience different trajectories: Phetchaburi was violent in 
the early 1980s but has been peaceful since; Buriram has been relatively peacefu l most 
of the time except from 1995-2001. Sub-national comparative studies, taking into 
account historical variat ion, provide dynamic pictures of Thai provincial politics. 
These three peaceful provinces have different locations, areas, population sizes, levels of 
economic development and income (see table 111.5). Chapter IO discusses why the 
coastal province of Phetchaburi, a notorious hub for gunn1en, jao pho, and illegal 
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activities in the central region, has been able to hold peaceful elections over the past 
three decades. The province has a roughly equivalent population size and the same 
number of MPs as Phrae. Phetchaburi 's hit men are the best, and scholars and media 
alike portray their political bosses as ruthless and vicious. As was the case in Phrae, 
Phetchaburi 's bosses invested heavily in illegal and rent-seeking businesses. A crucial 
difference is the existence of a power monopoly in Phetchaburi. Since the mid 1980s, the 
province has been controlled by one clan. Power is shared and divided among clan 
members; when intra-clan competition erupted, family members compromised and 
negotiated. Intra-clan compromise led to peaceful elections in Phetchaburi. 
Chapter 11 deals with Buriram, a northeastern province, which changed from violence-
prone to peaceful in less than a decade. The province is as populous as Nakhon Si 
Thammarat and shares similar levels of people 's income as Phrae. Before 1995, Buriram 
elections ran relatively smoothly as bosses competed with non-boss candidates and no 
one sought absolute power. Buriram's elections became violent from 1995 to 2001 when 
one political family sought complete control, using force to eliminate rivals. During this 
period, Buriram became an electoral hot-spot like Nakhon Sawan, in which multiple 
fact ions fought for control but none succeeded. The province then became peaceful once 
again after one family eventually monopolized power. Even though the clan power was 
challenged by other groups in 2007 and 2011 , elections were still peaceful. I argue that 
Bur iram's ideo logical political struggle post-2006 inhibited violence.· 
In Chapter 12, the investigation turns to Sa Kaeo, Buriram's neighbor and border eastern 
province. Sa Kaeo is one of the most peaceful provinces in the country despite having 
poor economic deve lopment, low per capita income, and old-fashioned godfathers and 
being a frontier economy. The province has never had violent election co mpetition; Sa 
Kaeo bosses have dominated the province for longer than their counterparts in 
Phetchaburi and Buriram. Sa Kaeo is an archetypical case of a power monopoly 
inhib iting electoral violence. 
In each chapter, I examine what causes peaceful elections by looking at politica l and 
economic structures, and ana lyzing po litical developments, and the fo rmation of 
provincial elites, fac tions, networks, and clans. Moreover, I investigate the path to elite-
faction monopo lies ; the ways eli tes devise electoral campaign strategies, create 
networks, deal with all ies and opponents, and adapt and maintain domination. 
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Examining the peaceful provinces leads to an understanding of different patterns of 
power and wealth accumulation in provincial Thailand. Analysis shows that different 
political and economic structures require politicians to have various methods of 
establishing and maintaining their domination. Politicians use violence to achieve their 
goals only urider specific circumstances. A province is peaceful not because politicians 
in that province are less brutal than their counterparts, but because political-economic 
settings do not require the use of force. 
Table 111.5: Comparison of three peaceful provinces (Phetchaburi, Buriram, and 
Sa Kaeo) 
Province Region Area Population MP GPP* 2010 GPPPer 
(2010 seats (Millions of Capita 
census) (2011) Baht) 2010 
(Baht) 
Phetchaburi Central 6,225 km' 462,000 3 50,443 I 09,227 
(coastal) 
Buriram Northeast 10,323 km2 1,652,000 9 60,090 36,384 
(inland) 
Sa Kaeo East 7,195km2 550,000 3 26,506 48,206 
(border) 
Source: The National Statistics Office of Thailand (201 O) ; National Economic and 
Social Development Board (2010) 
* GPP= Gross Provincial Product 
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Chapter 7 
Phrae: Fatal fa mily feuding 
In late 2007, Phrae made big headlines with a high-profile murder case. On the morning 
of October 22, Chamchai Silpa-uaychai, the Phrae PAO (provincial administrative 
organization) president , was shot dead by an unident ified gunman-while he was jogging 
in the provincial sports stadium. His death shocked the local people. He was acclaimed 
as a rising star in Thai politics-one of the best local politicians in the country who 
received many awards-and was highly popular among local residents. He was one of 
the local politicians who was actively involved in improving the conditions and 
efficiency of the decentra lization program. H is popularity made him an ' asset' that every 
political party wanted to possess. Before he died, he was asked by political parties, both 
the Democrat Party and the People 's Power Party of Thaksin, to lend support to their 
candidates in the coming elections in December 2007. He was also asked to run as a 
candidate himself if he so chose. 
The gunman was arrested not long after the murder. He confessed and told the police 
that he was hired by a local businessman, a cousin of a prominent politician in Phrae, to 
kill Charnchai fo r the price of 50,000 baht ($1667). The accused politician strongly 
denied any involvement. Chamchai was not the first , and will not of course be the last, 
victim of political conflict in Phrae. For many decades, the province has been politically 
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polarized. Vio lent incidents have frequently occurred during both national and local 
election campaigns. The murder of Charnchai merely highlighted the violent nature of 
the power struggle in the province; when a deeper investigation was pursued, additional 
stories of bloodletting were found. 
Phrae is a northern province near the border with Laos. The neighboring provinces are 
Phayao, Nan, Uttaradit, Sukhothai and Lampang. The province is subdivided into 8 
districts (amp/we). These are further subdivided into 78 sub-districts (tambon) and 645 
villages (muban). It is a small province with relatively low population density, and is 
famous for its serene environment, rich traditional culture, customs, and lifestyle. Up 
until the present, a large number of households make their living by crafting wood 
furniture and producing a range of textiles designed by local designers. But it is the rich 
natural resources that are most important for the province' s economy, as Phrae is one of 
the areas in the country most suitable for growing the highest quality go lden teak and 
tobacco. A variety of minerals have also been found in some areas of the province. 1 The 
province is thus famous fo r its tobacco and logging businesses, tracing back to a century 
ago. These lines of business have become a source of wealth for some local business 
families who subsequently established themselves as the economic elites of the province. 
Neveriheless, as explained in Chapter 3, natural resource extraction and rent-seeking 
activities require government protection to ward off competition, leading to the active 
involvement of businessmen in elections. The inter-familial conflicts among provincial 
elites, who have overlapping business interests and similar political ambition, have 
rendered political contestation in Phrae vo latile and bloody. 
( 
1 ~ 
1 Worakan 2001 , Prachakhom Thong1hi11 5 (54) (August 2005) , pp. 27-29. 
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1. Mueang Phrae 6. Song 
2. Rong Kwang 7. Wang Chin 
3. Long 8. Nong Muang Khai 
4. Sung Men 
5. Den Chai 
Wongwan family 
The best-known patriarch in this province is Narong Wongwan. The story of colorful 
political struggle could not be completely told without mentioning his name. He was the 
dominant figure and center of provincial political life for almost four decades. When he 
was still politically active (up until the early 2000s), there were no instances of political 
intrigue, betrayal, or revenge in this northern province that did not involve him. 
Narong is a longstanding MP (1979-95) of the province. He was born on 25 December 
1925, and his family line can be traced back to the governor of the Phrae region under 
the abso lute monarchy in the nineteenth century. His family conveniently used this 
position to obtain a teak concession from the East Asiatic Company. Narong's father, 
Saen Wongwan, subsequently obtained a logging concession from the Thai government 
which covered many provinces in the north beyond Phrae. During -World War Two, his 
fami ly also ventured into rice trading and owned a saw mill. As an old aristocratic 
family of the province, all of the Wongwan family business activities were well-
supported by local government officials and the governor. The Wongwans also 
strengthened their control of the local economy by engaging in joint-ventures with the 
prominent Pathong family, to whom they were closely related .2 These lucrative business 
investments were later passed on to and further expanded by Narong, the third 
generation of the family. Unlike many local notables of his generation, Narong received 
a good education abroad, a bachelor degree in economics from the University of 
Kentucky in the United States. He worked for the East Asiatic Company for a short 
while before running his family business. It was he who made the Wongwan family 
much more prosperous and powerful, particularly when he expanded the family business 
from logging into the new businesses of tobacco-growing, mining, hotel ownership and 
management, cattle fanns, and trades in several provinces in the north in the late 1950s 
2 Tirayoot 2008: Wanchart 2012: 71-76, 108-116. 
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to 1970s.3 The family flagship company, Thepwong, which manages the tobacco trade 
and import/export business, is the biggest tobacco enterprise in the country with the 
largest share of the market. There are more than a hundred thousand people in the upper 
north, including Phrae, Lampang, Chiang Rai, Chiang Mai, Lamphun, Phayao, and Nan 
province, working in his family business empire.4 Besides Thepwong, the family owns 
many other companies as shown in the table below. 
Table 7.1: Wongwan family businesses 
Name of the Company Founding Year Type of Business 
1. Thepwong 1949 Saw mil ling, tobacco 
2. Mueangrae Sahm Thong 1969 Mining 
3. Bai Yasup Thai Industry 1970 Tobacco 
4. Chiang Mai Kan Mueangrae 1974 Mining 
5. Yasup Sakon 1974 Tobacco 
6. Sayam Watchara 1977 Machine trade 
7. Bai Ya Virginia Don Mun 1959 Tobacco 
8.Siamese Export Coffee 1979 Coffee 
9. Kasettakarn Sombunbaep unknown Ranch 
I 0. Siamese Nakkhao Thurakit unknown Newspaper 
11. Phalittaphan Thanunachat unknown Agricultu ra l business 
12. Chiang Ma i Chatura Mit unknown Construction 
13. A andP unknown Hotel 
14. tobacco-curing factory (more than 140 unknown Tobacco 
factories in the north) 
,, Source: Manager Daily (northern edition), 3 August 1992, p. 5 
Like severa l other successful local businessmen, Narong turned to politics to protect and 
enhance his fortune. The more stabl e parliamentary system after 1980 was an open 
opporturuty for many tycoons like Narong. He was elected to parli ament for the first 
time in 1979 with a very impress ive 89,822 vo tes, the highest in the prov ince. After that, 
he always won a lands lide victory in elections in Phrae. Moreover, with the strong 
politica l machine he had created, he was constantly in the position of being among the 
top ten vote winners of the country from 1979 to 1992, with hi s peak in the 1986 and the 
3 Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994: 80-81 ; Chainarong 2000; Prachachat Thurakit , 3 June 1996: 33. 4 Matichon, 13 June 1998: 4. 
5 Quoted in A.notha i 2005: 54. 
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1992 polls when he gained the most votes of any candidate in the country. 6 Given the 
fact that he financially supported several candidates in his faction in other provinces, he 
was able to negotiate for significant ministerial posts almost regularly. In 1980, he was 
elevated to the post of deputy minister of interior. Then he was deputy minister of 
agriculture in 1981 and a minister of the same office in 1983. He again obtained the 
position of minister of agriculture in the Chatichai Choonhavan government in 1990. 7 
It was no accident or luck that he was appointed so many times to oversee the Ministry 
of Agriculture. As a businessman turned politician whose family had vast interests in the 
agricultural sector, it was highly beneficial and critical to have power over the budget 
allocation and policy-making of the relevant ministry. This enabled him to support other 
MPs in his faction through jobs and budget allocation. By doing this, he gained loyalty 
and maintained his grip on power over them. Narong knew that he needed to build a 
large political faction ·. in order to gain leverage over other provincial bosses in 
competition for ministerial posts. Moreover, this position helped him strengthen his 
patronage network in Phrae by manipulating budget decisions and diverting state 
resources to develop his own province and financially support his local followers. This 
was a common practice that was done by almost every politician in Thailand. 8 
It is important to note that Narong's ministerial post and his vast l_ocal business empire 
had secured his electoral base for a long time. The tobacco business boomed throughout 
the northern region beginning in the 1970s with increasing export demand, earning him 
and the people in his circle a vast fortune. His relatives and key canvassers who, with his 
help, managed to be owners of tobacco curing plants secured a large profit because of 
the rising price of tobacco during this period. The villagers who grew tobacco also 
benefited handsomely from this profitable business as they sold the crop to the curing 
owners at a high price. The relationship between the tobacco plant owners and growers 
were developed and tightened both economically and personally. 9 This relationship 
subsequently. proved to be highly rewarding during election times. Most of the tobacco-
6 Matichon, 13 June 1998: 4; Bangkok Post, 3 July 1995: 3. 
7 After deserting the Kitsangkh om Party in the late 1970s, Narong formed his own party, Ruam Thai, 
which later merged with the Ekkaphap (Solidarity) Party. After the coup in 1991 , he was the head of the 
military-backed party, Samakkhitham. As explained in Chapter 3, this party won a majority in the 1992 
election but Narong failed to be elevated to the prime minister position because of the ' drug ' incident. In 
the 1995 election, he moved a large faction under his command, Terd Thai, to join the Chart Thai Party of 
Banharn. In the 2001 election, he and his faction switched to work with the TRT party ofThaksin. 
8 The most-well known and perhaps most ski llful politician practicing the politics of pork-barreling is 
Banharn Silpa-archa from Suphanburi. See Nishizaki 2011. 
9 Pasuk and Sungsidh I 994: 80-81. 
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processing plant owners worked with Narong not only as business partners but also as 
key vote canvassers for his election campaign. Similarly, farmers who were tobacco 
growers became strong political supporters ofNarong's family. 10 His high position and 
influence among local people earned him the title "pho-liang," an unofficial title used in 
the North to address a respectable we ll-to-do man. With a strong network of vote 
canvassers and a solid economic base, Narong won the elections consecutively since 
1979. In the March 1992 election, Narong was the head of the newly-created 
Samakheetham Party backed up by the Junta who staged a coup in 1991. His party won 
the election, with 79 seats, and he would have become the 19th prime minister of 
Thailand had the U.S . government not revealed reports that they had denied him an entry 
visa because of suspected links to narcotic trafficking (see Chapter 3 and 4). Narong has 
persistently denied the allegation. 11 Though he failed to obtain that highest position, he 
is no doubt one of the most powerful and successful politicians in his generation who 
built up his political career from being a local businessman--who had managed to have 
a nearly monopolistic control over economic and political power in his hometown- to a 
top position in the capital. From 1979-1 995, politics in Phrae were orderly and peaceful 
as Narong co1mnanded respect and power over every local politician and faction. 12 
Narong has eight sons, two of whom, Anusorn and Anuvat (1953-), have been highl y 
successful in their business and political careers and become their father 's successors·13 
The Wongwan fami ly 's predominance, however, was challenged by its own political 
subo rdinates in the mid- l 990s. This is examined in the next section. 
10 ln1erview, PAO cou ncilor, Ph rae, 7 January 2010. 
11 Prachachal Thuraki1, 3 June 1996: 33. 
12 Interview, Anu va t Wongwa n, Phrae, 8 January 20 10; interview, form er candidate for Phrae MP in th e 
I 980s, Phrae, 13 December 2009. 
13 Manager Daily, 2 1 Ju ne 2003. 
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Chart 7.1: The Wongwan Family (a selected genealogy) 
Saen Wongwan+wife 
/ I 
Phathong Family Narong 
/ ---------U rai ( first wife) Sirilak (second wife) 
I 
Anusom Aunvat Narit 
Supasiri family 
The political situation in Phrae changed in 1995, as the Wongwan family's political 
power was critically challenged and shaken from within his inner circle. In the 1995 
general election, Narong was defeated by a young female candidate, Siriwan 
Pratsachaksattru (1956-), who was then a totally new face in national politics. 14 She, 
however, was not a stranger to Phrae voters as she came from a locally prominent family 
and was, significantly, the daughter of Sanit Supasiri, a long time key vote canvasser of 
Narong. Sanit and Narong were old friends and business partners. Sanit came from a 
relatively less wealthy fami ly than Narong, but he and Narong work_ed closely for a long 
period of time in the logging and tobacco businesses. The Supasiri family also managed 
to have their own tobacco-processing plants and gravel quarry. Sanit was highly trusted 
by Narong as he was assigned to work as his political representative in the province. 
Because Narong .was a high-profile MP who always held a ministerial post in a coalition 
goverrunent, he had to spend most of his time in meetings in Bangkok rather than in 
Phrae. 15 It was Sanit who helped Narong run his business and also secured his electoral 
base among the local const ituencies. Sanit was Narong' s right-hand man who 
coordinated with public officials and local business associates, solved local conflicts, 
and offered various sorts of help to villagers on a daily basis. He was also known as one 
of the most influential local strongmen, respected and feared by local people, and 
controlled a group of local tough guys and gu nmen who were notorious for deploying 
violence against insubordinate villagers and opponents. 16 People came to see Sanit as 
14 Prassachaksattru is her husband family name. 
15 Narong is not exceptional. Most of Thai provincial MPs, once they get elected, have a second house in 
Bangkok and spend time in their own home province only durin g weekend or electoral season. 
16 Interview, local journalist, Phrae, 12 January 20 1 0; interview, local offici al , Phrae, 9 January 20 10. 
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they had no access to Narong directly. A client like Sanit turned himself into a new 
patron, or an agent who became a principal. 17 Under these circumstances, Sanit was the 
one who had direct contact and control over vote canvassers and the vote base in 
Narong's constituencies. There was no problem as long as Narong and Sanit were on 
good terms. 
The conflict started in the 1995 election. After having several members of his family 
elected to the Phrae provincial council, Sanit thought it was time for his family to enter 
national politics. He begged his old friend and patron Narong to fi le his daughter as a 
candidate of the Chart Thai party team. Narong denied the request, saying that Siriwan 
was not yet ready to be an MP. He suggested that she build and gain more political 
experience at the local level. Sanit was very disappointed with this decision after 
devoting his time and energy for Narong for a long time. Besides, given the fact that 
Phrae can have three MPs, putting Siriwan as a candidate would not affect Narong 's 
power. 18 From his perspective, his fami ly deserved the MP position. Sanit and Narong 
fell out after this incident. 19 Sanit knew that he had a chance to win as he controlled most 
of the vote canvassers in the constituencies, and also because Narong was recently cast 
in a negative spotlight with the "drug trafficking" allegation incident. He pulled all of his 
vote canvassers out ofNarong' s campaign, and joined the Democrat Party. Siriwan ran 
as a candidate under the Democrat Party, and she managed to defeat Narong with a big 
margin. The result made the headlines in all major newspapers, with the sensational 
phrase "Elephant [Narong] fa ll s."20 
Siriwan's victory over Narong, six-time MP and former prime minister candidate, surely 
was a big surprise to national political observers, but it was not something unanticipated 
by Phrae peop le. One loca l political analyst said " [l]n Phrae, we are not really surprised 
that Siriwan got overwhelming support. In the past, Sanit helped Narong win the most 
votes of any cand idate in the country. Why can't he do the· same for his own 
17 The princ ipal- agent problems are discussed ex ten sively in th e literature on poli tical behavior, 
particu larly in the context of clientelism and electora l politi cs. The puzzle was focused on h ow the 
politicians, who are patrons, monitor the voters, who are th eir cl ients, to vote as promised (Lehoucq 2003; 
Muno 20 I 0). But scholars have overlooked tJ1e relationship between candidates and vote brokers, who act 
as intennediaries between politicians and voters. 
18 In 1995, the electi ons were still conducted under the multimember constitu encies. 
" Interview, key vote ca nvasser of th e Supasiri fa mil y, Phrae, 8 December 2009. See also Matichon , 16 
December 2004: I I, Khom Chat Luek, 3 March 2002: 16; Khom Chat Luek, 17 December 2004: 3. 
'
0 Matichon, 6 Jun e 1995; Matichon, 3 Jul y 1995. 
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daughter?"21 Narong had been too complacent about his political support and had not 
paid attention to his constituency, relying solely on his vote canvassers. Siriwan and her 
father, on the other hand, had worked hard and taken care of people's problems on 
behalf ofNarong for more than two decades. They were considered influential persons 
in the province, gaining loyalty from the lower levels of vote canvassers and the 
villagers. Local people called Siriwan "mae liang," a term used in the north to address 
an influential, well-to-do woman. Moreover, as a former aide ofNarong and his team, 
Siriwan admitted that she knew their "tricks" and applied those same tricks to get herself 
elected. One powerful winning strategy was doing a big favor for the villagers by buying 
tobacco and other agricultural products from them at a high price during the electoral 
season.
22 After this humiliating defeat, Narong decided to wash his hands of politics. He 
was, however, still actively involved in politics by supporting his followers and his own 
son to run for elections. The family feuds between the Wongwan and Supasiri families 
began in the mid 1990s, and elections in Phrae, which used to be relatively peaceful, 
have turned violent since that time. From 1995-2011, it became one of the most violent 
provinces in terms of numbers of election-related violent incidents and the overall death 
toll. Several vote canvassers of both the Wongwan and Supasiri families, including other 
political families and factions, were intimidated and killed in each election beginning in 
1995. They became casualties of fierce conflicts among prominent families . Some of 
them got killed at the hands of their opponents, but some of them were slain because 
they betrayed or were disloyal to their bosses. Moreover, a few were killed by competing 
bosses because they refused to canvass for anyone. 
In the 1996 election, Siriwan got elected again, this time with 130,322 votes, the highest 
in the province and among the highest of the country. But her Democrat team members 
failed to win their seats. 23 This outcome demonstrated that the factors most important to 
her victory_ were her popularity and strong personal vote canvassing networks, rather 
than the polit·ical party label or policies.24 The other two winning candidates were new 
faces who came from another prominent family of Phrae-Auapinyakul. This election 
also included a dramatic upsurge in the already-virulent use of violence as part of 
election campaigning in Phrae. The province was identified by the national police as a 
21 
"Why Voters Dumped Narong," Bangkok Post , 16 July 1995: 20. 
22 Interview, vote canvassers ofSiriwan, Phrae, 9 December 2009 and 8 January 2010. Also see, Bangkok 
Post, 3 July 1995: 3. 
23 Khao Sod, 13 July 2000: 4. 
24 This was also true in the case of other successful MPs. The situation would be changed after 1997. 
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hotspot, with 21 hired gunmen operating in the province, including 10 former police. 
The Prime Minister, Banharn Silpa-archa, visited Phrae three times before the polling 
day and gave interviews that the province was full of gunmen and so-called "dark 
influences." He expressed concerns that violent tactics would be used by a certain 
candidate to intimidate opponents to win elections. 25 Soon after his interview, more than 
150 police officers from Bangkok were sent to Phrae. Several houses were searched and 
people were arrested along with the seizure of weapons. It turned out that the search 
targets were Siriwan's tobacco processing facilities and her supporters ' houses. The 
search attempt was aimed to show that Siriwan was an influential figure who had many 
thugs working for her. A week before the election day, Siriwan complained to the media 
that many of her supporters were harassed and their houses were shot at during the night. 
After the election, Siriwan admitted that this election was much tougher than the first 
time she ran, and she and her canvassers had to fight hard to win this campaign. 
However, her key opponent, Vorawat Auapinyakul, claimed that Siriwan's goons 
intimidated his vote canvassers into not campaigning for him. 26 
Chart 7.2: The Supasiri Family (a selected genealogy) 
Sanit+Wanli 
Suphawan Phawan Phongsawat 
Suraphong+Phonphilai Siriwan+Tha-ngai Pratsachaksattru 
Auapinyakul family 
Another influential political fami ly in Phrae which was involved in intense power 
struggle is the Auap inyakul clan, which had been in political alliance with the Wongwan 
family. The head of the family, Metha Auapinyakul, is a Sino-Thai businessman who 
earned the nickname "Co lumbus of Mining Enterprise" as he monopolized the mining 
business in Phrae and several other provinces.27 Metha started as a bank manager in a 
15 Thai Rarh, 19 October 1996: 17 ; 77,ai Rarh, 28 October 1996: I, 17, 23. 
26 lvlarichon Sursapda, 3-9 December 1996: 3 1; Thai Rarh, 19 October 1996: 2. 
27 Chai -narong 2000. 
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local branch of the Kasikorn Thai Bank in Phrae and later helped his father-in-law run a 
large tobacco plantation and a logging business. His wife's family, Kanthatham, was a 
prominent family in Phrae whose family line could also be traced backed to the governor 
of the Phrae region prior to the 1932 revolution. By marrying into an old established 
family, Metha has access to the world of the bureaucracy and its beneficial political 
connections. He expanded his father-in-law's tobacco plantation to 3,000 rai. Later he 
ventured into the mining business in Lampang province, a neighboring province of 
Phrae. Within six years he had become the founder and chairman of two mining 
companies, with joint-investment from wealthy families in Bangkok. He subsequently 
successfully obtained several concessions from the government in mining enterprises in 
many provinces around the northern region. One of his flagship companies, Banpu, was 
highly profitable to the extent that their son later registered it in the stock market. It has 
been one of the "hot companies" in the Thai stock market over the past several years. 
His company has been importing coal from state enterprises in China to Thailand. He 
was also involved in the activities of the Tobacco Association, in which the Wongwan 
family was very active as well. 28 The two families have had a good business and 
political alliance for two generations. 
Metha was first elected to parliament in I 976. He failed a few times during the 1980s 
when he ran under the Democrat Party. Later Narong asked him tQ run under his team, 
and after that he became a prominent MP of the province along with Narong. Metha also 
joined Narong when Narong founded the Samakkhitham Party in 1992 and later moved 
with Narong to the Chart Thai Party. In 1996, Metha, like Narong, withdrew from 
politics and passed on his career to his sons and daughter. He has four children, three of 
whom have been involved in politics. The most successful one is his youngest son, 
Vorawat Auapinyakul (I 959-), who started from the local level by being elected twice as 
the mayor of Phrae municipality, the first time in 1990 when he was only 31. He then 
ran for MP in 1996 under the banner of the Chart Thai Party and was elected handily. In 
addition, he also brought his brother-in-law, Tosapom Serirak (1955-), who was running 
in the same team to enter parliament with him. Another Chart Thai candidate , who 
lacked the backing of a political family, failed to get himself elected.29 That remaining 
seat, as mentioned, was won by Siriwan, a rising star who became famous overnight 
28 Chai-narong 2000; Than Setthakit, 11 November 2004: 1, 2. 
29 Interview, local election commissioner, Phrae, IO January 2010; Interview, local journalist, Phrae, 16 
January 2010; Wanchart 2012: 66-71 , 85-96. 
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after defeating the political giant Narong a year earlier. Therefore by 1996, Phrae 
politics had entered a new era of the young generation. They all were young bloods who 
were polit ical heirs of established families in their home province. Tensions among the 
families remained high as no single family was capable of monopolizing the power in 
the province. 
Four years later, election-related violent conflicts in Phrae further escalated to a new 
scale as a result of the combined effects of internal and external factors. The province 
witnessed a political realignment with the coming of an ambitious new national political 
party, changing styles of political campaigning, new political leadership, and new 
sources of capital. 
Chart 7.3: The Auapinyakul Family (a selected genealogy) 
Metha+ Thirawan 
Methi Panhathai + Thotsaphon Serirak Ong-at Yorawat 
Phrae political dynasties in the era ofThaksin and national political crisis, 2001-
2011 
The rise ofThaksin and his gigantic Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party brought massive change 
and a new power balance to the provincial political landscape. It was a sort of political 
tsunami that left only a few provinces untouched. Phrae was one of the most, if not the 
most, hard-hit provinces. 
As mentioned above, political life in Phrae was defined by polarization even before 
Thaksin came to the scene. Three powerful political fami lies were divided into two 
camps: the Supasiri clan versus the Auapinyakul and Wongwan clans. The polarizat ion 
was, however, exacerbated by Thaksin ' s party' s intervention. Siriwan 's fa mily was still 
loya l to the Democrat Party, whi le the Auapinyakul family teamed up with the 
Wo ngwans under the banner of TRT. Thaksin and the Auapinyakul family were not 
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interested in power-sharing, and wanted to monopolize the political power in this 
province. Without Narong running, the Wongwan family played a less active role in this 
power struggle but the family decided to go along with the Auapinyakuls. 30 This led to a 
war of attrition between the two camps-the Supasiri family and the Auapinyakul-
Wongwan alliance-which had equal capacity to employ violent tactics to win over their 
enemies. 
Wongwan, Auapinyakul, Supasiri, and Thaksin 
As discussed in Chapter 5, when Thaksin Shinawatra founded his Thai Rak Thai Party in 
1998, he announced that his party would be a party that represented a different kind of 
politician-clean, young blood, highly capable, and modern. The strategy later changed 
as he realized that to be successful in elections, he also needed support from veteran 
provincial bosses. Around the country, Thaksin tapped into the resources and networks 
of influential political families. In Phrae, the Wongwan and Auapinyakul families were 
his targets. 
Thaksin made his first move by approaching Narong to be the president of TRT's 
advisory board. As Thaksin aimed to gain a large number of seats in the north, his own 
home region 3 1, and promoted himself as a prime minister of the northern people, he was 
looking for someone who had great influence in that sphere. N_arong was a perfect 
choice as he possessed both a vast amount of wealth and political connections. He still 
had several politicians under his control and owned a business empire in the region. 
Narong and Thaksin had also known each other for a long period of time as businessmen 
originating from the north. The offer from Thaksin was accepted by Narong, and he 
confidently promised to Thaksin that he was going to help TRT win at least 35 out of76 
available seats from the north. 32 Narong successfully exercised his power over several 
northern MPs by asking them to run under the TRT banner. Nevertheless, the 
appointment of Narong, who still had a tainted image from the drug incident, as key 
advisor to the party was criticized by the media and political observers as a step 
backward for Thaksin. 33 
30 Interview, Anuvat Wongwan, Phrae, 8 January 2010. 
31 Thaksin 's family comes from Chiang Mai province. 
32 TRT finally won 54 seats in the north (the Election Commission _2001, 
http :1/202.183.226/sorsor/numbermp.html). Many of them were veteran MPs from Narong's faction. 
33 Thai Post, 11 June 1998: 1, 14. 
201 
Two incumbent MPs from the Auapinyakul clan were likewise approached by and 
eventually moved from the Chart Thai Party of Banham to join the TRT. Their move 
made Banharn furious as it meant Chart Thai lost its two strongest candidates in the 
north. Narong was the broker behind this political deal. 34 In fact, there were many other 
local politicians in Phrae who wanted to run under the TRT as the party was gaining 
high popularity. But Thaksin and Narong were aware that only members of the 
Auapinyakul family were strong enough to compete with the Democrat team led by 
Siriwan. With the new electoral system of single seat districts, the party had to fill in the 
strongest candidate in each constituency. That was the reason that they tried very hard to 
convince both Vorawat and Tosaporn to switch parties. At the same time, Vorawat and 
Tosaporn were acutely aware that their campaign would be smoother if they did not go 
against the tide of popularity of the TRT and Thaksin. 35 It was therefore, a mutual 
benefit for TRT and their family to join forces. Tosaporn ran in Constituency 1, and 
Vorawat in Constituency 3. They were likely to win without any difficulty. TRT, 
however, had struggled to find a viable candidate to compete with Siriwan in 
Constituency 2. Rumors were spreading in Phrae that Siriwan was approached by TRT, 
and that she was asked to switch from the Democrat party to TRT. Later the story 
appeared in the national media through the speeches of the Democrat leader, Chuan 
Leekpai, that were given during the electoral campaign in several provinces. On one 
occasion, Chuan told the audience, 
This election battle is.unusual. I want to praise Siriwan or Mae Liang 
Tile, our Democrat MP, because she rejected the 50 million baht 
[US$1.6 million] offer given to her by the TRT leader, asking her to 
sw itch parties . Once she rejected, Thaksin went to talk to her fa ther, but 
she insisted she wanted to stay with the Democrat Party. So we have 
before us a committed politician who could not be bought off 36 
Siriwan came out to confirm this , adding that besides money she was also offered a 
ministerial post if she moved to join TRT. Thaksin later admitted that the talk between 
him and Siriwan's fat her actua lly happened, but said that it was Siriwan's father who 
34 Manager Daily, 8 November 2000: 14. 
.is Nae,v Na, 10 July 2000: I , 6; Manager Daily, 18 November 2000: I 1-12. 36 Khao Sod, 18 December 2000: 8. 
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had invited him to meet at their house in Phrae. 37 The idea of having Siriwan join TRT 
was discussed in the talk, but no money or any position offered, according to Thaksin. 38 
The dispute between the two sides about this political deal went on for almost four 
months. The Democrat Party used this point to discredit Thaksin and TRT, accusing 
them of "dumping" money to buy promising candidates. The factual details about this 
negotiation _have remained unclear, but it is clear that there was an attempt to have 
Siriwan run as TRT candidate in the 2001 election39. The attempt failed. The situation 
was therefore back to the normal polarization between the Supasiris and 
Wongwans/Auapinyakuls, albeit with the new involvement of the TRT. 
The heat of the competition could be felt long before the election. In June 1999, Vorawat 
and Tosapom organized a press conference accusing Siriwan and her family of 
murdering and intimidating their vote canvassers. Two were killed, two survived 
assassination, and another one who was editor of a local newspaper and their vote 
canvasser was intimidated into closing the newspaper. 40 They believed that the murders 
were politically motivated as one of those killed was a local journalist (who at the same 
time was a village headman and a vote canvasser of Vorawat) who ran a story strongly 
criticizing Siriwan's role in obstructing local development in Phrae. According to them, 
soon after the story published, the journalist was killed.41 Siriwan denied the accusation 
and said it was merely an attempt by her rival to destroy her reputation prior to the 
election. 42 
37 According to Thaksin , he knew Siriwan 's family through Siriwan's sister who has been working with 
him at his AIS (Advanced Info Services) company. Other TRT members further claimed that it was 
Siriwan's sister who asked Thaksin to have Siriwan run for TRT in the 2001 election. 
38 Matichon , 4 September 2000: 1, 19. 
39 Siriwa~ said she was not in the negotiation meeting between Thaksin and his father, but she later knew 
from her father that Thaksin brought with him 20 milling baht on that day. Siriwan claimed that her family 
pretended to go along but made a counter-offer that if Thaksin paid 70 million baht, she would move to 
TRT. Soon after, Chuan Leekapi ca lled Siriwan asking about the deal , prompting Sir_iwan to hold a press 
conference to say she will not join the TRT. She believed that Thaksin was very furious with her not 
switching party. Interview, Siriwan Prassachaksattru, Phrae, 14 January 20 10. 
40 In Thailand, it is common that local journalists work as vote canvassers for the politicians. Many 
political families either own local newspapers or have journalists on th eir payroll. Phrae is not exceptional 
(interview, local election commissioner, Phrae, 10 January 2010; interview, former PollWatch local 
committee, Phrae, 7 January 2010). 
41 Manager Daily, 22 July 1999: 16; Ban Mueang, 2 June 1999: 1, 8.The dispute was over the issue of the 
development funds to support the local textile business that Vorawat and Tosapom received from the 
government and channeled them to their constituencies. The project was accused by Siriwan of lack of 
transparency. Both groups used their own local media to attack each other over the issue (Manager Daily, 
22 July 1999: I 6). 
42 Manager Daily, 29 July 1999: 8. 
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Closer to the polling day, more violent incidents occurred. On 21 January 2000, the 
house of the kamnan (sub-district head) of Mae Lai sub-district was bombed at night. 
The case was complicated as Vorawat claimed that the victim, who was his relative, was 
his vote broker and was attacked by his rival. The victim himself later went to report this 
incident to Siriwan, and gave an interview that the bomb was done by Siriwan' s 
opponents aiming to "stir up" the situation. He was on the side of Siriwan. 43 On 22 
November 2000, a sub-district councilor of Ban Mae Yang Thon was slain at his house. 
According to the police investigation, the murder was election-related violence as the 
police found that the victim was canvassing votes for TRT candidate, Vorawat, and the 
Democrat candidate at the same time. 44 On 12 December 2000, the Democrat 's vote 
broker filed a complaint with the police, alleging that he was intimidated by Vorawat's 
campaigning staff. 45 A few days later, a vote canvasser of Tosapom was reportedly 
harassed by knife by unknown people. She was asked to stop campaigning for the TRT 
if she wanted to stay alive. After this incident, Tosaporn urged the provincial election 
commission to "pay serious attention to the violent tactics employed by candidates in the 
electoral campaign, not just focusing on the vote buying activities, as the politics in 
Phrae turned more and more violent."46 The day before the polling day, Siriwan 's 
husband, who was a provincial police chief in Nan, a neighboring province of Phrae, 
was urgently transferred out of the area by order of the national police chief. The 
election commission made a complaint that he had been interfering in electoral 
competition in Phrae, helping his wife. 47 At the end, Vorawat and Tosapom were able to 
secure seats in their strongho ld. Siriwan likewise managed to get herself elected, though 
with difficu lties and hardship, in the midst of Thaksin and Thai Rak Thai fever, 
particularly in the northern region, which is the home region of Thaksin 's fami ly. The 
animosity between the two camps remained. 
The 2005 election turned out to be the bloodiest election in the history of Phrae. The 
incentives fo r both parties to win were equally strong. It was a chance for 
Wongwan/Auapinyaku l, with the support of Thai Rak Thai, to monopolize power in the 
province by getting rid of their long-time enemi es. Fo r the Supasi.ri fami ly, it was a 
43 Krungthep Thurakit, 29 January 2000: 2. In Thai loca l poli tics, especia lly after th e decentraliza ti on 
process, it would be wrong to assume that relati ves will a lways be on th e same side. In several cases, they 
support opponents again st th eir own famil y. In th e 20 I I general election , th ere were many promin ent 
fa mili es ruru1ing under different parties again st each oth er. 
44 lnt erview, local official, 9 January 20 IO; Krungthep Thurakit, 22 November 2000: 17- 18. 45 Matichon, 12 December 2000: 14. 
46 Matichon, 18 December 2000: 14. 
47 Krungthep Thurakit , 7 January 200 I : I 0, 12. 
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battle to save their last stronghold-their home constituencies- and a share in 
provincial power. 
The confrontation started long before the election. Si.riwan's and her supporters' house 
were thoroughly searched by the police twice. First, in February 2002, some 200 
policemen searched at several locations, . including Siriwan's house, tobacco curing 
factories and gravel quarry, the home of the Democrat Party's branch president, and the 
Democrat Paity's branch office. The search warrants cited that suspicious weapons and 
illicit drugs might have been hidden there, but nothing illegal was found . . Similar 
searches were conducted in several provinces throughout the country ostensibly as part 
of the Thaksin government's efforts to suppress firearms and drugs. However, Siriwan 
viewed this "as political persecution aimed at discrediting the opposition." 48 In 
December 2003, Siriwan's brother's and sister's houses, and their vote canvassers' 
residencies were searched again by police from Bangkok. Nothing illegal was 
discovered, but seven guns were seized. The po lice claimed the search was a part of the 
operation under the government's campaign against "influential people," launched since 
May 2003 (see Chapter 5). According to the police, Phrae became one of the search 
targets because politically-motivated murder cases occurred very often in the province.49 
There was a lurking report in the media that some members of the Supasiri family were 
put on the black list of "influential people" compiled by the proyincial governor and 
police chief 50 Tosaporn and Vorawat made their own list containing the names of the 
Supasiri family members, several of whom were local politicians, and submitted it to the 
Interior Minster. They showed evidence that some of the Supasiri family members were 
convicted and sentenced to jail for premeditated murder and illegal logging, and many 
other cases were st ill in court. Siriwan said she had nothing to do with those cases. She 
believed that she was unfairly treated by the government because she stood in the way of 
its goal to win all the seats in Phrae. 5 1 
The contest went from bad to worse in the run-up to the election when Thaksin 
announced the name of the candidate who would compete with Siriwan in Constituency 
48 The Nation, 28 February 2002: 2A. 
49 Matichon, 15 December 2003: I, 5. 
50 Thai Rath, 19 Jul y 2003: 1, 11. As mentioned in Chapter 5, Thaksin government asked every provincial 
governor and police ch ief to compi le a list of influential figures in their province and send it to the 
governm ent. But some TRT members also created their separate li sts for the government. 
51 Interview, Siriwan Prassachaksattru, Phrae, 14 January 20 IO; cf. Khom Chat Luek, IO July 2003: I, 14. 
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2. It was Anuvat Wongwan, political successor ofpho Liang Narong. Anuvat was a new 
face in politics. Prior to joining TRT, Anuvat was a businessman who was responsible 
for taking care of various parts of the Wongwan family business, including tobacco 
firms, in direct competition w ith Si.riwan' family business. Though he previously spent 
most of his ti.me doing business outside Phrae, his vote base was not smaller than 
Si.riwan's, because of the popularity of TRT and the good standing of his family. 
Thaksin himself picked Anuvat as his choice to stand as the TRT candidate in the 
election, believing that on ly members of the Wongwan family could defeat Si.riwan. He 
said to the voters when he helped his candidates campaign in Phrae on 11 December 
2004, 
People here have voted for Si.riwan for several ti.mes. How was it? 
Nothing has been getting better as she was with the opposition. 
Choosing candidates from TRT is better. This time all of you should 
change to vote for Anuvat. He can work with me side by side. I need to 
have candidate from the Wongwan family compete in this constituency, 
so we can fight. As long as I am a prime minister, I promise you all 
gangsters must be taken down. I will take care of Phrae people, so 
Phrae people do not have to be afraid of anyone. 
He stayed overnight and slept at the famo us local temple to show how serious and 
committed he was to Phrae people. 52 This rousing speech by Thaksin occuned just two 
days after the violent incidents in which two key vote canvassers of Anuvat were shot. 
Adding fue l to that, Anuvat told the reporters that 
I am never afra id of competing with Mae Liang Tik [Si.riwan] ... If I 
were afraid I would never run since Phrae Constituency 2 is a turf of 
influential people. IfI do not run for an MP, this [dark influence] issue 
would never stop ... and if I win this election over Mae Liang Tik, it 
wou ld be a reward of my life. 53 
A political battle between two major rival parties was clearly spiced up and underlined 
by the long standing rival ry between two most influential fam ilies. 
51 Khao Sod, 15 December 2004: 3 I. 
'-' Matic/1011 , 26 Ja1rnary 2005: 11 . 
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All tactics, both legitimate and dubious, were employed by both sides to win this high-
stake election. Anuvat approached a group of old vote canvassers of his father, many of 
whom were currently working with Siriwan. 54 These veteran brokers were offered 
various kinds of material resources to switch sides to support Anuvat. During that time, a 
large number of Phrae villagers suffered from the problem of oversupply of agricultural 
products. They could not sell their products to the market, or were forced to sell them at 
a very low price. Anuvat owned many agricultural export business and tobacco firms, 
the total asset value of which was more than 1 billion baht. Therefore it was not a 
problem for his firm to spend more than 16 million baht buying a large amount ofrice, 
corn, and tobacco from the farmers, including low quality products. He also asked his 
foreign business partners to help him buy the products. The conditions set by him were 
simple: he would not buy products from villagers in the clientelistic network of 
Siriwan. 55 
Siriwan was thus in a relatively difficult position. Her father died in early 2002. Without 
Sanit's charisma and influence, a group of vote canvassers had switched their loyalties. 56 
Her family business was affected by the political situation. The frequent search of her 
tobacco curing plants and other firms by the police disrupted her business. More 
importantly, big tobacco dealers in the north, especially Chiang Mai province, had not 
bought products from Siriwan's clients' network. This maneuver had heavily affected 
more than 1,000 traders, factory owners, and big farmers who worked with the Supasiri 
family. The .Wongwans was able to muscle their influence over the tobacco industry 
community. One of Anuvat's brothers, Narit Wongwan, is the president of the Thai 
Tobacco Growers, Curers and Dealers Association (TTA) of Payao and Chaing Rai 
province, and very active in the national TTA.57 At that time, it was shown that 
Siriwan's total asset value was 65.52 million baht, with 23.69 million baht debt. 
Siriwan's financial and political capital was significantly diminishing, and paled in 
comparison ~ith the Wongwan's and Auapinyakul family's capital. 58 
54 Interview, Anuvat Wongwan, Phrae, 8 January 2010. 
55 Krung/hep Thurakit, 9 August 2004: 19; Bangkok Post, 22 January 2005: 3; Ban Mueang, 24 May 2004: 
14. 
56 Interview, member of the Supasiri family, Phrae, I 4 January 20 I 0. This Supasiri clan member said 
many of their vote canvassers were "bought off with a huge amount of money" by their major rival. 
57 Matichon 15 August 2004: 11; Than Setthakit, 11 November 2004: I, 2; Manager Daily, 25 May 2004: 
14, 15. 
58 This difficult situation was admitted by their own people. Interview, member of the Supasiri family, 
Phrae, 14 January 2010; interview, key vote canvasser of the Supasiri, Phrae, 9 December 2009. 
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Both camps accused each other of using old-style political tactics such as threats, 
intimidation and violence to try to grab the seats. Some columnists lamented that the 
electioneering in Phrae looked like a war, not an electoral contest. 59 Vote canvassers 
were caught between two fiercely competing family-based factions. Those who were 
effective in gathering votes and those who had divided loyalties put their lives in danger. 
On 22 May 2004, Sivan Piangjai, a chairman of the Democrat Party branch in Phrae, 
was shot dead in his car and his body was dumped in the forest. The victim had been a 
long-time vote canvasser of the Supasiri fami ly, when Sanit and Narong were still on 
good te1ms. He helped canvass a large number of votes for Narong to the point that 
Narong won a landslide victory every time he ran. When the two patrons split, Sivan 
fo llowed Sanit and was a key man who had helped Siriwan defeat Narong with a big 
margin. When Siriwan first heard of the news, she rushed to see the corpse of Sivan and 
told the reporters that she deeply regretted what had happened because Sivan was her 
father 's loyal aide and everyone in the Supasiri family loved him as a father figure to 
them. She admitted that Sivan was a key vote canvasser of her family and also a tobacco 
trader who had been fighting hard all of his life to protect the interests of farmers. 
Surprisingly, she begged everyone not to link this vio lent incident to the ongoing 
electoral contest. "Do not blame me, and I will also not blame anyo ne who did it. Every 
life has value. Good people 's life should not be used as a political tool," she said. 60 
No culprit was ever identified, like in most of the election-related violent incidents in 
Thailand, but local people and media believed the death was related to the business and 
electoral disputes. Some believed Sivan was killed because he was so influential in 
Constituency 2 to the extent that he could shape the voting results. 61 Nevertheless, other 
loca l sources said Sivan, whose nickname was Uncle Buan, was lately more inclined to 
wo rk with Anuvat as his fam ily's tobacco business was in crisis with the problem of 
overstocking. He was reported ly going to sell his tobacco to Anuvat 's Thepwong firm , 
wh ich was actively buying tobacco from farmers. The Supasiri family insisted that this 
news was not true, although they admitted that their fami ly business and their clients , 
including Sivan, were fac ing a serious crisis since the dealers in Chiang Mai refused to 
59 Daily News, 2 February 2004: 33 . 
60 Manager Daily, 25 May 2004: 14, 15. 
61 Loca l observers no1ed Sivan controll ed over 30 percent of votes in the Constituency 2 (interview, loca l 
politi cian, 13 December 2009; interview, vote canvasser ofSiriwan, 9 December 2009). 
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buy their tobacco.62 Some of the Supasiris' supporting team claimed that Sivan told them 
before he was shot dead that he had been offered 200,000 baht from the opponent to not 
help Siriwan in this election. 63 Police investigating this case opined that electoral and 
tobacco business conflicts were the motivations behind this murder. 64 
In the run-up to the election, Phrae witnessed a greater number of murders. On 4 
December 2004, a president of Mae Yang Tan's Tambon Administrative Organization 
(TAO) was shot dead in his house. He was a vote canvasser of Siriwan in the 2001 
election, but after being elected to the TAO president position in October 2004, he 
switched to support Anuvat. 65 Six days later, a group of gunmen attempted to assassinate 
a director of the TRT campaign team in Constituency 2 and his wife on the road. Both of 
them, who were key vote canvassers of Anuvat, survived. This family was working 
closely with the Wongwan family. Their daughter contested in the election for the Phrae 
Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) council in 2004 but lost in a very close 
race to a candidate from the Supasiri family. 66 In January, several houses of Siriwan's 
vote brokers were attacked with M16s, but nobody was injured or died. Police said the 
shootings were not designed to kill. Siriwan believed these attacks were acts of 
intimidation aiming to frighten her supporters to stop campaigning for her. After this 
incident, Siriwan's supporters put people to patrol in the area of their houses day and 
night.67 One week before the polling day, there was a brawl be_tween Siriwan's and 
Anuvat's teams when they were electioneering in one district. Siriwan accused Anuvat's 
team members of attempting to murder her by running her over.The other side claimed 
that their car was blocked and they were hit by Siriwan's supporters. Both sides filed a 
complaint at the police station.68 The incident heated up a contest that was already tense 
in the final week of the campaign. 
After a series of scandals and violent incidents months before the election, the three-time 
MP Siriwan was decisively defeated by Narong's son. Anuvat and Tosaporn both won in 
their constituency handily as their opponents were not as strong as Siriwan. After the 
62 Manager Daily, 25 May 2004: 14, 15 ; ASTV Manager, 21 June 2004. 
63 Krungthep Thurakit, 2 February 2005: 18. 
64 Daily News, 24 May 2004: I , 14. 
65 Kham Chat Luek, 6 December 2004: 2, 17; Krungthep Thurakit , 2 February 2005: 18. 
66 Kham Chat Luek, 11 December 2004: I, 16. The Supasiris commented that this targeted fami ly used to 
work for them but later turned against them and switched to the TRT (interview, member of the Supasiri 
family, Phrae, 14 January 2010). 
67 Matichan, 18 January 2004: IL 
68 Manager Daily, 25 January 2005: I, 2. 
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official result came out, Siriwan went to file a complaint at the Election Commission 
office, saying that she was cheated. She vowed to fight till the end, "until I get justice in 
this election."69 It was clear that she had tried everyth.ing to keep her family's only 
remaining MP seat but to no avail. With the success of Anuvat standing, the Wongwan 
family regained power and once again came back to dominate Phrae politics. Teaming 
up with the Auapinyakul family under the strong brand of Thai Rak Thai, they had the 
upper hand over Siriwan's family, and stood a better chance to win in the next election. 
Backed by their strong political power, both the Wongwan and Auapinyakul families 
secured the profits of their businesses in the province. 
The Supasiri family's political power diminished at the national scene but remained 
fairly intact at the local level, as several clan members maintained their elective posts in 
municipal and PAO councils. Importantly, the popular and highly respected PAO 
president, Charnchai Silpa-uaychai (1954-2007), was also a political ally of the family. 
Born in a poor family in Phrae, he was a bright student who graduated from the 
prestigious Chulalongkorn Medical School and worked as a rural doctor for several 
years before turning to do business with friends in various sectors, including hospitals, 
hotel services, car sales, and money lending. 70 His political career started by being 
elected to the PAO council in 1995. In the following year, he was persuaded by Siriwan 
to be a team member of the Democrat Party and stand for Parliament, but he failed to get 
elected. After the failure at the national level, he came back to establish himself in local 
politics and was elected by PAO councilors to be the PAO President in 1997. 71 In the 
first direct election of the PAO in Plu·ae in March 2004, Yorawat and Tosaporn tried to 
topple Charnchai by fie lding a candidate who had a similar profile to him. Niyom 
Wiwatthana-ditthakun, a medical doctor-cum-businessman, was chosen and backed up 
by a political machine of the Wongwans and Auapinyakuls. Though it was not 
compulsory by law that PAO president candidates had to belong to a political party, 
Niyom ran under the official support ofTRT. He and his key supporters knew very well 
that TRT was very popular in the area. Niyom was a PAO councilor from 1990 to 1999, 
a deputy speaker of the PAO council , and an elected senator in 2006. Besides, his wife 
had close connections to the Wongwan and Auapinyakul fami lies.72 Niyom strongly 
believed that party brand and a backup from a powerfu l famil y could get him elected. 
69 Manager Daily, 9 February 2005: 15-16. 
70 Interview. PAO council or, Phrae, 7 Jan uary2010; Marichon, I March 2004: 8. 71 Before 2004 , PAO presidenl was indirectly elected by the PAO councilors, not by direct electi on. 72 Wanchart 20 I 0: 72. 
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Chamchai, on the other hand, ran under the name of a local group, Hak Mueang Pae 
(Love Phrae).73 However, it was not a secret that he received strong support from the 
Supasiri family. Charnchai won the competition, but the margin was not as big as his 
team expected. His victory was highly crucial not only for Chamchai, but for his allies 
like Siriwan's family, whose political space was squeezed out. 74 
In late 2007, the political atmosphere in Phrae was stirred up again as the general 
election was going to be held in December, followed soon thereafter by the election of 
the PAO president in March 2008. It was the first national election after the coup in 
2006 that ousted Thaksin. Polarization between political groups at the national level had 
inevitably intensified rivalries at the local level. The PAO president election was not less 
competitive, and the notoriety of Phrae 's violent electoral politics came back to haunt 
people. On 23 October 2007, Charnchai, 53 , a three-time Phrae PAO president, was 
gunned down in the morning at a public sports stadium. A gunman shot him from behind 
before fleeing on a waiting motorcycle, leaving his bullet-riddled body in a pool of 
blood. Since he was well-known and well-liked by local people, and local politicians 
around the country, 75 his murder case made big headlines in every daily newspaper and 
prompted the national and regional police to set up teams to hunt down the gunmen. This 
was a rare case for Thai police that election-related violent incidents were taken 
promptly and seriously. A week later, Crime Suppression Divisiqn officers, who had 
taken responsibility for the case from local police, anested four men they believed to be 
behind the murder. According to the police, three of them were rookie gunmen who had 
been involved in local drug trade. 76 Another suspect was Jongrak Supasiri, who had been 
implicated by the other three men as the mastennind. Jongrak is a cousin of former 
Democrat MP Siriwan, and was well known among local people as an "influential" man. 
He was atTested before in the attempted murder of police officers, but later acquitted by 
cou1i, and was sentenced by the Appeals Court to fourteen years in prison for the 
73 Siam Rath, 15 December 2003: 2 1. 
74 Interview, former team member ofChamchai 's PAO campaign, Phrae, 7 January 20 10; interview, key 
vote canvasser of Siriwan, Phrae, 9 December 2009. 
75 He was a former president of the PAO Association ofThailand, and had been very active in pushing for 
the decentralization plan and related local administrative laws. 
76 Interview, local police, Phrae, 13 January 2010. Police noted that because Chamchai was a very high 
profile and beloved politician, several professional gunmen dare not to take this job as they knew the 
police would investigate the case seriously. Thereby Charnchai's enemies hired the rookie, drug-addicted 
gunmen. 
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premeditated murder of a village headman in Muang Phrae district. The latter case has 
been pending at the Supreme Court.77 
Vorawat said Charnchai' s slaying was politically-motivated as Charnchai had recently 
called a meeting with a group of 21 provincial councilors, and officially announced his 
support fo r the People 's Power Party (PPP), the Thai Rak Thai reincarnated party. He 
also appointed his former opponent from TRT, Niyom, to be the PAO president ' s 
advisor.78 Moreover, he was reportedly at odds with Siriwan and her younger brother 
Pongsawat Supasiri, who was speaker of the Phrae PAO. The major rift resulted from 
the dismissal of Pongsawat from the speaker 's post by Charnchai in relation to the 
serious disputes over the bank loan for PAO projects. 79 Pongsawat, however, rejected 
the assumption by police that the murder was linked to a conflict over a bank loan. He 
said he would be "really stupid" if he really masterminded the murder, and also told the 
media that 
my family's reputation had been severely damaged by the case. 
Siriwan and I have nothing to do with the murder ofCharnchai. The 
real culprits behind the murder are those who are profiting from 
Charnchai's death, which is not my family. 80 
Even though the Supasiri family persistently denied that they had anything to do with the 
tragic incident, local people seemed to believe that the family had somehow been 
invo lved . The confli cts between Chamchai and the Supasiris were not a secret among 
political observers in Phrae. Charnchai often came into disputation with the Supasiris 
over the control and allocation of the PAO budget. Many local sources also mentioned 
the strong interference ofSiriwan in PAO activities as a major cause of their fa lling-out. 
81 Chamchai's announcement that he was go ing to switch sides to support the Wongwan 
and Auapinyakul fami lies was publicly known. This politica l move of Chamchai had 
-, Khao Sod. 4 November 2007: 2. These cases were previously used by Vorawat and Tosa pom during the 
2005 elect ion campaign to attack Siriwan . 
78 Matichon, 23 October 2007: I, 12. 
-
9 Chamchai made a 120-million-baht loan from the Krung Thai Bank fo r PAO's 11 0 projects. Pongsawat 
stopped Chamcbai from receiving the loan , saying it was not transparent. This prompted 21 councilors, 
under the control of Charncha i, to s ign a letter to dismiss Pongsawat from the speaker's post. Pongsawat 
then turned to the Administrative Court to have the dismissal order reversed (Bangkok Pos1, 31 October 
2007: 4). 
'° Khao Sod. 3 1 October 2007: I, 15; Bangkok Pas!, 31 October 2007: 4. 
s, Interview. PAO councilor, Phrae, 7 January 2010; in terview, vote canvasser of the Supasiris, Phrae, 9 
December 2009: interview. forn1er loca l elect ion commiss ioner, Phrae. 14 January 20 10. 
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far-reaching consequences for the balance of power in the province. It meant that the 
Wongwan and Auapinyakul families were going to have a monopolist ic control of Phrae 
politics at every level and the Supasiri family was go ing to lose everything. Charnchai 's 
influence over local politicians was undeniable, as he controlled 21 out of24 members 
of the PAO council. Many village headmen, kamnans and members of local 
administrative bodies also supported him. One kamnan who was a member of 
Charnchai's group said members of his group abided by Charnchai 's political decisions 
without question as they "would readily back the elections candidates of political parties 
Charnchai supported."82 
Ultimately, it was clear that the Supasiris badly suffered from the whole incident. In the 
PAO president by-election on 9 December 2007, Anuvat, who had resigned from MP to 
run for this local position, won the contest in a landslide. He was chosen by both 
families to run in this by-election as it was important for them to have their own member 
heading the local administrative bodies. His easy victory came from the fact that he 
received unanimous support by former team members of Charnchai. 83 Two weeks later, 
the political strength of the Wongwan/Auapinyakul alliance was reaffirmed in the 
general election. They fielded three candidates, one incumbent and two new faces: 
Vorawat Auapinyakul, Niyom Wiwatthana-ditthakun, and Panhathai Serirak. Niyom 
replaced Anuvat who moved to a new position, and Panhathai, a fresh new face who had 
never run in any electoral contest, replaced Tosapom, her husband who was banned 
from politics for five years after TRT was dissolved. 84 Panhathai is also a sister of 
Vorawat. Before entering politics, she was taking care of her family's mining business, 
Banpu Public Company Limited, and was also a board member of Sarin Property 
Company, a big real estate company. 85 Vorawat told the reporters that the reason 
82 Bangkok Post, 31 October 2007: 16. 
83 Matichon, 6 November 2007: I 0. Initially, there was a poli tician from another famil y, Phan om Khwan, 
wanted to run for the position. But senior figures from the Phanom Khwan family and th e Wongwan 
fami ly brokered th e deal that Wongwan would spare the senate 's post for the Phanom Khwan fami ly in 
exchange for th e latter fami ly's decision not to stand for th e PAO president election. The Phanom Khwan 
family was an old family who owns a hotel business in Phrae. One family member was elected MP once in 
1976. They never succeeded in getting elected again after since. Their capital assets were relati vely sma ll 
compared to the Wongwan , Auapinyakul , and Supasiri fam ili es (interview, Phanomkhwan' s fami ly 
member, Phrae, 13 January 2010; more detail s on th e Phanom Kh wans in Wanchat 2012: 54-56, 82-84, 
115-116; Matichon , 6 November 2007: 10). 
84 In the 2007 electi on, many fami ly members of th e bam1ed politicians ran for MP to protect and maintain 
their fam ily' s politi ca l power. 
85 For detail s on Banpu Compan y, see its website: http://www. banpu.com/th/ 
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Panhathai, a successful business woman, decided to run for this election was because she 
believed that voters "put their trust in the Auapinyakul family." 86 
In the final results, all three of them received overwhelming majorities from the voters. 
Siriwan and her Democrat team members were defeated again but by a larger margin 
this time. Chamchai's murder had become a card played by the opposing team. 
Countless posters and banners were put up around the province during the election 
campaign, lamenting the tragic and untimely death of Chamchai. On 12 November 
2007, right after filing candidacy registration at the election commission office, Vorawat 
and his team members rushed to the Phrae PAO sports stadium to pay homage to 
Charnchai's soul af the spot where he was shot dead. They also asked for "moral 
support" from the late Chamchai so that they could win this election. 87 Though the 
justice system has not yet reached at the final verdict on the cause of his death, local 
people seem to have their own answers. A village headman in Phrae's Long district, a 
hometown and political strongho Id of Charnchai, said, "even a good man like the PAO 
president, who was well-known and well-liked by a lot of people, died because of 
politics. What wou ld happen to smaller people like us?" 88 The Supasiri family was 
embarrassed at the Charnchai' s funeral when they had to leave early as they were not 
welcomed by his family. As one Supasiri family member lamented, 
Charnchai's death had been heavily politicized by our political opponents. His 
fami ly did not even invite us to participate in the funeral ceremony ... They 
treated us as an adversary. Now we do not have permanent friends, but we have 
permanent enemies. 89 
After the 2007 election, Vorawat's politica l career was on the rise. With a close 
conJ1ection to Thaksin 's sister, Yaowapa Wongsawat, and monopolistic power in his 
local ity, he received a cabinet post ill the Somchai Wongsawat government for the first 
tin1e since he entered politics, and again in the Yingluck governrnent. 90 Anuvat was 
successful and popular with his new post. Charnchai's po litical network, Hak Mueang 
86 ASTV Manager, 14 November 2007. 
87 ASTV Manager, 15 November 2007. 
88 Bangkok Post. 3 1 Oct 2007: 16. 
89 lnterview, Supas iri· s famil y member, Phrae, 14 January 20 10. 90 Un like other provincial bosses in the Yingluck cabinet who lost their position after work ing for on ly a 
brief period, Vorawa t firmly retained his seat. Yingluck has rotated him to several positions; current ly he 
is mini ster of science and technology. 
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Pae, was integrated into his network and well supported by him through the PAO budget 
and jobs. For this reason, he has a strong and solid power base. In the latest PAO 
election in October 2011, however, Anuvat's power was challenged by his own ally. 
Vorawat publicly supported one candidate to stand against Anuvat as he felt that Anuvat 
was too independent and had not accommodated his demands. More importantly, in the 
general election in July 2011, Vorawat was very angry when he knew that Anuvat tacitly 
supported a candidate from the Bhumjaitai Party of Newin Chidchob (whom the 
Wongwan family had a close relationship with since the 1980s) to compete with his 
sister in Constituency 1. Eventually, Anuvat won the election over Vorawat's candidate 
as he acquired strong support from the majority of PAO councilors (22 out of24). 91 But 
a new line of conflict has then emerged- this time it was the Wongwan versus 
Auapinyakul family. Both sides claimed they truly represented the pro-Thaksin 
movement in Phrae. Vorawat used his ministerial post and his close relationship with 
Thaksin's sister to facilitate the Red Shirt mobilization in his constituency. Anuvat 
abandoned the Bhumjaitai Party and turned to Thaksin after the 2011 election; he and his 
PAO councilors also built a strong relationship with many local Red Shirt groups in 
Phrae in order to strengthen their power.92 Nevertheless, it is too early to foresee how the 
friction between the Wongwans and the Auapinyakuls will evolve. 
After the 2007 defeat, the Supasiri family was in its weakest po~ition ever. A family 
member was accused of involvement in a high-profile murder, many vote canvassers 
shifted their loyalty, and the family business was in a precarious condition. In the 2011 
general election, Siriwan was given the 22nd position on the party list slate of the 
Democrat Party, a reward for being a long time loyal member of the party. It was the 
first time, however, since 1995 that she did not run for the constituency seat. The party 
list position that she received from her party was in a safe zone for being elected. For 
someone who once made headlines by "defeating a political giant," this move was 
clearly an embarrassing retreat. She fielded her two siblings to stand in the constitueney 
seat, and both of them were overwhelmingly defeated by Pheu Thai candidates, led by 
Vo raw at. They received only about half of the votes won by their opponents. Moreover, 
their family failed to mobilize a sizeable party list votes for the Democrat Party. In 
Phrae, the Democrat Party received only 22,231 party list votes, while Pheu Thai swept 
91 Matichon, 6 November 2011 ; Interview, Natthakon Withitanon, local scholar, 12 November 201 I. 
92 lnterview, Natthakon Withitanon, local scholar, 12 November 2011. 
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61,867 votes.93 This election reflected the Supasiri family's comparatively weaker 
fin ancial and political position in the aftermath of two consecutive electoral defeats, as 
well as a series of violent scandals. The popularity of Thaksin and his allied parties 
definitely played a role in their loss to a certain extent. But if the family was in a 
stronger position, they would have been able to withstand those political forces-just as 
prominent political families in some other provinces have done.94 The 2011 electoral 
contest was less bloody than the past elections; one vote canvasser was killed and few 
people were intimidated .95 It was one of the calmest elections in the history of Phrae 
since 1995. Violence, however, could erupt again anytime in the coming elections as the 
struggle fo r a monopoly of power among provincial bosses is far from over. 
"No permanent friends, only permanent interests": a deadly polarized power 
structure 
In summary, all three political families discussed in the case of Phrae province are 
economic elites of the province who actively engaged in political contestation. Electoral 
procedures have been a channel for them to enter into national politics to accumulate 
power and enhance wealth. It is also a theatre of conflict that defined the fortune of the 
families in political as well as financial fronts. Elections thus became a matter of life and 
death. Political life in this small but polarized province has been full of colorful stories 
of family feuding, conflicts, cooperation, intrigue, betrayal, ambition, temporary 
alliance, revenge, and deceit . It is clearly far from the smooth picture that has been long 
painted by the patron-client framework (see Chapter I). 
The economic activities in Phrae are still relat ively backward, not highly developed, 
mainly based on primitive accumulat ion, political connection, and the exploitation of 
natural reso urces. The local economy is mainly based on low-skill , labor-intensive 
industry, which generally requires a license or concession from the government. As 
exp lained in Chapter 3, these lucrative concessions are commonly acquired by and 
secured through political connections. Having access to politica l power through elective 
posts is therefore highly important and rewarding, and wea lth and political power 
93 See full details of Phrae electi on results in 
http: phrae.nfe.go.th/songl ib/popup.php?name-knowledge l &file-p readknowledge&id=45 94 
For the prime examples of the politi ca l clans who could survive Thaksin 's attacks, see Chapter 11 on 
~uriram·s Chidchob and Chapler 12 on Sa Kaeo·s Thienth ong. 
Khao Sod. 28 August 20 11 : I; Banmueang, 5 June 20 11 . 
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support and enhance each other. Electoral battles between powerful business-political 
families are fiercer than normal elections, and require vast resources and resoluteness to 
defeat the rivals. This imperative encourages politicians, like the Wongwans, the 
Supasiris, and the Auapinyakuls, to build strong political machines and to resort to 
violent practices. 
Election-related violent incidents in Phrae, as well as in other provinces in Thailand, are 
fundamentally shaped by local factors. The situation seemed to change slightly after 
2001, but local conditions remain more decisive than national factors. Though the 
national factors, notably Thaksin government's "war on influential people" and 
Thaksin's interference in consolidating local power, played a role in exacerbating 
conflict, violence was primarily determined and perpetrated by local players. The root 
cause of electoral violence is the fierce struggle between provincial bosses to have a 
monopoly of power. Power seekers resort to violent methods to eliminate their key rivals 
or disloyal followers , paving the way to electoral victory and domination. The next 
chapter discusses the political situation in Nakhon Sawan, a highly fragmented power 
terrain recorded as the most violence-prone province in central Thailand. 
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Chapter 8 
Nakhon Sawan: Fragmented, deadly political terrain 
Nakhon Sawan is located in the upper north of the central region, popularly known by its 
old name of Paknam Pho. It is one of the largest provinces in the central region of 
Thailand, in terms of both population and area, well known for the convergence of the 
Ping, Wang, Yorn, and Nan rivers to form the Chao Phraya. It is an important gateway to 
the northern region. Neighboring provinces are (from north clockwise) Kamphaeng Phet, 
Phichit, Phetchabun, Lop Buri, Sing Buri, Chai Nat, Uthai Thani and Tak. Nakhon 
Sawan began as a primary settlement of Chinese immigrants in Thailand and the large 
established Chinese community has driven the provincial economy since the early 19
th 
century. Most ofNakhon Sawan's prominent local business groups and political familie s 
are descendants of the Chinese settlers. Because of the convergence of major water 
ways, the province has been central to river traffic and a hub of commercial trading and 
transportation. It is therefore not surprising to find that the owners of river and bus 
transpo1i companies established themselves as important business leaders. Nakhon 
Sawan is also one of the most important areas for rice production in the country. 
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Agriculture is still a primary economic activity and income source for people in the 
province, with rice, com and cassava as main products. As an agriculturally based 
province, the personal annual income ofNakhon Sawan (70,035 baht) is lower than the 
national average (160,556 baht). 1 Beyond that, there are small and medium-sized 
agricultural-related and food industries and firms invest ing in the transportation 
business. The construction business sector is large and profitable, as the Nakhon Sawan 
Federation of Industries and the Nakhon Sawan Chamber of Commerce has turned the 
province into a modem logistics hub linking the central and the northern regions. 2 Most 
Nakhon Sawan local politicians either directly own or have a share in construction 
companies through family connections. With a population of over one million people, 
the province currently has six MP seats. 3 
Nakhon Sawan is subdivided in 15 districts (amphoe) , and these districts are further 
subdivided into 130 sub-districts (tambon) and 1328 villages (muban). 
1. Mueang Nakhon Sawan 9. Phaisali 
2. Kro k Phra I 0. Phayuha Khiri 
3. Chum Saeng 11. Lat Yao 
4. Nong Bua 12. Tak Fa 
5. Banphot Phisai 13. Mae Wong 
6. Kao Liao 14. Mae Poen 
7. Takhli 15. Chum Ta Bong 
8. Tha Tako 
1 Data based on National Economic and Socia l Development Board 20 I 0. 
2 Prachacha1 T/111raki1, 8- 11 Apri l 20 I 0: 24. 
3 The number was reduced from seven to six seats in th e 201 I general election in line wi th the changin g 
number of constituency sea ls nationwide. See Elect ion Commission of Thailand , Na kh on Sawan 
Province· s website for further informat ion: http ://www2.ect.go.th/home. php?Province=nakhon sawan 
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The "rainbow" province: a fragmented power landscape 
The political landscape in this province is different from many others in Thailand as it 
has never been dominated by just one or two prominent political families. Several 
families have fiercely competed for power involving different maneuvers in a vo lati le 
political atmosphere. No single group has ever succeeded in controlling politics and 
business in Nakhon Sawan. When one group or individual strove for monopoly power, 
the bloodshed was inevitable. Unlike Nakhon Si Thammarat (see next chapter) and 
Phrae, political parties played a less critical role than political families and factions in 
electoral contestation and political alignment. Nakhon Sawan is thus usually called a 
"rainbow province" in the sense that its political landscape is always comprised of 
several groups and personalities with different political ideas and affiliations. The 
absence of a power monopoly makes political competition in this province fierce and 
bloody. 
We can see from the table 8.1 below how fragmented the political landscape ofNakhon 
Sawan has been. In the past, except in 2005, the province has never been dominated by 
one political party, let alone one political family or faction. Its fairly large size is not 
sufficient to explain its political fragmentation as there are other larger provinces, 
including Nakhon Si Thamrnarat and Buriram4, that have been conti:olled by one party or 
single family. The dispersal of power in Nakhon Sawan sterns from the fact that no local 
political groups have been able to gain access to and maintain monopolistic control over 
the local resources required for establishing predominance. If polarization is the 
situational factor that determines violent political outcomes in Phrae, it is fragmentation 
that produces the same outcomes for Nakhon Sawan. 
4 Both provinces have been allotted nine MP sea ts as compared to six in Nakhon Sawan. 
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Table 8.1: Nakhon Sawan MPs and its political parties 
Election date Number of MP seat Number of political 
party winning seats 
22/4/1979 6 1 
18/4/1983 7 2 
27/7/1986 7 2 
24/7/1988 7 3 
22/3/1992 7 3 
13/9/1992 7 4 
2/7/1995 7 4 
17/11/1996 7 4 
6/1 /2001 7 3 
6/2/2005 7 1 
2/4/2006 (only TRT competed) 7 1 
23/12/2007 7 5 
3/7/2011 6 3 
Source: the Election Co mmission ofThailand; Department of Provincial 
Administration, Ministry oflnterior. 
Leading political families: Khamprakob, Nirot, and others 
Khamprakob: from politics to business 
The Khamprakob family is the oldest political family in Nakhon Sawan, and one of the 
country' s o ldest active po litical fami lies. 5 Sawas Khamprakob (1919-) , the head of the 
fami ly and a veteran politician, is a man of humble origins. After receiving a law degree 
from Thammasat University, he began his career as a lawyer before entering politics. In 
1942, he was elected to the Nakhon Sawan municipal council and appointed mayor 
when only 25. Then he was persuaded by senior politici ans to run for MP in 1946 under 
the Democrat Party, of which he himself was one of the founders. He was successful in 
his fi rst and second elections. In 1957 he shifted to the Serimanangkasi la Party of 
Phibun Songkhram, and again in 1969 switching when he joined the military-backed 
Sahaprachatai Party of Thanom Kittikhachon. After the 1973 uprising, he founded his 
5 As previous ly di scussed, th e phenomenon of Thai political dynasties is relati vely new, especially 
compared to neighborin g country like the Philippines. Almost all of th e fami li es currently holding power 
in Tha i poli tics en tered nati onal politi cs after 1973. There were on ly a few political famili es whose power 
could be traced back to th e I 940s or J 950s: am ong them, Chaiyanan from Tak, Limpaphan from 
Sukhotha i. and Angkinan from Phetchaburi. 
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own party, Kaset Sangkom and was elected consistently until 1983. Since then he has 
switched parties on several occasions in order to be elected in almost every election. 
However, after failing twice in 1995 and 1996, he stepped down-undoubtedly with an 
impressive record of being elected MP 12 times, and holding 8 ministerial posts in total. 
He also successfully brought his nephew, Prathueang Khamprakob, and his son, 
Veerakom Khamprakob (1954-), into Parliament as team members. Prathueang was first 
elected in 1969 and won seven elections subsequently until he stopped in 1995. 
Veerakorn, the third son of Sawas, first became MP in 1983 and was elected six more 
times until being banned in 2007 when the Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT), a party for which 
he was a committee member, was dissolved. The family's power was at its peak between 
the 1980s and the 1990s, especially in 1983, 1998, and 1992 (September), when clan 
members secured three out of seven MP seats in the province. 6 No other family in 
Nakhon Sawan has surpassed this performance. Other families were only able to have 
one member elected in each election. 
The Khamprakob family was not wealthy when it entered politics in the early 1940s. 
Sawas did not run any businesses when he started his political career. He initially built 
his family to be politically influential. According to Sawat, it was an honor for his 
family to be called a "political family ofNakhon Sawan" and he wanted to pass on the 
political legacy to the next generation. 7 Later on, by the late 1950s, however, after 
gaining access to government resources through ministerial posts and having been in 
power for decades, his family managed to connect political power to wealth. The family 
has invested in the construction business by founding a company named "Sahakan 
Witsawakon" in 1954 8 and later expanded to real estate as it possessed and had 
accumulated vast tracts of provincial land over a long period of time. Khamprakob is a 
political clan with wide connections, a plentiful war chest, and a large entourage. Several 
politicians in Nakhon Sawan who were active and well-known in the 1990s and 2000s 
were former Kamprakob political aides. 9 
6 Tawatchai 1998: 101-103 ; Wattachak, 27 July 1997: 15-16. 
7 Tawatchai 1998: 103. 
8 Noppanan 2006: 336. 
9 Interview, local politicians and local journalist, Nakhon Sawan, 1 September and 5 September 2010. See 
also Prachachat Thurakit , 24 February 2000: 2. 
223 
The political influence of Khamprakob has been in decline since the late 1990s. Sawas, 
as head of the team, lost to a new young opponent in the 1995 poll. 10 A year later, in the 
following election, Veerakom was the only family candidate elected. Some new faces 
emerged and successfully challenged the family's power. Though Veerakom managed to 
secure his seat, his position was unstable because he, at that time, belonged to the 
scandal-ridden Terd Thai faction in the Chart Thai party, led by Narong Wongwan from 
Phrae. Many members of this notorious faction were accused of corruption and political 
scheming. The media and coalition parties harshly criticized their behavior, finall y 
forcing Prime Minister Banharn to dissolve parliament and call for new elections. 11 
Veerakom then needed to look for a new political party with which to run for election. 
Chart 8.1: The Khamprakob Family (a selected genealogy) 
Rit Khamprakob + Buachip Anuwat 
Sawat+ Mali Pramaiphim Mek+ Thom ten other siblings 
Prathueang three other siblings 
Phuwadon Phanuwat Wirakon Phiraphong Ditsathat 
Niro!: from business to politics 
The Nirot family, prominent in the province, was different from the Khamprakobs. They 
accumulated wealth for decades until becoming one of the most successful local 
capitalist groups in Nakhon Sawan before turning to politics. Thavom N irot (1 927-
2008), head of the fam il y, a hard-working Thai entrepreneur of Chinese descent , 
pioneered a bus company until it became one of the biggest in the northern region during 
the period from the 1970s to the 1990s. He started from nothing, helping his mother se ll 
goods in the Nakhon Sawan city market after World War Two. Then he used some of his 
savings to buy a few trucks carrying passengers and agr icultural products from the city 
'
0 Sunai Julapongsathon ( I 95 I- ) was a youn g blood politician from Chart Pattana who defeated Sa was, 
and si nce 200 I has become one of th e most prominen t Nakhon Sawan MPs under Thaksin ' s allied parti es, 
and a vocal supporter o f the red shirt movement. 
11 See more discussion of this po liti cal episode in Chapter 11. as Buriram·s most powerful polit ica l family, 
the Chidchob. also belonged to thi s notori ous faction. 
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to outer districts. He also bought rice from farmers and sold it to merchants in the Pak 
Nampo market, a highly profitable venture that earned him healthy income. In 1957, he 
expanded his family business to chicken farming and within a few years his "Thavorn" 
farm became the largest chicken farm in the north. In 1962, the family started running a 
bus service between Nakhon Sawan and Chaing Mai. Their transportation business grew 
rapidly; the number of buses increasing from 35 in 1962 to 250 in 1979. At its peak, 
Thavom Company had 500 buses running from Bangkok to the north and between the 
north and northeast, and employed a total of 2,000 staff. Since the bus company was 
highly profitable, the Nirot family had dropped other business investments, such as rice 
trading, and focused mainly on transportation. 12 In order to run a legitimate business and 
enjoy a business monopoly, the transport company needed to acquire concessions from 
the government to operate along pennitted routes. Every company competed fiercely to 
obtain these lucrative concessions. As discussed in Chapter 3, the surest way for local 
businessmen to acquire government concessions (and other rents) is to have a direct 
access to parliament by fielding family members in elections. The Nirots followed this 
path as well. 
Like other large Sino-Thai families, Thavorn has five children. He sent them all to study 
in the United States with his own money, a practice that only a wealthy family could 
afford to do, particularly in the 1970s. Once his family business ~ as relatively stable, 
Thavorn decided to enter local politics. He was elected as an independent candidate fo r 
Nakhon Sawan municipal council in 1958, and never failed to be elected until he passed 
away in 2008. In 1983, he formed a local political group called "Phatthana Banmueang" 
(develop the homeland) which subsequently dominated the municipality. As a head of 
"Phatthana Banmueang," he was elevated to mayor. He was very successful in 
developing Nakhon Sawan municipality into one of the most beautiful and most 
comfortable in which to live. 13 The success earned his administration many national 
awards and repeated victories in municipal elections. From 1958 to the early 2000s, 
electoral co~petition in the Nakhon Sawan city municipal area was very peaceful , 
compared to situations in local and MP elections in other districts. The Nirot famil y 
secured a power monopoly in the city municipality for several decades without any real 
12 Thavorn 2008: 54-57. 
13 Nakhon Sawan municipality provides the cheapest clean tap water to every household . Its huge green 
public park, full of sport equipment, was voted the best park in the country. Thavom also renovated th e 
municipal office and turned it into a gigantic and elegant building based on th e model of the American 
White House. On top of that, municipal schools offer English, Chinese, and Arabic language courses to 
their students. 
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challenge. This was partly due to the family 's solid financial support. Almost all 
prominent lo cal business families or groups in Nakhon Sawan city had supported the 
Nirot family in elections; several of them provided money for campaigning while others 
fie lded key members of their families as candidates for municipal council in Thavorn' s 
team. In this way, municipal projects were fairly distributed through the group's 
networks. This powerful collection of business owners covered a wide range of 
economic activities, from transportation, hotels, department stores and retail outlets, 
private hospitals, agricultural machinery, construction hardware, tourism business, to 
media ownership. 14 The N irot 's fami ly business, which expanded from buses and 
chicken farming to real estate, land development, hotels, shopping malls, tourism, cable 
TV, publishing, and construction after the 1990s, was another major source of electoral 
funding. 15 The membership of the municipal council was composed mainly of wealthy, 
urban businessmen. These affluent candidates' campaigning did not rely much on 
political parties or any formal associations. They campaigned on their own rather than 
under a party banner, and used business employees as vote canvassers. 16 A strong war 
chest plus the widespread popularity of Thavorn's team among local voters made the 
polling contests a non-event. Nonetheless, after being in power for 23 years and 
finishing his fifth term, Thavorn finally stepped down as a mayor in 2004 when he was 
approaching 74 and passed his political legacy to his second son, Jitkasem Nirot ( 1952-). 
Without a long-standing charismatic patron, the city municipal elections have became 
more exciting. Nirot's power was challenged by the Kamprakob family. 
Though the Nirot family's po litical power is enormous, its territory has been limited 
primarily to the city. The fami ly has never been able to assert control over rural areas of 
the province. Pinyo Niro! (195 1-), the eldest son of Thavorn and thus far the only MP 
from the clan, always ran in Constituency 1 covering the city municipal area. Pinyo 
obtained a bachelor and master's degree in business management from the United States. 
After graduating and returning to Thailand in 1976, he helped his father run the famil y 
business for a period of time before starting his own businesses, a water bottle-producing 
factory and a dog farm, which were not successfu l. He took a keen interest in po litics, 
14 Key fam ili es were Tan visut , Sun th on Lekha , Sattayaprasen, and Kunawong, owner of a big depanment 
store in Nakhon Sawan city (Prachachat Thurakit , 17 January 2000: 23 ; Nakhon Sawan City Municipa l 
2005) 
i; Prachakhom Thongthin, 10 ( 16 December 200 1- 15 January 2002): 12- 14. 16 
Murashima ·s sludy ( 1987) of elections of Nakhon Sa wa n city mu nicipa l council in 1980 had si mil ar 
findings. He found that most ca ndidates on the city counci l, except one, did not belong to a pol itica l pany, 
and politica l panies themselves made no attempt 10 play a role in the loca l elections. Given th is situation, 
he noted. candidates in city council election give littl e thought 10 using pany names to attract votes. 
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was elected to municipal council from 1985-1992, and worked as a key vote canvasser 
for the Khamprakob family for several years before standing for national elections 
himself. He ran for MP in March 1992, under the Samakheetham Party 17, and was 
elected with strong family support. 18 He has hopped from one party to another in every 
election since then. In 1995 , he shifted to the Chart Pattana Party, then to the Chart Thai 
Party in the 2001 election, and later again joined the TRT to run for the 2005 election as 
a head of the TRT's Nakhon Sawan team. Pinyo credited Suphanburi province's 
progress to Banharn, of which he attributed to the unity of Suphanburi politicians under 
the lead of big boss Banharn. He aspired to do the same for his home province. The 
problem with Nakhon Sawan, according to him, was the lack of cooperation and unity 
among politicians belonging to different political parties and factions. 19 
Chart 8.2: The Nirot Family (a selected genealogy) 
Thavorn + Samnao Chunlasang 
Siripong Siriphon Pinyo Jitkasem Chomphunut 
Pinyo 's view, one shared by many Nakhon Sawan politicians, was true. Apart from 
Khamprakob and Nirot, there were several other families or individuals who had come 
to share power in the province since the 1970s. Among them are included Sawitchat, 
Asuni na Ayutthaya, Intharasut, Julapongsathon, Jamsai, Siriwannasan, Panudomlak, 
and Rojanasathien. One particular figure from the Rojanasathien family is worth 
discussing. Boonchu Rojanasathien (1921-2007) a renowned banker and tycoon from 
Bangkok, was not born in Nakhon Sawan but had been elected as Nakhon Sawan MP six 
17 As mentioned in Chapler 3, this pa11y was found ed after the 199 1 coup by the coup group "the Khan a 
Raksa Khwam Sangop Riaproi Haeng Chat" (the Nationa l Peacekeeping Counci l- NPKC). The party, led 
by Phrae MP Narong Wongwan, attracted many old and new politi cians from the powerful famili es in 
several provinces. 
18 His personal finan cial sta tus was also fairl y strong. In September 200 1, Pinyo publicly declared that he 
has total asset 136. 8 milli on baht, and hi s wife 17.87 million baht (Khao Sod, l November 2001: 1, 10, 
11 ). 
19 Interview Pinyo Nirot, Nakhon Sawan, 3 September 2010. Also see his comments in Khao Sod, 4 
October 2000: 3. 
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times from 1986-1996, with the help of an influential Nakhon Sawan boss.20 During the 
1970s-1 990s wealthy businessmen from Bangkok who wanted to be MP would find a 
"backward" province, in which they had reliable local political brokers, and spend 
considerable money (through the local boss's po litical machine) to get elected. Nakhon 
Sawan was a perfect place for this kind of po litical operation as the political landscape 
was wide-open with no supreme boss. Reportedly the first time Boonchu ran in Nakhon 
Sawan in 1986, he was sarcastically called "Boonchu-James Bond" as he spent 
stupendous quantities of money, distributed in black leather suitcases, buying votes and 
buying local leaders to work as his vote canvassers.21 
None of above fami lies or individuals managed to stay in power for long. They were 
elected once or twice as MP then disappeared from the political scene. In every election, 
new political faces made their presence felt. Alliances between families, business elite 
clusters, and other personal fo llowings were loose, unstable, and often shifting. The 
relationship between the Khamprakob and Nirot family had turned from friends to foes 
within a generation. Both fa milies have attempted to make political allies at both the 
national and local levels to enhance their famil y' s power. In several cases, nonetheless, 
their allies have abandoned or betrayed them either secretly or openly. No permanent 
friends, just pennanent interests. 
Nevertheless, not all big business families in Nakhon Sawan became political. Several of 
them preferred doing business and stayed away from direct invo lvement in polit ics. One 
main reaso n is the vo latil e and violent nature of political contestation in the province. 22 
Another is that their business operation did not depend heavily on political connections 
or coercive power. Instead they were able to directly access the financial institutions in 
Bangkok or, in some cases, fo reign investors for loans and techno logy, bypassing local 
power and re lying on more market-based mechanisms. Their sources of revenue mainly 
come from service businesses such as hotels and education; from trading (equipments, 
'
0 Nawi 1993: 100-106; Thai Rath, 20 March 2007. 
"Interview, loca l politicians and loca l journalist, Nakhon Sawan, I September and 5 September 20 10. 
Pri or to " land ing" in Nakhon Sawan, Boonchu had been elected twice as an MP fo r Chonburi . But he 
inconvenientl y ran into confl icts with kamnan Poh, supreme boss of Chonburi, so he had to find a new 
place to contest. At th e same tim e, there was another big business tycoon from Ban gkok, Thane! Telan, 
runnin g for MP in Nakhon Sawan who fai led to get elected as he had no loca l boss helping him . This 
"stray dog" practice, however, has been in decline sin ce th e 200 1 electi ons as it became ineffective with 
growing politi ca l loca lism and new electoral laws, in accordance with the 1997 constitution, whi ch 
demanded that cand idates have strong roots in their constituency. 
22 Interview, Supoj Wa ngpreedalenku l, vice president of Na khon Sawan Federation of Industries, Nakh on 
Sawan, 6 September 20 I 0. 
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stationery, steel); or from manufacturing (sugar, and others). 23 Families that have been 
active in politics, on the contrary, are running types of businesses that need political 
power to enhance and protect their wealth. The construction, transportation, land 
development, and real estate businesses create enormous wealth for local elite families. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, these lucrative rent-seeking enterprises entail fierce 
competition for the profitable, long-term, and monopoly contract, license or concession 
from the government. Intimidation and other forms of violent tactics were frequently 
employed in order to ward off business rivals. Political power is desirable for stronger 
connections to government and virtual immunity from prosecution against illegal 
activity. Consequently, in Nakhon Sawan, the stakes of electoral contest are extremely 
high. Unlike Phrae, in which violence began in the late 1990s, Nakhon Sawan has 
witnessed electoral violence regularly since 1979. It has many cases been intertwined 
with business conflict. 
Examples of election-related violence are recorded as follows. In 1979, a candidate from 
the Kitsangkhom party survived an assassination attempt.24 In April 1983 , Pravat 
Nianphak, a front runner in the MP election from the Kitsangkhom Party, was shot dead. 
The police investigation noted two motives for the murder: electoral conflict and 
conflicts in competition with another influential lo cal figure over a marble mining 
concession.25 In July 1986, a Ratsadom Party vote canvasser was_ intimidated until he 
had to flee his home.26 In the March 1992 election, Nakhon Sawan was declared a hot 
zone by the police national office. A few days later, an Ekkaphap Party vote canvasser 
was killed; this incident prompted an angry outburst from Bunchoo Rojanasathien, a 
head of the Ekkaphab Party and also MP from Nakhon Sawan, criticizing the complete 
failure of the police to prevent violence. 27 The 1995 election witnessed another violent 
incident when Democrat candidate Bunphan Sutthiwiriwan was attacked while speaking 
to· his audience from a campaign truck. He survived, but his henchmen were injured . 28 
The situation was not better in the 1996 election as vote canvassers from several parties 
were intimidated by tough guys during the campaign. Each party pointed to their 
23 Siriwiriyakul family (education, hotels, and sugar factories) and ltthichai Charoen (construction 
machinery, steel trading) are primary examples (EGAT survey 2011: 9-5 - 9-6; interview, Supoj 
Wangpreedalertkul, Nakhon Sawan, 6 September 2010. 
24 Matichon, 17 April 1979: 1, 12. 
25 Matichon, 10 April 1983: I , 12. 
26 Matichon, 16 July 1986: special 3. 
27 Matichon, 19 March 1992: 2l;Matichon, 20 March 1992: 21. 
28 Thai Rath, 24 June 1995: 17. 
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opponents. A brother-in-law of a prominent candidate from the Chart Pattana Party was 
also shot dead in his car a few days before polling day. 29 
Electoral violence in Nakhon Sawan reached its peak in the run up to the general 
elections in 2001. The more democratic constitution promulgated in 1997 could not 
eradicate the vio lent electoral campaign methods as long as the local political and 
economic conditions remained largely unchanged. Furthermore, a decentralization 
process implemented since 1997 made the wide-open political space in this rainbow 
province even wider. "New men," emerging from less wealthy and less established 
family backgrounds, competed with the political heirs of elite families and displayed 
"the required savvy for the age of mass electoral politics." 30 
New and old local elites: fragmentation, consolidation and breakdown of political 
order 
Up until the late 1990s, all politicians in Nakhon Sawan, though affiliated with different 
parties and factions, came from similar backgrounds and knew each other very well. 
They were basically alumni of the same elite school in the province and children of 
prominent fami lies. As some of them said, "it was a close-knit community. We had 
known each other as friends or as schoolmates. We hobnobbed with each other and we 
always met at parties and soc ial events even when we were political rivals. " 3 1 Another 
one made a similar comment: " if you went to ten different social events in Nakhon 
Sawan, you still met the same group of people."32 This sociological underpinning had 
crucial consequences for the pattern of electora l violence in the province. As one 
experienced politician explained, "the elites in Nakhon Sawan do not kill each other. 
When we have conflicts, it is our subordinates who are kill ed. For example, vote 
canvassers who work for the enemy would be got rid of in order to teach them a lesson." 
However, he admitted that the situation has changed since decentralization: "now the 
elite start to target each other because ' new elites' have emerged. These new elites come 
29 Thai Rath, 15 November 1996 : 23. 
30 See Kerkvli et (1995) for a comparable phenomen on in Philippine polit ics durin g th e 1950s- 1960s. 31 In terview, Somsak Arunsurat, Deputy Speaker of the Nakhon Sawan Provincial Council , Nakhon 
Sa wa n, 2 September 20 I 0. 
32 Interview. Vimolsri Chaopreecha, former candidate for Nakh on Sawan MP, Na kh on Sawan, 4 
September 20 I 0. 
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from different backgrounds. Not everyone knows each other like the old days. It is 
getting more fragmented and alienated."33 
On the evening of 29 January 2000, five days before the PAO elections, Prasert 
Viboonrat, Nakhon Sawan PAO head caretaker, was shot dead from a long distance by 
an unknown sniper while giving a speech to a large crowd of voters. The hit man used a 
laser rifle with a silencer for precision and sound reduction. This type of assassination is 
not common in Thailand, especially locally, because a gun with this high caliber is very 
expensive (500,000 baht) and usually not available in the market. It is restrictedly to 
authorized government officials in a few special units. 34 The state has employed 
professional snipers to suppress demonstrators in 1973, 1992 and most notoriously in 
2010. Prasert' s murder thus alarmed the police and local politicians around the country. 
The year 2000 was called "the year of voting dangerously" as there were nation-wide 
direct elections for local offices (Provincial Administrative Organization [PAO] and sub-
district); direct elections for the senate; and the general election (with a completely new 
electoral system). 35 The national police chief sent his best investigative team to Nakhon 
Sawan to solve the case. 
Prasert came from humble origins, with no parents or relatives involved in politics. 
Unlike children from elite families who went to prestigious high scbools and universities 
in Bangkok or even abroad, Prasert received a modest education from local schools. 
When he was young, he was well-known for his unruly behavior with a gang ofruffians. 
This reputation continued after he was elected to village headman and then sub-district 
head in his hometown. With a keen interest in politics, he tried to run for MP once but 
completely failed, so he turned to local politics and has been elected a provincial 
councilor since the early 1990s. Veerakom Khamprakob supported his first time election 
victory but the relationships deteriorated after one ofVeerakom's village head man vote 
canvassers was killed. Veerakom suspected Prasert was behind the murder. After this 
incident, Prasert went to work for Pinyo Nirot instead. Decentralization and its newly 
empowered local administrative bodies provided good opportunities for Prasert who had 
relatively low social and cultural capital to make his presence felt in the circle of 
33 Interview, long-standing Nakhon Sawan provincial counc ilor, Nakhon Sa wan, 2 September 20 IO. 
34 Accordin g to police files, this rifle has been used on ly once in local political conflicts when a notorious 
Phetchaburi godfather, Somchit Phuangmani was shot dead on 2 April 1980 (Matichon Sudsapda, 8-14 
February 2000: 89-90). See Chapter JO for pol iti cs behind Somchit 's murder. 
35 Krung/hep Thurakit, 2 February 2000: 12, 18. 
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Nakhon Sawan elite. In late 1998, Pinyo supported his running for PAO chairman, 
which he won over the incumbent, Amnat Sirichai, by only one vote. 36 The victory was a 
result of heavy lobbying. Some members denied voting for him, reportedly saying "I 
will not support a thug to rule the province." This statement made him furious. 37 
Nevertheless, Prasert was aware that some provincial councilors and locals did not 
welcome him, so he attempted to change his tainted image. He donated his own land to 
the local school and distributed large amounts of the PAO budget for local development. 
He made many new allies to ensure he could win the next election clearly. But making 
allies brought with it enemies. Prasert was asked by a former MP, Thirawat 
Siriwannasan, prominent businessman-turned-politician and a patriarch of the 
Siriwannasan family, to help his wife get elected as senator for Nakhon Sawan in 
exchange fo r helping Prasert ' s team to win the PAO election. 38 The alliance between 
Prasert and the Siriwannasarn fami ly was frightening to other provincial political groups 
since both had a strong voter base and the latter had an ample war chest (from a 
construction business and a rock mining and crushing plant) to enable victory in local or 
national elections. 39 Prasert 's interference in the senate election upset two other powerful 
families who had fielded their famil y members for the contest. 40 Therefore, Prasert 
created a lot of enemies who wanted to get him out of the way. According to local 
observers, his enemies collectively contributed money to hire professional gunmen to get 
rid of him. 41 
A series of violent incidents occurred after Prasert 's death. A village headman, who was 
a vote canvasser for Prasert' s team and Nakhon Sawan MP, Prasart Tanprasert , was shot 
and seriously injured on the PAO polling day. Prasart said he knew who the mastermind 
of the murder was, and announced to the public: "I have never been afra id . I go here and 
there alone. However, if I were shot dead, I can guarantee that another MP in this 
province will be surely dead. my famil y will not let him live."42 Aft er the senate 
elections, a losing candidate's house was attacked, but he survived. He believed that it 
36 At that poin t, prior to 2000, electi on to chairman of the PAO was an ind irect election, decided by 
provincial cou ncil members. 
37 Krung/hep Thurakit , 2 February 2000: 17. 
38 Two electi ons were being held at about the same time: PAO elections on 5 February 2000 and senate 
elections on 4 March 2000. 
39 Th e Siri wann asan fa mi ly owned a large construct ion company ca ll ed " Porn sawa l Construct ion" 
establi shed in 1969 (Noppan an 2006: 33 1 ). 
'° Krungthep Thurakil , 2 February 2000: 17: Prachachal Thurakil, 24 February 2000: 2. 41 lnterview, local journ alist, Nakh on Sawan, 1 Sep tember 20 10. 
" Khao Sod, 6 February 2000: 2. 
232 
was intimidation to make him refrain from protesting voting results, in which he had 
accused a certain winner of vote buying. Another local politician's house was bombed. 
The police investigation found that the attack was related to electoral conflicts over the 
senate poll. 43 
The situation calmed down for a few months before erupting in bloody scenes again 
before the 2001 national election. Political power remained fragmented. The only 
change was the brand of political party with which each politician affiliated. Pinyo's 
father forced him to shift from the Chart Pattana to the Chart Thai Party due to a 
"gentleman's agreement" Thavom gave Banham before the elections. A few former 
MPs, including those from the Siriwannasan family, followed Pinyo to the Chart Thai 
Party. Veerakom, along with some of his subordinates, abandoned the New Aspiration 
Party to join the Thai Rak Thai Party ofThaksin. He was, however, frustrated with one 
of his team members who switched allegiance at the last minute deciding to run for 
Chart Thai with Pinyo. "This was most ungrateful," he said. Finally Veerakom had to 
ask his beloved 81-year-old father Sawas, who had been disqualified from senate 
elections (as a result of committing electoral laws violation) to run in that constituency. 44 
Other veteran MPs scattered and ran under different parties. The Democrat Party 
recruited a young candidate, Kasem Panudonlak, from a construction tycoon family to 
stand in Constituency 2. Every party had high hopes of winning Nakhon Sawan, in 
which seven House seats were up for grabs. The election results reflected highly 
fragmented power in Nakhon Sawan, as Chart Thai and TRT won three seats each and 
the Democrat Party one. TRT could not repeat its miraculous performance in Nakhon 
Sawan, as it had in other northern provinces. Worse, Veerakom, a six time MP and team 
head of the TRT team, and his father, suffered stunning defeats from their opponents 
from Chart Thai. It was the first time since 1946 that Nakhon Sawan had no MP from 
the Khamprakob family. Local observers pointed out that the ·family's defeat was largely 
the result of "old school" electioneering tactics, relying mainly on force and 
intimidation," employed by the team members, of which voters increasingly 
disapproved.45 Another startling fact in this election was that all incumbents, with the 
exception of Pin yo, failed to get re-elected. 
43 Krungthep Thurakit, 25 March 2000: 13-14, and Khao Sod, 6 June 2000: 2. 
44 Bangkok Post , 2 December 2000: 3. 
45 Interview, loca l journalist, Nakhon Sawan, 7 September 2010. 
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In the end, betrayal and violence were business as usual in volati le Nakhon Sawan. Vote 
canvasser intimidation was reported to the police. A group of thugs wandered around in 
several areas, particularly in Constituency 3 and Constituency 4, forcing rival vote 
brokers to switch allegiance or stay neutral. According to one vote canvasser, he was 
asked by goons 
with whom do you want to work? If you do not want to work with us, it 
is ok. But stand idle. Do not help anyone. Otherwise you will be in 
trouble. I have warned you. You know.46 
A Chart Thai vote canvasser in Constituency 4 barely survived an assassination attempt. 
Another vote canvasser in Constituency 5, a deputy mayor of Paisali municipality, was 
shot dead during the campaign. He had been working for a TRT candidate before being 
asked to switch to another party. However, it was reported that he kept canvassing votes 
for both candidates at the same time, and this possibly led to his tragic death. 47 A few 
months after the poll, another famous kamnan in Takli district who failed to get his boss 
elected was shot dead by hired gunmen. 48 It was not until the fo llowing election in 2005 
that power in the province was consolidated. It was achieved through the collaboration 
of local and national bosses. 
TRT targeted Nakhon Sawan in the 2005 election, as it was one of the few provinces in 
the north that the party had yet to control. The "War on Dark Influence," (see Chapter 5) 
used effe ctively in other provinces, had failed in Nakhon Sawan. The provincial 
governor submitted a list to the government, identifying only seventeen unimportant 
figures as " influential people." It was reported that the governor was afraid of the 
provincial "big bosses" so he did not dare to mention any significant names. Thaksin 
was highly upset with his list. 49 The situation went from bad to worse when unknown 
gunmen shot and severely injured a local police officer working to suppress the dark 
influence. The invest igation fo und that politically backed local mafias were behind this 
attempted murder as the government 's tough policy on mobsters damaged their 
underground business. 50 
'
6 See a full interesting report in Krungthep Thurakit, 1 January 2001: 5. 41 Krungthep Thurakit, 19 November 2000: I, 4. 
48 Daily News , 19 July 200 I: 2. 
'"Khao Sod, 11 July 2003 : I, 12. 
50 Thai Rath, 30 December 2003: I, 19. 
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It was clear that Nakhon Sawan bosses formed a political force to be reckoned with. 
Nevertheless, Thaksin succeeded, for the first time in the history of the province, in 
persuading all local factions to join forces under his party, asking them to forget past 
mutual animosities. By mid 2003 Thaksin approached Pinyo, the most respected and 
charismatic figure, to act as his political mediator. Though Pinyo 's task was difficult, he 
succeeded in persuading all incumbent MPs from different parties (bar one) to rnn under 
TRT. 51 TRT's slogan was "Seven Nakhon Sawan MPs united into one. The full potential 
for Nakhon Sawan development." Banyin Tangpakorn, the TRT candidate in 
Constituency 6, commented to the media "there will be no more conflict among 
politicians like in Suphanburi ... and we will definitely develop our province into a 
bigger one than Suphanburi."52 The result was emphatic. The Thai Rak Thai party swept 
all seven seats in Nakhon Sawan in the 2005 general election, and polling was relatively 
peaceful compared to previous elections. Only one violent incident occurred. 53 TRT 
campaign head, Pinyo, admitted that TRT popular policies (particularly the war on drugs 
and universal healthcare) combined with strong candidates were two crucial factors in 
his team's landslide victory. 54 
Under the new circumstances, the province managed to have a brief period of peaceful 
politics from 2003-2006. The municipal and PAO elections tha_t were held several 
months prior to the national election went smoothly because the deal between prominent 
bosses had been resolved. The Nakhon Sawan city mayor election, held on 7 March 
2004, was a contestation of power between two families who were both now working 
under Thaksin. Jitkasem Nirot, Pinyo ' s younger brother, represented his family, while 
Veerakorn backed up one less well-known candidate to compete with Jitkasem. Both 
claimed to have support from Thai Rak Thai party, but finally it was clear that TRT 
supported Jitkasem when Y oawapa Wongsawat, Thaksin' s sister and deputy leader of 
TRT party, came to Nakhon Sawan municipality on 28 January 2004 to support 
51 Interview, Pin yo Ni rot, Nakhon Sa wan, 3 September 2010. In the beginning Veerakom did not 
cooperate as he saw Pinyo as his long time rival. Finally, Thaksin had to intervene by fi elding Pinyo in the 
party-list slate (15th) and Veerakom in a constituency-seat. 
52 Daily News, 23 November 2004: 36. He mentioned Suphanburi of Ban.ham because Chart Thai party 
was the strongest competitors ofTRT in Nakhon Sawan in that election. 
53 On 29 December 2004, a vote canvasser of the TRT candidate in Constituency 5 was shot . dead 
(MatichQn, 18 January 2005: 14). 
54 Interview Pinyo Nirot, Nakhon Sawan, 3 September 2010. 
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Jitkasem. 55 The competition went peacefully and Jitkasem won by overwhelmingly 
margins, continuing his fami ly's long dominance of municipal politics. The PAO 
election that was held a week after the city municipal election also went peacefully. All 
Thai Rak Thai MPs, except Veerakom, unanimously supported Amnat Sirichai, former 
PAO head and businessman, to oppose the incumbent, a brother of Prasert Viboonrat. 
TRT allowed Amnat to officially use the party brand in his campaign. Amnat won the 
election easily and there were no political murders. After the election, Amnat gave an 
interview expressing sat isfaction that 
now with the unified MPs, it is easy for me to work. I have always 
wanted politicians in Nakhon Sawan to work together. The goal is now 
achieved and the conflicts are decreasing. The PAO can rely on MPs in 
bringing government budget to the province. Then the development will 
go in the same direction. 56 
A few months later, Thaksin's government held a cabinet meeting in Nakhon Sawan as a 
gesture of gratitude to Nakhon Sawan politicians and voters. It was on this occasion that 
Thaksin gave a speech that later caused an uproar from the opposition, as he said 
I will be straightforward here. Those provinces who put their trust in us 
[TRT Party] , we will take special care of you. Of course we need to 
take care of people in the who le country, but time is limited. So we 
need to spend time in the provinces that trust us in particular. The 
provinces who placed little trust in us, have to wait. It is not that we are 
not going to treat you, but we need to set priorities. 
He promised Nakhon Sawan significant development as people in the province 
unanimously voted fo r TRT candidates. 57 
55 Prachachat Thurakit, 23 February 2004: 33. Jitkasem is the second son ofThavom and replaced his 
father as a manager of Thavom Farm Company in 2003 before runn ing for mayor. The family compan y 
was not in a good position during the time he oversaw it as it had to compete fi ercely with other emergin g 
bus companies. Eventua ll y it had to sell 80 % o f their buses to an other big political family that owned a 
transponation business emp ir e in Nakhon Ratchasima, the Cherdchai famil y. The economic crisis in 1997 
and spike in oil price dur in g the lraq wa r led the family transport business a to endure a heavy loss (Than f.e11haki1, 30 March 2003: 29; interview Pin yo N irot, Nakhon Sawan, 3 September 2010). 
Khao Sod, 14 May 2005: 25. 
57 See Thaksin·s ti.i ll speech in Thai Rath, I November 2005: I, 14, 16. Pin yo mentioned that Thaks in 's 
cabi net had approved 4 billi on baht fund for mega development projects in Na khon Sawan, but after tl1e 
coup the budget was cu t in half. 
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The situation, however, changed dramatically after Thaksin was toppled by the 2006 
coup. With the fall of Thaksin, and strong pressure from the military, the factions 
splintered into many directions. The political landscape returned to a rainbow situation. 
Pinyo, as a former head of the TRT team, was not able to resist army pressure therefore 
he left TRT and switched and went to a small party. 58 Veerakom and Banyin abandoned 
Thaksin too and joined another new party. 59 The result of the 2007 election showed the 
most fragmented result in the history of the province, as its seven seats were shared by 
five parties (see table 8.1 above). 60 Some local patrons have tried to capitalize on the 
power vacuum created by the coup. The most ambitious of all was a PAO president 
Amnat Sirichai. He aimed to monopolize power, and his political ambition made 
electoral competitions intense and bloody again. Many lives were lost , including his 
own. 
Amnat Sirichai: ambition with a (violent) cost 
On the night of 11 July 2010, during the World Cup Soccer final match, Amnat was 
assassinated by a professional sniper while watching the exciting game along with 
thousands of others in the courtyard of Nakhon Sawan city hall. He died in exactly the 
same way as his predecessor Prasert Viboonrat, killed by a precision rifle from afar. The 
logic and motives behind his murder were also similar to those of Pr(lsert . 
Amnat (1942-2010) came from a very poor family, a son ofNakhon Sawan farmers. As 
a boy, he had to work in several menial jobs, including fetching vegetables for pigs, to 
support his own education. His marriage to a daughter of a Nakhon Sawan provincial 
councilor opened the door for his political career. He was recruited by his father-in-law 
to be a team member for provincial council elections, and was consistently elected after 
1983 .61 In 1997 councilors voted him head of PAO but he was replaced by Prasert 
Viboonrat a year later after fierce lobbying. He staged his comeback in 2004, with strong 
support from Pinyo and the TRT. Afterwards, he was selected by his peers to be the 
president of the Northern PAO Federation (2004-2006) and president of Thailand PAO 
58 He moved lo Ruamjailhai Chat Pattana Party led by Chel~rn Thanajaro and Suwat Liptapanlop. 
59 Both of them moved to Matchima Party led by Pracha Leophai-ratana and Somsak Thepsulhin. 
60 Interview Pin yo Nirot, Nakhon Sa wan, 3 September 20 I 0). Other observers also mentioned th e 
interference of the military in th e electoral campaign (interview Nakhon Sawan city municipal councilor, 
Nakhon Sawan, 2 September 2010; interview, loca l vote canvasser, Nakhon Sawan, 3 September 2010) . 
61 See biography o f Amnat in his creation volume (2010), and also Khao Sod, 14 May 2004: 25; Post 
Today, 16 Ju ly 2007: al 2. 
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Association (2006-2008) respectively. As a president, he was a very vocal critic of the 
government 's implementation of decentralization, which lacked enthusiasm and clear 
direction. This bolstered his popularity among local politicians. When the Constitutional 
Court disso lved the TRT party in 2007, Amnat suggested to his local colleagues the idea 
of creating their own party named the "Thong thin Thai Party" (Thai Local Party) to 
stand in the general election. He believed that the party could win at least 20 seats, as 
more than a hundred capable MPs were banned from competing.62 The idea was well 
accepted by many local politicians, but failed to materialize. 
Back in Nakhon Sawan, Amnat tried to monopolize power by fielding his own people in 
every position including helping his wife get elected in the 2008 senate election. 63 He 
supported many local candidates in the TAO polling contests, which put him in conflict 
with other influential MPs in the province who usually control the TA Os through their 
followers. 64 Furthermore, he planned to control the city municipality that was 
permanently dominated by the Nirot fami ly. One of Arnnat's close po litical associates 
was recruited to oppose Jitkasem at the end of his term. 65 According to the unwritten 
local code of conduct, this move was deemed ungrateful because the Nirot fami ly had 
helped him politically and financially for a long time. 66 For this reason, Pinyo decided to 
run against Amnat in the 2008 PAO presidential elect ion. Pinyo ' s goal, as a leading 
member of the Nirot family, was not to win but to teach Amnat a lesson that winning 
power in this province "was not that easy." 67 It was Amnat who won, but he had to put 
more energy and investment into his campaign than expected. Amnat 's ambition did not 
stop there. He planned to quit as PAO president when the national election was 
announced, then have his key associate to replace him, to assist him to run for MP. He 
chose to associate with the Bhumjaitai Party of Newin Chidchob, formerly right hand 
man of Thaksin, in support of his ambitious plan. 68 The Bhumjaitai Party, newly 
estab lished in 2008, aimed to win as many seats as possib le and to strengthen their 
62 Siam Rath, l June 2007 : 1, 9; Matichon, 24 July 2007: 8. 63 Hi s wife was subsequently disqua lified because she did not full y d isclose her total assets to th e National 
Ant i-Corrupti on Commission , an offense that violated the constituti on. However, Amnat fielded in hi s 
wife 's younger sister in th e by-electi on and got her elected . 
64 Interview, TAO president for a sub-distri ct in the Muan g di strict , Nakhon Sa wan , 3 September 2010. 
Generally in the past, candidates for TAO president would be supported by the N irot, Khamprakob, or 
Panudomlak families , and on ly a few ran independentl y. 
65 lnterview, loca l journali st, Nakh on Sawan, 7 September 2010. 66 Interview, hotel businessman and former candida te fo r Nakhon Sawan MP and mayor, Nakh on Sawan, 
5 September 20 IO; interview, loca l journali st, NakJ1on Sa wan, 7 September 20 10. 67 interview, Pin yo Ni rot , Nakhon Sa wan, 3 September 2010. 68 See politica l role ofNewin and th e Bhumj aita i Party in Chapter I 1. 
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power in the 2011 general election, especially in the north and northeast. The party had 
been using its control of the Interior Ministry to enhance its electoral prospect 
nationwide by tapping into the networks of leading local politicians, especially PAO 
presidents, in each province. Amnat became their perfect local partner. He was 
ambitious, popular, and resourceful. He promised to win at least five seats in Nakhon 
Sawan for the party in exchange for a ministerial post.69 Each of Amnat ' s strategies 
undoubtedly created new enemies for him as he trespassed on other bosses ' political 
territory. Amnat confided to one of his friends that the modern era of Nakhon Sawan 
politics would be controlled by his Sirichai family, instead of the old elite families. 70 
Amnat's death was caused not only by his political ambition for power monopoly, but 
also by fraudulent business schemes. His financial situation was precarious before he 
became PAO president, as he was in debt from fai led investments in provincial hotels 
and entertainment complexes. One of his companies was about to be declared 
bankrupt. 71 This forced him to use his political power to recoup his financial losses. The 
PAO budget was not distributed transparently and he heavily interfered in bidding for 
PAO construction projects. Amnat 's family owned a construction company and it alw<1ys 
won the contracts for PAO construction. No other companies had a chance, even 
Amnat ' s key business associates. Amnat's egregious self-interest made his allies angry 
and eventually they turned on him. According to Nakhon Sawan government officers, 
provincial construction bidding was one of the most scandalous activities as it involved 
corruption, coercion and vio lence. Moreover, the few honest government officials who 
disapproved of the PAO president's dubious practices were intimidated and suspended. 
72 Many past murders in Nakhon Sawan were related to conflicts in the construction 
business, and the perpetrators had never been prosecuted. 73 A number of corruption 
cases regarding PAO activities were investigated by the National Anti-Corruption 
69 Interview, city municipal councilor, Nakhon Sawan, 2 September 2010. 
70 Interview, Amnat's friend and a former candidate for Nakhon Sawan MP, Nakhon Sawan, 4 September 
2000. 
71 Finally, there was a court order delivered on 31 March 2008 to freeze his company' s assets. See 
Ratchakitchaanubeksa, 125: 75 (1 July 2008): 109. 
72 lnterview, ·senior goverrunent official in city municipality and PAO, Nakhon Sawan, 2 September and 3 
September 20 I 0. First, the bidders who had no political connections would be offered money to withdraw. 
If they refused to accept the money, they would be intimidated or assaulted. 
73 Usually, perpetrators were never arrested. In some rare cases, however, the former candidates for MP, 
the TAO president, or municipal councilors were charged by the police but later acquitted. See, for 
example, Kham Chat Luek, 1 September 2004: 3; and the court case in 2005 in Matichon, 30 September 
2005: 12; Thai Rath, 30 September 2005: 19. 
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Commission. Amnat had several cases pending court decision and he was being sued by 
several opponents. 
Business and political conflicts surrounding Amnat exacerbated the situation in Nakhon 
Sawan. Prior to his death on 12 July 2010, a series of violent incidents against local 
politicians occurred. In February 2008, a vote canvasser for a candidate for Chumsaeng 
municipal councilor was shot dead. A few days later, the house of a construction 
businessman who was running for the senate was bombed; he had accused his opponents 
of violating the electoral laws and the case was under investigation. In September 2008, 
a losing PAO councilor candidate was shot dead. The police found that he was involved 
in many legal cases. He, along with the losing candidate for PAO head from Chart Thai 
Party, lodged several complaints against Amnat after the election, alleging that Amnat 
broke the law during the election campaign. Not long after that, one of Amnat 's political 
advisors survived an assassinat ion attempt; he was injured but his driver was killed . At 
about the same time, the house of well-known former TRT MP Banyin Tangpakom was 
bombed with a heavy M67, fo rtunately leaving no casualties. The conflict between 
Amnat and Banyin was well known to local people. In February 2010 there was another 
political casualty. Paichit Panudomlak, a powerful, senior PAO councilor and father of 
former Nakhon Sawan TRT MP Kasem Panudomlak, was brutally gunned down by a 
group of gunmen. He and Kasem were preparing to run for MP under the TRT banner in 
the 2011 election, and were expected to win. 74 His death heightened political tensions 
and led to expectations that more violence would fo llow. Amnat 's death was thus not a 
complete surprise, but nonetheless came as a terrible shock because it was so brazenly 
executed in a pub lic space. 75 
Those behind Amnat ' s murder have never been identified, let alone arrested. Many 
people definite ly benefited fro m his death. Nevertheless, Amnat 's assassination brought 
the province into political chaos. The breakdown of political order that had existed since 
the coup went fro m bad to worse. Corrupt police and some figures from the criminal 
underworld adeptly exploited the situation. According to the local voters, the by-elect ion 
of PAO president, to replace Amnat, on 5 September 2010 became an "ugly battle 
74 Details of these polit ica l murders were reported in Nakhon Sawan loca l newspapers. See, in parti cu lar, 
Khao Siam, 16 August 2010: 1-4. 
75 lnterview, journalist and friend of Am nat, Na kJ1 on Sa wan, 4 September 20 10. 
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between crooks and thugs."76 The two leading candidates were well-known for their 
unruly and dishonest behavior, and both of them were running as proxies of their bosses. 
One was a former policeman, boxing camp owner, and avid gambler. He used to supply 
protection for local mafias who owned gambling dens, underground lotteries and 
brothels. Later he turned to local politics and was elected provincial councilor but 
continued his work with gangsters. He was independent of Arnnat and had his own 
support from influential figures. 77 In this by-election in particular, he was financially 
supported by an illegal cartel, comprising a corrupt high ranking police officer and a big 
boss from a neighboring province, Uthaithani. The second leading candidate was a 
gangster turned politician who owned a large underground business, involving 
prostitution, underground lotteries, gambling, drugs, and illicit transportation. His 
construction cartel also monopolized business in several provinces in the lower north by 
using force to scare away his business rivals. A power vacuum in Nakhon Sawan gave 
him a perfect opportunity to expand his business empire. 78 Another candidate was also a 
former police officer notorious for his extrajudicial killings. When he quit the police, he 
established a security company monopolizing protection business in Nakhon Sawan. 79 
His brutality scared off opponents, including provincial council members. Amnat 
appointed him to a PAO administrative position and assigned him many "dirty jobs." He 
had created many enemies for himself and Arnnat. This candidate was proud of his 
record. "I am a fighter," he declared, "if I did not fight, I could_ not live in Nakhon 
Sawan and I would not stay alive till now. Po litical struggle is very tough here."80 
76 Interview, senior local journalist, Nakhon Sawan, 7 September 2010; a small vendor, Nakhon Sawan 
city hall, 7 September 2010; former Nakhon Sawan MP, Nakhon Sawan, 5 September 20 10; government 
official in charge of overseeing Nakhon Sawan PAO head's by-election, Nakhon Sawan, 3 September 
20 10. 
77 Interview, local journali st and hustler, 3 September 2010 
78 Interview, local journalist, Nakhon Sa wan, 7 September 201 O; hotel businessman, Nakhon Sa wan, 6 
September 20 I 0. This boss used to be Amnat's business partner but later turned against him when Amnat 
stopped providing his company with contracts. I was told that he struck a lucrative deal with the candidate 
he supported- if the candidate won the election, this boss will get five percent commission fee from all 
PAO construction projects. It shou ld be noted that during the war on "dark influence" carried out by 
Thaksin government in 2003, this strongman was put on the blacklist by the authority and prosecuted on 
many charges. However, he made his political comeback after the coup. 
79 Every big company and govermn ent unit had no choice but to hire security guards from his company 
because that was the only way to ensure "safety" would be provided. Interview, local journalist, Nakhon 
Sa wan, 7 September 2010. 
80 lntervjew, candidate for Nakhon Sawan PAO president' s by-election, Nakhon Sawan, 4 September 
2010. 
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At the beginning, Pinyo announced that he was going to oppose these two candidates fo r 
the PAO chairman post, but he withdrew his candidacy at the very last minute. 81 He 
explained in the press conference that his mother requested he not stand because it was 
too dangerous and not worth risking his life. 82 Behind the scenes, however, Pinyo 's 
pullout was the result of political negotiation between political heavyweights in Nakho n 
Sawan after the killing of Amnat. They agreed that they had to temporarily unite to 
avoid the situation degenerating into full-scale war between warring factions. They 
agreed to give support to one candidate (the boxing camp owner) unanimously; Pinyo 
was asked to withdraw in exchange for a pledge from other groups that they would not 
field candidates opposing the Nirot family in the city municipal election. The political 
territory was divided up so that the province could have a provisional peace. Pinyo 
accepted the deal as he knew too well that since his family already controlled the city 
municipality, further control over the PAO, which invo lved a larger budget and massive 
manpower, would not be welcomed or tolerated by other factions. 83 
Despite the deal, vio lence still broke out as one small political faction did not agree to 
the negotiation. They fielded a strong candidate and put up a real fight. In the run up to 
the election, both sides tried hard to lobby PAO councilors for support. When lobbying 
fai led, violence was employed. On 20 August 2010, two weeks before the election day, 
Meekhom Sakulrat, a leading PAO councilor fo r Payuhakiri district and a wealthy 
businessman, was shot at point blank range and died in fro nt of the Nakhon Sawan 
Polytechnic School. It was known .that he was approached by one candidate asking for 
help, but he chose to help another candidate instead. This killing was perpetrated as a 
signal to other councilors to choose the right side. After this incident, several councilors, 
and Amnat's wife, fled the province to Bangkok and did not return until the poll was 
over. Nobody wanted to risk becoming the next victim. 84 Neither candidates nor their 
canvassers dared to canvass votes publicly. The campaign virtually stopped- no rall ies, 
81 He had already coll ected the registration form from the election commission office and put up his 
campaign billboard. lnterview, Saranyoo Athitsayanyakorn, director of Nakhon Sawan election 
commission, NakJ1on Sawan, 7 September 20 10. 
82 Kham Chat Luek, 11 August 20 I 0. Pin yo also told me that "it is not diffi cu lt to win thi s election , but I 
do not know how long I coul d stay alive after th at. " Interview, Pin yo Nirot, Nakhon Sawan, 3 September 
20 10. 
83 lnt erview, long-time vote canvasser and municipal member, Nakhon Sawan , 7 September 2010; election 
com mission officer, 7 September 20 I 0. Jitkasem Nirot was al so aware of the issue of power-sharing. 
When asked about the prospect of running for MP, he firm ly sa id no, saying that the Nirot fami ly already 
has hi s brother as an MP. Interview, Jitkasem Nirot, Mayor of Nakhon Sawan city muni cipality, Nakh on 
Sawan, 2 September 2010. 
" Interview, local journali st, Nakhon Sawan, I September 20 10. 
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no caravan, no door knocking, and no speeches. 85 On polling day, only 50.29 percent of 
voters turned up to cast their ballots, a very low turnout for a PAO president election. 
Moreover, invalid votes (votes for no candidate combined with spoiled votes) hit a 
record high of ten percent, clearly reflecting the electorate's dissatisfaction with both 
candidates. At the end, the candidate supported by a group of local bigwigs won the 
election with a clear majority. 86 A year later, unfortunately, the provincial election 
commission charged that the winning candidate had violated electoral laws. The case has 
been forwarded to the Appeal Court and the decision is still pending. In the meantime, 
he has been suspended from the job until the court decision. Tensions arose in the 
province. It is highly likely that violence will break out soon as the balance of power has 
been disrupted again. 
One veteran politician complained that, following the coup, as experienced politicians 
were banned and political paiiies dissolved and weakened, "politics in the province is 
controlled by hoodlums who know nothing except using force." 87 Another one summed 
up the situation in Nakhon Sawan with a candid remark: "politics here is full of 
gruesome murders because there is no mighty godfather. Every boss has quite equal 
power so no one is afraid of anyone. That is why they kill each other again and again." 88 
Now we tum to the last violent province, exploring poLitico-econ_omic structures and 
electoral violence in another fragmented territory-Nakhon Si Thammarat, the most 
dangerous place for voting in Thailand. 
85 My personal observation, Nakhon Sawan, September 2010. The political atmosphere in Nakhon Sawan 
a week leading up to the poll was calm but tense. 
86 Khom Chat Luek, 8 September 2010: 8. Interview, Saranyoo Atbitsayanyakom, director of Nakhon 
Sawan election commission, Nakhon Sawan, 7 September 2010. 
87 Interview, former candidate for Nakhon Sa wan MP and mayor, Nakhon Sa wan, 5 September 2010. 
88 Interview, Thap Krit District's municipal councilor, Nakhon Sawan, 7 September 2010. 
243 

Chapter 9 
Nakhon Si Thammarat: Inter- and intra-party violent fighting 
Nakhon Si Thammarat is located 780 kilometres from Bangkok on the eastern shore of 
the Gulf of Thailand, the most populous province of southern region, and the second 
largest southern province in terms of area. It is mainly rugged hilly rain forest. The large 
area of water of the Songkhla lakes basin connects the province to Songkhla, 
Phatthalung, and Trang, forming the distinct geographical setting called the mid-south. 
Since the late seventeenth century, the region has been known for its rich natural 
resources. The land was "harvested for bamboo, therapeutic herbs ... animal hides and 
tusk ivory" and "the forest people collected bamboo, resin, rubber sap, honey and rattan 
which they bartered for rice with cultivators on the plains ." 1 Geopolitically, the province 
has long been the center of governance in the southern region. Because of its 
topography, distances, and rough environment, the Siamese Royal government in the 
past had only nominal control over the region. Nakhon Si Thammarat was a powerful 
local proxy on whom Bangkok had to rely. In a position of regional hegemony, the 
province's ruler enjo yed formidable political power and economic prosperity. Amid the 
extensive reforms of King Chulalongkorn, however, the Bangkok elites attempted to 
centralize power and curb the dominance of ruling local elites. Nakhon Si Thammarat's 
1 Reynolds 2011 : 48-49. 
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autonomous power was reduced when the government designated Songkhla, its 
neighboring province, as the center of the southern administrative circle of provinces 
(monthon).2 But Bangkok did not always prevail. Because of difficult access to this 
inhospitable frontier territory and poor governance infrastructure, matters of security and 
justice were often left to forceful local leaders. A local historian noted that even though 
the southern railroad line was built in 1907, the area was largely still an isolated place. 
Indeed, it was still being settled up unti l the late 1950s.3 Unsurprisingly, the province 
has a long tradition of lawlessness, "banditry," rural toughness, and pirating. 4 Since the 
late 1970s, the province has had a reputation for its frequent politically motivated 
killings. Also, it competes with Chonburi and other notorious provinces for the highest 
crime rate in the country. 
Nevertheless, as already discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the high rate of homicide or 
"everyday" vio lence does not necessarily indicate violent electoral politics. Several 
provinces with high crime rates have managed to conduct peaceful elections. The 
provincial political economy is a decisive factor creating conditions for high-stakes, 
fierce, and violent contestation. Underground and illegal economic activities are rampant 
in many areas ofNakhon Si Thammarat and make large sums of money for several local 
big men who control these businesses. This includes smuggling and counterfeiting; drug 
trafficking; prostitution; running casinos, gambling dens, and underground lotteries ; 
illicit mining and fisheries; automobile theft; extortion; and protection rackets. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the nexus between illegal economy and political actors produced 
dead ly electoral competition. As elsewhere, electoral politics in Nakhon Si Thammarat 
are closely related to political-economic conditions. 
As one of the country's most populous provinces, Nakhon Si Thammarat has been 
ass igned ten MP seats in the national election. 5 Nakhon Si Thammarat is subdivid ed into 
23 districts. The districts are further subdivided into 165 sub-districts (tambon) and 1428 
vi llages (muban). 
' Reynolds 201 1: 49-50. Though the administrative unit was titled "Nakhon Si Thammarat," the 
admmistrati ve center was at Songkh la (Tej 1977: Appendix Ill). 3 Mana 2003: 25-36. 
4 Trocki , unpublished; Th omas 1975. 
5 According to the Election Com mission data in 2007, th ere were two other provinces that have ten seats 
of MPs: Udon Than i and Buriram. Provinces that have more MPs sea t than Nakhon Si Thammarat are 
Chian g Mai ( 11 ), Khon Kaen ( 11 ), Ubon Ratchathani ( 11 ), Nakh on Rat chasirna (I 9) , and Bangkok (36). 
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1. Mueang Nakhon Si Thammarat 13. Ron Phibun 
2. Phrom Khiri 14. Sichon 
3. Lan Saka 15. Khanom 
4. Chawang 16. Hua Sai 
5. Phipun 17. Bang Khan 
6. Chian Yai 18. Tham Phannara 
7. Cha-uat 19. Chulabhom 
8. Tha Sala 20. Phra Phrom 
9. Thung Song 21. Nopphitam 
10. Na Bon 22. Ciiang Klang 
11. Thung Y ai 23. Chaloem Phra Kiat 
12. Pak Phanang 
Prior to 1976: ideological electoral campaigns 
Electoral competition turned fierce in Nakhon Si Thammarat after the- late 1970s and 
reached its highest level in the 2005 national election. Prior to the troubled period, 
elections in the province had been relatively calm and gave a platform to many honest 
and capable pobticians, who came from relatively poor families and started their careers 
as local school teachers, lawyers or civil servants. After several years of hard work in a 
district, either native to them or adoptive, and being loved and respected by the local 
people, these individuals were asked to nm for elective positions. With the full support 
of the electorate, they won elections handily with very simple electioneering-door to 
door knocking. This method required no major investment and no political machine. 
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Three names, plus one, were cases in point: Cham Jarnratnet, Sawai Suthipitak, and 
Norn Upparamai. Cham (1898-1978) was MP for Nakhon Si Thammarat five times. 
Before running for elections, he was a school teacher and civil servant whose young life 
was inspired by the revolution of the People's Party that overthrew the abso lute 
monarchy in June 1932. He stood for elections and won from 1937-1957, and in the 
House of Parliament he earned a good reputation as a vocal and dedicated MP fighting 
for the welfare of his constituents (Cham 1978). Sawai (1917-1994), followed his 
father's footsteps and became a teacher and civil servant. As a bright student, he 
received a masters degree in Economics from Thammasat, after which he was offered a 
teaching job at Thammasat University while working at the Comptroller General 's 
Department. During the Second World War he joined the underground Free Thai 
movement led by Pridi Bhanomyong. After the war, he was elected in his hometown and 
appointed a secretary of the prime minister, a very prestigious position for a politician 
from a humble famil y from the south.6 Norn (1911-1983) was another outstanding MP 
from Nakhon Si Thamarnrat who at one point of his political career was elevated to the 
position of deputy House Speaker and minister for education. He taught at many local 
schools before proceeding to work at the Interior Ministry and later became a lawyer. He 
entered politics first as an elected councilor for Nakhon Si Thammarat Muang 
municipality, and later became a deputy mayor for several terms. In 1952 he ran for the 
lower house and was elected and won another three times. The 1969 general elections, 
held under the Thanom Kittikachorn government , was the last election that he stood for. 
The last position before he stepped down was as Deputy House of Parliament Speaker. 
His reputation as an honest, po lite, humble, and ideologically committed politician was 
widely acknowledged at home and abroad; he was awarded a number of certificates of 
merit for his work, and after he retired fro m politics he was invited by many institutions 
to give lectures on local history, geography and language. 7 These three fine politicians 
were quality lawmakers in the early period of Thai Parliament, and had counterparts in 
several other provinces. It is ironic that prior to the· 1973 democratic uprising, when Thai 
par liament did not actually control mu ch power and perks, and the stakes were not high 
in electoral competit ions, the country witnessed a large number of high caliber 
6 Th e governm ent he served was toppl ed by the coup in 1947. He withdrew from politics and establi shed 
his law finn , but fina ll y had to fle e th e country in 1949 , along with several supporters of Pridi , as he was 
one of th e targets of poli tica l persecution of Phi bun ' s government (Vichien 2000; Narong 2005: 41-44) 7 Davi d Wil son ( 1966: 2 19) notes that Norn "has sought publi c office for more abstract motives than 
money. 
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politicians entering the House. The situation changed dramatically after 1973, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, when a the new type of politician came to the scene. 
Besides the three honorable cases, it is pertinent to discuss one additional figure from 
Nakhon Si Thammarat: Surin Masdit, who represented and struggled in a transition 
period from the old era of peaceful and non-spectacular competition to the new era of 
turbulent elections. 
The Democrat Party versus the Ketchart family: violent competition for dominance 
and territory 
Masditfamily 
Surin Masdit (1927-1986) was a respectable three-time legislator who represented 
Nakhon Si Thammarat from 1969 to 1976.8 As a child from an extremely poor family 
with no secondary school education, he was remarkably successful. He started out as a 
janitor, and then became a secretary of the city municipality before being elected 
municipal councilor and eventually speaker of the municipality. Soon afterwards he 
worked as the main vote canvasser for Democrat candidate Sawai Sawasdisarn (a rival 
of Cham and Norn), for several years and ran for the position himself in the 1957 
election but fai led to get elected. He finally succeeded in 1969. As~ young MP under a 
military dictatorial regime, he made himself known for his open criticism of the army for 
its secretive budget and operations. At the same time, he founded and edited the local 
newspaper named "Siangrat," (People 's Voice) a hugely popular newspaper in Nakhon 
Si Thanunarat because of its direct criticisms of incompetent and corrupt local officials. 
As a result of his outspoken role, he became popular among progressive students and 
dissidents who were challenging the regime at that time. After the fall of the Thanom-
Praphat government in 1973, he was elected twice in 1975 and 1976, and was appointed 
as Minister in the Prime Minister Office under Seni Pramoj's government. His 
progressive ro le continued throughout this turbulent period of "democratic experiment." 
Unfortunately, his ministerial term was very short as it was disrupted by the brutal 
student massacre and the 1976 coup. Surin, along with the other two ministers of the 
Democrat party, were accused by right wing groups of being communists, a serious 
8 For the colorful life ofSurin and his political role, see Narong 2005: 51-54; Tawatchai 1998: 158-60, 
and; Cba li ao 2000. 
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charge that endangered their lives. Therefore he fled and later entered the monkhood to 
protect himself, and withdrew entirely from politics. 
Throughout his political career, Surin was loyal to the Democrat Party. He never 
switched to another party. In fact, he was the key person who made the Democrats 
immensely popular in Nakhon Si Thamrnarat. He built a strong network of vote brokers 
through his friends and relatives and expanded the voter base of the party. And his 
articulate and aggressive oratorical style became the prototype of the Democrat's 
electioneering. The newspaper he founded had also served as the party' s mouthpiece . 
His reputation and strong voter base paved the way for two of his political successors to 
enter the House with ease. His daughter, Supatra Masdit, a USA master 's degree 
graduate who retired from teaching at Thammasat to run for MP, was elected in 1979 
with the highest number of votes in the province. She had a successful political career, 
was elected an MP seven times (never losing in a single race), and was the first female 
MP to be appointed a minister. She served as PM's Office minister twice, from 1988 to 
1990 and 1997 to February 2001. After that she faded from politics, but the Masdit 
family still had another member serving as an MP in the parliament. Surachet Masdit , 
the eldest son of Surin, became a legislator for Nakhon Si Thammarat in September 
1992 after working as a bureaucrat in the Health Ministry and later serving as a 
provincial councilor after 1985. As the eldest son, he had taken care of the family's 
political business, acting as a power broker for his father and his sister locally while they 
were doing their duties in Bangkok.9 Supatra and Surachet , as well as their father, were 
loyal members of the Democrat party; their long-running electoral victories partly relied 
on the party brand, and, in turn, strengthened the popularity and influence of the party in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat. 
Samphan Tongsamak 
Another political figure who helped the Democrat party to assert dominance in the 
province was Samphan Tongsamak (1942-) . A local teacher and journalist-turned-
politician, Samphan was the longest serving MP and a leading figure of the Democrat 
party in Nakhon Si Thammarat. He won elections thirteen times consecutively fro m 
1975 to 2007. Well known fo r his political shrewdness since he was young, many 
candidates requested he wo rk as their vote canvasser. Samphan was Surin 's po litical 
protege, from whom he had learnt var ious electioneering techniques. His political 
9 The Nation 9 February 2009 : I B: Ta watchai 1998: 158-60. 
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persuasiveness and manipulative skill were legendary. A story was told that in the run up 
to the 1975 election, when he was asked by Surin to have a meeting with the rector of 
Nakhon Si Tharnrnarat Teaching College in order to invite him to run for MP for the 
Democrat. Samphan did not actually go to the meeting, instead he told Surin that the 
rector declined the candidacy-and proceeded to run on his own. 10 He was also keen to 
establish his vote canvassing network. His early career as a teacher in local schools 
helped him build strong networks with teachers, many of whom later became key vote 
canvassers for him. He never lost an election. His promotion to the post of deputy 
minister of education from 1983-1988 and minister of education from 1992-1 995 helped 
reinforce his strong patron-client relationship with the teaching community. Also, 
Samphan often visited his constituency and cultivated relationships with a wide range of 
social groups, including not only monks, students, village headmen, local politicians, 
civil servants, and also some local fellows with shady backgrounds. 11 
After the 1975 elections, the Democrat party led by Samphan and the Masdit family, 
along with other candidates, tried to assert political dominance over their opponents. But 
the path to dominance was not a smooth one, and took a long time. In fact, it was quite 
bloody. Relat ionships among Democrats were equally unstable as they were fighting 
against each other fo r political hegemony. Contrary to popular myth or even scho larly 
conventional wisdom that the Democrat Party had long dominated _the southern region, 
including Nakhon Si Thammarat, it was really only after the July 1995 election that the 
party succeeded in conso lidating its provincial base in Nakhon Si Tharnrnarat (and other 
provinces in the south). 12 The Demo crats' mo st fo rmidable and long-standing opponent 
was the Ketcha1i fam ily. 
'
0 Interview Natt awut Karnpob, former personal secretary of Samphan, 2 August 2005, by Narong 
Bunsuaykh wan, quoted in Narong 2005: 56. 
11 Matichon,7 April 2001: 1 I; Matichon, IO May 200 1: 1, 2 1. 
12 For the conventional account of the Democrat party, see Noranit (1 987); for the Democrats and the 
south, see Ji ra porn (2004). TI1e Democrat Party itself loves to label its party "a party of southern people." 
The exceptional work which rightly discusses and tries to challenges the ex isting myth is Askew 2008. 
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Table 9.1: The performance of the Democrat Party in comparison to other parties 
in Nakhon Si Thammarat, 1975-2011 
Election Date Democrat Party Other Parties Total 
26/1/1975 5 3 8 
4/4/1976 8. 0 8 
22/4/1979 3 5 8 
18/4/1983 9 0 9 
27/7/1986 9 0 9 
24/7/1988 4 5 9 
22/3/1992 7 2 9 
13/9/1992 6 3 9 
2/7/1995 10 0 10 
17/11 /1996 10 0 10 
6/1 /200 1 10 0 10 
6/2/2005 10 0 10 
23/12/2007 10 0 10 
3/7/20 11 9 0 9 
Source: Nakhon Si Thammarat Election Commission; Narong (2005: 28-36) 
Ketchart family 
The gripping story of the power struggle in Nakhon Si Thammrat is not complete 
without reference to its most famo us and powerful fami ly, the Ketcharts. The fami ly has 
been actively invo lved in provincial political life since the late 1970s and was a key 
actor in the province 's ferocious political battles. The three most renowned family 
figures were Preecha, Nivet, and Somnuek, who together made the fam ily legendary, 
being called by lociJls the "three musketeers." 13 They were sons ofa well-to-do business 
family. 14 Their father, Mia Ketchart , was a self-made man with great di ligence. By the 
1940s, Mia had set up shops trading agricultural too ls and construction materials, and 
owned a fresh market , an apartment block, rice and vegetable farms, and a bullfighting 
den (a very popular loca l sport associated with gambling). His mother was a hard-
working housewife who helped her husband farming and selling food in the market. 
Apart from Preecha, Nivet, and Somnuek, they had another three sons and three 
13 Int erview, sen ior loca l vote canvasser, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 2 1 January 2000. 14 The following infomiation on early period ofKetchan fam ily, if not otherwise mentioned, 
is based on Ramai (2000: 67-73) and Pradit ( 1998: 102 -1 90). 
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daughters living together in a large house. Most of their children became merchants or 
traders, with only two working in the bureaucracy. Local people called the Ketchart's 
patriarch "Nai Mia" (boss Mia), a name borne with pride in the family, as he had a 
reputation for being charismatic, respectable, and very generous. 15 Many people sought 
out his family for various kinds of help, and the Ketcharts provided free food and jobs 
for the poor and unemployed. Many neighbors worked in their farms and dens. The 
respected Ketcharts naturally earned the status oflocal patron. 
Chart 9.1: The Ketchart Family (a selected genealogy) 
Mia + his wife 
f Preecha I Nivet 
j 
I Somneuk+ Saisawatinthisae seven other siblings I 
Kanop brother 
During election campaigning, Ketchart's house was frequently visited by many 
politicians. "Nai Mia" was courted by candidates from different part_ies to work as a vote 
canvasser, and he agreed to work for some of them. The young family members of 
Ketchart thus had a good grasp of politics. Among Nai Mia's heirs, the seventh child, 
Somnuek Ketchart (1940-), had the most successful political career. With seven terms as 
Nakhon Si Thammarat mayor, from 1985 to 2011, Somnuek was one of the longest 
serving local politicians in the country and dubbed by the media as "the permanent 
mayor ofNakhon" 16. He was elected first as municipal councilor in 1980, then elevated 
to the post of deputy mayor in 1982 and mayor two years later. Before he stood for 
election, he was a successful businessman who owned a cattle ranch, a construction 
company, a s·aw mill, and a newspaper. His "Muangtai" (Southern City) newspaper was 
highly popular and was in competition with "Siangrat" of Surin Masdit. Given his 
Bangkok-based university education, fluency in English, excellent leadership skills, and 
15 "Nai" is originally used to mean a member of the nobility, but now mainly used for mister, master or 
boss. 
16 "Nakhon" is a short and popular name that people refer to Nakhon Si Thammarat province. Somnuek's 
impressive record is only second to Hat Yai Mayor Kreng Suwannavong who was in power for 29 years 
from 1973-2002 . For Kreng' s political career, see Prachakhom Thongthin, 13 (16 March- 15 April 2002): 
36-38. 
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personal wealth, he possessed greater resources than his opponents. He was very popular 
with voters as his administration pioneered numerous welfare projects and infrastructure 
development, including free healthcare, affordable and high quality education, sport 
stadiums, and cheap water and power supplies. 
Under his administration, Nakhon Si Thammrat municipality received many domestic 
and international awards. Somnuek was invited to conferences and workshops to talk 
about local development. Regarding elections, there were many times when his team 
won all the available councilor seats, and sometimes he even ran uncontested for the 
mayoral post. The Ketchart family not only had complete control over the municipality, 
but also dominated the provincial council. Nivet Ketchart (1929-2005), Somnuek' s elder 
brother, had been elected a provincial councilor since 1973 and held the powerful 
position of council president ever since. Large numbers of councilors were under his 
patronage and control. Effectively the two brothers Nivet and Somnuek had a firm grip 
on their political territories. Their predominance, however, was owed to the support of 
their beloved and forceful bro ther, Preecha Ketchart. Preecha was different from his 
brothers as he never held a fo rmal political position throughout his life. Nevertheless, 
even without the elected post, he commanded tremendous political influence. According 
to his enemies, he had a domineering and vicious persona, but to his friends and 
fo llowers Preecha was a respectable and benevo lent man. Called by locals "Nai hua 
Cha" 17 and earning the title of "Nakhon godfather" from the popular press, Preecha's life 
conveniently fitted the notion of " life- imitating-art, more than art in1itating life ." 18 He 
was a man of broad connections and charisma, fea red and loved by people, and fo llowed 
by an entourage of loyal subordinates roaming the city day and night. People in disputes 
asked fo r his mediation, and people in serious trouble likewise sought his help. He had 
been allegedly invo lved in the Nakhon Si Thammarat underworld of crime and 
racketeering fo r decades. 19 Undeniably, his influence was cri tical to his brothers ' 
polit ical success. He exercised his po litical muscle behind the scenes in every way he 
co uld to ensure that his fami ly's po li tical dynasty was not overpowered by rival s. With 
17 Nai hua is a common , unoffi cial titl e used by people in the south to address a respectabl e well -to-do 
man. It is equi va lent to p ho-liang in the north . 
18 It was not a secret th at Preecha was highly impressed by the main character in the fam ous novel The 
Goe/far her by Mario Puzo and repeatedly read th e book (whi ch had been tran slated into Thai in I 979 and 
had become very popu lar) in order to learn lessons from th e story Interview, form er local gunman , 
Na kh on Si Thammarat , 2 1 January 20 I 0 . 
19 lt was reported that Preecha an d hi s followers had operated protecti on rackets, ransom, gamblin g dens, 
broth els, and underground lotteries . in terview, form er loca l poli ceman and form er gangster, Nakh on Si 
Th am marat, 2 1 and 22 January 20 I 0 . 
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Preecha in the shadows, Nivet and Somnuek enjoyed firm control of their political 
organizations with no difficulty. 
Since the 1980s, the Democrats had tried very hard to penetrate into the terrain of the 
Ketcharts' power but they had not succeeded. The Ketcharts, on the other hand, 
attempted to expand their territorial power from the municipal and provincial council to 
the House of Legislature but to little avail. Both sides were persistently defeated when 
they went beyond their strongholds, but they kept fighting. This situation made electoral 
contestation in Nakhon Si Thammarat from the early 1980s to the late 1990s extremely 
fierce and often fatal. 
Even though the Ketcharts stood independently at local elections, they chose to affiliate 
with major political parties in the national elections. Those parties likewise wanted them 
to be a local political partner in order to win over the Democrats. The Ketcharts were 
originally affiliated with the Kitsangkhom Party of Kukrit, the main Democrat opponent 
in national politics. The family entered the national arena for first time in the 1979 
election, fielding Somnuek as a candidate, but he failed to get elected and never ran for 
MP again (concentrating instead on municipal politics). In the April 1983 election, the 
family made another attempt. This time Nivet was appointed head of the Kitsangkhom 
team that was up against the Democrats, led by Samphan Tongsamak and Supatra 
Masdit. Nivet ran in Constituency 1, which mainly covered the muang municipal area, a 
family power base. Electoral results demonstrated that the Kitsangkhom candidates put 
up a good race, but they still lo st to the Democrats . Nivet, as team leader, obtained the 
highest number of votes but it was not enough to elect him to the House. The Democrats 
won all nine seats and Samphan Tongsamak was rewarded by his party the post of 
Deputy Minister ofEducation. 20 But the Ketchart family did not give up hope of having 
a family member in the House, as they led a group of Kitsangkhom's candidates 
competing with the Democrats again in 1986. This time another family member, Vichot 
Ketchart, wh~ resigned from the post of provincial councilor to run for MP, was head of 
the team. Unfortunately, though Vichot and his colleagues gained more votes than in the 
previous election, they were still crushed by the Democrats. 
As mentioned above, electoral contests in Nakhon Si Thammarat were highly vio lent. 
But the patterns and perpetrators of violence had significantly changed from the 1970s to 
20 Praclit 1988: 103 - 107. 
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1980s. Before the 1980s, electoral violence was related to the ideological conflicts and 
government' s suppression of the communist insurgents. At that time, some areas of 
Nakho n Si Thammarat province were under the influence of the Communist Party of 
Thailand (CPT), especially the Thung Song, Ron Phibun, Chian Yai, Hua Sai, and 
Chauat districts adjacent to the Banthat Mountain. A number of local residents in these 
districts went to the jungle and joined the communist armed struggle. The spreading of 
communist ideas and the clout of the CPT certainly helped two Socialist Party 
candidates win seats in the constituency in 1975 and 1976, the first and the last time that 
the province had radical, left-leaning lawmakers.21 As a strongho ld of the CPT, the areas 
intermittently witnessed violent clashes between government soldiers and insurgents, 
and the violence spilled over to the electoral sphere. For example, on the polling day of 
the April 1976 election, in the Thung Song district that was a stronghold of the Thai 
Communist Party, there was a report that a group of30 militia soldiers in green uniforms 
went around the village intimidating voters not to go cast ballots, and four villagers had 
been reportedly killed two days earlier. 22 In the next election in April 1979, communist 
insurgents attacked a precinct in Chauat district on voting day trying to snatch ballot 
boxes and clashing with soldiers patrolling the area. The intense fighting lasted for 
around 20 minutes and resulted in the loss of one sergeant. 23 The violent battles between 
state officials and rebels surrounding electoral campaigns finally faded by the early 
1980s once the CPT had collapsed. 24 
Since then, election-related violence was conducted by warring local political factions 
and fa milies. The ultimate goal of the violent tactics was to win the election, not to 
disrupt it. The April 1983 campaign marked a watershed in the changing patterns. The 
election witnessed intimidation by opposing camps: the Ketchart family and the 
Democrats. Immediately after the poll, the winning candidate Sarnphan requested 
21 
Those two candidates were Chanrni Sakdiset and Akom Suwann op. Chamni was later a key member of 
the Democrat Party. For a hi story and operations of CPT in Na khon Si Thammarat, see Saroop (2009: 
302- 327) and Phu Banth at Group (200 1). For the popularity of lefi-l ean ing parti es in the 1975 and 1976 
election , see Chapter 2. 
22 Prachachat, 4 April 1976: I , 2, and 12. 
23 Matichon, 23 Apri l I 979. 
24 
The fal l of the CPT, ex plains Anderson (1977 ; 1990), was primaril y caused by th e three-corn er war of 
1978-80 among Communist China, Communist Vietnam, and Communist Cambodia. During th e war, 
Vietnam invaded and occupied most o f Cambodia , an d it defea ted the Chinese arm y th at attempted to 
occupy Vietnam . Both Vietnam and conquered Cambodia stopped p rovidi ng th e CPT with weapons, 
money, protection, an d cross-bord er safety. Also, China (to whi ch th e largely Chinese leadership of the 
CPT was loya l) shut down the CPT's propagand a radi o stati on and other bases in Yunnan in exah ange for 
the Thai governm ent' s su pport for th e Khm er Rouge. See Chapter 4 for the broad picture of the changing 
pa ttern s of electora l violence from th e 1980s to 1990s. 
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protection from the police as he claimed that his life had been threatened by a "local 
influential figure" so that a by-election would be staged, 
[T]herefore I could not be incautious. Everyone knows how threatening 
the influential people in Nakhon Si Thammarat are. If they can get rid 
of me, then nobody stand in their way ... since the communist rebe ls' 
power diminished, now the local gangster stepped in terrorizing 
residents. If anyone refused to be under their thumb, they would be 
threatened and pillaged. Everyo ne knows who the gangster 's leaders 
are, but rio one dare speak up. 25 
The Democrats frequently accused the Ketchart fami ly of using "dark influence" to win 
elections. In both general elections in 1983 and 1986, the slogan of the Democrat team 
led by Samphan Tongsamak was "Do not elect mafioso to the House." The message 
clearly attacked the Ketchaii family. 26 Ahead of the 1986 election campaign, the 
political situation heated up when Samphan demanded that the government deploy 
police forces down to Nakhon Si Thammarat, arguing that the province was facing a 
serious problem of "dark influence." Samphan and other Democrats furt her complained 
to Prime Minister Prem Tinasulanond that Kitsangkhom's supporters in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat used a lot of gambling and illegal money to fund their ~lectoral campaigns 
against the Democrat Party. Because he was a minister in the coalition governmem, the 
government responded promptly to Samphan's complaint. In late 1985, minister of 
interior General Sith Ji.rarot ordered a major police operation led by the infamous Police 
Colonel Sanphet Tharnmathikun (1940 -) to crack down on Nakhon Si Thammarat mafia. 
This po litically motivated scheme ended in a bloody operation. Born in Surat Thani, 
neighboring province ofNakhon Si Thammarat, Sanphet had spent most of his career 
suppressing banditry Gi troubled provinces, his colorful character earned him the 
nickname "Jack Parlance lawman. "27 Sanphet was a rogue police officer who believed 
that to suppre~s serious crime police had to operate outside the normal scope of the law. 
He was hence notorious for the practice of extrajudicial executions. To carry out the 
assigned operation in Nakhon Si Thammarat, he enlisted a gro up of local thugs to help 
him patrol the city. Sanphet worked closely with Samphan to subdue the underworld 
25 Matichon, 21 April 1983: 3. 
26 Pradit 1988: 112. 
27 People thought be looked like a famous Holl ywood actor who portrayed some of the most intense and 
gripping villains in severa l movies. 
257 
networks of Preecha Ketchart. According to Samphan, once he arrived in the province, a 
senior local policeman, who was a mutual friend of both he and Preecha arranged a 
meet ing among the three to try to stall or halt the operation. Samphan issued an 
ultimatum to his adversary Preecha: 
you tell your people that if they want to contest politics either local or 
national ones, they must stop all unlawful activities. Otherwise, if you 
guys want to make money from illegitimate business, then you have to 
refrain from politics and so I will pretend that I do not know what kind 
of business you are in. 
Preecha refused to make a deal. 28 Afterwards, Sanphet called a meeting with the po lice 
officers from the whole province, declaring in front of them that 
from now on we are going to a battle .. . it is a tough war fighting our 
enemies without knowing when it will end. We might be wounded or 
even shot down. So everyone get yourselfready. 
He also told the police who had been under the payroll of the outlawed gangs to quit or 
transfer to work in other provinces as he could not work with the corrupt officials. 29 
Full-scale war had been further justified when Sanphet called a press conference 
officially accusing several Nakhon Si Thammarat provincial councilors of being 
members of criminal gangs who used dirty money to manipulate provincial politics. The 
press conference caused an uproar. At a provincial council meeting on 5 November 
1985, V ichien Ketchart, co uncil chairman, joined other councilors in strongly 
condemning Sanp het ' s allegat ion and demanded he be transferred out of the province 
immediately. The mot ion was carried by a unanimous vote. The fo1mal letter was sent to 
th·e national po lice chief and inte rior minister in Bangkok, but to no avail. 30 
Nothing could stop Sanphet. He delivered named coffin s to the temple near every single 
of his target 's houses, and a few days later those coffins were actually needed. Many 
loca l ruffi ans, felons, gunmen, thieves, and gang members, including Preecha, were 
28 See the story about this interestin g encounter in Sanph et' s un publi shed p iece of wri ting (Sanphet, 
unpublished paper). 
29 Sanphet, unpubl ished paper. 
30 Prad it 1988: I 08. 
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forced to flee to save their lives.3 1 Those who did not escape, for whatever reaso n, were 
brutally gunned down. The killing spree was widespread particularly in city areas, in 
which the Ketchart family power base was located. The operation received a mixed 
reaction from the local people. Many of them were glad that the criminal gangs were 
suppressed. However, many were disappo inted with the motives behind and 
consequences of this operation. It was clearly a politically_ motivated plan to weaken the 
Democrats' political opponents. On the one hand, vote canvassers who were not on .the 
Democrats' s ide effectively became casualties of this war. On the other hand, it was a 
free ticket to those vote brokers or local mafia on Sanphet's and Samphan's sides to 
continue their illegal activities. The Ketchart fami ly business empire was in ruins. Police 
blocked their financial transactions and closed down Preecha's illicit business affairs, 
including gambling dens and underground lotteries . The economic bases of their power 
were crumbling. 32 Despite this, provincial criminal activities continued, merely changing 
hands from one kingpin to another. Sanphet's key henchmen took over the Nakhon Si 
Thammarat underworld and established themselves as new gang leaders. 
It was no surprise that the July 1986 election was violent. Since the start of the 
campaign, three vote canvassers of the political parties opposed to the Democrats had 
been executed by unknown hit men in different locations. One key Democrat vote 
canvasser was also shot dead. The deputy police chief ofNakhon Si :rhammarat said that 
from January to April, vast numbers of people in warring political fact ions had been 
murdered. 33 In the run up to the election day, candidates and their supporters were 
campaigning in an ever more difficult, life-threatening situation. In August 1987, one 
month after the poll, Samphan's house was bombed. He immediately blamed "the 
influential figure" fo r the incident. It was not difficult to figure out to whom he was 
referring.34 The climate of fear and hostility remained until the following July 1988 
election. Certain cases of election-related violence were connected to previous confl icts. 
31 Some gunmen were ex-communists who, after emerging from the jungle, either worked independently 
or with a big man. They were another prinrnry target of Sanphet. Many of them had to wait until Sanphet 
left the province before they could come back home safely. Preecha reportedly went to Chonburi to li ve 
with kamnan Pho, Somchai Khunpluem. Interview, fonner local police and former friend of Preecha, 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, 22 Jan uary 20 I 0. Also see Cham long Fangcholchit, "Pol. Col. Sanphet 
Tham math ikul and Jatukham Ramthep (endmg)," Nation Sudsapda, 24 December 2007: 75. 
32 Infomoants mentioned a comparison between Preecha and kamnan Pho. Preecha, unlike the Chonburi 
godfather, had not diversified or expanded his business to legitimate ones, so his power was in disarray 
when his network of underground economy was destroyed. lnterview, former MP candidate and vote 
canvasser for Nivet Ketcbart, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 26 January 2010. 
33 Matichon, 8 May 1986: I, 2; Matichon, 22 Ju ly 1986: 1, 2. 
34 Despite that, there was a strong rumor among the loca l people that it was a self-perpetrating act (Pradit 
1988: 104-105). 
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For example, on 5 May 1988, one man was found shot dead in his own house in Muang 
district. The victim was identified as a former aide of Pol. Co l. Sanphet and also a key 
vote canvasser of Samphan in the last election. The relationship between him and 
Samphan turned sour after the election, and eventually they turned from allies to foes .35 
In following elections, the Ketchart family switched from Kitsangkhom Party to General 
Chava!it Yongchaiyudh's New Aspiration Party (NAP), as they hoped that a new 
political partner would assist them in subjugating old political rivals. 36 The conflict 
continued. Be that as it may, a new group of young blood politicians emerged and 
complicated the battle for a power monopoly in this vo latile province. In July 1988 the 
Democrat Party lost all three seats in Constituency 3 to young candidates from Khao Na 
Party: Chamni Sakdiset, Witthaya Laewparadai, and Sutham Sangprathum. All of them 
were progressive student activists in the 1970s and novices at electioneering, except 
Chamni who had run once before in 1975. Their vigorous, determined, and fresh 
campaign, plus a selling-point of being home-grown, gave them electoral success. They 
continued their impressive performance in the subsequent two elections in March and 
September 1992, joining the Palang Dharma Party of Maj. Gen. Cham long Srimuang. 37 
For the Democrats, these political newcomers were a new major obstacle to their 
aspiration of political monopoly. Just as in earlier years in regard to the three Ketchart 
brothers, they came to be known as the "young three musketeers. " 
Throughout the 1990s, electoral violence in Nakhon Si Thammarat primarily stemmed 
from a power struggle between the Ketchart family and the Democrats. The emergence 
of new faces added fuel to the fire but did not shape or change existing cleavages, 
because the Democrats succeeded in persuading the newcomers to work with them in the 
35 Matichon, 6 May 1988 , I, 2. 
36 Following a trend of soldi ers enterin g tl1 e parliament, Cha va lit Yongchaiyudh formed th e New 
Aspira tion Party in 1989. A core of hi s party members compri sed of retired military officers, bureaucrats, 
and loca l notables. For tl1e role of Chava lit and his NAP party, see Kin g 1996. 
37 The Palang Dharma Party was establi shed in 1988 by th en popular Bangkok governor Chamlong, a 
religious ascetic who ea ts one mea l a day and has taken a vow of celibacy. During the 1970s, however, he 
was pan of the ri ght wing mobili zati on aga in st the progressive movements of student- labor- farmer 
alliance. The core members of its founder came from the Santi Asoke Buddhist sect and youn g 
professional s. The party was popu lar am ong th e urban middl e class, particularly in Bangkok, as it 
projected the clean image of its leaders. The party was not success ful in the ou ter provinces though. The 
victory of its three ca ndidates in Nakhon Si Thammarat was thus highl y impressive and sign ifi cant. For 
the ro le of Chamlong and the Palang Dharn1a Party, see Chapter 3 and 4, and Sombat (1989); McCargo 
(1997); King (1996). 
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1995 general election.38 At the same time, the Ketchart family ' s power and support had 
dwindled as a consequence of the ugly battles with Sanphet. Many followers left the 
Ketcharts. The turning point came in 1999 when Preecha passed away. The loss of its 
indispensable coercive resource threw the family into disarray. Family enemies fully 
exploited their disintegration in the 2000 PAO elections. These local elections were 
highly important as they laid the political fo undations for the general election in 200L 
Local election winners would be in a position to exercise immense power and budget 
under the control of the PAO office to help their team win on the national stage. The 
PAO election was very close and vote canvassers on both sides lost their lives in the 
violent campaign. Ketchart 's team led by Nivet and backed by the NAP Party won 25 
seats out of a total number of 42, and the rest were won by the Democrat-backed and 
independent candidates. The result made Nivet strongly believe that councilors would 
elect him chairman of the Nakhon Si Thamrnarat PAO. However, a group of the 
Democrat MPs led by Chamni Sakdiset interfered and lobbied councilors to vote for 
their candidate, Vithun Detdecho , Chamni's right-hand man and cousin. The lobbying 
turned nasty when some councilors were kidnapped and locked up in a safe house in a 
neighboring province until voting day, 15 February 2000. The Ketcharts could not reach 
some of their team members. On voting day, the atmosphere was extremely tense. The 
provincial governor deployed 200 police to secure the meeting hall, in which the vote fo r 
chairman was talking place. Nivet lost to Vithun by 19 votes t_o 23. Several team 
members had clearly betrayed him, and his legendary record of serving 21 terms as the 
chainnan of the provincial council had come to an end. 39 A wave of po litical ki llings 
took place after this political intrigue, and several local vo te canvassers and councilors 
were victims. 40 
Without Preecha in charge of the Ketcharts ' political schemes, the family was 
powerless; they were unable to pull the strings as they had done in the past. Political 
struggles in Nakhon Si Thammarat demonstrated that coercive force was imperative to 
the acquisition and maintenance of power. By the end of the 1990s, the Democrats had 
achieved nearly complete political control of the province as they held all MP seats in 
38 Only Sutham refused to join the Democrats. He stayed wit h Palang Dharma, and later was one of the 
fou nding members of tl1e Thai Rak Thai Party. 
39 See details in Siam Rath , 16 February 2000: 1, 10; Krungthep Thurakit, 16 February 2000: 12, 18. 
40 See the murder case of the Democrat MP's assistant in June 2000 (Thai Rath, 6 June 2000); a bomb on 
the Democrat Party's headqua11er in Chauat district in January 2000 (Maticlwn, 5 January 2000: 1, 31); 
murders of Samphan 's vote canvassers in April 200 I (Khao Sod, 7 April 200 1: ll); the assassination of 
PAO chairman ' s advisor in May 200 1 (Matichon, 10 May 2001: 1, 2 1); the failed assassination of 
provi ncial councilor for Pak Panang district on August 2001 (Matichon, 29 October 2001: l , 2 1). 
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the July 1995 and November 1996 general elections and had their own person elected as 
the PAO chairman. Now, they wanted to take over the last territory of power that they 
had not yet succeed in controlling- the city municipality. The Ketcharts, on the other 
hand, vowed to save their last territory at all costs. 
The Ketchart family's last stand, Democrat intra-party conflicts and small bosses 
There were four important elections being held in Nakhon Si Thammarat in the first half 
of the 2000s: the general election in 2001, the city municipal election in 2003, the PAO 
election in 2004, and the February 2005 national election. The Democrats emerged as 
clear winners in all contest, except the municipal one. The Ketchart fami ly withdrew 
from the general election in 2001 as they realized they had no chance of winning and 
they wanted to focus on the municipal level, their last stronghold. The 2003 municipal 
election was crucial as it was the first direct election for Nakhon Si Thammarat city 
mayor. Somneuk' s position was to be challenged by candidates supported by famous 
Democrat MP Surin Pitsuwan. Surin was a Harvard Ph.D. graduate and a former 
Thammasat lecturer in the Political Science Department, elected as an MP for the first 
time in 1986. A former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs from 1992 to 1995 and the 
Minister in the same ministry from 1997 to 2001 , he enjoyed a high international profile 
and was reportedly aiming to run for the position of United Nations general secretary. 
Ironically, his standing in the province was not on a par with his international fame as he 
was accused by other Democrats of abandoning his constituency and losing touch with 
local vo ters. Other candidates viewed him a vulnerable member of the team due to his 
infrequent visits to the constituency. He was perceived as the team's weak spot. 4 1 
Political infighting within the Democrat party was common in Nakhon Si Thammarat as 
everyo ne wanted to acquire hegemonic power over this mo st populous of southern 
provinces. Intra-party confli cts heightened after the party achieved its dominance in the 
mid 1990s. One strategy fo r the Democrats to be on top of their party fellows was to 
head the electoral campaign team and have their own people take control of lo cal 
elective posts. Surin, while st ill being an MP, volunteered to lead the campaign fo r the 
city municipal elect ions in 2003 for the Democrats. He claimed it was time he took the 
helm as Samphan Thongsamak, former Democrat campaign leader, had fa iled many 
times in defeating the Ketchart famil y. Surin delivered good results as Democrat 
candidates won half the total municipal council seats. It was the first time Ketchart 's 
" Commen ts made by a key vote canvasser of the Democra t quoted in Narong (2005: 63). 
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team failed to have absolute control in the municipality. Somneuk, however, managed to 
win the first direct election as city mayor. 42 
The 2004 PAO Chairman election 
Political battles between the two rival camps continued in the following elections. In 
2004, in the first direct election for PAO chairman, the Ketchart family supported their 
main ally, Surachai Danwattananusorn, former Pak Panang district councilor, to 
challenge the incumbent. The Democrat Party announced they would not field any 
candidate.43 The announcement stemmed from existing conflicts between the two 
Democrat factions led by Surin Pitsuwan and Chamni Sakdiset. Chamni supported the 
incumbent, Vithun Detdecho, while Surin's key political aide, Sayan Yutitham (who was 
provincial council president under Vithun's administration) put himself forward as an 
alternative candidate. The Democrat Party's conunittee did not give endorsement to 
either Vithun or Sayan as they did not want to take side. Finally both of them ran as 
independent candidates, but locals were well aware of their political allegiances. As 
mentioned, the phenomenon of intra-party conflict is normal for the Democrat Party in 
the southern region as the party brand was very strong, motivating ambitious members to 
compete for party candidacy for the local and national elections. The Thai Rak Thai 
party also got involved in the competition as they wanted to assert their power in a 
Democrat party stronghold . Initially, the party wished to field Sanrhet Thammathikun, 
the famous lawman and former Commander of Provincial Police for Nakhon Si 
Thammarat who carried out the violent crackdown on criminals in the 1980s. Sanphet 
had been a member of the party since it was founded and assisted in TRT's election 
campaign in 2001, fighting the Democrats (his former allies in the 1980s). Nevertheless, 
the TRT had fonned a tactical alliance with and relied largely on the Ketcharts in 
penetrating the Democrats' terrain, therefore it acceded to the Ketcharts ' proposed 
candidate.44 The election thus witnessed both major intra- and inter-party conflicts. 
The two main candidates, Vithun and Surachai, were experienced, well-connected and 
savvy political figures who had been involved in provincial politics for decades. Vithun 
(1955- 2009) was a close relative and long-time political aide of Chamni Sakdiset. He 
42 Prachakhom Thongthin, 3: 26 (April 2003): 30-31; Siam Rath , 30 April 2003: 23. 
43 Even though Nivet did not run for the chairman, the Ketchart family fielded several young family 
member as candidates for provincial councilors (Matichon, 10 February 2004: 22). 
44 Matichon, 6 January 2004: 22; Krungthep Thurakit , 26 January 2004: I 5; Matichon , 6 February 2004: 
22; Siam Rath, 11 February 2004: 23. 
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came from a poor family background, had been elected as provincial councilor since 
1984 and canvassed votes for Chamni for many years. Known as a local strongman, 
Vithun owned cock- and bull-fighting dens, and a few scandals made him notorious. On 
2 August 1999, on a trip to Bangkok, he and his friend were stopped and their car 
searched by the police. The police fo und a heavy load of drugs and weapons in their 
Mercedes-Benz. Prior to this search, the police had received information from their 
sources that traffickers were moving drugs from the south to the capital. However, with 
a few phone calls to a "powerfu.1 person," Vithun was out on bail with only a charge of 
carrying an offensive weapon in public, while his friend faced a severe charge of 
possessing drugs, was refused bail and locked up in jail. The scandal made headlines for 
several days and was discussed in the parliament as Chamni was by that time a Deputy 
Minister of Interior and Vithun an ass istant of Chamni and pro vincial councilor. The 
opposition accused Chamni of interfering in the police investigation and having a 
gangster as his political assistant.45 The scandal notwithstanding, six months later 
council members elected Vithun PAO chainnan, defeating Nivet Ketchart. During his 
first term, provincial councilors complained and charged him with physical assault and 
intimidation in connection to PAO competitive construction biddings.46 In addition, his 
chairmanship was consistently challenged by the opposition councilors led by vengefu l 
Nivet, with the support of Surachai. Vithun survived all political maneuvers aiming to 
overthrow him, but, because of the council fi ght ing, his administration hard ly passed any 
laws or implemented any policies. 
Against this backdrop, the PAO election on 14 March 2004 was closely monitored by 
police as the prospect of extreme violence loomed large. It was a neck-and-neck race 
and in the end the poll was won by Vithun by a small margin. Pre- and post-electoral 
violent incidents took place leaving two dead and one serious injured. In the final stage 
of electioneering, there was a serious dispute between two of Vithun's vote canvassers, 
as one accused the other of secretly lending support to the opponent. Only two days after 
the dispute, the accuser, who was a personal secretary of Chamni and former counci lor, 
was shot dead at night after finishing his canvassing.47 Two weeks after the poll, 
45 Thai Post, 3 August 1999: I, 16; Thai Post , 5 August I 999: 1, 16; Krung/hep Thurakit, 6 August 1999: 
15-16; Marichon, 7 August 1999: 20. 
46 There was one contractor lodging an assault charge against him witl1 the Mueang police station in 
March 2000 (Siam Rath , 27 March 2002: 20). Hi s admin istrati on was oft en in conflict witl1 the public 
officia ls over th e issue of transparency o f the constructi on project. Interview, former Na khon Si 
Thammarat PAO's officia l, Na kh on Si Thamm arat, 29 January 20 I 0. 47 Marichon , 2 March 2004: I , 13; Marichon, 4 March 2004 : I, 5. 
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another chief vote canvasser of Vithun was gunned down. The police investigation 
found that, after the election, the victim' s life was targeted by the losing candidate, an 
influential person in the area. 48 Lastly, on 8 May 2004, masked gunmen on motorcycles 
opened fire on Suyit Chusuthon, a newly elected provincial councilor, at an intersection; 
he survived but was badly wounded. 49 
The 2005 national election 
After local people and observers thought they had witnessed the most violent electoral 
conflict in the history of the province, the 2005 general elections delivered even more 
deadly outcomes. In this election, the Ketchart family consistently joined TRT in an 
attempt to expand their territorial power and defeat the Democrats. The TRT campaign 
director was Sutham Saengprathum, former Nakhon Si Thammarat MP and one of the 
fabled "three musketeers" who successfully challenged the Democrat Party's 
dominance. The TRT fielded new faces and veteran candidates and expected to gain two 
or three seats, putting high hopes in Constituency 1 in particular because the Ketchart 
family was fielding its own third generation, Kanop Ketchart (1970-), the eldest and 
beloved son of long-standing mayor Somnuek. Kanop, unlike his father and his uncles, 
grew up in a different environment which had no connections to the underworld. Being a 
former student activist and bright engineering graduate from the esteemed 
Chulalongkorn University, he obtained his doctorate in engineering_from the University 
of Colorado at Boulder, and came back to work as a university professor in Thailand and 
was rapidly promoted to the position of deputy dean.5° Kanop was thus a very 
formidable candidate, possessing a good education, wealth, social status, and 
membership in a political dynasty. Moreover, he was very young and energetic and an 
extremely hard-working candidate, spending two years in advance of the scheduled 
election electioneering and visiting every single household in the precinct. Another 
factor that strengthened his confidence of winning was the fact that there were 66,000 
votes in the municipality, the family fortress, which constituted 60 percent of all voters 
in Constituency 1 . 
The Democrat party was hence not confident ofretaining their seat in this constituency. 
The incumbent Huwaideeya Pitsuwan, younger sister of Surin Pitsuwan, was a weak 
48 Matichon, 3 April 2004. 
49 But he could not spoke after since as the bullet cut through his vocal cords. See Ph unam Thongthin, 4: 
50 (April 2005): 85 . 
so Interview, Kanop Ketchart, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 3 December 2009. 
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Democrat cand idate as she had only served as MP once (in 2001). 51 At the last minute, 
with a great surprise to political observers and TRT, the Democrat party changed its 
candidate. Huwaideeya was moved to the party list seat at number 47 (with little chance 
of being elected), and Surin moved from the party list to replace his sister in 
Constituency 1.52 Despite having won six elections, Surin admitted that this election was 
to be the toughest of his po litical career. He explained why he had decided to make his 
comeback in the constituency: 
[C)ompetition in the area is becoming dirty and violent, and getting 
worse ... local voters have been threatened by influential groups not to 
help the Democrat candidate ... It was too hard for my sister to handle. 53 
His explanation regarding "influential groups" was clearly a revival of the old political 
discourse the Democrat party had employed to attack the Ketchart family in the past. 
Kanop, on the other hand, attacked the weakness of Surin, 
Local people want a representative who stays in the constituency, works 
on their behalf and coordinate projects with the government. . . People 
have not benefited from their representatives as much as they should 
because their MP is rarely here and has taken little interest in local 
issues. 
His campaign posters asked local people bluntly "what has Mr Surin done for you during 
his 19 years in parliament?"54 Both the TRT and Democrat party devoted their time and 
energy electioneering in this constituency (and another two that TRT thought they had a 
chance to win). It was a Thaksin policy that the party would not waste time in 
constituencies they could not win. In Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thaksin publicly conceded 
that the party expected only 2-3 seats.55 The statement was reinforced by Sutham, the 
TRT campaign manager, and refl ected in the way the party fund ed their campaign. The 
51 
She had an opportun ity to run fo r th e constituency seat in 200 I as Surin had moved 10 1he party li st sea t. 
Surin, however, had to fight hard with Samphan and Chamni to secure th e candidacy for hi s sister because 
those two MPs wanted to fie ld th eir own people. Fina ll y Surin won thi s bitter infi ghting at the expense of 
ot her party faction s' leaders. 
52 
It was chaotic as massive campa ign posters and banners of Hu waideeya in every spot throughout th e 
f: recinct had to be taken down and replaced by Su rin ' s posters in the last stage of campai gning. 3 The Nation, 4 February 2005: 5A. 
54 Bangkok Post, I February 2005: 3. 
55 Prachachat Tlwrakit , 31 January 2005: I 0. 
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stakes were exceptionally high in Constituency I, a battle between "two doctors," in 
which the opposing candidates were long-time rivals. The Ketchart family wanted to get 
revenge for their unexpected defeat earlier in the municipal council election and to fulfill 
their long-time political dream to have family member in parliament. Kanop was 
carrying the burden of his family's unfulfilled aspirations. Surin likewise could not lose 
since his family would then have no representative in the House. The Democrat 
heavyweights such as Chuan Leekpai, former prime minister, Apirak Kosayodhin and 
Abhisit Vejjajiva had to make several visits to Smin's constituency, an indication of how 
precarious his position was. 
The Special Branch Police 's secret poll and intelligence report indicated that the TRT 
had a chance of winning three seats in Nakhon Si Thammarat, including Constituency 1, 
and the contests (along with Buriram and Phrae) were prone to violence. 56 The fierce 
competition among candidates prompted the Region 8 Police office (covering the upper 
south region) to closely monitor the movements of suspected local hit men in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat and neighboring provinces who were plotting attacks on candidates and 
canvassers. Police beefed up surveillance operations in the run-up to the election by 
setting up check-points at strategic locations and conducting weapons searches. One 
week before election day, the Region 8 Police raided eleven locations in Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, including the houses of local politicians and canvassers, in search of illegal 
weapons. The main targets were Surin's and Kanop's key vote canvassers, and large 
amounts of weapons (machine guns, hand guns, and grenades) were found and seized. 57 
In spite of tight security, the 2005 poll was the most violent national electoral 
competition in the history of the province. Regarding electoral results, the Democrat 
Party was able to secure all ten seats as they had done in the previous elections, and 
Surin narrowly escaped a humiliating defeat. Kanop, on the other hand, failed to make 
history for his family. But he remained active pursuing his political career. 58 
56 Khao Sod, 22 December 2004: 31. The Special Branch Police, or the "Santibal" in Tiiai , was a po li ce 
unit responsible for detecting and investigating political crime. Their activities generally include coll ecting 
and analyzing data , and submitting intelligence reports to the government. One of their routine tasks was 
to conduct a secret nati onwid e poll survey, infamously known in Thai as "Santibal poll," regarding the 
general electoral competitions. For a brief history of the organ ization , see Tyrell Haberkorn , "Special 
Branch Poli ce," (unpublished paper 2012). Also see Chapter 7 and 11 for the 2005 elections in Phrae and 
Buriram (respectively). 
57 Khao Sod, 27 January 2005: 15; The Nation, 2 February 2005: SA. These raids were part ofThaksin 's 
"war on influential people" (see discussion of this policy in Chapter 5). 
58 Interview, Kanop Ketchart, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 3 December 2009. Kanop believed that ifSurin did 
not replace his sister, he would definitely have won th e competition. After the electi on, he was appointed 
to be an assistant for Minister of the Prime Minister Office, and later an advisor of the Nakl1on Si 
Thammarat mayor. 
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In the aftermath of the victories obtained by the Democrats in the 2004 PAO election 
and 2005 general elections, the Democrat Party had reached political predominance in 
the province . And Nakhon Si Thammarat became "the Capital City of the Democrats" as 
it had contributed the largest number of seats to the party. 59 It played a pivotal role in the 
party's electoral strategy. Ironically, the acquired party dominat ion exacerbated conflicts 
and deepened the divisions between the democrats. Almost all of Nakhon Si 
Thammarat's influential po litical families, except the Ketchart family, had associated 
themselves with the Democrat party. These prominent families were: Sakdiset, 
Boonyakiat, Senpong, Kaewparadai, Wichaikun, Masadit, Pitsuwan, Adithepworaphan 
and Thongsamak. No family has been able to achieve economic or political dominat ion 
over the other fam ilies. The fragmentation of power among the Democrats lies in the 
fact that none of them belonged to a prominent business family. Most of them, except 
the Adithepworaphan family, had backgrounds in Jaw or teaching before entering 
politics. 60 Once they became lawmakers, they started doing business by putting 
investment in public companies, the stock market, natural resource extraction, or owning 
local enterprises, particularly construction. This pattern of wealth accumulation and 
power contrasted the pattern witnessed in Phrae in which prominent political families 
generally arose from elite business families. 61 And because of the environment of 
unsettled political terrain and consequently fierce political struggle, each faction had to 
construct his/her own networks of supporters and then attempt to glue them together 
through patronage, money and coercive power. 
As illustrated above, many Democrat MPs (not different fro m their opponents) had 
themselves surrounded by a group of fo llowers who had shady backgrounds or were 
connected to illegitimate businesses. 62 This pattern significantly shaped the course of 
political struggle in Nakhon Si Thammarat. As a professional politician-turned-
59 The party ga ined 97 constituency sea ts in th e 2005 general election. Therefore the seats it obtained in 
Nakh on Si Thammarat constituted 10 percent of the total. 
60 The Adithepworaphan family owns th e Toyota dealership for Nakhon Si Tharnmarat. Nari sa 
Adithepworaphan , a second generation of the fami ly was an MP since 2001. See her and her family asset 
in: http://www.thai swa tch.com/pol i tician/info/pid/POL00000005 89. 
6 1 It is, however, s imilar to th e " politics to bus iness" pattern of the Kamprakob family in Nakhon Sawan 
(see previous chapter) . 
62 A notable example of this was Nom Temrat, key politi ca l aide of Samphan Tongsamak, who was 
support ed by his boss to get elected as a provincia l councilor. A big-time gambler, land speculator, and 
one of th e most powerful loca l big men, he was shot dead on 9 May 200 I, not long after the PAO electi ons 
in whi ch he ran and lost. Over his career, he had made a lot of enemies in the loca lity (Matichon , 10 May 
200 I: I. 21 ; Matichon , 13 May 200 I : 23; Matichon, 28 May 200 I : 19). 
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entrepreneur, being elected to the House gave the access to profitable opportunities and 
power linkages with other businessmen and political authorities. The political position 
was also crucial to protect themselves and their followers from investigation and 
prosecution over illegitimate and/or unlawful conduct. In Nakhon Si Thamrnarat, 
political power constantly shifted from one faction to another within the Democrat Party. 
The fact that each political faction has relatively equal influence in the province has 
made the intra-party competition for political offices in Nakhon Si Thamrnarat very 
tense and prone to violence. The conflict usually started in the process of candidate 
selection. Each group lobbies party leaders fiercely to field their relatives or key 
supporters. The entitlement to Democrat candidacy became a valuable political resource 
worth fighting for. Back-stabbing and betrayal were normal among warring factions. 63 
The 2008 PAO Chairman election 
Fierce Democrat Party infighting has been manifested in various cases. The 2007 city 
municipal election witnessed friction between the Pitsuwan and the Senpong families, 
both of whom fielded their own candidates to compete with Somnuek. The long-
standing mayor won handily as loyal Democrat loyal voters were split. 64 Infighting 
occurred again in the 20 April 2008 PAO chairman election. Chamni Sakdiset and 
Chinnaworn Bunyakiat, both high-ranking members of the Democrat Party, fielded their 
cousins who stood against each other for the post. The Ketchart faITiily and TRT party 
did not compete. This election clearly proved that intra-party competition is as fierce and 
deadly as inter-party conflict. Media described the contest as "a striking thunderstorm" 
as both camps employed dirty tactics to overpower their enemies, including vote-buying, 
lawsuits, intimidation, violent attacks, as well as sinister black magic. 65 Many vote 
canvassers on both sides were assassinated. 66 It was certainly the most violent PAO 
63 There was an infamous case in the 2005 general elections in whi ch one Democrat incumbent made a 
large sum of money (around IO million baht) by "selling" his candidacy to an ambitious fellow. Interview, 
former MP candidate, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 3 December 2009; interview, loca l businessman, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, 20 January 2010. 
64 Kham Chat Luek, 15 May 2007: 5. 
65 On 5 February 2008, a group of monks found that a black magic ceremony was done on temple grounds, 
evidenced by broken tiles and burning pictures of candidates with their names in folding papers. 
According to tJ1e monk, the ceremony was an old practice aimin g to curse the targeted person to death 
(Matichon , 7 February 2008: 8; Daily News, 7 February 2008: I, 15). 
66 For instance, th e failed assassination of the candida te for the deputy PAO chairman during tl1e elect ion 
campaign (Khao Sod, 16 September 2007: 15); tJ1e killing on 28 Apri l 2008 of a contractor and TAO 
chairman who was a key vote canvasser of hi s relative in the PAO elections (Phunam Thongthin, 8: 87, 
May 2008: 33); the murder in early May 2008 of a businessman who canvassed votes for his niece large 
enough to win over the candidate from an influential local fa mil y in Tasala district (Manager, 3 June 
2008); and th e assassination of the famous gunman ni cknamed "Juab Paknang" on 25 May 2008 , who was 
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election in the history of the province. The winner, Vithun Detdecho , Chamni 's cousin, 
won by a slight margin. A few months after the election, 200 police searched the house 
of the new PAO chairman and found a large stock of machine guns and ammunition. 
The PAO chairman Vithun believed that this search was politically motivated.67 Only a 
year later, voters had to cast a ballot again fo r a by-election for PAO chairman as Vithun 
suddenly died of cancer. 68 The by-election on 24 January 201 0 was unequivocally a war 
of Democrat against Democrat; there were five candidates, four of them affiliated with a 
current Democrat MP (Chamni Sakdiset, Surin Pitsuwan, Chinnawom Bunyakiat, and 
Witthaya Kaewparadai). The only non-Democrat candidate, Kriangsak Phuphantrakun 
received po litical, tactical support from the anti-Democrat fo rces in the province.69 The 
anti-Democrats felt that politics of the province needed to be changed and the 
Democrat's political monopo lization had to be stopped. The candidate they supported, 
however, was a former member of Bunyakiat's team in the previous PAO election. In 
this sense, every contender was, to certain extent, tainted by association with the 
Democrat power machine. There were two fro nt-runners: the one backed by Chamni, 
who was able to solicit support from most Democrat MPs and Vithun 's family, and the 
one supported by Chinnawom Bunyakiat, the then Minister for Education. The electoral 
contest was tense. Of the five cand idates, three were locally known for their involvement 
in illegal businesses and underground activities. After Vithun's fa ll, conflicts between 
the Democrats deepened, thus increasing the chances of violent confrontation. A telling 
manifestation of the highly vo lati le situation was the fact even after winning, the elected 
candidate was not brave enough to go anywhere public. He locked himself in his house 
for almost a month, protected by his own bodyguards and po lice. He was told by his 
political advisers that he faced the real danger of being assassinated by his r ivals. 70 
Provincial election commissioners were concerned by this prospect of post-election 
violence. There were precedents of elected candidates being ki lled before an official 
announcement, therefore enabling the runner-up to be declared the winner instead. 7 1 In 
incriminated by the police in conn ection to th e murder of the contractor on 28 Apri l 2008 (Manager, 12 
August 2008). 
67 Ma1icho11, 18 October 2008; Matichon, 22 October 2008. 68 Hi s sudden death was a top ic of discussion. Most loca l people believed that he di ed, not from cancer, 
but from black magic. Personal observation and interviews, loca l residen ts, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 
December 2009 and January 2010. 
69 Thi s led to strange bedfellows, as it comprised of th e Ketchart family, some TRT members, red shirt 
groups, a few Yellow Shirt faction s, and a group of gamblers and gangsters. Persona l observation and 
direct participation in electi on campaign , Nakhon Si Thammarat, December 2009 to Febru ary 20 I 0. 70 Personal observa tion , Nakhon Si Thammarat, January 20 10. See a lso the news report in Siam Ralh, 26 
January 20 10: 24; Siam Rath , 15 February 20 10: 21. 
71 Interview, loca l electi on commiss ion officer, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 26 January 20 I 0. 
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this sense, it was not completely paranoid to be overly cautious. In fact, during the 
campaign, all major candidates were put in bullet-proof cars with their personal 
bodyguards or gunmen, and some of them even wore bullet-proofvests.72 
Small local bosses and scattered violence 
Even though the province does not have a nationally famous godfather, there are several 
groups of small-scale local bosses or local big men in the province who make their 
living from smuggling, gambling, prostitution, drugs dealing, underground lotteries, 
illicit trade, protection racketeering, and other fraudulent business. When these illegal 
activities are connected with politics, as elaborated in Chapter 3, they make political 
competition prone to violence. In addition, plentiful natural resources, such as forests, 
minerals, rubber, seafood, oil, and vast land drive fierce political struggle at elections. 
Nakhon Si Thammarat has a large agricultural sector, covering a wide range of 
enterprises from mining, forestry, rubber and coffee plantations, fisheries, and shrimp 
farming. These types of business need considerable manpower and land and strong 
muscle. to control them, and, political influence to obtain licenses and ward off business 
rivals. Business and political conflicts are closely intertwined. Disputes over land 
entitlement, land encroachment, bidding for licenses and construction projects frequently 
breed violence. Intimidation and murder are employed to get rid of epemies who stand in 
their way to the exploitation of rich natural resources and the monopolization of the 
lucrative businesses. 
As a result, violent conflicts among the local bosses and their henchmen are common in 
Nakhon Si Thammarat. Most of these petty gangsters are naturally vote brokers for 
prominent politicians. With the support of their powerful bosses, many of them have 
moved into legitimate politics and successfully transfonned themselves. The 
differentiation between crime and politics, criminals and politicians has been blurred in 
this dangerous, power-fragmented province. 
The case of a politically motivated murder of a journalist in Nakhon Si Thammarat 
reaffirmed the province' s notoriety. On the night of I August 2008, Atiwat Chaiyanurat, 
a reporter of Matichon daily newspaper, was shot dead at home in Nakhon Si 
72 Personal observation, Nakhon Si Thammarat, December to January 2010. Interview, local journalist, 
Nakhon Si Thammarat, 28 January 2010. 
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Thammarat. Shortly before his death, he had reported on many cases of corruption in 
local administrative organizations. Because of his articles, certain politicians had been 
disqualified from running for local elections. A preliminary investigation suggested that 
his murder was linked to his journalistic work. Apart from reporting on corruption, he 
also covered a police manhunt for a gunman who had been in the district prior to the 
local election. His investigation into the search for the assassin angered a senior 
provincial civil servant who had allegedly protected the gunman. Atiwat and his family 
had received death threats several times. The fact that the killing took place inside his 
house and was carried out by highly professional gunmen indicates that the murder was 
not only premeditated but also arranged by influential figures. In the end, the son of a 
prominent PAO politician, an enemy of Atiwat, was summoned and investigated by the 
police. 73 The murder of a journalist should not be ignored by observers or the state since, 
compared to other countries (like the Philippines or Sri Lanka), killing journalists is less 
widespread in Thailand. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Thai political bosses 
normally avoid using violence against media personnel as it causes too much public 
attention. 74 
The local elections for the posts of Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO) 
chairman and councilor were no less violent than the competition at the municipal, PAO 
and national levels. For a long time, there had been evidence linking many homicide 
cases to competition for the office of village and sub-district headman. This type of 
political killing was rampant in the 1970s; large numbers of village and sub-district 
headman had been murdered throughout the province. 75 Since the beginning of 
decentralization, with direct elections for local administration, Nakhon Si Thammarat 
has been one of the hot spots (perhaps the "hottest" spot) facing rampant electoral-
re lated violence. Vast numbers of vote canvassers, including candidates themselves, 
have been killed during both pre- and post- election periods. Each politica l faction has 
supported their own relatives and subordinates in running for the TAO offices in order to 
co nt ro l the local budget and manpower deemed vital to their success in winning 
elections at higher levels. 
73 Interview, loca l journalist, Nakhon Si Thammarat, 28 January 20 I 0. For furthe r detai ls and progress of 
the case, see Matichon , 5 August 2008: Khao Sod, 20 October 2008; Matichon, 3 1 October 2008. 74 Another recent case of the murder of a journali st occurred in Suphanburi province, a province of a 
"peace fu l" strongman, Banharn Sil pa-archa. On September 27, 2008, Matichon journalist Jaruek 
Ra ngcharoen was fatally shot , and it was beli eved the kill ing was related to hi s reporting on loca l 
governmen t corruption. 
71 See an excellent study in regard to loca l violence in Nakh on Si Thammarat during the J970s by Trocki 
(unpubli shed: 29). 
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To sum up, since the 1995 general election, Nakhon Si Thammarat has been dominated 
by the Democrat Party at the national level, but highly fragmented at the local level. The 
Democrats' domination of the national level, however, has been constantly challenged. 
The electoral contestation of the province has been marred by violence as a result of 
both inter- and intra-party conflicts. The Democrats dominated the province in the same 
fashion that they have done in other upper southern provinces, using local cultural 
identity, patronage, and strong political machine.76 Nevertheless, the coercive force was 
as equally important as other factors, and was integral to the political struggle for the 
monopoly of power. Infighting among the Democrats and hostilities between them and 
their rivals are not yet over. The spread of local competing clans contributes to the 
frequent occurrence of violent incidents in local election campaigns. 
In the next three chapters, I examine three relatively peaceful provinces-Phetchaburi, 
Buriram, and Sa Kaeo. These .locations assume different political characters, power 
structures, and patterns of electoral conflict from what we have seen in the three violent 
provinces discussed in this part. Their experience unravels the possible variations of 
domination and contestation of power in Thai provincial politics. 
76 Askew 2008; Pichai, Somchet, and Vorawit 1988. 
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Chapter 10 
Phetchaburi: The blood ties that bind 
At first glance, Phetchaburi 's profile has all the necessary factors for pervasive electoral 
vio lence: a lack of monopoly of power, the involvement of local politicians in the illicit 
economy, plus the abundance of gunmen (read: coercive resources). The province, 
however, has managed to have remarkably peaceful elections over the past three 
decades. What was the missing causal linkage or, put in another way, what preventive 
measures ave1ied deadly conflict from erupting in the province? A close investigation 
into the political life of this medium-large coastal province, linking the central to the 
southern region, has revealed a non-violent pattern of power struggle. 
Phetchaburi is a medium-large province with a fairly small population, which makes it 
one of the least densely populated provinces in the country. Neighboring provinces are 
Ratchaburi , Samut Songkhram and Prachuap Khiri Khan. It is a coastal province not far 
from Bangkok (only 150 kms distance), with the Gulf of Thailand to the east and a 
mountain range forming the boundary with Myanmar. It takes only I hour 's drive from 
the capital to this popular vacation destination (known since King Rama the Fomth's 
time) which provides travelers with more tranquil and less expensive accommodation 
and faci lities than its counterpart on the east coast or the southern islands. The provincial 
economy is mainly based on agriculture, trading and small-scale industry that relates to 
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its rich natural resources, including tropical trees, valuable minerals, sea products, etc . 
The province 's location and abundance of natural resources are ideal for coastal 
smuggling, illegal logging, and contraband goods trading sold in Bangkok and other 
major provinces. Gambling, underground lotteries, and drug trafficking are also 
prevalent, and have becom~ profitable businesses for local politicians and bureaucrats. 1 
If we compare the province to Chonburi, a coastal province on the other side of the 
country which bears a striking resemblance to Phetchaburi but is more affluent, one 
could say that Phetchaburi is under developed. In terms of infrastructure, tourism and 
industrial development, Phetchaburi is far behind Chonburi. The province 's Gross 
Provincial Product per capita is, however, higher than Phrae, Buriram, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, and Sa Kaeo. 2 
The province is subdivided into 8 districts (amphoe), which are further subdivided into 
93 sub districts (tambon) and 681 villages (muban). 
I. Mueang Phetchaburi 5. Tha Yang 
2. Khao Yoi 6. Ban Lat 
3. Na ng Ya Plong 7. Ban Laem 
4. Cha-am 8. Kaeng Krachan 
As mentio ned, Phetchaburi is infamous as "the gunmen capi tal" of Thailand frequently 
identified by the Police Department as having the highest concentration of hired gunmen 
1 Pasuk, Sungsidh , and Nualnoi 1998: 33, 96, I 05 . 
2 Accordin g 10 the data in yea r 2008, Phetchaburi Gross Provincial Product (GPP) wa s 50,443 million baht 
and ils GP P Per Cap ita was I 09,227 million baht, whil e Chonbur i' s GPP and GPP Per Capita are 657,545 
and 544,160 milli on baht respecti vely (National Economic and Social Development Board 2008). 
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m the country. 3 In preparation for election security prior to each national poll, the 
activities and movement of groups of gunmen in Phetchaburi are always under close 
police scrutiny because the mercenaries from Phetchaburi are popular and in demand 
among the politicians throughout the country who want to use violence to eliminate their 
enemies. Hit men from Phetchaburi are popular because of their acquired reputation for 
accuracy, effectiveness, and discretion. However, most "killing orders" are from outside 
the province, particularly cases of politically motivated murders, because political 
competition in the province is relatively peaceful. 4 Phetchaburi is therefore a prime 
example of the geography of supply and demand of violence being separated and not 
necessary overlapping (see previous chapters). A province that has a high concentration 
of gunman is not necessarily an electorally violent-prone province, and vice versa. In 
Thailand, coercive resources like gunmen are a highly mobile workforce, conveniently 
facilitating a long-distance demand for violence. 
Besides being named a gunmen capital, news media, popular writers and observers 
usually call the province a "land of savages" or "city of the ruthless." 5 These 
inausp1c1ous names have damaged the province 's image and hurt local tourism and 
business; local residents and politicians complain about this 'notoriety'. 6 The local 
people have a point. Despite the high numbers of gangsters and hired gunmen, 
Phetchaburi does not have the highest murder rate in the country. _ 
Phetchaburi is definitely not a province devoid of crime and illegality, but the data show 
that it is not in the top-ten. In terms of homicide, it was rated somewhere between 13 th to 
3 See the information in the report by the Research and Development Division of the Royal Thai Police 
Department (unpublished: 17-20). For the account of Phetchaburi gunmen in the 2001 election , see King-
oe Lao Hong, "Gunmen ready for the poll: Helping their boss to the House," Krungthep Thurakd, 9 
November 2000: DJ (in Tiiai), and "Revealing gunmen blacklist: On sale during election campaign ," 
Daily News, 16 November 2000: l , 3. During Thaksin's administration, the government agency 
announced tha t Phetchaburi had 15 groups of hired gunmen, one of the highest in the country (Khao Sod, 
21 June 2003: l, 11). And see a news report on Matichon (22 October 2004) for the stories ofPhetchaburi 
gunmen in the '2007 general electoral contest. 
4 It is common to find in the police investigation that the pell)etrators of political killings in several regions 
were hired guns from Phetchaburi's gangs. See, for example, the case of murders in Rayong (Khao Sod, 
18 January 2001: 1, 6); the political kidnapping and intimidation in Samut ·Prakam (Thai Post, 14 
December 1999). Sometimes Phetchaburi's assassins travelled far to the south to execute their jobs. For 
example, the murder case in Nakhon Si Thammarat (Matichon, 31 January 1992: I, 22). Even Banharn 
Silapa-archa and his team members of Chart Thai party in Suphanburi were also the clients of 
Phetchaburi 's gunmen, hiring them to be their security guards during the election campaign in the 1980s 
(Matichon, 7 April l 983: 9). 
5 See, for example, Sarakadee magazine ( I 993: 53-59); Piak Chakkawat 2005: 70-128. 
6 It becomes the normal issue for debate in electoral contests in Phetchaburi on how to rescue the 
province's image .. See, for instance, the campaign in the 1988 election (Matichon, 10 May 198 8: 2); in 
200S (Bangkok Post, 25 December 2004: 3), and; in the 2011 poll (Matichon, 13 June 201 ]). 
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20th in the country.7 According to 20 10 police data, Phetchaburi ranks number 23 rd for 
homicide. Back in the 1980s and 1990s, when the province started to build its reputation 
as the "land of savages," Phetchaburi was even then not among the top-ten for murder. 
Nonetheless, the province's murder ranking taken per capita is significantly higher: in 
certain years, the province ranked number lO th .8 Other ·than Phetchaburi, there are 
several provinces which constantly appear in the top list of those plagued by criminality 
more seriously than Phetchaburi, namely Surat Thani, N akhon Si Thammarat, Songkhla, 
Trang, Chumpom, Krabi, Phatthalung, Chonburi , Nakhon Ratchasima, Phetchabun, 
Chinag Rai, Chiang Mai, Ayutthaya, and Suphanburi. 9 Also, the public has never 
perceived provinces such as Krabi, Suphanburi and Ayutthaya as "lands of savages," 
despite having actual high murder rates. However, the more important point is that there 
is no correlation between the homicide rate and election-related violence. Some low 
homicide rate provinces have faced rampant electoral killings. Phrae is a case in point. 
Whereas some high homicide rate provinces have managed to hold peaceful elections; 
Trang, Krabi , and Suphanburi are good examples of this. 
Phetchaburi's tainted image as a hotbed of criminal vio lence and politically motivated 
murders probably stems from the impression people received from the brief period of the 
province 's bloodsta ined history in the early 1980s. Even though the province has been 
tranquil and uneventful since the mid 1980s, the gripping stories linger on in peop le ' s 
minds, including those of academics. As wi ll be demonstrated in the follo wing section, 
Phetchaburi has turned from a ferociou s, vio lence-pro ne place to a strikingly peacefu l 
one. 
7 The top-ten ljst in 20 IO in cludes th e following provinces (by ranking order): Pattani, Songkhla, Nakhon 
Si Thammarat, Surat Thani, Narathi wat, Yala, Chonburi , Tran g, Patthal ung, and Chi ang Ma i. Thi s shown 
result was calculated by the author from th e raw data provided by th e Central In formation Technology 
Center (http: //stat istic. police.go.th/dn main .htrn). The three provi nces in the deep sou th - Pattani, Ya la, 
Narathiwat, on ly entered the top-ten li st after th e violence severely broke out in the areas sin ce 2004. For 
the data on the homicide ra te from 1983- 1996, see Worawan Chutha et al. 2000; from 1997-2010, see the 
Central Information Tech nology Cen ter's webs it e (http ://statisti c.police.go. th/dn main .htrn ). 8 See the detail in Worawan Chutha et a l. 2000: 12- 13. Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994: 76, in the brief section 
that th ey d iscussed Phetchaburi 's godfa ther, mentioned that in term s of cr ime statistics " Phetchaburi 
ranked third (behind Chonburi and Nakhon Si Thammarat)," but there was no exact reference provided. 
The information is u1 contrast to the data I have coll ected either in terms of absolut e number or rat io. 
Many other works sim ilarly referred to Phetchaburi as the prototype of th e Thailand 's violent, gangster-
dominated province, in cluding Nishizaki 2004, 20 11 , Ockey 1992. Thi s is al so contrary to my findin gs. 9 See the Research and Developmen t Divi sion of tl1e Roya l llrni Poli ce Department (unpubli shed: 
Appendix n); Worawan Chuth a et a l. 2000; the Cen tra l Information Technology Center 's website 
(http://stat ist ic.pol ice. go. th/dn main .h trn ). 
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From violent to peaceful province: the days before the family domination (1950s-
1983) 
The Angkinan family and their enemies 
ff Phrae has the Wongwan family as its well-known provincial political dynasty, 
Phetchaburi has the Angkinans. For years, members of this powerful family have been 
elected to parliament. Some of them obtained coveted ministerial positions and/or 
became prime ministerial advisors. This family has dominated both local and national 
politics in Phetchaburi for longer than any other family. It has built and sustained a 
strong connection to the military, the police and high-ranking civil bureaucrats, and has 
a wide informal network with groups of local notables and the underworld community. 
Their path to power had not been smooth since they had to fight fiercely with other 
political groups that had the similar goal of controlling provincial politics. During the 
open era of democratization and parliamentary politics in the 1970s, five major political 
forces emerged in Phetchaburi: the Angkinan clan, the Thianlai group, the 
Samphawakhup family, the Somjit Phuangmani group, and the kamnan Chong clique. 
The intense political struggles between these rising, ambitious powers produced deadly 
consequences for the province. Within a decade, however, the Angkinan family had 
survived severe political battles and emerged victorious. 
The Angkinan family is one of Phetchaburi's old established families. The founding 
political patriarch of the Angkinan family was Phat Angkinan (1911-1968). Phat was a 
son of the late Phum Angkinan, who was in turn the son of a Chinese immigrant who 
became a fab led lawyer during King Rama VI's reign. Due to his remarkable career, 
Phum, who was posted to Phetchaburi as a public prosecutor, received the noble tile of 
"khun" and a royally-bestowed surname. 10 He then became Khun Angkinanpong and 
practiced law in Phetchaburi until he passed away. He was loved and respected by the 
local residents as he kindly helped the poor and the helpless by providing them with 
cheap or even free legal counseling and services. 11 It turned out that his noble deeds did 
his descendants good political service when they stood for elections. Khun 
Angkinanpong had ten children with four wives, and two of his sons, including Phat, 
entered politics. 
'
0 Pasuk and Sun gsidh 1994: 77. 
11 Natchanut 2000: 9 1-93. 
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Phat Angkinan, like his beloved father, was a legal practitioner. He married the daughter 
of a big wealthy Phetchaburi family, and with her he had two sons, Piya and Yut 
Angkinan, both of whom later became highly successful and prominent provincial 
politicians. 12 After Khun Angkinanpong passed away, Phat established a law firm and 
made himself known to the locals as a dedicated lawyer who helped poor clients. Many 
of Phat's clients, including those who had shady backgrounds, became his political 
clients and brokers when he decided to run for municipal elections. In 1948, he won the 
mayoral race and remained in office for ten years. 
During his mayoral terms, other opposing local camps challenged him unsuccessfully. 
The most potent challenger was a group led by his own nephew, who Phat eventually 
persuaded to be his ally, thus avoiding unnecessary fighting. His sons learnt and later 
adapted this strategy as a way of handling opposition. Phat's electioneering style could 
be labeled a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, it was charitable and innovat ive (for 
that period), for example advertising at the movie shows or giving a political speech 
during the intermission of film screening (a free entertainment service provided by him 
during the election campaign). He also distributed goods to local residents and treated 
them to special feasts to show his generosity. 13 On the other hand, his campaign usually 
employed a large number of local tough guys and intimidating gunmen providing 
security everywhere he went. The distinctive character of Phat's entourage was open 
display of firearms in public. 14 Phat 's spectacular campaign style was clearly an exercise 
in coercive power and a demonstration of domineering fo rce aimed at intimidating his 
rivals and impressing locals. These strong-arm tactics initiated by Phat were adopted by 
other powerful local figures, including his enemies and his own sons in the ensuing 
years. 
12 In total, Phat has six children with several wives; two chi ldren wi th a first wife, one adopted daughter 
who later on married the poli ce chief of Phetchaburi, and three other children with unknown wives. See 
the oral hi story of Phat and hi s famil y col lected by the Loca l Data Base Project, the Academic Resources 
and In forma ti on Technology Center, Phetchaburi Rajabhat University in " Phat Angkinan- Phetchaburi " 
(h ttp://gold .pbru.ac. th//rLocal/stories.php?story=02/06/ I 9/I 008993) ; Yut 2003: J. 13 Yul confessed that his family handed out an enormous amount of moonshin e liquor (brewed by 
himself). an estimated 32 ,000 bottles per election campaign. See " Yut Angkinan: Political Legend of 
Phetchaburi, episode 2- rowdy teenager life in Phetchabur i" Prachakhom Thongthin, 3: 29 (July 2003): 
26-28. 
14 Natchanut 2000: 95. 
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Phat stepped down as mayor to run as MP for Phetchaburi in 1957 and had his nephew 
replace him as mayor. 15 He won the 1957 national election and became the second 
person from the Angkinan family to successfully become a lawmaker. 16 However, he 
served as a parliamentarian only once before returning to the municipality. In early 
1968, he founded the local political "Phat group," under which he ran and was 
successfully reelected as Phetchaburi city mayor in a landslide. 17 Unfortunately, he died 
after being in power for only six months. His Ul).anticipated passing notwithstanding, his 
family's political influence remained strong as he had securely put his family members 
into significant political positions. Since early in his political career, he had enlisted his 
sons in his campaign to give them first-hand political experience and acquaint them with 
electioneering tactics, including dirty tricks. He had also introduced his sons to his circle 
of influential figures from the time they were young. And many times, he had taught 
them how to fight, survive and earn respect in the world of Phetchaburian local strong 
men. On one occasion, Phat had such a serious dispute with a provincial military officer 
that they challenged each other to a gun duel. Phat brought Yut, his teenage son, to the 
gun-duel site, an isolated spot in the forest. On the way there, he put a pistol in his son' s 
hands, hinting at what he needed to do. In the end, their adversary did not show up, but 
Yut learnt a valuable lesson. 18 Phat crafted every step of his son 's political career, and 
used his connections to put both of his sons to work in Phetchaburi ' s major banks ' local 
branches. In due course both of them moved up to bank manager, a powerful position 
allowing authorization of bank loans to businessmen and all sorts of clients. These 
positions were highly beneficial to their political careers. 19 
In 1967, with his father ' support, Yut Angkinan (1936-) was elected to municipal 
council. Immediately after Phat 's demise, the council unanimously voted for Yut to 
replace his faiher as the new mayor. Yut inherited a political fortune from his father and 
15 See an account of the Angkinans ' early political standing in "Yut Angkinan: Political· Legend of 
Phetchaburi, episode I" Prachakhom Thongthin, 3: 28 (June 2003): 22-24; Prachakhom Th ongthin, 3: 29 
(July 2003 ): 26-28. 
16 Thongphun Angk.inan, a half-brother of Phat, was the first lawmaker of the famil y elected in 1938, but 
ran only one time. 
17 When Sarit Thanarat took power by staging a coup in 1958 , his government decided to dissolve the 
municipality nationwide as part of the political scheme to centralize political power into his military-led 
administration. The system of municipality was resumed in 1967 when Prime Minister Thanom 
Kittikhachon, a political heir of Sarit, made a facil e attempt to reform his regime. See Prachakhom 
Thongthin, 3: 31 (September 2003: 27). 
18 
"Yut Angkinan: Political Legend of Phetchaburi, episode 2- rowdy teenager life in Phetchaburi" 
Prachakhom Thongthin , 3: 29 (July 2003): 28. 
19 
"Yut Angkinan: Political Legend of Phetchaburi, episode 5- permanent mayor of Phetchaburi" 
Prachakhom Thongthin , 3: 32 (October 2003): 26-27. 
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has since gone on to lead the "Phat group" in dominating the city for decades. Piya 
Angkinan (1933-), the eldest son, was chosen by Phat to seek a position in the provincial 
council as an attempt to expand family power. Piya comfortably won his district 
election, when he first ran in 1957 at the age of just 24, becoming one of the youngest 
elected councilors in the country at that time. He was later elevated to president of the 
provincial counci!. 20 
The 1970s to early 1980s was a period during which the Angkinan clan strove for 
monopoly power by extending their networks of influence, making new allies, and 
eliminating their opponents. The political terrain was clearly divided among fami ly 
members: Yut was assigned to take care of the municipal area, while Piya was 
responsible for controlling the provincial council. The two brothers have quite different 
characteristics. Yut is soft-spoken, wellamannered, charming, charismatic, and perfectly 
composed and calm; a thinker type. He is the political strategist of the clan. Piya is the 
opposite. He is hot-tempered, loud-talking, aggressive, and possesses a macho posturing, 
non-caring image; a fighter type. In many respects, Piya's characteristics a.re typical Thai 
godfather-politician type. Piya is normally surrounded and by a .group of intimidating 
tough guys clad in jeans, jacket and dark glasses. He is the political enforcer of the 
Angkinans. 
Under Yut's leadership, the city municipality became a family stronghold. Oppositions 
or challenges rarely surfaced. The three other groups who had fought his father 
( comprised of a group of local businessmen, lawyers, teachers and civil servants) had 
gradually turned from foes to friends . Most of the time, Yut used his diplomatic ski lls to 
negotiate and persuade his opponents to join fo rces with offers of positions in the 
municipality or material benefits. Therefore, his administration had never faced serious 
conflict and was reelected repeatedly without much difficulty. 2 1 Secure at home, Yut 
became increasingly involved in national politics. In 1977, he was appointed by coup 
leader Admiral Sa-ngat Chaloyu, his relative, to be a law maker responsible for drafting 
the constitution. Two years later, he was duly appointed to be a senator. 22 Moreover, his 
municipal colleagues from other provinces nominated him to act as president of the 
National Municipal League of Thailand (NMT) from 1977-1 979, a position to which he 
20 lnierview, Piya Angkinan, Pheichaburi , 17 December 2009. 
21 
" Yut Angkinan : Political Legend of Phetchaburi , episode 4- I am permanent mayor" Prachakhom 
Thongthin , 3: 31 (September 2003): 26-28. 
22 Sa-ngat Chaloyu married to Yut ' s aunt, Benjamat Angkinan (Natchanut 2000: 118). 
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was reelected another three times. Piya had likewise thrived in the provincial council's 
power domain. 23 
Despite the family's success in local politics, their jomney to Parliament was neither 
smooth nor straightforward. In 1969, Piya made his first attempt to be elected to the 
House, but lost to a long-time adversary of the family, Phanit Samphawakhup (1915-
1992), by a very slight margin. Phanit was a famous lawyer and prominent businessman, 
a graduate from Thammasat University. His family came from Phetchaburi but he had 
been away from his hometown for a long time for higher education, and had spent most 
of his time in Bangkok after finishing his degree. He established a business law fim1 in 
Bangkok, which became highly successful over a short period of time because of his 
skill and connections. His firm had taken care of several eminent clients, such as the 
Kasikorn Thai Bank and some large agriculture trading firms. Besides his Jaw firm, he 
and his wife ventured into the lucrative business of land development and real estate as 
he acquired a vast amount of land from certain clients for whom he had won cases. Since 
some of his clients were not able to pay lawyer fees, they paid him with land. 24 Another 
business venture Phanit pioneered was the mining industry, from which he made 
massive profits. The modus operandi was to have his company inspect land throughout 
the country to locate valuable minerals; once discovered, he used his political 
connections to obtain mining licenses from the government, then_ sold the licenses to 
leading industrial companies. Subsequently, his large real estate and mining enterprise 
revenue were used to finance his election campaigns. Furthermore, with the wide 
connections he had established through legal counseling and land development projects 
with national capitalist groups, such as Sahaviriya Group, Siam Motors Group and 
Kasikorn Bank, his campaign war chest was much larger than other contenders including 
the Angkinan clan members. 25 Phanit was basically the most affluent MP candidate for 
Phetchaburi from the 1950s to the early 1980s. 
Conveniently, Phanit was elected the first time in February 1957 alongside his team 
mate from the government-backed Seri Manangkhasila Party. At that time Phetchaburi, 
23 
"Yut Angkinan: Political Legend ofPhetchaburi, episode I," Prachakhom Thongthin, 3: 28 (June 2003): 
22-24. 
24 Natchanut 2000: 86; Phanit 1993. 
25 Sahaviriya Group is one of the leading Thailand 's iron and steel fi rms. Siam Motors Group was founded 
in 1962 as a joint venture between the Phomprapha , a Thai leading business family, and Japanese Nissan 
company, importing hardware and Japanese Nissan automobil es (Pasuk and Chris 2002: 83, 126, 140). For 
a connection between Phanit and the leading business companies, see Natchanut 2000: 85 -87; "Pongsak 
Samphawakhup: When He went up North," Manager Monthly (July 1988); Phanit 1993. 
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as a small province, had only two constituency seats. The Seri Manangkhasila Party was 
founded and led by Field Marshall Phibun Songkhram and the then national Police Chief 
Phao Siriyanond. The party used the state apparatus, including sub-district heads, village 
headmen, local bureaucrats and police officers, to gather votes for their cand idates. Their 
candidates thus had the upper hand in most electoral competitions, and Phetchaburi was 
no exception. In Phetchaburi, Phao gave a direct order to his rogue police henchman in 
the provincial crime suppression division to work as chief vote brokers for the party's 
candidates. The local gangsters and big men were fearful of Phao's henchman as he was 
ruthless in handling criminals. In order to survive, they involuntarily worked as vote 
canvassers for Phao 's party contenders by not only collecting votes for them but also 
intimidating their opponents. In the end, both candidates from Seri Manangkhasila Party, 
Phanit and his team mate, were easily elected because candidates from other parties 
withdrew from the competition to avoid confrontation with a potentially fata l Phao. 26 As 
discussed in Chapter 2 this was certainly a period in Thai po litics in which archaic 
bureaucratic forces actively intervened in electoral processes. 
In the fo llowing election of December 1957, Phanit had to run independently as the 
Sarit-led coup ousted the Phibun and Phao faction on 16 September 1957. This time he 
faced a formidable opponent: the Angkinan family. The campaign was more intense than 
any previous polls as both contenders were prominent provincial figures with so lid 
power bases. Phat stood for MP for the first time and invested heavi ly in the campaign to 
guarantee his victo ry. Interest ingly Phat ' s stro ng-ann electioneering tactics created an 
atmosphere that impacted on his rival 's campaigning. Phanit employed a number of 
gunmen and local ruffians to guard him and his team. 27 This sent a message to Phat that 
he also had control over coercive resources. Eventua lly, Phanit created an inner circle of 
key vote brokers comprising tough guys whose jobs were to control the grassroots vote 
canvassers in each local precinct . Ult imately, both Phanit and Phat were elected. 
Bloodshed was avoided as there were no other potent contenders in the poll. Hence there 
was no reason for either side to attack against each other when they could share seats. 
Nevertheless, Phetchaburi politics became fierce ly-contested from this point on, and the 
image of the " land of the ruthless" emerged. 
26 See Na tchanut 2000: 82-84, for further in formation about the role of Phao' s henchman in electioneering 
~ Phectchaburi in the February 1957 poll. 
- Na1chanu1 2000: 84-9 1. 
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In the 1969 election Piya competed and lost to Phanit, but a team mate of Piya, Chalerm 
Yaikwawong (1934-), who was a political scion of the powerful Yaikwawong family, 
was elected. The Yaikwawong family was a wealthy and influential Phetchaburi Chinese 
business clan whose empire encompassed a wide range of economic activities. They 
owned opium dens in several provinces throughout the central region including 
Phetchaburi, a monopolized operation for which they were the sole government-
appointed contractor. Also, the family owned a number of gas stations, soft-drink 
factories, seafood retailers, fishing boats and sea ports. The family also controlled liquor 
trading, a profitable venture.28 It was no surprise that the family patriarch, Thianlai 
Yaik:wawong (1899-1968), was a respectable local notable with whom the provincial 
governor, police chief, and other top local bureaucrats wanted to establish contact. 
Officials sought his assistance to support government undertakings, such as building 
schools and hospitals, improving infrastructure, renovating temples, repairing broken 
bridges and patronizing local charities. Thianlai never disappointed them, and his long-
time dedication to and support of charitable works earned him the prestigious, high-
ranking royal insignia.29 Be that as it may, he was much more than a philanthropist: in a 
similar fashion to the Angkinan clan and Phanit, Thianlai effectively controlled a corps 
of armed mobsters who could be seen alongside him patrolling the neighborhood in the 
west side of the province, a family stronghold. 30 Most of these mobsters were family 
henchmen whose nonnal jobs (outside the electoral season) were running opium dens, 
sea ports and other business enterprises, but then acting as vote canvassers during the 
election campaigns. The Y aikwawong clan was thus the ideal key vote broker every 
candidate was looking for; the family was extremely rich and had muscle over the local 
bureaucracy and local strongmen. Phanit asked Thianlai to collect votes in the western 
constituencies for him, and, with the help ofThianlai, Phanit won. 
The two leading provincial bosses, Thianlai and Phat, passed away at about the same 
time in 1968. Shortly thereafter, the general election was held. There were three major 
contenders: Phanit, Piya and Chalerm. Yut Angkinan had a plan for his brother Piya. 
Knowing the Yaikwawong family 's support was a key factor behind Phanit ' s victory in 
28 See the oral history ofThianlai and his family collected by the Local Data Base Project, the Academic 
Resources and Information Technology Center, Phetchaburi Rajabhat University in 'Thianlai 
Yaikwawong- Phetchaburi" (http://gold.pbru.ac.th//rLocal/stories.php?story'-02/07/04/8207942); See also 
Thianlai 1971. 
29 
"Thianlai Yaikwawong- Phetchaburi" 
(http:// gold.pbru.ac. th//rLocal/stories .php?story'-02/07/04/8207942): Thianlai 1971 . 
30 Natchanut 2000: 87-88, 97-98. 
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the previous election, Yut isolated Phanit by asking Chalerm to abandon Phanit and run 
under the same team with Piya. Phanit and Chalerm were therefore political rivals in this 
elect ion, and many of Phanit 's vote canvassers were swayed to work fo r Chalerm. As it 
turned out, Chalerm came first and Phanit second ; both of them entered the House. Piya 
came third with only 48 votes fewer than Phanit. The young candidate fro m the 
Angkinan clan learnt a hard lesson: never rely on another candidate's muscle. In 
addition, he attributed his defeat to his "irresoluteness" and the lack of physical 
"toughness" that would enable him to fight his competitors. 31 He came back in the 1975 
election with a fo rceful strategy. 
Phetchaburi witnessed unruly and violent electoral contestations in January 1975 and the 
subsequent two general elections of 1976 and 1979. The province made newspaper 
headlines with several spectacular violent incidents. The riveting reports of dead bodies 
of candidates and canvassers, and tight security during polling campaigns with troops of 
police and military personnel, became regular occurrences in this small coastal province. 
The public and outsiders associated the province with the image of a " land of 
gunslingers" connected with the Wild West. 32 In the 1976 poll, political observers 
identified Phetchaburi (along with Saraburi), as the most dangerous place in the country 
with electoral competition plagued by "goons and intimidation." Reportedly, unknown 
gunmen threatened and shot vote canvassers befo re polling day. 33 
The most vio lent electoral contest in Phetchaburi ' s history occurred in the April 1979 
general elect ion. There were ten candidates from three parties competing fo r two 
coveted seats. The four fro nt runners were Piya Angkinan, Phanit Samphawakhup, 
kamnan Chong K.hlaikhlueng, and Co lonel Narong Kittikhachom. All of them were 
politica l heavyweights and similarly notorious fo r their use of "dark influences" and 
forcefu l campaigning tactics. Kamnan Chong K.hlaikhlueng (1979-1 944) was a 
po litically ambit ious young local teacher-turned-lawman who believed in the extra- legal 
methods of suppress ing crime. Local residents in his district were fearful of him as much 
as the criminals. With his strong clout in Chongsakae sub district, he was asked by 
31 Interview, Piya Angk.inan, Phetcbaburi , 17 December 2009. 
32 See. for example, th e reports, "Campaign in Phetchaburi heated up: Firearms handed out to goons to 
th reat en," Prachachat Daily, 4 January 1975: 3; "The Police were ordered to stay neutra l: Tough s ituation 
in Phetchabur i- " lan d of gunmen ," Prachachat Daily, 8 January 1975: 3; Prachachat Daily, 14 February 
1976: 3. 
33 
"Po li1ical assass ination ,"' Prachachat Daily, 24 February 1976: 3; " Dirty tri cks in campa igning," 
Prac/,achat Daily. 23 March 1976: 3; " How many more will d ie?" Prachachat Daily, 29 March 1976: 3. 
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Chalerm and Piya to be their vote canvasser in the 1969 poll, which was his entry point 
to politics. A few years later, he resigned from his public servant duty and was elected as 
provincial councilor. 34 In this election, he sought the MP position by making an alliance 
with a powerful figure from Bangkok, Narong Kittikhachom, who was the eldest son 
and the sole political successor of the former Prime Minister Thanom Kittikhachom. His 
family fled the country in the aftermath of the October 1973 uprising, and had made 
several attempts to return-eventually succeeding in 1978. Shortly thereafter, they 
attempted to regain their lost wealth and power through parliamentary politics. Narong 
chose to run in Phetchaburi as he had known many leading godfathers in the province, 
including Piya who was his old schoolmate. 35 Another local strong man who helped 
Narong gamer votes was Somchit Phuangmani, Narong's loyal friend and up-and-
coming local mob leader who owned a business empire ranging from pineapple 
plantations, gas stations, truck companies, ice factories to fisheries. Somchit controlled a 
large sector of the underground economy and a gang of gunmen in the eastern bloc of 
the province. Several underworld figures fully supported Narong's campaign team. On 
top of this, Narong had brought in a troop of notorious hit men and ex-soldiers from 
outside Phetchaburi, with a stockpile ofweapons.36 What made the situation complicated 
was the fact that Somchit and Chong had actually been rivals. Inevitably, the political 
alliance between Narong and Chong was fraught with tension and mistrust. 
As election campaigning started, the prospect of violence loomed large. The national 
Police Headquarters ordered the provincial governor of Phetchaburi to tighten security in 
both the pre- and post- polling periods. The governor, fearing political killings among 
opposing gangs, asked all gang leaders to meet up in the sacred local temple and made 
them swear before Buddha to harbor no grudges against each other and to refrain from 
using violence to win the election. It was the appropriation of a traditional ritual, hoping 
that religious belief could restrain their wayward behavior. 37 However, · all of the 
34 See Chong 1981 ; the Local Data Base Project, the Academic Resources and Information Technology 
Center, Phetchaburi Rajabhat University, "Chong Khlaikhlueng - Phetchaburi" 
(http://gold.pbru.ac.th//rLocal/stori es.php?stonc=04/06/! 8/6268977). 
35 They studied together at the most prestigious male high school, Suankulap. The Angkinan family and 
the Kittikhachorn family were also very close since their fathers' generation (Phad and Thanom). As a 
result, after October 1973, Piya was hunted down by a military leader who was a main rival of the 
Thanom-Praphat faction as they believed Piya was the right-hand man of Narong. Fortunately, his 
precarious life was saved by the then Army Commander-in-ChiefKrit Sivara. Interview, Piya Angkinan, 
Phetchaburi, 17 December 2009. 
36 Interview, local journalist, Phetchaburi , 16 December 2009; former assistant district officer, 
Phetchaburi, 17 December 2009. 
37 Matichon, 2 March 1979; Piak 2005: 74. 
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authorities ' noble and other worldly efforts to stop the murderous vio lence were in vain. 
On 20 March 1979, Chong .Khlaikhlueng, a candidate from the Kitsangkhom Party, was 
brutally shot dead in his Volvo along with three of his henchmen in a night ambush after 
coming back from canvassing votes at the local temple. In the victim's car, the police 
found several rifles belonging to Chong 's henchmen, one of whom was a lower ranking 
soldier suspended from duty (in Chonburi) and making a living as a hired gunman. 
Obviously the victims had prepared for a fight. The police also fo und 106 bullet shells at 
the crime scene, and the investigation concluded that a group of fifteen skilled shooters 
had carried out the attack. The scale and efficiency of the slaying signified that powerful 
mobsters were behind it. 
Shortly after the murders, other candidates sought police protection as they feared they 
might be the next target. Somchit and Narong, in particular, were fearful of revenge 
attacks as Chong 's family suspected they were the main culprits responsible fo r the 
murder of their boss. 38 Both of them fmnly denied the accusation. Somchit gave an 
interview in exasperation, 
When I knew Chong was shot, I ordered my assistants to lay a wreath at the 
funeral. I wanted to go to the funeral by myself, but with a rumor like this [that 
I killed Chong] I did not go ... If the killing was indeed a politically motivated 
murder in order to win the election, there is no reason I killed Chong as we 
were associates. Would not it be more reasonable to murder other candidates 
from the opposing camps? It is true that I have a lot of followers, but I see no 
one who thinks I am a bad person. 39 
The Angkinan fami ly were also murder targets. According to Yut, a team of gunmen 
were hired to assassinate him but he narrowly escaped, 
[S]omeone wanted to shoot me, not because I was contending with him. In fact, 
those guys wanted to get rid of Piya, but they knew that if they wanted to eliminate 
Piya, they needed to get me fast because I was handling "backup force" for Piya 's 
38 Matichon, 2 1 March 1979: Pi ak 2005: 77-79 , 95-99. 
39 Somch it 's in terview to a group of journali sts after the assassination of Chang, quoted in Piak 2005:77-
78. 
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campaign. I still remember .... There were gunmen on motorcycles riding around my 
house a couple of times. So I was alert and well prepared.40 
The locals believed that the violence would not stop easily and bloody revenge would 
happen because " influential people" would not seek state justice but would sort things 
out themselves. Local residents did not trust the local authorities because they were 
aware that local officials were under the clout of the powerful bosses. This was why 
Chang 's brother and his wife asked the Phetchaburi governor to transfer the murder case 
from the local police to the central bureau as they believed that a couple of the involved 
investigators were closely connected to the gunmen who killed Chong. 41 The slaying of 
Chong was startling and unprecedented; it was the first case of a candidate being a target 
in Phetchaburi. Prior to this incident, contenders' henchmen and vote canvassers were 
the primary victims of the election-related vio lence. The escalation of vio lence was thus 
expected.42 
Confronted with the prospect of gangland warfare, Prem Tinsulanond, army-
comrnander-in-chief and deputy interior minister, deployed a troop of police from the 
Crime Suppression Division to operate in Phetchaburi until vote counting was over. 
They arrested and imprisoned unauthorized state agents working for the candidates as 
personal bodyguards (the apprehension of six soldiers who were helping Narong's 
campaign, was a prime example), and ordered the provincial governor to prepare to 
cancel voting instantly if the situation spun out of control. 43 In the end, polling went 
through with no chaos. Piya and Phanit were two of the winning candidates. However, a 
series of gruesome killings and retaliations between opposing political gangs occurred in 
the post-election period and lasted for almost a year. A score of gang members from 
each group lost their lives in a battle fo r their bosses ' attempt to secure a monopoly 
power. The most prominent case was the assassination of Somchit Phuangmani, one of 
the most prominent local gang masters. According to police investigations, the shooting 
might have been in reprisal for Chang' s death. 44 
40 
"Yut Angkinan: Politi ca l Legend of Phetchaburi, epi sode I 0- li fe in a den of ruffians," Prachakhom 
Thongthin, 4: 37 (March 2004): 49-51. · 
4 1 
"Phetchaburi : land of gunmen and brutality," Matichon, 26 March 1979; "Phetchaburi: th e twi light 
zone," Maticho11 , 3 April 1979; Piak 2005: 82. 
42 Matichon, 23 March 1979; 26 March 1979. 
43Matichon, 25 March 1979; 28 March 1979: I, 12; 2 1 April 1979. 
44 Somchit was brutally gunned down in the down town area of the city whi le he was eating with his 
bodyguards in a popular loca l restaurant in front of the movie theatre. Two teams of ski llful hired guns 
shot him with M 16 rifles from afar. They escaped ri ght away after getting their job done and have never 
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The rise to dominance of th e Angkinan family 
By the time the 1983 general election was announced, the post-1 979 election mobster 
kill ing havoc had rearranged the balance of power in Phetchaburi. Two leading po litical 
figures, Chong and Somchit, had vanished (without capable successors), and N arong had 
withdrawn to seek his polit ical entry to the House in another province.45 The only two 
powerhouses left in the contest were Phanit ' s camp and the Angkinan family. A long-
time MP, Phanit was critically weakened as after the last election his enemies had 
completely eliminated his key vote canvassers. Phanit ' s wealth remained strong but his 
rivals' violent tactics undermined his network of informal power. The many killings of 
his subordinates scared off other potential vote brokers and thus crippled his election 
campaign.46 The Angkinans, on the other hand, had emerged fro m the battle with their 
manpower, wealth and political strength intact. Without serious contenders, the 
Angkinan family rose to the top. In the 1983 poll , Phetchaburi had one additiona l seat 
for MP due to a population increase in the province. The Angkinan family believed they 
had a promising chance of sweeping all available seats, so they fielded three family 
members as candidates. Piya, assigned leader of the team, sought reelection alongside 
two of his brothers: the younger brother Yut resigned as mayor to run fo r MP for the 
frrst time, and cousin brother Phimuk Angkinan (1925 -) was added to the tearn.47 Yut 
confessed that he stood for the election this time because, with the extra seat , he did not 
have to compete with his bro ther. Moreover, he pointed out the MP position would 
provide him with a considerably larger budget to spend in his constituency than as 
rnayor. 48 The three brothers won the votes smoothly in a landslide victory. Besides, they 
made history: three MPs in a single pro vince corning from the same fami ly. The po litical 
been caught. Interview, former assistant di strict officer, Phetchaburi, 17 December 2009; Piak 2005: 
95:98. 
45 Chang's brother was nominated by associates to succeed h is broth er as a leadin g of the gang, but fina lly 
he had to flee th e province after knowing he was targeted. He and his fa mil y relocated to Chonburi to see~ 
for protect ion from the eastern godfather Somchai Khunpluem, and spen t time there for several years 
before returning to Phetchaburi (see, "Ratchasak Khla ikhlueng: Chong' nephew who wants to overcome a 
vicious circ le of ' infl uen tia l peop le'," Matichon , 21 December 2004: 9). For Narong, he found that 
electora l contestation in Phetchaburi was overly diffi cu lt to win , so he moved to stand for the electi on in 
Ayu tthaya (a lso not his home town) in the fo llowing elections and was duly elected as an MP there for 
severa l times. See the politica l life ofNarong after 1973 in Bunchai 1990: 89- 141. 46 lnterview, Pi ya Angkinan, Phetchaburi, 17 Decem ber 2009. 47 Phimuk was the son of Thongphun, MP for Phetchaburi from 1938 to I 946. He was elected as an MP 
for the first time in 1976, and ran again in 1979 but fai led (Natchanu t 2010: 110-113). 48 He sa id that being a mayor, he was given onl y 300,000 baht a yea r for th e local development budget, 
while tJ1e MP was bei ng able to easily lobby the government for a project worth 10 to 100 mill ion. This 
was, of course, the situation long before the decentra lization process was im plemented. See "Yut 
Angkinan: Politi ca l Legend of Ph etchaburi, episode 6- seven t imes in th e Lower House," Prachakhom 
Thongthin, 3: 33 (November 2003): 114- 11 5. 
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legend was then repeated in the 1988 general election with the same all three brothers 
elected. 
For nearly a decade, from 1983 to 1992, the Angkinan dynasty dominated Phetchaburi 
politics. They controlled all political terrain from national assemblies to the 
municipality. Yut had his wife, Buppha Angkinan, replace him as city mayor. Generally, 
no opponents seriously challenged their grip on power. Piya said that during the 1980s, 
I wandered around the province alone with my sole driver with no fear of 
being assassinated, compared to the past where I had to have three pickup 
trucks follow me around. Frankly, [I dare travel alone] because all my 
enemies were dead. The whole damn lot of them were blown away, and 
their children had no clue how and on whom to take revenge. 49 
With its political power secured, the family's wealth was substantially enhanced. Yut's 
business in shrimp fanning and salt panning expanded from small to large-scale. He had 
over 2,700 rai of land serving the province 's largest salt panning business, which gave 
him on average 80 million baht a year. He was subsequently nominated to be president 
of the Phetchaburi Salt Panning Farmers Association. He further ventured into lucrative 
land speculation during the economic boom. Phetchaburi is a coastal province bordering 
Burma, a famous tourist spot with several serenely beautiful beaches and a connecting 
point between the central and the southern region, rendering it a paradise for land 
speculation. As an influential person, Yut accumulated vast tracts of lands by acquiring 
them through political connections or buying some of them from local residents and 
fanners for very low prices. He became a broker for land speculators from the capital 
and giant corporations from Bangkok who needed land in Phetchaburi for investment. In 
one case, he sold 3,000 rai of land (bought from the locals) to the Chonlaprathan 
Cement Company to build a gigantic factory. The deal made him a "billionaire" 
overnight.50 Additionally, his wife owned ice and drinking water factories. 
49 Interview, Piya Angkinan, Pbetchaburi, I 7 December 2009. 
'
0 Besides the 2,700 rai of salt panning land, Yut possessed 1,000 rai of land near the famous Kaeng 
Krachan dam, JOO rai in Ta Yang district, 40 rai near the famous Cha-am beach, and 40 rai in the 
downtown area of the city, the most expensive location. One of his important clients was Charoen 
Siriwatta.napakdi , one of the richest men in Thailand who is a liquor business tycoon (Mae Khong Whisky, 
Chang Beer, etc.), a luxw-y hotel empire owner and the "king of land speculation." See Yul 's asset and 
business in "Yut Angkinan: Political Legend of Phetchaburi, episode 9- opening assets of Mayor Piak," 
Prachakhom Thongthin , 3: 36 (February 2004): 28-33 ; "The Angkinan: Godfather," Prachakhom 
291 
As for Piya, the eldest brother in the family, he owned a range of profitable business 
mostly obtained and secured by political influence. For example, he operated gas 
stations throughout the province. In addition, he controlled the route and operation of the 
public and private buses from Phetchaburi down to the Deep South, on which he can 
stop any bus company from running busses if he so decided. Those who wanted to use 
these roads had to share their handsome profits with him. The provincial construction 
business was under his domination too. For any large development projects requiring 
bidding, Piya said "I could help my friends and associates win the tender. During those 
days I could tell other contenders [who wanted to compete with my friends] not to bid. 
Anyone wanted to bid, they would be dead." 51 Although his family did not own a 
construction company, the way he assisted his associates win government contracts had 
earned his family deep respect, and helped foster a strong relationship between his 
fami ly and the influential provincial business elites. Moreover, the fact that all available 
MPs seats belonged to the family, the Angkinans were strongly united and thus had 
more negotiating power over the MPs from other provinces in the fight for local 
development budget allocation. Consequently, they were able to bring a lot of 
infrastructure projects to the province (for example, irrigation system, dam, main roads 
and schools) during their terms. 52 Therefore, it was not surprising that during this decade 
they successfully built and so lidified a strong patronage network comprised of a group 
of loca l businessmen, civil servants, and local strong men. The patronage network of the 
family was, however, fundamentally buttressed by the force of coercion. 
From 1983 to the present, the political contests in the "gunmen capital" or "land of the 
ruthless" have been remarkably peaceful. The earlier bloody struggle for a power 
monopoly paved the way for peaceful political order. Even though the Angkinan 
dynasty 's power was eventually chal lenged in the mid 1990s, it did not lead to the 
spilling of any politic ians ' blood. The phenomenon of peace lay in the sociological 
underpinning of the province's political structure after the 1980s. It was intra-family 
connections that prevented competitive electoral contests from escalating into the deadly 
Thongthin, I : 6 (August-September 200 1): 62-63; "Charoen Siriwananapakdi: Liquor Tycoon Invaded 
Phetchaburi," Prachachat Thurakit, 29 October 2001: 1, 4. 
51 Interview, Pi ya Angkin an, Phetchaburi , 17 December 2009. 52 Interview, Piya Angkinan , Phetchaburi , I 7 December 2009; Prachakhom Thonglhin, 3: 34 (December 
2003): 113-114. 
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warfare. Since the 1990s, the Angkinans' political contenders for power were cousins, 
not business rivals, therefore attenuating the political competition. 
Intra-family conflicts between the Angkinans, Polabutrs and Supapangs: ties that 
bind and conflict with no bloodshed 
The Angkinan brothers' dynastic power was challenged in the September 1992 general 
election. Both Piya and Phimuk were defeated, and Yut was the only Angkinan to enter 
parliament. The two brothers were beaten by a young candidate, Alongkom Polabutr 
(1956-), their own cousin. Alongkorn ran for the Democrat Party and brought a new 
style of electioneering to the electorate. The most important factor, however, that gave 
him courage to run against the dominant clan was his awareness that, because he was 
family, his life would not be in real danger. After 1992, he won the election 
consecutively ( except in 1996) and was able to get his brothers and allies elected along 
with him. His political success was built up at the expense of his Angkinan kin. After the 
mid 1990s, the Polabutrs were a new political force in Petchaburi. 
The Polabutr family 
Alongkorn was heir to Phoemphon Polabutr, the family patriarch who ran under Phat in 
1967 for position of municipal councilor and was elevated to the post of deputy mayor 
from 1976 to 1983. Phoemphon was close to Phat and Thongphun Angkinan as he was 
raised by these two uncles after his father passed away. He was their protege, helping 
them in their legal practice. Phoemphon's mother was Phat ' s elder sister (see family tree 
below); the Polabutrs and Angkinans are two branches of the same family. While the 
Angkinans had embarked on a successful political and business trajectory since the 
1960s, the Polabutr family had remained in relative political and economic obscurity. 
Phoemphon lost a fair sum of money in business. His political career had also been in 
the shadow of the Angkinan dynasty. Apart from being the· deputy mayor under Phat, 
Phoemphon never succeeded in national elections. To compensate, the Polabutr family 
made sure their children had good degrees. 
Alongkorn Polabutr held two degrees from Tharnmasat and Chulalongkom University, 
the two top universities in the country. After graduation, he helped his father briefly in 
the mining business, and then went on to be a journalist, an occupation which gave him 
fame and a public profile. He played an active role in creating a journalists' union to 
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protect the interests of media personnel, and in abolishing draconian laws that restricted 
media freedom. He founded his own private company to produce TV news programs and 
became the deputy chief director of an influential daily newspaper. He ran for MP the 
first time in March 1992 and failed, but was elected in the following polls in September 
1992 and July 1995 on the Democrat Party ticket. After an unexpected loss in the 1996 
elections, he made a strong comeback in 2001 and has not lost since.53 
Alongkom brought a new style of politics to a province that had been long-dominated by 
bossism. As a neophyte with great public-speaking ski lls, a modem image, and good 
career record (as a journalist) of combating corrupt politicians, he was perceived by the 
voters as an alternative. His style of electioneering contrasted with the Angkinan's 
brothers who were terrible orators, inaccessible, and intimidating with the old-image of 
political mafia, After losing the first contest in March 1992, Alongkom learnt that there 
was strong anti-boss sentiment among the middle class, entrepreneurs, and young voters 
but no one, including other candidates, dared speak up. He thus proposed to represent 
these electoral groups and capitalize on their discontent. He successfully translated these 
negative sentiments into votes for himself In his September 1992 election campaign, he 
spoke against the "influential godfathers in Phetchaburi," saying that the province lacked 
progress and investment because business people were afraid of the vio lent tactics and 
dark power that had long characterized the province. Everyone knew that Alongkom 
was referring to the Angkinans. His message that "influential bosses are the major 
obstacle to the development of the province" was emphasized in his every speech, and 
won him high praise from voters. The electorate thought he was brave to speak out. 54 It 
was ironic that the candidate who ctiticized clan politics fiercely and won because of his 
anti-clan campaign was part of the family himself. 
With the rise of Alongkorn, the Angkinans gradually lost their grip on power at the 
national level. In the last six election battles from September 1996 to the December 2007 
polls, Piya lost 5 out of 6 polls. Since 2001 there has been no Angkinan candidate who 
has won the constituency seats. The fami ly head Piya admitted the situation had 
changed, "this day, yo u have to understand that voters do not like mafia-style politicians. 
People do not accept it . They have changed." 55 More importantly, even though the 
53 Natchanut 2000: 135-37; Khao Sod, 17 July 2000: I , 9-11. 54 In terview, loca l official , Phetchaburi , 17 April 2012; Natchanut 2000: 136, 141. 55 lnterview, Pi ya Angkinan , Phetchaburi , 17 December 2009. 
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family had wished to employ forceful tactics to regain power, they were aware that 
vio lent methods were no longer viable as their opponents were now blood relatives. In a 
candid interview on how to win the election again, Piya answered, 
IfI say it frankly, I have to be nakleng (tough guy) again. They [my 
opponents] used vote-buying, I have to use guns. That is the way to win. 
Otherwise I do not know how I could fight with them . . . In Petchaburi, if 
you played politics like gentlemen, you have no chance to win. You have 
to be tough and forceful. The situation would get better after a few deaths. 
Phetchaburi has been like this for a long time. 56 
Despite laying out these wild ideas, Piya admitted that violent tactics were impossible 
because the Polabutrs were his cousins. Both Yut and Piya told stories in public and 
private about helping the Polabutr family raise their children, including Alongkom, and 
supporting their education and other expenses. 
I paid for Alongkom' s education, and when Alongkom went to the 
United States to work, I bought a car for him. At his wedding, I asked 
Suntarapom band [a famous singing band] to perform as a special 
treat .... I have always told voters that the Polabutr famiJy members are 
my cousins. They attacked me a lot in their campaign, but I never got 
angry or held any grudges against them. 57 
Also, Piya claimed that he saved Alongkorn 's life several tin1es, 
Well. . . he [Alongkorn] is my cousin. Many times when he was a target 
of assassination he saved himself by saying that he was my nephew. By 
claiming that [families ties], the gunmen pulled back. Otherwise he 
wou ld be dead a long time ago.58 
Unlike Yut, Piya harbored grudges against the Polabutr cousins for years, lamenting that 
his help was met with ingratitude and unkindness . But, he complained, "they are cousins. 
56 Interview, Pi ya Angkinan, Pbetchaburi , 17 December 2009. 
57 Interview, Yuth Angkinan, Phetchaburi, 21 April 2012. 
58 Interview, Piya Angkinan, Phetchaburi , 17 December 2009. 
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We are related. What I can do!" 59 The importance of familial connection in preventing 
deadly conflicts was stressed by several veteran local observers. One local official close 
to both the Angkinan and Polabutr fami lies said, "If Alongkorn was not Piya's nephew, 
he would not be able to get himself elected and still be alive. He would be gotten rid of" 
Another observer made a similar comment, "if other candidates attacked the Angkinans 
in their campaign as Alongkorn did, they would be sw-ely dead. " 60 
To make sense of the peaceful political competition between politicians in Phetchaburi 
after the 1990s, one needs to understand a phenomenon I call "clan politics in disguise." 
For non-local observers and the media, Phetchaburi has been a voting hotspot for many 
reasons: its polarized political structw-e, the pervasive · underground economy, and its 
large supply of hired gunmen. But its "po larized politics" has been, in fact, merely a 
perception. Since 1992 three families have dominated and controlled the province: the 
Angkinans, the Polabutrs, and the Supapangs. All three families are closely related by 
blood and marriage. The Angkinans and the Polabutrs are relatives, as mentioned. The 
Supapangs are re lated to the Angkinans by marriage. The family head, Lob Supapang, 
was a fo rmer city mayor (1943 -1 947) and deputy city mayor (1948-1956) under the Phat 
group. The family controlled a vast amo unt of land in the province, and later expanded 
to businesses of housing, estates, hotels, pubs and restaurants, and money-lending. As a 
powerful and affluent business family, the Supapangs were approached by other families 
for po lit ical support. Lob's gra nddaughter married the eld est son of Yut Angkinan. 
Furthermore after 200 1, Alongkorn asked two of Lob's sons, Apichart and Kampol, to 
join the Democrat team in standing fo r national elections. Alongkorn's move was tin1ely 
and brilliant , as the Supapangs could have been the Polabutrs' formidable competitors, 
especially if the two Supapang brothers teamed up with the Angkinans. 61 
The electoral competitions between these three families were neither fierce nor 
uncompromising. There were backroom deals made in advance of each election. Even 
when deal s were broken, they fou nd ways to compromise. No blood was spilt and no 
one was hurt because, at the end of the day, these political competitors were related and 
belonged to the predominant pol itical structure of a tripartite dynasty. 
59 lnterview, Piya Angkinan, Phetchaburi , 17 December 2009 60 Interview, loca l officia l, Phetchaburi , 17 April 2012; interview, loca l scholar, Phetchaburi , 21 Apri l 
2012. 
61 In terview, loca l scholar, Phetchaburi , 2 1 April 2012; interview, loca l journalist, Phetchaburi, 17 April 
2012. 
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Yut Angkinan, seven time MP and two time cabinet member, as well as the most senior 
and charismatic figure in the tripartite dynasty, was accepted by all as dealmaker. Yut 
and Alongkom made the crucial deal in the transitional period prior to the 2001 
elections. With a new constitution restricting the rights of provincial politicians who 
lacked university degrees, Yut had dim career prospects as a lawmaker in the new 
system. He decided to return to a domain he used to dominate local politics. 
Decentralization empowering local administration made his decision easy. He was also 
compelled to run for mayor again because of a fight for control of the city municipality 
between his wife Buppha Angkinan, the then mayor, and the Polabutrs. Buppha was 
elected as a municipal councilor in 1981 and became mayor two years later, when she 
was only 32, after her husband ran for an MP post. 62 Her administration style created 
conflict between her and the Polabutrs since she monopolized her position's power and 
perks without sharing them with the Polabutrs. Discontent had been simmering for years 
.until the Polabutrs decided to challenge Buppha in the 2000 municipal poll. When Yut 
heard of the challenge, he feared the city municipality would be taken over by the 
Polabutrs. The situation left him with no option but to negotiate with Alongkom, 
offering to take the post back from Buppha and run it himself, appointing one of 
Alongkorn's brothers to be his deputy overseeing the lucrative portfolio of construction 
affairs. Yut also promised not to compete with his nephew in the House elections, a 
promise he has never broken. At the same time, the local political group led by Kampa! 
Supapang, named "Phetchaburi Pattana" (Phetchaburi development) , was convinced in a 
similar vein by Yut not to run but join his team. 63 The deal was struck, and the territory 
was divided between the three families. There was no contestation in the municipal 
voting of 2000 (and in the following poll of 2004); Yut was elected mayor without 
opposition. Within the Angkinan family, the area was divided between Yut and Piya, in 
which the former controlled the city municipality and the latter controlled the Provincial 
62 Buppha was an agent for Singha Beer in Petchaburi, and was later an agent for other popular beverage 
companies. She also owned the ice factories in muang and two others districts in the province, and had a 
business of bird nest in Banlaem district While being a mayor, she built a house valued 30 million baht; it 
is so extravagant that local people has cal led it a "palace." She was in power as a mayor of the city for 17 
years. In the 200 I election, she ran for MP with the Thai Rak Thai Party, competing with her nephew 
Alongkorn and lost See, Matichon, 10 July 2007: 3; and a detailed ethnographic study of Buppha ' s 
political life in Fishel 2001. 
63 Interview, Yuth Angkinan, Phetchaburi, 21 April 2012. 
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Administrative Office (PAO). 64 In this way, the three fami lies effectively established the 
political order of the province. 
However, political deals were sometimes broken by incidents of one fami ly's territory 
being invaded by others. This sort of eruption of political conflict had created tensions 
between fami lies; however, it did not lead to violence as family heads acted swiftly to 
resolve the situation. A number of cases are worth mentioning: the 2008 city municipal 
poll, and the 2004 and 2008 PAO elections. The mayoral poll of2008 was a competition 
between Yut and Atiphon Polabutr, Alongkorn's elder brother. Atiphon was deputy 
mayor, appointed by Yut from 2000-2008. Ambitious to be the mayor himself, he 
competed against Yut in the 2008 mayoral election. He told voters that he was running 
against his uncle because his uncle 's administration had fai led to respond effectively to 
local people's needs. Yut, on the other hand, fe lt unhappy fighting with his nephew: "I 
had already planned that after fully serving two tenns, I would promote Atiphon to 
replace me. But, unfortunately, Atiphon was too impetuous. Anyhow, I understand that 
sometimes a henchman wants to be a boss." In this intra-clan battle, nephew Atiphon 
lost to uncle Yut by a small margin. 65 After the poll, people still witnessed uncle and 
nephew talking to and greeting each other at many events. Atiphon was defeated by Yut 
again in the 2012 municipal election by an even larger margin. On election morning, 
Atiphon rushed to apologize to Yut for his crude verbal attacks against Yut during the 
campaign. According to Yut, it was Alongkom who broke the promise, but he well 
understood that "it was po lit ics," and "I always told people that the Po labutrs are my 
cousin. "66 
The PAO election in February 2004 also involved political infighting within the tripartite 
dynasty. The three main candidates in this electoral competition were Chaiya Angkinan 
(the eldest son of Piya), Yutthapol (Yut 's son), and Kampol Supapang, and all of them 
were personally related. Chaiya and Yutthapol were cousin brothers, while Yutthapol 
and Kampol were fa ther- and son-in-law. Thi s was a mesmerizing election fo r outsid e 
observers. Some commentators viewed it as a po litica l farce . 67 For local residents, this 
battle made se nse. For tripartite mem bers, the PAO chairman 's posit ion was dynasty 
64 Interview, Pi ya Angkinan , 17 December 2009; interview, loca l election commission official, 17 April 
20 12. 
65 Ma1ichon , 26 February 2008: 8; Matichon, 11 March 2008: 8. 
66 Jnterview, Yut Angkinan, Phetchaburi , 21 April 201 2. 
67 See comments ill Prachakhom Thong1hin, 2: 13 ( 16 March- 15 April 2002): 29-30. 
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"private property" and each candidate thought they were equally entitled to the post. In 
one respect it was a fight over budget allocations, but it would be misreading to 
underestimate candidates' considerations of family dignity and sense of entitlement. 
Both political heirs on each side of the Angkinan family competed with each other since 
they were young, and they thought they deserved better positions than their kin. Piya's 
sense of entitlement was clear when was asked about the PAO political battle "if it was 
not my son, I could not think of anyone else. But, you know, of course it has to be 
among the Angkinans."68 Given that every contender was competing for the same vote 
base, the campaign was genuinely competitive. The campaign involved verbal attacks, 
poster vandalism and billboard destruction. The aggressive contest notwithstanding, 
neither candidates nor vote canvassers experienced any physical violence. In the end, 
Chai ya Angkinan managed to beat his two cousins in a close competition. 69 
In the next PAO chairman elections in April 2008, Chai ya was challenged by a new 
competitor, not a complete stranger to the administration or his family: Itthiphong 
Polabutr, another younger brother of Alongkom and former provincial councilors. 
Kampa! and Yutthapol withdrew as they both pursued other political avenues. Kampol 
ran for the House election in 2005 along with Alongkom and his brother Apichart. 
Yutthapol worked with his father as the deputy mayor from 2005 to 2008, and prepared 
himself for national elections. 70 A family connection was manifest .in the PAO chairman 
voting. It demonstrated lines of loyalty. Yutthapol teamed up with and offered strong 
support to his male cousin Chaiya to protect the stronghold of the Angkinan family 
against the encroachment of the Polabutrs. The Angkinan team demolished the Polabutr 
candidate by a great margin. 71 Ultimately, it proved that the blood of the first cousins 
was thicker than blood of the second cousins. 
68 Interview, Piya Angkinan, 17 December 2009. See also a news report in Prachakhom Thongthin, 2: 13 
(16 March- 15 April 2002): 29-30. 
69 Chaiya received 74,425 votes, Kampol 50,058, and Yutthapol 36,878. Matichon, 7 January 2004: 22; 
Matichon, 4 March 2004: 8. 
7° Kampa] failed in the 2005 poll, but was eventually elected in the 2007 election. 
Yutthapol stood in the 2011 election as the party-list candidate ranking number 4 with the Chart Thai 
Pattana Party ofBanharn Silpa-archa, and was duly elected. 
71 Krungthep Thurakit, 4 April 2008: 16. 
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Chart 10.1: The Angkinan Family (a selected genealogy) 
Khun Angkinanphong (Phum Angkinan) 
~
Phum (first wife) Mui (second wife) 
I Thongphun+ Pramun Phueam+ Khun Sakdrunchit 
~ ---'I'------ - \ 
/ / Phat+ Bnnyuat 
Phimuk Phoemphon Polabutr+La-o Pi a+Urai Yuth+ Buppha 
-Adun 
-Yingnapha 
-Ueamphon Suksan -Kiratirat 
-Atiphon l:-Panchit Chaiya+Thiwamat 1-Yutthaphon+daughter 
-Uaiphon 
-Alongkom 
-Atthaphon 
-Panchaphon 
-Phattharaphon 
-ltthiphong 
-Yotphon 
ofKampol Supapang 
-Phonlayut 
-Chiraphon 
-Pinnapha 
Table 10.1: the Angkinans and the Polabutrs in Phetchaburi National Elections 
1938 Thongphun Angkinan 
1957 Phat Angkinan (Sahaphurn Party) 
1975 P iya Angkinan (Chart T hai Party) 
1976 Phirnuk Angkinan (Chart Thai Party) (Piya lost) 
1979 Piya Angk inan (Chart Prachath.ippata i Party) (Ph.imuk lost) 
1983 Phimuk Angkinan and Yul Angkinan (Chart Thai Party) , Piya Angkinan (Chart 
Prachath.ippatai Party) 
1986 Phirnuk Angkinan and Yul Angkinan (Chart Thai Party) (P iya lost) 
1988 Ph.imuk Angkinan, Yul Angkinan, and Piya Angkinan (Chart Thai Party) 
1992/ 1 P iya Angkinan and Yut Angkinan (Chart Thai Party) (P h.imuk lost, Alongkom 
Polabutr ran firs t time with the Democrat Party and lost) 
1992/2 Yut Angkinan (Chart Pattana Party), AJongkom Polabu tr (Democrat Party) (Ph.imuk 
and Piya lost) 
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1995 Yut Angkinan (Chart Pattana Party), Alongkom Polabutr (Democrat Party) (Piya lost, 
Phimuk did not run) 
1996 Piya Angkinan (Kitsangkhom Party), Yut Angkinan (Chart Pattana Party) (Alongkom 
lost, Phimuk did not run) 
2001 Alongkorn Polabutr (Democrat Party) (Piya lost, Buppha Angkinan lost, Yut and 
Phimuk did not run) 
2005 Alongkorn Polabutr (Democrat Party) (Piya lost) 
2007 Alongkorn Polabutr (Democrat Party), Atthaphon Polabutr (Democrat Party/party list) 
(Piya lost, Thiwanrat Angkinan lost) 
2011 Alongkom Polabutr (Democrat Party/ party list), Atthaphon Polabutr (Democrat Party), 
Yutthapol Angkinan (Chart Thai Pattana Party/party list) (no candidate from the Angkinan 
family running in constituency seats) 
Table 10.2: the Angkinans and the Polabutrs in Phetchaburi Local Elections 
1948-1968 Phat Angkinan (city mayor) 
1968-1983 Yut Angkinan (city mayor) 
1967 Piya Angkinan (provincial council president) 
1983-2000 Buppha (city mayor) 
January 2000 Yut Angkinan ( city mayor) 
2000 Cbaiya Angkinan (PAO chairman) 
February 2004 Cbaiya Angkinan (PAO chairman) 
-
February 2004 Yut Angkinan (city mayor) 
March 2008 Yul Angkinan (city mayor) 
April 2008 Chaiya Angkinan (PAO chairman) 
April 2012 Yut Angkinan (city mayor) 
Clan domination and clan survival 
Scholars often use Phetchaburi as an example of the predominance of godfathers in Thai 
politics .72 Yoshinori Nishizaki, examining the practice and ritual of power in 
Suphanburi, compared the political decline of the Angkinan of Petchaburi to the 
enduring power of Banharn in Suphanburi to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of violent 
tactics to win votes. He pointed to the fact that Piya and members of his family failed to 
72 See, for example, Ockey 1992, Pasuk and Sungsidh 1994, Vi engrat 1994. 
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be elected to parliament, thus demonstrating the limited explanatory power of other 
scholars' arguments of the significance of violence and intimidation in local elections. 73 
Those studies do not explain the dynamic and complex relationships between violence 
and accumulation and preservation of power. The so -called "godfather" figmes never 
emp loyed or relied upon sheer terror to establish their power and win votes. As the 
Angkinan cases show, it was necessary to build reliable and strong networks of 
canvassers, to dispense goods and services to the electorate, and to form alliances with 
other elite provincial groups. In this sense the fact that Piya failed to get elected does not 
invalidate (or validate) the power of an explanation based on vio lence and intimidation. 
In fact, as noted above, since the mid 1990s the Angkinans had already restrained 
themselves from using force against their own rivals. The main reason was their 
opponents were family, in particular, cousins. It is therefore important to understand the 
conditions that compel and/or constrain any politician, including the non-mafia type, 
from employing coercive force as part of their political campaigns. 
The po litical situation in Phetchaburi mirrored other Thai provinces that have influential 
clans controlling provincial politics and businesses. In these provinces, family was the 
most rudimentary and significant political asset fo r candidates wishing to assert and 
preserve po litical control over their districts. Family networks were more cohesive, 
reliable and durable than political parties, factions, and friends. Political succession took 
place primari ly within the clan, and pol itical coalitions were formed through marriage. 
Political clans' second or third generations had advantages over their opponents as they 
inherited a politica l base and an electoral machine put in place by their patriarchs. It was 
through fami ly ties that candidates were trained and recruited fo r political office, and 
provided resources (money, patronage networks, electoral machines and public 
recognition) for elections. Kinship network were vital to both political expansion and 
wealth accumulation. In the provinces in w hich clans were remarkably strong, political 
parties' contribu tions to e lectoral success were minor or negligible. Even in the post-
1997 political environment , in which party brands and poli cy packages had become 
influentia l for vote rs, both Thaksin 's allied parties and the Democrat Pa11y played 
marginal roles in Phetchaburi politics. In the 200 1 Phetchaburi elect ion, by recruiting 
party candidates from the notable local bosses, Thaks in requested Piya to run fo r the 
TRT party. According to Piya, T haksin strongly beli eved that the TRT brand plus the 
73 Nishiza k.i 2004: 29. 
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Angkinan family reputation would ensure his victory. But Thaksin was wrong as Piya 
did not win the election. He ran again in the 2005 and 2007 elections under the allied 
parties of Thaksin, and lost again both times. Piya then came to realize that the party 
brand did not help him win seats as effectively as his family name. In the local election 
campaigns for PAO chairman, Piya and his son therefore avoided using the party logo 
and emphasized instead his family's long histo1y oflocal services, and this strategy was 
highly successful. 74 
The clan monopolies have created an uneven playing field, effectively discouraging and 
penalizing non-elite contenders. These political families prevent new and aspiring 
people, who do not belong to the socio -political class from which the traditional elite 
have been recruited, from winning elections. The domination of the Angkinans-
Polabutrs- Supapangs is illustrative of how the traditional families, in collaboration, 
have successfully inhibited the emergence of "outsiders" in the local elections; and 
reserved positions exclusively for family members. Surviving throughout years of 
political crises, the Angkinan family is currently one of the oldest local political families 
in modern Thai politics. Decentralization processes have provided opportunities for the 
family to maintain its power through a new platform. By fielding and supporting family 
members at every level oflocal elections, the Angkinans have exercised political control 
not only over the province and municipality, but also right down to the sub-district 
level. 75 
The lucrative business of hired gunmen has suffered in the relatively quiet and peaceful 
political life of Phetchaburi since the 1990s. The supply of violence has exceeded the 
demand for killing. By 2012, reports stated a total of 80 hit men across the province, 
operating under three different powerful bosses: a local politician, a provincial 
businessman, and an owner of the gambling dens, respectively. 76 As political-murder 
work had dried up in the province, these professional assassins were forced to find new 
ways or new places of making a living. Several of them received orders for jobs in other 
provinces in which political murders were still in demand, many of them switched to the 
74 Interview, Piya Angkinan, Phetchaburi, 17 December 2009 ; Matichon , 7 November 2007: I 0. 
75 Interview, local election commission official , 17 April 2012 ; interview, local entrepreneur, 17 April 
2012. 
76 Interview, two local police officers, Phetchaburi, 17 April 2012. 
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risky but money-spinning businesses of drug dealing and gambling, and some moved 
easily into the world of professional shooting sports. 77 
77 
Interview, two loca l police officers, Phetchaburi , 17 April 2012; interview, lawyer who had represen ted 
many Ph etchabu ri 's gunmen , Phetchaburi , 18 April 20 I 2. 
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Chapter 11 
Buriram: Dynastic power, party machine, and ideological politics 
Observers may puzzle over the categorization of the infamous province Buriram as 
"relatively peacefol," given popular media portrayal of the province as the hotspot for 
dirty election campaigns and unruly voting patterns. Amid all the usual hyperbole, 
analysts have never seriously understood the political reality of the province. Certainly, 
the province has not been utterly calm throughout its history. Violent incidents in 
electoral contestation were witnessed briefly from 1995 to 2001, and the province gained 
notoriety from what happened during this tumultuous time. Since this period, however, 
this northeastern province located next to the Cambodian border has managed to have 
fairly competitive elections without violence. The framework set out in Chapter 1 
explains that a violence-prone province is one that lacks a monopolized power structure 
and has many candidates whose main revenue comes from illegal activities and/or 
businesses that depend on government concession or licenses. This was the case with 
Buriram in the period 1995-2001 but throughout other periods there were the conditions 
for peace, namely the monopoly of power by one group and the absence of inter-boss 
struggle. Buriram's electoral contests fell into a violent interlude when influential 
business-cum-political families attempted to monopolize provincial politics and found 
that their business rivals stood in their way. When they successfolly took power, 
violence disappeared. The pattern was similar to that found in Phetchaburi from the 
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1970s to the mid 1980s, when the Angkinan family rose to power. However, a puzzle 
occurred in the 2007 and 2011 polls when clan power was challenged but the elections 
were peaceful. This chapter investigates Buriram province to understand the specific 
conditions that contribute to the lack of violence in the absence of a power monopoly. 
If family ties were institutional factors contributing to peaceful electoral polit ics in 
Phetchaburi, it is changing modes of electoral conflict that explains the lack of violence 
in Buriram. Political and ideo logical contestation have shaped electoral politics in 
Buriram since 2006. New political developments helped break the cycle of violence, 
bypassing the personal conflicts among local bosses and directing the conflicts toward 
political ideas and platfonns. 
The struggle over one clan's monopoly 
Simi lar to Suphanburi, often known as "Banharn-buri" after its most powerful patron, 
Buriram was called "Chidchob-buri," clearly demonstrating which fi gure and fami ly 
controlled this territory. Nevertheless the Chidchob family's rise to power was achieved 
more quickly and in a less peaceful way than its counterpart in Suphanburi. In less than 
two decades, the family was successfu l in controlling the province from top to bottom, 
and fro m the city municipality to the outskirts. The Chidchob family applied all 
available strategies, old and new, legal and illegal, to win over their political and 
business rivals. Unlike old-style godfathers in other provinces (for example in 
Phetchaburi), Buriram's godfather represented a new style of boss, highly adept at 
adapting himself to a changing po litical world. To understand the changing pattern of 
political violence in Buriram, we need to examine the Chidcho b's path to power. 
For decades, on 4th Apr il every year, more than I 0,000 people in Buriram attend an 
extravagant birthday party for Chai Chidchod, the Chidchob family patriarch, at the 
city's gigantic fi e ld, a fa mily stronghold . The fami ly provides thousands of tables, 
abundant free food , good movies and music all night long. The attendees who usuall y 
come to greet the host of the event vary from cabinet members, senior bureaucrats from 
Bangkok, provincial governor, the police chief, business elites fro m Bangkok, local 
entrepreneurs and merchants, the head of Chamber of Commerce, bank managers, loca l 
government officials, celebrities, low-ranking civil servants, loca l polices, loca l NGOs, 
heads of ho usewife associations, vote canvassers, and local tough guys. The prominence 
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of the invitees has increased over time, along with the family's political influence and 
fortunes . The event is regularly organized by Newin Chidchob, the fourth child, named 
by his father after the notorious Burmese General Ne Win. He meticulously plans every 
minor detail of the event to ensure it went smoothly. In 2010, the gathering was in full 
swing as Chai had become House Speaker and his beloved son Newin had more than 70 
MPs under his control with the newly created Bhumjaitai Party, the country' s third-
largest political party. The gathering witnessed the attendance of not only the Buriram 
provincial governor but also his counterparts from ten other provinces, including high-
ranking officials from the Ministry ofinterior. All of them came from the capital to visit 
the Chidchob patron in the countryside. 1 
Buriram is one of the north-eastern provinces of Thailand, which has borders with Sa 
Kaeo, Nakhon Ratchasima, Khan Kaen, Maha Sarakham and Surin. To the south-east 
the province borders Cambodia. The name Buriram means Province of happiness. The 
province is subdivided into 23 districts (amphoe), and the districts are further subdivided 
into 189 sub-districts (tambon) and 2,520 villages (muban). This province is large in 
terms of territory and population as it had 1,652,000 residents, according to the 2010 
census, ranking number seven in the country. In tenns of economic development, 
however, the province does not perform well. The province 's wealth depends primarily 
on the agricultural sector: rice farming and cash cropping ( com, cassava, sugarcane, 
rubber tree, eucalyptus, etc). Official data from 2010 show 205 ,038 households and 
556,309 laborers in the province's agricultural sector, accounting for about 70 percent of 
total labor in the province. Farming areas occupy 75 percent of total land .2 Trading and 
industrial sectors are significantly small and contribute modestly to provincial 
prosperity. By 2010, the province had only 471 factories, together hiring only 12,481 
workers and producing agricultural goods, food, wood, and textiles products.3 In 2010, 
the Gross Provincial Product (GPP) of the province was 60,090 million baht and its GPP 
per capita was 36,384 baht, a record low, locating the province in the country' s bottom 
ten and the lowest of the six case studies.4 Despite its low level of economic 
development, Buriram has political significance from the sheer size of its population. 
1 Personal observation of the event, Buriram, 3-5 April 2010. 
2 Data from Buriram Provincia l Extension Agricultural Office, "Bas ic Information on Provincial 
Agriculture 20 IO," http ://www.buriram.doae.go.th/information.him 
3 Data from Buriram Provincial industrial Office, "Factory Statistic," 
http: //www.industry.go.th/ops/pio/buriram/Page/statistic.aspx 
4 The population data is drawn from the National Statistic Office of Thailand 2008, and the GPP and GPP 
per capita numbers are from National Economic and Social Development Board 2008. 
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The province provides nine MP seats (equal to Nakhon Si Thammarat) when the average 
is three to four seats and is therefore a province of keen interest to national politicians. 5 
Be that as it may, Buriram's striking characteristic is that most politicians, including the 
Chidchob fami ly, come from business elites who accumulated their wealth through the 
construction business and natural resource-extraction industries (see below) . Gravel 
crushing is one of the most significant financial sources fo r business,cum-political elites 
in Buriram. Most of gravel crushing plants are in the city district, the Chidchob 's 
backyard. Buriram stones are known for their high quality. There is a high demand for 
Buriram stones usually supplied to the construction business locally or to adjacent 
provinces. 6 Normally, the licenses are obtained through competitive bidding, and the 
winning bidders command the strongest political influence. 
Prior to the Chidchobs' rise in the late 1990s, elections in Buriram were not violent. 
There had been no political group or fami ly ambitious enough to attempt to monopolize 
power in this vast territory. Each group was satisfied enough to control two or three seats 
in their bailiwicks. The Chidchobs were the first monopolizers. The chidchob's political 
ambitions, combined with the nature of the family business, in which its wealth came 
from the resource-extraction economy and the cut-throat construction business, made 
their power struggle fierce and uncompromising. 
The Chidchobs made their first entry into parli ament in 1969 as the family patriarch 
Chai Chidchob won as an independent (after fa iling twice as a Democrat) . Chai was 
born in 1928 in Surin, a neighboring province, but moved to Buri.ram after finishing high 
school to look fo r work. He fo und his fortune in the gravel quarry business. He fou nded 
a company called "Silachai" in the city district that later on became his family political 
strongho ld . At the same time, he was invo lved in local political affairs and elected as a 
sub-district head. Reportedly Chai was very keen on establishing friendly connections 
with his sub-district co lleagues, and these connections contributed a great deal to his 
success standing for MP. 7 Having an official posit ion helped his family amass vast tracts 
of private and pub lic lands through legal manipulation and loopholes. 8 During this early 
5 In the 20 1 I electi on, the number o f seat was reduced to 9 because of th e changing tota l number of lower 
House MP. Onl y Bangkok, Chiangmai , and Kh onkaen have more available sea ts than Buriram. 6 In terview, member ofB uriram Federal of Thai Industry, Buri ram , 8 October 20 10. 1 Matichon Sudsapda, 13: 655 (March 1993) : 6. 
8 A few cases o f th e land in vasion and un lawfu l appropriation were in later period prosecuted and pending 
in court cases. See, Matichon, 18 November 2009; Krungthep Thurakit , 24 August 20 1 I. 
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period his business and political careers did not proceed smoothly as he occasionally lost 
elections. 
Another prominent sub-district head, Sawat Khotcha-seni, who also owned a gravel 
crushing plant and construction company, was also highly respected locally and, as a 
staunch anti-communist leader, overshadowed Chai. Locals viewed Chai and Sawat as 
rivals. In fact, they were friends who had gravel plants located next to each other and 
their children grew up together. They merely had different political styles and thus never 
stood on the same team. 9 Sawat's power faded in the mid 1980s as he had no capable 
political heir. Late in his career he tried to bring together all Buriram politicians to run 
under the Chart Thai party. Sawat's negotiations with powerful provincial elites failed as 
there was no willingness to work together. 10 Without Sawat, Anuwat Wattanaphongsiri, 
who owned several go lf clubs and substantial real estate, and Pichit Thiraratchatanon, 
whose main business was construction, dominated the province. Most of the time, Chai 
was running independently or for a different party from Anuwat and Pichit (who usually 
joined fo rces to build a vote base fo r the Chart Thai Party in Buriram). 11 Over the 
decades no faction strove for political monopoly. The substantial geographical size of 
the province was a major obstacle to any politicians moving beyond their constituency 
and campaigning in other districts. 12 Each politician enjoyed their own slice of pie in 
their districts. In this way, Buriram managed to have orderly elections for years. 
The situation changed when the second generation of the Chidchob fami ly came on the 
political scene. Chai 's advantage over his local opponents was his five able sons and one 
daughter. His most politically potent son was his belo ved Newin Chidchob (1958 -) who 
first served as a Buriram provincial councilor and council president when he was only 27 
(and the youngest counci l president in the country at that time). In 1988, Newin ran for 
the Lower House and won. And within a short time he was able to overpower his 
father's competitors, became head of a potent political faction, and was appointed to a 
coveted ministerial post. By the end of the 1990s, Newin had become a force to be 
reckoned with in nat ional politics. Newi.n was more ambitious than his father and was 
9 interview, Sawat 's daughter, Buriram, J 2 October 20 I 0. 
'
0 Interview, Sawat's daughter, Buri ram, 12 October 20 I 0. 
11 Niran 2006: 19-20. 
12 interview, former vote canvasser of Anuwal Wattanaphongsiri and current key vote canvasser of 
Chidchob family, Burirarn, 13 October 20 I 0. 
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able to achieve po litical success beyond that of his father. He was a political rising star 
who made his fami ly wealthier and more powerful. 
At Cbai 's request Anuwat supported Newin's first electoral win in 1988. Cha i knew that 
his sub-district head position and limited war chest were not sufficient to obtain victory 
for both himself and his son against several strong candidates. He therefore asked 
Anuwat to mentor Newin, hoping Anuwat would provide Newin with all necessary 
electioneering tactics and political networks. In return, Chai convinced Anuwat that his 
son wo uld do anything at all to assist bis mentor. Chai's request was smart because 
Anuwat was well-known in Buriram as having initiated and developed a complex system 
of vote-canvassing and vote-buying for over a decade. As an astute businessman, 
Anuwat applied modern business management techniques to political electioneering by 
which the campaign team would calculate how many votes they had in their pocket and 
how many were needed in order to win over their opponents. The electorate was divided 
up into many sub-groups and each group was assigned a vote canvasser to buy votes. 
Team members were also responsible for keeping up-to-date accounts of money spent in 
vote-buying activities and vote-canvassers lists. 13 
Newin learnt a great deal from his mentor. Since Anuwat was occupied with his 
ministerial position in Bangkok, he trusted Newin as his proxy in the province. Hence, it 
was Newin who took care of the constituency, controlled vote brokers and the war chest, 
and was attentive to the voters' needs. Newin took the opportunity to build his own 
popularity in the district. His down-to-earth manner and attentiveness impressed 
villagers. He was accessible and helped those in need. Locals relied on him to solve their 
day-to-day troubles, and bi s networks dutifully delivered "goods and gifts" during 
election campaign time. As a result , local district people were grateful to Newin, not 
Anuwat. Moreo ver, Newin recruited a number of influential village-head men and sub-
district beads to work for him as vote canvassers, and he took very good care of them. 
This gro up of loca l officia ls would later become the most loyal and most effective vote 
gatherers for the Cbidchob fa mily. 
The Chidcbob fam ily gradually took over Anuwat 's po litical machine. In the 1995 poll, 
after three co nsecutive wins, Newin thought it was his time to be Buriram's political 
13 In terview. famil y member o f former vote canvasser of Anuwat Wattanaphongsiri and current key vote 
ca nvasser of the Chidchob family, Bangkok, 22 September 2010. 
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boss himself instead of working in Anuwat's shadow. He asked a group of vote 
canvassers to shift from Anuwat to his family, and almost all of them said yes. 14 He 
formed his own team of candidates, competing with Anuwat and Pichit, and successfully 
beat both of them in the 1995 and 1996 general elections. In the 1996 poll, he assisted 
his wife, father, and close friend win seats. It meant that there were three Chidchob 
family members in the House: the first time that a political clan from an obscure 
province like Buriram had managed to establish a strong presence in the national 
assembly. 
After getting rid of Anuwat and Pichit, the Chidchobs controlled half of the province's 
political terrain. Buriram started to experience violence in electoral campaigns in the 
1995 and 1996 polls. Intimidation between opposing teams was prevalent. On all sides 
the vote canvassers were prime targets. They accused each other of intimidating vote 
brokers. There was one incident in which Newin's subordinates beat and injured two of 
Anuwat's vote canvassers. Newin and Chai faced assault charges. 15 The election 
monito1ing group reported violence in both polls on the night before voting day, 
popularly known as "a night of howling dog." Black-shirted thugs with weapons blocked 
roads to villages in too-close-to-call constituencies. Candidate's hired muscle visited 
villages at night to buy votes at the last minute and to block competitors from doing the 
same. Election monitoring teams had to solicit border patrol police .and army to disperse 
the "threatening men in black." In some cases, thugs resisted dispersal resulting in minor 
injuries. Monitoring teams never asked provincial police for help because everyone 
knew the powerful clan controlled them. Local election observers noted candidates used 
forceful tactics for the first time in 1995 and 1996 and again in the 2001 elections. 16 
The interval between the 1992 and 1996 polls was turbulent for the now powerful, well-
known Newin. On the evening of 18 November 1993 , his house in Nonthaburi province, 
neighboring Bangkok, was bombed. Nobody was injured and the house was not 
seriously damaged. The incident happened only a few days after the House censure 
debate, in which Newin played a critical role as a key opposition member, criticizing 
14 Interview, former vote canvasser of Chai Chidchob, Buriram, 10 October 2010; interview, former vote 
canvasser of Anuwat Wattanaphongsiri and current key vote canvasser of Chidchob family, Buriram , 13 
October 2010. 
15 Interview, lawyer of victims, Buriram, 11 October 2010; see also Matichon, 2 July 1995. For other 
incidents in the 1995 poll, see Matichon, 14 June 1995: 14. As for the 1996 election, see Thai Rath, 28 
October 1996: 1, 17, 23. 
16 Interview, local election monitor, Buriram, 7 October 2010; interview, former Buriram local election 
monitor, Nakom Sawan, 7 September 2010. And see news report in J\lfatichon, 3 July 1995. 
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corrupt government policy. However, police investigations revealed that the bombing 
had been carried out by the po lice officers close to Newin himself. His reputation was 
tarnished by this public scandal. 17 One year later, he divorced his first wife and 
remarried Karuna Supha, the daughter of a construction billionaire from Chiangmai 
province. His father-in-law was regarded as one of the most prominent figures in the 
country's construction business due to his business empire and his wide-ranging 
connections. His remarriage was the talk of the town as both families were famous and 
the dowry was worth 40 million baht, including 8,888,888 baht in cash, 73 carats of 
diamonds, and go ld jewelry. 18 This well-publicized marriage definitely enhanced the 
Chidchob's social status and wealth. The high dowry, meanwhile, raised questions on 
the source ofNewin' s affluence. A few months later, his name came up in the scandal 
over bidding for a large dam construction project contracted by government. On the 
bidding day, a group of hooligans threatened and obstructed other bidders to bid for the 
project, and several witnesses identified Newin at the scene. Eventually, all companies 
withdrew and Newin ' s father-in-law's company won the contract without competition. 
Later the government nullified the contract after several complaints about the bidding 
process.19 
Events surrounding the 1995 electoral campaign gave Newin more trouble. Two days 
before voting, a special police task force from Bangkok arrested two of his key vote 
canvassers on charges of electoral fraud . The police raided their homes and found piles 
of bank notes worth 11.4 million baht. The money was divided into 120 baht lots, and 
beside these piles were lists ofregistered voters and campaign posters ofNewin and his 
team members. One of those arrested owned the house and was the sister of one of the 
member of Newin 's team. She protested her innocence and said the money was not 
prepared for vote-buying but for land acquisition. Even though Newin was never 
charged or prosecuted, the media and general public judged him guilty. 20 The case 
damaged his public image further and earned him the nickname "Mr. 120." 
All scandals notwithstanding, in the 1995 poll Newin won bi s home district seat 
decisively (with almost the highest vote margin in the country). Also victorious were the 
17 Matichon Suds11pda, 14: 693 (3 December 1993): 14. 
18 Matichon Sudsupda, 22-28 October 1996: I 0- 11. 
19 Manager Magazine (Sep tember 1995); Matichon Sudsapda, 15: 784 (29 August 1995): 12. 20 In 1998 , the Supreme Coun found the defendants guilty of the vote fraud and sentenced them to one 
yea r in prisons, and the am ount of 11 .4 milli on baht was confiscated. See th e verdi ct and background of 
the case in Matichon Sudsapda (27 January- 2 February I 998): 16. 
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other six Chart Thai party candidates supervised by Newin. According to the unwritten 
quota system rule of Thai parliamentary politics, control over seven MPs ensured Newin 
a cabinet position. After many rounds of negotiation, Banharn Silpa-archa, head of the 
Chart Thai Party and then Prime Minister, agreed to give Newin the prestigious post of 
the Deputy Minister of Finance. This appointment caused public uproar, since the post 
was normally given to a capable technocrat. The business community, economists, the 
media, and the middle class in general viewed the appointment of a young boss from a 
backward province to a position controlling public money as completely unacceptable. 
Newin was criticized as inexperienced, incompetent and unqualified. The Banharn 
cabinet in general and Newin's appointment in particular was viewed as a political 
nightmare for the reformists, middle classes, and the traditional elites; it confirmed their 
belief that the House of Representative was manipulated and controlled by corrupt 
uneducated provincial godfathers.21 Institutional opinion polls confirmed that this 
perception was widely held. Newin topped every poll for being the most unacceptable 
and most unqualified minister in Banharn's cabinet. 22 Banharn was under strong 
pressure to remove him. Newin's father defended him publicly, saying he was suitable 
for the position because he was a capable politician and had ample personal wealth to be 
the Minister of Finance given that he earned 12 million baht per month from family's 
gravel crushing plants. The head of the Chidchobs even told the media that one day 
"Newin would become the Thai prime minister. "23 Chai' s reasoning_ perplexed the public 
because they did not see how the ability of managing a monopoly family business would 
necessarily make him suitable to manage the country's finances. 
The Chidchobs firmly resisted Banharn's attempts to dismiss Newin from cabinet. They 
knew that the unstable government coalition needed their factional support, and they 
were aware that harsh criticism from middle class and media in metropolitan Bangkok 
had no effect on their popularity at home. Confident of this, Newin spoke to his 
supporters in Buriram, 
I told the prime minister that ifI was removed from the Finance 
Ministry position, then [he would have to] dissolve the House and call a 
new election .... I also told the prime minister that he has been prime 
21 See the agenda and politics of tbe political reform movement in the 1990s that led to the constitutional 
refonn in 1997 in McCargo 2002, and Callahan 2005. 
22 See the results of the surveys in Matichon Sudsapda, IS, 779 (25 July 1995): 87-88. 
23 Matichon Sudsapda, 15: 780 (1 August 1995): 11. 
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minister for 9-10 months and I also have been minister for 9-10 months. 
He can dissolve parliament. I am only 38. It is not that I am arrogant, but 
I believe that when the new election comes I will definitely come back 
as an MP again. 24 
This speech, including other remarks by Newin that he would kick Banharn in the neck, 
made Banharn and other Chart Thai Party factions furious. In the end, Newin could not 
stand the pressure and resigned. Not long afterwards, the Banham government collapsed, 
and a new general election was called. Newin had difficulty finding a new party to 
associate with as many parties saw him as a liability, particularly those parties with 
strong voter bases in Bangkok. Recruiting Newin to their party might mean a loss of 
urban popularity. Some members ofNewin 's team abandoned him to join other parties 
as they were afraid that he would not be able to run. After several weeks' struggle, and 
only a few days before the candidacy registration deadline, Newin and his allies were 
accepted by a small political party Ekkaphap, led by a fellow boss from Nakhon Pathom 
province. 
Newin' s fa ith in his constituency was warranted as his faction won four seats out often. 
In Newin 's constituency, his vote tally was staggeringly high, showing clearly that hi s 
supporters were so lidly behind him regardless of his party affiliation. In his hometown, 
he was popular and powerfully buttressed by a political machine that never fa iled to 
deliver votes during elections. By the end of the 1990s, half of the provincial territory 
was firmly governed by the Chidchob family. But it was equally clear that a local 
strongman like Newin was not welcome in the capital that was dominated and controlled 
by traditional bureaucratic elites and a presumptuous middle class. Newin was not 
deterred as he aimed to expand his family power to cover the whole territory. Thi s 
unstoppable political ambition led to a fa tal outcome in the next election. 
Chart 11.1: The Chidchob Family (a selected genealogy) 
I Utsani+Chawa lit 
Artarsa 
Chai+ La-o ng 
I 
lTaweesak iNewin+Karuna I Saksayam 
Supha 
I 
two other brothers 
24 Th is speech was given in his bail iwick on 18 May 1996 , see Matichon, 21 May 1996: 11. 
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Prelude to the 2001 poll: the violent path to clan predominance 
The 2001 election in Buriram was the most unruly in the history of the province. It was 
also one of the bloodiest elections in the country conducted under the new constitution. 
Many voters called it the most fearful and bloody poll in the history of the province ; 
involving intimidation, violent attacks enmeshing candidates and vote canvassers, and 
thugs patrolling the precinct prior to election day. 25 It was a critical battle between the 
Chidchob clan and their enemies. Up to this election, no party or family had ever 
dominated the province. For example, between 1996 and 2001, ten Buriram MPs 
belonged to four different political parties (Ekkaphap, Democrat, Chatphatthana, and 
New Aspiration Party). The Chidchob family was the most powerful political clique in 
the province followed by the Petchsawang group led by Sophon Petchsawang (1940-) ; 
the Thongsri group led by Songsak Thongsri, one of Newin's cousins working 
independently, and the Liangpongpan family represented by Panawat Liangpongpan 
(1958-), the Chidchob's key business and political competitors. Each group had their 
own vote bases in specific districts built through patronage and personal connections. 
Despite possessing more power than other political factions, the Chidchob family's 
power was limited to the city district and its adjacent areas. To achieve their desired 
monopoly, the family had to neutralize the political influence of the three other groups. 
Their task was made even more difficult, if not impossible, when -~ new player entered 
the competition in the 2001 poll-the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party of Thaksin, a newly 
founded but forceful and affluent party aiming to win so me seats in this large province. 
TRT showed their seriousness by fielding strong candidates, some of whom were 
Newin's former opponents. 
There was bloodshed relatively early in the campaign. On the night of December 18, 
1999, the Democrat MP for Buriram Panawat Liangpongpan was shot four times at close 
range by gunmen outside his apartment in Bangkok on the way back from Parliament. 
Panawat survived but was seriously injured and taken to the nearby hospital. The 
gunmen fled the scene by motorcycle. Panawat 's attempted murder made headlines in 
every major newspaper and television station as he was a well-known politician from the 
party of the current government. The fact that the assassination attempt occurred in the 
capital during the House session attracted great public attention and put high pressure on 
the police to solve the case. Police believed that the murder attempt was connected to 
25 Matichon, 30 January 2001: 18. 
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political or business conflicts that Panawat had in the province. But Panawat was 
convinced that it was purely politically motivated, to eliminate him before the next 
election. 26 The police were able to arrest a gurunan within a week, which is unusually 
fast fo r a murder case in Thailand. The rut man was well-known in the Bangkok 
underworld. He confessed to the crime and told the police that he received orders from 
Taweesak Chidchob, Newin 's elder brother, as he owed Taweesak for helping his ill 
mother receive treatment in hospital. He confessed to doing the job for free to show his 
gratitude to his boss. He also claimed he did not know Panawat personally and had no 
knowledge that Panawat was a parliamentarian. The only thing he knew was that 
Panawat was his boss' s arch enemy. 27 As explained in Chapter 3, this gunman 
represented a type of assassin who conducts murders in order to pay a personal debt 
owed to political boss (i.e. clientelistic killing) , rather than as a business deal. 
The po lice had a warrant for Taweesak's arrest but they never succeeded in 
apprehending him. He is still at large as of early 2013. According to locals, Taweesak 
was Chai ' s rowdiest son and fled to Bangkok at a young age to make his fortune. He 
worked for a Bangkok underworld boss as a gambling racketeer and hoodlum 
commander. Panawat 's would-be assassin was Taweesak ' s right hand man. Taweesak 
rarely appeared in his hometown except during elections, returning to assist his family's 
campaign with strong-arm tactics.28 The involvement of a member of the Chidchob clan 
in the MP shooting critically damaged the Chidchob name. Newin and Chai held a press 
conference, saying they had had no involvement in the case nor direct contact with 
Taweesak fo r a very long time. They told the med ia that Taweesak alone was 
responsible fo r the attempted assassination. Nevertheless the public perceived the 
Chidchobs as ruthlessly power hungry and willing to employ violence to eliminate their 
adversaries. Everyo ne knew that Panawat was a major Chidchob family rival. 
In fact , the Chidchobs and the Liangpongpans were almost polit ical id entical· twins. 
They had similar family backgrounds, accumulated wealth in the same ways in the same 
terri tories, and used exactly the same strategies to win votes. The national media 
po rtrayed Panawat's murder att empt as part of a saga between "good po liticians" and 
"croo k pol it ic ians," but fo r locals it was the usual but uncompromising confl ict between 
26 Siam Rath, 19 December 1999: I , 2; K11111gthep Thurakit , 23 December 1999: 3. 27 Daily News, 26 December 1999: I , 14. 
28 Interview, fam il y member of key vote canvasser of th e Chidchob family, Bangkok, 22 September 2010. 
Also see a br ief profile of Taweesak in Matichon , 27 December 1999: 19. 
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two forceful political clans competing for the control of the province. 29 The two families 
were political as well as business rivals. As we learnt from other provinces, political and 
business enmity was a perfect formula for electoral violence. Panawat Liangpongpan 
was elected for the first time in 1986, when he was only 26, with the support of his elder 
brother Sawaeng Liangpongpan, an old-fashioned but highly influential sub-district head 
feared by locals in Kumuang district. Panawat and Newin were the same generation of 
politician and, in fact, were political allies briefly. Panawat was affiliated with several 
parties: he first started with the Mualchon Party from 1986-1992, then moved to the 
Chart Thai Party in 1992, then switched to the Democrat Party in 1996. Before running 
for national elections, he was provincial councilor. He hit the headlines by winning more 
votes than Chai Chidchob in the 1996 national election. 30 His family controlled the 
Kumuang district; his elder brother was a long-standing sub-district head, and his 
younger brother and his sister-in-law were municipal councilors. In Panawat's 
constituency, no other political groups had ever beaten him, including the Chidchobs 
who lo st to Panawat's team several times. The November 1999 PAO poll was another 
battle in which the Liangpongpans prevailed over the Chidchobs, embarrassing Chai 
who was confident that his family would win the district PAO councilor seat. Both 
families used intimidation and coercive force. On several occasions the police were 
employed to restore order. 31 The Liangpongpans monopolized the profitable 
construction business in Kumuang. Kamnan Sawaeng was infamoµs for his toughness 
and connections to local thugs. Sawaeng also owned a cockfighting den popular with 
district gamblers and ruffians. Furthermore, the family nominated Panawat 's wife to run 
for senator in Buriram in the 2000 senate election, in which she had to compete with 
Newin's sister. 32 
In January 2000, after recovering from his operation, Panawat gave an interview saying 
"not everyone in Buriram is a godfather. There are only certain families destroying 
Buri.ram people 's reputation." He continued saying that Buri.ram was more violent than 
other provinces because even government MPs, of whom he was one, were murder 
targets.33 According to Panawat's "personal theory", he was led to believe that "no one 
29 Newin reportedly learnt several electioneering tactics from Panawat ' s brother when he began his 
political career. Interview, former political ally of Newin Chidchob, Buriram, 14 October 2010; local 
journalist, Buriram, 19 October 2010. 
3° Khao Sod, 22 December 1999: 4. 
3 1 Daily Manager, 21 December 1999: 13; Matichon, 21 December 1999: 1, 21. 
32 Dokbia Thurakit , 27 December 1999: 8. 
33 Matichon, 16 January 2000: 1, 19; 17,ai Post, 8 January 2000: 2. 
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dared kill a parliamentarian . .. but at the end my belief was proved wrong." 34 In fact, 
Panawat was largely correct to assume MPs were off limits, as since the late 1980s MP s 
were less frequently targeted than vote canvassers (see chapter 4 and 6). His attempted 
assassination was quite unusual. In his 17 January 2000 criminal court testimony, he 
made an audacious move by implicating the Chidchob family. Panawat described seven 
potential motivat ions for the attempt on his life, pointing out they all invo lved the 
Chidchobs. Some of Panawat 's assass ination motives concerned fierce competition 
between two fami lies in local po lls. Others related to his role in exposing the Chidchobs' 
abuse of power in local politics. But Panawat said the primary motivation for his 
attempted murder was political conflict over the 2001 general election. He said thi s 
confl ict was a matter of li fe and death becau se in the new electoral system (the FPTP), 
there could be only one winner per constituency. His and Chai's overlapping vote bases 
forced a confrontation between them, Panawat noted; and he further told the judges that 
the Chidchob family wanted to control the province by winning all ten seats and he was 
their major obstacle. Panawat claimed that if he was killed, his rival would save 80 
million baht because " if I were still alive, they have to spend that amount of money to 
win over me."35 Three days after Panawat 's testimony, the comi delivered a guilty 
verdict and sentenced the gunman to life imprisonment fo r attempted murder. The police 
also charged Newin's elder brother, who was on the run, for masterminding the murder 
p lan. 
Stories about Panawat ' s attempted assass inat ion ran fo r weeks in the med ia and 
damaged the Chidchob family's politica l prospects. Initiall y, Newin and his fa mil y 
wanted to join the Democrat Party in the 200 1 poll expecting the Democrat 's reputable 
image to rescue him from endless scandals. The Democrat leaders, at the same time, 
wanted Newin 's faction in their party since they were acutely aware that the Northeast 
region was their weakest spot. Since the 1980s the Democrats had completely fa iled to 
win the support of the Northeastern vo ters. With the inclu sion of Newin ' s po li tica l 
faction, party leaders saw prospects of winning a fair number of seats in the large 
impoveri shed reg ion, enhancing the Party 's chances of fo rming a new government. But 
in the afte rmath of Panawat 's shooting, the deal fe ll through. Several party members 
opposed Newin saying his disreputable image was go ing to ruin the party's popular ity 
among Bangkokian voters and urban vo ters in other provinces, part icul arly for Party- list 
34 Thai Post , 20 January 2000: I, 2. 
35 See th e full testimony of Panawat in Khao Sod, 20 January 2000: I , I 0. 
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votes. Even before the Panawat shooting incident, he was staunchly against the idea of 
having Newin in the Party as they both strove for the same constituency. Panawat said 
publicly many times he was not changing his constituency "whatever happens, I am 
going to stand in Kumuang district, my hometown."36 According to a major politician in 
the 200i poll for Buriram, "Panawat's enemy must have decided to use violence to 
eliminate him after negotiation on the issue of overlapping constituencies failed." 37 After 
his attempted assassination, Panawat answered the question about the prospects of 
Newin joining the Democrat Party, saying "I believe party members [of the Democrats] 
have a heart. .. I have permanent scars caused by po lilies. It is definitely clear that I 
could not be Newin's political ally." 38 
Again, in 2001, Newin and his faction had difficulty finding an established party to stand 
in the general election. Banharn, his former boss who expelled him from the party a few 
years earlier, welcomed him back to the Chart Thai Party and gave him a second chance. 
Banham was not a benevolent or forgiving person, but he desperately needed Newin's 
faction to add more seats to his party after losing many strong candidates to Thaksin's 
affluent That Rak Thai Party. Banharn knew that Newin, regardless of his notoriety, was 
the leader of a large political faction and thus had the potential to win seven to ten seats. 
Apart from his hometown, Newin had expanded his political power to cover the 
constituencies in neighboring provinces in the lower northeast such as Sisaket, Sakon 
Nakhon, Ubon Ratchathani, Surin, and Kalasin. 39 Several candidates in these provinces 
were supported by the Chidchob family. Building up a large political faction beyond 
one 's own home province comes at a large cost. However, Newin's wealth-
accumulated while he was in politics in the 1990s-enabled him to build and expand his 
faction. Over the years, his family's and his associates' construction companies won 
many tenders for government megaprojects. By the end of the 1990s, Newin had become 
one of the top ten richest cabinet members with total assets worth 298.50 million baht. 
He owned vast tracts of high-priced land in Buriram, Bangkok, and Chiangmai, and his 
wife was even wealthier with a net worth 846.79 million bah! (making her one of the 
36 See the reports of his earlier interviews in Siam Rath, 19 December 1999: I , 2; Matichon, 20 December 
1999: 4. 
37 Thai Rath , 19 December 1999: 19. 
38 Thai Post, 3 February 2000: 3. 
39 Matichon Sudsapda , 9- 15 October 2000: 13. 
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richest cabinet ministers ' spouses).40 Such wealth and power indicated and also fulfilled 
his desire to be a regional boss, not merely a provincial one. 
In the wake of Panawat's shocking failed assassination, local res idents believed that the 
coming poll in Buriram would be violent, as one said, "politics in Buriram is tough, even 
a mountain can be toppled." Another local politician lamented the increase in recent 
violence, noting that in the past "politics in Buriram was intense but not overtly violent." 
41 The attempted murder of a well-known MP put full blown vio lence on the horizon. 
Veteran politician Sophon Phetsawang, an MP fo r Buriram who had accumulated hi s 
personal wealth from the construction business like other politicians in Buriram, 
attempted to avert violent confrontation by persuading all powerful local faction leaders 
to negotiate. He proposed that every group compromise and try to reach a power-sharing 
agreement, in which all ten seats in the province be fairly allocated to each group to 
avoid bloodshed in the campaign. Sophon intended to ask for the mediation of a senior 
and charismatic po litician from the Democrat Party who both Panawat and New in 
respected.42 Nobody responded to Sophon' s call for mediation, and thus the province 
was primed for bloody electoral warfare. 
The 2001 poll: the clan, fierce rivalry, and the (party) dark horse 
The 2001 poll in Buriram was a fierce three-way contest between the Chidchob famil y 
groupings (associated with the Chart Thai Party) , the Liangpongpan family (Democrats), 
and Sophon Phetsawang and associates (Thai Rak Thai Party) . Political observers had 
focused on the rivalry between Newin and Panawat. In the end, however, it was the 
newly fanned TRT party who emerged as the surprise winner and gained the mo st from 
the competition. Buriram electoral results truly demonstrated a significant change in 
Thai electoral politics, particularly in the North and Northeast regions, showing that 
(populist) policy packages and party branding were increasingly significant in shaping 
vo ters' decis ions. Clan networks remained important as long as they were able to control 
vital resources and delivered patronage to the local community, and were capable of 
using coercive force to ward off their enemies. The political clans who were not in a 
strong posi tion were wiped out by the populist politica l party. Clans with robust enough 
40 See detail s of the construc ti on business empi re of hi s network in Dokbia Thurakit, IO Januar y 2000: 8· 
for Newin and hi s wife's total assets, see Matichon Sudsapda, 20-26 January 1998: 15-16. 
41 Matichon, 22 December 1999: I , 2 1; Thai Post, 19 December 1999: I , 10. 
42 Khao Sod, 25 January 2000: 11 . 
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powerbases were able to withstand the forceful party and not be completely eradicated. 
The Chidchob family ofBuriram was located in the latter category. Moreover, when the 
Buriram Election Commission announced the official results the Chidchobs realized that 
their most formidable opponent was the massive new party, the TRT, not their local 
personal foes. 
As everyone expected, the election was violent. Buriram was named one of the most 
violent provinces in 2001 , the worst record in the province's history. The two most 
violent areas were the first and fifth constituencies. Record conflict levels in the fifth 
constituency were no surprise as it was the district in which Panawat competed with the 
Chidchobs. A key Chidchob family vote canvasser admitted that Panawat was their 
toughest opponent as his family had a strong clientelist network in the district. At that 
time Newin's team was not able to completely invade Panawat's territory, therefore they 
used all available tactics.43 Newin decided to field his father Chai Chidchob for the top 
seat of the Chart Thai party list to ensure an easy track to parliament for his beloved 
father. By this move, it also avoided a direct confrontation between Chai and Panawat. 
He instead put one of his brothers to fight against Panawat in his constituency. As both 
sides employed coercive force, campaigning exploded with violence. The primary 
targets were vote canvassers, and candidates used hard-arm tactics to either command 
their own team's loyalty or to eliminate their opponent 's key canva.§sers (see Chapter 3). 
Candidates approached key vote canvassers such as village headmen or sub-district 
heads, to work for them. Compared to others involved in the elections, the vote 
canvassers' lives were the most precarious. If they said "no" to one side and worked fo r 
others, they were eliminated by the candidate whom they refused. Some thus opted to 
stay neutral. Even as non-aligned they were not completely safe as they were suspected 
by both sides. Candidates and their coteries frequently threaten vote brokers to guarantee 
their neutrality: the case of the Khaen Charoen village headman (in the fifth 
constituency) who dares to refuse to work for both powerful contenders, is apposite, A 
few days before the election, he was shot by a gang of mysterious gunmen at home. 44 
The first constituency had many violent incidents too. It is in a long-standing Chidchob 
family city district. The family had always won elections by a staggering margin in this 
district. However, Newin fielded his business associate, Prasit Tangsikiatkun to stand 
43 Interview, long-time key vote canvasser ofChidchob family, Buriram, 9 October 2010. 
44 Krungthep Thurakit , 4 January 2001: 17-18; Matichon, 4 January 2001: 14. 
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against the TRT candidate, Phanprapha Intharawitthayanan (1950-), who had been born 
in Buriram but spent most of her life in Bangkok. Phanprapha was a high-profile 
businesswoman and socialite, married to a wealthy businessman-turned-politician. Her 
family networks were strong in the city district as some of her relatives held local 
administrative posts. She was head of the TRT candidates' team for Buri.ram, and the 
party expected her to make her mark in this hard-fought territory. TRT had a bountiful 
war chest, but they lacked a strong team of vote canvassers as they were newcomers to 
the area. Phanprapha's opponents used the fact that she had left Buri.ram and lived in 
Bangkok for a long ti.me. Local observers and her competitors accused the TRT team of 
"dumping money" to create an ad hoc political machine. There was so me truth in the 
accusation. The TRT invested heavily in influential local figures to work as their vote 
canvassers. Some of those figures were vote canvassers who formerly worked for 
Newin. This pattern of "buying" vote brokers disrupted the Chidchob's long-established 
political networks, thereby leading to violent tussles over vote controllers. A key 
Chidchob family henchman admitted that the family had lost a number of vote 
canvassers to the opposition. According to him, those who left were "bitter with us, or 
felt that they were not taken care of well enough, or thought they would be better off 
with the opposing team." However, he noted that only a minority defected. 45 
In the pre-election period, some of those who defected had their lives threatened, were 
physically assaulted and/or assassinated. Many vote canvassers had to seek police 
protection because hooligans harassed them day and night and it was not safe to leave 
home and campa ign. According to one of Phanprapha's key vote canvassers (a 
community leader and a fom1er Newin broker) some TRT team vote brokers stopped 
working after local thugs constantly threatened them. A partisan village headman and 
some tough guys threatened her but she decided to continue for personal and political 
reaso ns, "l like TRT's po li cy package. .. and my mom was a good friend of 
Phanprapha's mom."46 Since both sid es felt they could not afford to lose, the first 
co nstituency abounded with intimidation, kidnappings, bomb threats, brawls, and car 
attacks. On the eve of voting day, the local election commission and election monitoring 
group needed to ask the army to escort them to the first and fifth constituency, on reports 
of impending clashes between opposing groups. When election observers and officers 
arrived at the scene they were caught between two gangs, but the gangs spared them as 
" Interview, key political henchman of the Chidchobs, Buriram , 8 October 20 10. 46 Int erview, key vote ca nvasser of Phanprapha, 6 and 14 October 20 10. 
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they were considered "non-combatants." Officials seized many weapons that night. One 
commented on his dreadful experience, "I was really scared ... it was like they were 
going to war. "47 
When the results of first round of vote counting came out, they were met with angry 
mass voter protests organized by the losing candidates. The situation spiraled out of 
control to the point in which the local election commission had to call for extra help 
from the police and army. Aggrieved parties filed multiple complaints of electoral 
misconduct and irregularities at the national election commission in Bangkok, resulting 
in the commission invalidating the results in four constituencies, including the first and 
the fifth district. When the second "electoral war" was over, two victors emerged-the 
Chidcho bs and Thaksin' s party. The Chidchobs grabbed four seats, including one in the 
first district, in which Newin's close friend defeated Phanprapha by a very small margin. 
One of Newin's younger brothers was elected MP for the first time in the family's 
domain. The TRT, on the other hand, finished with a more impressive performance 
winning six seats, including the competitive one in the fifth constituency. 48 Surprisingly, 
in the fifth constituency, a new face candidate from the TRT, Peerapong Hengsawat, a 
wealthy local businessman who owned many factories in the area, was a political dark 
horse defeating the top contenders, Newin's brother and Panawat. Peerapong puts his 
win down to Newin and Panawat underestimating him, and voters l:>eing attracted to and 
enthusiastically supporting TRT's populist policies.49 
All winning candidates from both camps shared one feature, and that is that they all 
owned or were shareholders in construction companies. 50 Generally speaking, TRT 
candidates ' qualifications were weaker than those of the Chidchob family. Their victory 
owed a great deal to Thaksin's popularity and the party's populist policies. For Newin's 
candidates, their victory depended first and foremost on the Chidchob family political 
machine as much as their own perso_nal vote bases and clientelist networks. For the 
Chidchob team, the party brand contributed almost nothing to their campaign and 
electoral success. Some voters did not even pay attention to or were aware of the 
47 Interview, election observer, Buriram, 7 October 2010; interview, local election commissioner, 14 
October 2010. 
48 The winning candidate in the ninth constituency was initially associated wi th a very small party called 
Seritham, which was a close ally of the TRT and was eventually integrated into the TRT after the election. 
For this reason, I regarded this candidate as a TRT candidate. 
49 Interview, Peerapong Hengsawat, Buriram, 16 October 2010. 
50 See occupational background ofBuriram MPs in 2001 poll in Niran 2006: 34-35. 
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Chidchob candidates ' party association. In every constituency, electoral results clearly 
demonstrated this mentioned pattern as the number of votes for a TRT's party-list ballot 
was higher than the number of votes for its constituency candidate. For Newin's Chart 
Thai, the pattern was totally opposite. For example, in the fifth constituency, the TRT 
had 25 ,812 votes fo r the constituency candidate and 31 ,11 3 votes for party-list, while the 
Chart Thai Party received 11 ,45 1 vo tes fo r the constituency (Newin's brother) , and 
11,213 for party list. 51 The 2001 election was a competition between the party machines 
and family networks, or, put another way, between programmatic politics and 
particularistic politics. This election made clear for the Chidchobs that Panawat was not 
a major obstacle fo r their ambitious plan to monopolize political power in Buriram. 
The 2005 poll: the political integration of clan networks and party machines 
The 200 1 election was the last violent election witnessed by Buriram residents. The 
three fo llowing general elections from 2001 onwards were peaceful and orderly. The 
absence of violence, particularly in the 2005 poll, was the result of political negotiation 
between two influential figures, Newin and Thaksin. Both were astute politicians who 
had learnt from the turbulent 2001 poll that it was too costly and damaging to have a 
head-on confrontation between a strong natio_nal party and a powerful local clan. They 
struck an important deal fo r the 2005 election so that both sides could avoid unnecessary 
co ll ision. For Thaksin, the Buriram strategy was not unique. In Phrae, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, Thaksin attempted to broker a deal with the Supasiri family, but the attempt 
fail ed and violence erupted. In Nakhon Sawan, the Nirot famil y agreed to act as local 
power brokers for the TRT, and the province escaped brutal contestation once befo re 
returning to vio lence after the 2006 co up. In Nakhon Si Thammarat, Thaksin was not 
able to cut a po litical dea l in the Democrat Party heartland. Therefore he supported the 
Ketchart famil y, a powerful clan and long-standing Democrat rival, spearheading TRT's 
ca1npaign in toppling the Democrats. That campaign led to a violent political showdown 
(as already elaborated in Chapter 9) . In Phetchaburi, the powerfu l local Angkinan clan 
was an obvio us choice for Thaksin, but he did not succeed due to the politics of clan (as 
argued in Chapter I 0). In Buriram, Thaksin had no option but to negotiate with the 
Chidchobs, undoubtedly the most fo rmidable power bloc in the province. 
51 Krungthep Thurakit , 18 Janua ry 200 1: 2; and see the offi cial election results of the 200 1 poll in the 
Office of E lection Commiss ion of Thai land 200 1. 
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Newin's faction decided to move to the TRT ahead of the 2005 election, and the TRT 
assigned him to lead the party campaign in Buriram. For Newin, the best option was 
working with Thaksin's party, thereby capitalizing on party popularity and material 
resources to consolidate his family ' s power at the expense of his enemies. Thaksin' s 
popularity and the TRT populist policies combined with the Chidchob family political 
machine brought the TRT team a landslide victory. TRT's party list and constituency 
votes in the 2005 poll in Buriram were significantly higher than those they received in 
the 2001 poll. 
Political success compelled TRT candidates who were former Chidchob family rivals to 
leave behind their past enmities. Sophon Phetsawang, who, since 1983, had been a 
Buriram legislator and leading TRT candidate in the 2001 election, agreed to work with 
Newin in the 2005 campaign. 52 Like Panawat, Sophon blocked Newin' s ambitions to 
monopolize power. For a long time, he had been a vocal opponent of the Chidchob 
family at both local and national levels. His financial base was no different from other 
major Buriram politicians, as his family owned a number of construction companies. 
Nangrong district was his political stronghold that even the Chidchobs could not invade. 
He solidified his local power base by fielding his son and wife in the district provincial 
councilor polls and both were duly elected. In the 2005 poll, Newin joined forces with 
Sophon under the TRT banner. When asked about Newin joining tbe TRT, Sophon said 
"I have no problem with Newin joining the Thai Rak Thai party ... I am ready to work 
with him ... lf lv1Ps in all ten districts can be united, that is going to be a good omen for 
Buriram people ... and it is going to effectively reduce violent competition."53 One of 
Sophon' s key political aides said he had no choice but to work with Newin. Despite the 
fact that Sophon despised Newin, he could not afford to abandon Thaksin 's party as he 
realized that the popularity of the TRT in Buriram was extremely strong, 54 
In the process of selecting candidates, Sophon's and Newin' s factions fielded their own 
former winning candidates (six from the TRT and four from the Chidchob family). 
Those members from both factions who lo st the 2001 poll were forced to find a new 
party. As a result , TRT won all ten seats and all incumbents were reelected and Chai and 
52 Sophon first ran for MP in 1979 under th e Democrat Party but fail ed. He was th en elected ti1 e first tim e 
in 1983, fail ed aga in in 1986 but succeeded in 1988 and aga in in September 1992, 1995, 1996, and 2001. 
He was a deputy House Speaker during th e second Chuan government, but never received any ministeri al 
post. See, Matichon, 20 February 2002: 3. 
53 Khao Sod, 28 July 2003: I, I 0, 11. 
54 Interview, former key political aide ofSophon, Buriram, 11 October 2010. 
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Newin entered the Parliament as TRT party- list candidates. The 2005 election went 
smoothly without any violent incident. The Chidchobs conducted closed-door 
negotiat ions prior to voting to pave the way for Newin's campaign to impress Thaksin 
with abso lute victory. Reportedly, TRT approached two popular local candidates (both 
close to Newin) from the Democrat Party and the Mahachon Party, to withdraw in 
exchange for ten million baht each. The candidate from the Mahachon Party, who was 
expected to run in the same constituency as Sophon, withdrew without giving any 
explanat ion at the last minute. 55 One ofNewin's key vote brokers conceded that Newin 
persuaded the Mahachon Party candidate to withdraw so that Sophon could win easily. 56 
Meanwhile, other old opponents of the Chidchobs were in no position to compete with 
the family this time. Panawat Liangpongpan, who replaced Newin as a Chart Thai 
candidate, was embarrassingly defeated by the TRT candidate for the second time by an 
even greater margin. 
After the 2005 election, the Chidchobs' political power reached its apex. It became one 
of the most successful political dynasties of the Thaksin era. The family dominated 
every level of political office in the province from MP to sub-district administration. 
Newin and his father, wife, and younger brother were in the House. His elder sister had 
been a senator since 2001. At the local level, Newin formed a political group called 
"Buri.ram Rak Thai," (Buri.ram loves Thai) a name that clearly linked and identified this 
local group with the Thai Rak Thai party. The Buri.ram boss exercised his politica l 
influence through this local group to assist his brother-in-law, Pol.Col. Chawalit Artarsa, 
elected as the Buriram PAO Chairman in 2003. Most newly elected pro vincial 
councilors owed the Chidchob family political machine their election victory. Chawalit 
was elected Buri.ram PAO Chairman despite having no political or public office 
experience nor ever having lived in the province. In the campaign, he changed his family 
name to Chidchob to emphasize his political belonging as his name was not known 
locall y. 57 To cement the alliai1ce between the Chidchobs and their former opponents, 
Sophon Phetsawang 's son was appointed PAO deputy ChaiJman under Newin ' s brother-
in-law. Most people knew Newin was a de fac to PAO Chainnan making all important 
55 Th is news was con firmed by one of th e TRT candidates. He admitt ed that the negotiati on indeed 
occurred but sa id there was no money offered . Thai Rath , 12 December 2005: I , 9, 10, 19; Matichon, 19 
January 2005: I I. 
56 Later on tl1is candida te from Mahachon went to work wi th Newin . Interview with a key vote broker of 
the Chi dchob fa mil y. Bu riram, 13 October 20 I 0. 
57 For a d iscussion of the 2003 PAO election in Buri ram, see Achakorn 2007. Also see, Prachakom 
Thongthin, 3: 32 (October 2003): 58-6 1; Prachakom Thongthin, 3: 35 (January 2004): 74-76. 
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decisions, including budget allocations. Before council meetings, Chidchob-aligned 
provincial councilors had to attend a briefing session at Newin's house to get 
instructions on how to vote. Whenever they had problem they went to consult with 
Newin. One former provincial councilor put it plainly, "Newin is everything of Buriram 
politics. "58 
After the 2005 election, Newin was rewarded with a cabinet post and became one of 
Thaksin's most trusted political assistants. Thaksin assigned him difficult, risky and 
sometimes secretive tasks, especially when his government faced a legitimacy crisis 
during his second tenn. In the wake of the 2006 coup, coup leaders arrested and detained 
Newin for several days as they knew he had the strong potential to organize mass 
demonstrations against the coup. After he was released, he did not keep a low-profile but 
spoke out aggressively against the coup leaders. He was influential in the formation of 
the Red Shirt movement. He mobilized people from the Northeast, the political 
stronghold of the TRT, to organize rallies against the coup-installed govenunent, and 
funded many radio stations and media outlets in attacking the army and Thaksin's 
enemies. Just after the Constitutional Court disbanded the Thai Rak Thai Party on 
charges of electoral malpractice in May 2007, Newin and other former party executives 
formed a new party called "Palang Prachachon Party" (People's Power Party or PPP). 
He effectively became a central figure ofThaksin 's new allied party and a leader of the 
anti-coup movement, and these two high-profile positions undoubtedly made him a chief 
enemy of army leaders. 59 
The 2007 poll: the emboldened clan, the struggling party, and the intervening army 
The 2007 poll was held about a year after the coup and only a few months after the 
promulgation of the August 2007 constitution and the formation of several new parties. 
This post-coup election was conducted in a tense but relatively peaceful environment 
with only a few vio lent incidents. As discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, the army heavy 
interference in the campaigning inadvertently made the 2007 election relatively 
peaceful. Instead of electoral killings between opposing political bosses, Buriram, along 
with other provinces, witnessed the obsolete pattern of state interference and 
58 Interview, former Buriram provincia l council or, Buriram, 11 October 20 10. Interview, senior Buriram 
PAO officer, Buriram, 14 October 20 10. 
59 See a colorfu l account ofNewin 's political life in th e aftermath of the coup in ltsarin and Cham nong 
2009. 
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repression-a throwback to the 1950s and 1960s military dictatorial regimes. The 
military int imidated Thaksin 's allied party's candidates and vote canvassers on the 
campaign trail. The situation in Buriram was worse than other provinces as army leaders 
regarded Newin as Thaksin' s right-hand man and a central PPP Party figure. They 
strongly believed that by weakening Newin, they could prevent the PPP from winning 
the election. The strategy of the coup group, which, following the takeover, was 
transformed into the Council of National Security, was to send soldiers to interfere with 
Newin's electioneering in Buriram. The military aimed to paralyze Newin's movement, 
restricting his capacity to mobilize his political machine in Buriram and elsewhere in the 
northeast region. The coup leaders were able to enlist two (out of five) Buriram 
provincial election commissioners to help them topple the Chidchob dynasty. They 
worked closely together both before and after election day, employing both physical and 
legal fo rce in an effort to achieve their self-described "noble" political mission. 60 
Fearing military pressure, several former TRT candidates, including Sophon, abandoned 
Thaksin to run for other parties. In response, Newin recruited former opponents as PPP 
team members. The military kept all PPP vote canvassers under constant surveillance. 
They could not go out to campaign without their vehicles being thoroughly searched. 
Some managed to disguise themselves and escape state vigilance, and some mobilized 
votes remotely from home through mobile phones and other communication 
techno logies. One ofNewin 's key canvassers commented, "it was like playing a game of 
cat and mouse."61 The military operation undoubtedly favored other parties. Unl ike the 
PPP team, other parties' vote canvassers were free to campaign and even to buy votes 
without being apprehended by the poli ce or election commission. Newin 's po litical 
rivals admitted they were "indirectly helped by the army" because "a group of soldiers 
helped obstruct Newin's vote canvassers in the course of buying votes." Newin 's 
oppo nents believed that was "the only way to beat Newin." 62 A PPP candidate summed 
up the situation: "in the 2007 po ll , we did not compete with ·opposing candidates, but we 
fought with a state apparatus contro ll ed by a coup group ."63 Key leaders of the Council 
of Nat ional Security stayed in Bur i.ram and co mmanded the "operation" by themse lves. 
60 Int erview, fon11er Buriram elect ion commi ss ioner, Nan , 11 January 20 I 0. Interview, Bu riram election 
commission offic ial , Buriram, 15 Oc1ober 20 I 0. 
6 1 Interview. key vote canvasser of the Ch idchobs Buriram, 14 October 2010. 62 lnierview, politica l opponent ofChidchob famii y, Buriram, 12 October 20 10. 63 Interview. People Power Party's MP candidate for Buriram in the 2007 elect ion , Bu riram, 9 October 
20 10. 
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They summoned village headmen and sub-district heads to stop campaigning for Newin, 
and instructed them to persuade villagers not to vote for the PPP party. 64 
Despite every possible form of repression, the election results did not go as the army 
expected. Newin helped the PPP win all seats except one in Buriram. The Buriram 
election commission, however, immediately issued three red cards to PPP ' s winning 
candidates for several charges of vote fraud. They were thus prohibited from standing 
again. In the by-elections that followed, Newin asked his supporters to vote for minor 
party candidates to prevent those supported by the army from winning. He also wanted 
to embarrass the election commission and the army. His plan succeeded; three little-
known candidates received 20,000 more votes than in the first round and won the by-
elections. 65 
Newin's resounding victory embarrassed the coup group and the Buriram election 
commission and proved how strong his political machine was. It was a win for Thaksin 
too because five out of nine winning candidates defeated incumbents who had 
abandoned Thaksin to join other parties. The results proved that the MPs who won in 
2005 were successful because of TRT's popularity. Without TRT's support and the 
Chidchob' s endorsement, their chances of being reelected were nil. Peerapong 
Hengsawat, one of the Thaksin defectors, conceded that he lost the 2007 election mainly 
because he switched parties and voters disapproved of his changing political affiliation. 
Villagers said to him "they still loved Thaksin and TRT policy so much."66 Another 
former TRT MP who lost in 2007 similarly admitted that his personal standing could not 
compete with PPP's massive support. 67 In contrast, Newin gauged his home province 
voter sentiment accurately. He shaped the PPP campaign as a political battle to bring 
Thaksin back from exile and give "power back to the common people". Anti-coup 
messages do_minated PPP's campaign in Buri.ram and elsewhere. For example, on a paTty 
stage on 25 September 2007, in a highly emotional speech in front of thousands of 
people in his hometown, Newin described his maltreatment in detention by coup leaders. 
He then talked about the failure of the coup, 
64 Interview, sub-district head in a rural constituency, Buriram, 17 October 2010; Chairman ofTambon 
Administrative Organization in a city district, 20 October 2010. 
65 Interview, key political henchman of Chidchob family, Buriram, 20 October 20 IO; Khao Sod, 23 
January 2008: 3. 
66 Interview, Peerapong Hengsawat, 16 October 2010, Buriram, 2010. 
67 Interview, former Thai Rak Thai MP for Buri ram, Buriram, 16 October 20 l 0. 
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Today is the first anniversary since we lost democracy to the dictator. 
We also lost the most beloved elected Prime Minister. The coup 
[group] made so many accusations [against us]. But today it is already 
proved that who is crooked and who is good, and if Pol. Lt.Col. 
Thaksin was really a bad person, people would surely not miss him so 
much like this. 68 
Newin framed the 2007 election as a political fight between the military and the populist 
party of ousted Thaksin. He told voters they had only two choices: a vote for the PPP 
was a vote against the coup; any other vote was for the coup. 
The 2007 election results clearly demonstrated that state interference in the electoral 
competition was not effective and was, in fact, anachronistic. State repression might 
produce unintended consequence in reducing the degree of electoral violence, but could 
not shape voter decisions. Voters were not afraid of the military and did not vote as the 
army instructed. Most of them felt insulted by state authorities when they were asked to 
vote for candidates who had never done anything for the province. By contrast, 
Thaksin's allied party and the Chidchob family, who the army and the traditional elite 
painted as a "pure evil," provided jobs fo r their family, found schools for their children, 
helped the elderly on medical care, etc. There was no reason to vote otherwise. 69 
Military electoral interference completely backfired. The army did not realize that Thai 
electoral politics had changed dramatically since 1997 as a result of a set of parallel 
changes: the implementation of the 1997 constitution, the decentralization process, and 
the emergence of new type of political party and its populist policy. State coercive force 
was no longer effective in detennining voter preferences or weakening popular 
politicians. 
After the Chidchob fami ly monopolized provincial power, violent methods became less 
necessary. The family created a far-reaching patron-client network to maintain power, 
disburse various kinds of material resources, and support their election campaigns. 70 
They turned from bosses into patrons. They gave government projects, public fund s, and 
68 See Newin ' s fu ll speech in Matichon , 26 September 2007. 
69 Interview, a group of vot ers, Buriram, 22 October 20 10; Buriram Red Shirt leader, Buriram, 18 October 
2010; a group of shopkeepers in city market, Buriram, 19 October 20 10. 7
° Following infonnation was gathered from several interviews with fr iends and fo ll owers of th e Chidchob 
fa mil y in September and October 2010. 
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local administrative jobs to campaign workers, vote canvassers, business associates, and 
relatives. Newin's Cabinet positions and his father ' s seat on the House Budget 
Committee made it possible for the family to channel public resources to fund their 
political networks. Also, the Chidchobs adeptly utilized Thaksin's popularity and TRT 
and PPP resources for their own personal advantage. Since the late 1990s, when they 
were elected, many family associates were able to secure income from government 
construction projects, mainly from the Department of Highways, the Marine 
Department, the Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning, and the 
Airport of Thailand Public Company Limited. The clan-controlled Buriram Provincial 
Administrative Organization (PAO) was another major' source of patronage flow. 
Normally, the PAO allocated each Chidchob-aligned provincial councilor a large sum of 
budget for jobs and local development projects in their constituencies. As supreme boss, 
Newin was never involved in small local construction projects and never asked for 
commission from friends and followers for the jobs and projects he had provided. In this 
way, he seemed generous and was able to command respect and loyalty. One follower 
said "Newin said to me that he had enough money already, so I do not have to give him 
any money. Just work for him."71 
Newin treated those in his network rather fairly. He promoted bureaucrats and assisted 
local politicians in winning elections. They, in return, mobilized votes for him (if they 
were local politicians or bureaucrats) or turned a blind eye to illegality or provided him 
an unfair advantage over his opponents during elections (if they were government 
agencies). Therefore it was mutually beneficial for both sides. The Chidchob's absolute 
control over the local bureaucracy made violent methods unnecessary. Uniformed men 
facilitated and protected illegal electioneering. Many officials were cogs in the family ' s 
political machine. In a clan-controlled province, the power relationship between 
bureaucrats and elected politicians was clearly imbalanced. In December 2009 a Buriram 
governor stated publicly that he has no fear working in Buriram. In fact , it was a lot 
easier · than working in other provinces since almost all of the national and local 
politicians in Buriram belonged to Newin' s network. He continued, 
It was an honor to be appointed provincial governor ofBuriram. Frankly 
speaking, I was picked by Mr. Newin [Chidchob] to work in Buriram. I 
dare say this since I am straightforward ... You can ban someone from 
71 Interview, key henchman, 20 October 2010. 
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having a political position but you could not forbid local people having 
faith in someone .. .. This is called charisma . . . which than Newin has. So 
he can select anyone he wanted to be in Buriram because it is his 
homeland. 72 
It was this kind of political influence over the local state apparatus that put the 
Chidchobs at a distinct advantage at every stage of the election process from voter 
registration, campaign conduct, ballot counting to election complaint adjudication. It 
was an unlevel playing field . A senior Buriram police officer commented, "since 2005 , 
election contests [in Buriram] have been completely controlled by one network. There 
has been no competition between equally strong candidates. There has been only a 
competition between a very strong side and a very weak one. Under these circumstances, 
the strong side did not need to use violence."73 
Even though the Chidchob's political machine was very so lid, Newin still demanded a 
lot from politicians and his vote canvassers. They had to visit their constituencies every 
weekend and attend to voter needs. Newin dismissed those who failed these tasks, and 
recruited more capable people to the network.74 Newin carefully selected all candidates 
for MPs and other important positions (such as PAO Chairman). No one in his network 
was entit led to the posts without scrutiny. Sometimes, he offered strong opponents a 
place in his team to avoid fi erce competition. He used strong-arm tactics against those 
who betrayed him or were recalcitrant. And those outside his network faced difficulty 
gaining access to local resources or wi1111ing seats in elections. Even if outsiders 
managed to be elected, Newin pressed them to work for the Chidchob family, otherwise 
they would have difficulties in undertaking their duties. 75 Eventually, almost all of 
independent candidates or former Chidchob family opponents ended up jo ining the clan. 
Former outsiders had learnt that it was the most direct and safest way to secure access to 
local wealth and power. For example, one Chidchob famil y opponent was requested by 
his vote canvassers to join the clan so that he could be elected. His vote canvassers did 
not want to compete with the Ch idchob fa mily as it was "too dangerous and exhaust ing." 
72 See th e full interview o f th e Buriram govern or in Matichon , 30 December 2009: 8. The word than used 
when someone want to ca ll another in a highl y respectable way. It ,s comm on to find civil servants use 
this word when tl1 ey refer to powerful politicians. 
1.1 lnterview, seni or local police offi cer, Buriram, 22 October 2010. 74 lnterview, local politician in tl1e Chidchob faction , Buriram, 15 October 20 1 O; former political 
henchman ofNewin Chidchob, 14 October 2010. 
75 In terview, independent Tambon Adm ini strative Organization 's councilor, Buriram , IO October 20 I 0. 
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After agreeing to befriend the clan, he won consecutive provincial council elections with 
no competitors.76 There were many similar cases of former Chidchob enemies joining 
the clan for political reasons. 
Locals called the Chidchob family "bann yai" (big house or house of the big man), and it 
was popularly said "all roads in the province lead to the Chidchob family," as the family 
has controlled nearly 90 percent of provincial elective posts. Only five to ten were not 
associated with the family, and this group of so called "independent figures" had to 
undertake low-profile political activity. 77 The Chidchobs certainly had a fair number of 
enemies in the province but no one had the audacity to challenge their power overtly-
until the 2011 general election when a challenge came from a political figure more 
charismatic and powerful than Newin. 
The 2011 election: battle between Newin and Thaksin 
The general political backdrop of the 2011 poll was complex. After the 2007 elections, 
Thaksin's allied party PPP was able to form two coalition governments. However, 
Yellow Shirt protestors paralyzed both governments. Two Prime Ministers from the PPP 
party had been forced to step down as a consequence of controversial rulings by the 
Constitution Court in September and December 2008 respectively._Like its predecessor 
Thai Rak Thai, the PPP party was dissolved by the Court and all executive members of 
the party were banned from any involvement in political affairs for five years. Newin 
decided to abandon the PPP for his political survival. After anti-Thaksin demonstrators 
forced the airport closedown in late November 2008, Newin realized he needed to break 
away from Thaksin to save himself and his family. As Thaksin ' s right-hand man and a 
key figure behind the Red Shirts, Newin was under severe pressure by the army. Before 
he left Thaksin, Newin said to a group of his key allies, 
there is no way we [Newin's political networks] can fight 
traditional elites. It is a war that we will never win. The 
establishment will not permit Thaksiri to rule the country. As 
76 Interview, former competitor of the Chidchob family, Buriram, 14 October 2010. 
77 Interview, Buriram election commission official, Buriram, 22 October 201 O; local journalist, Buriram, 
19 October 2010. 
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long as we support Thaksin, the army will put a harsh pressure 
on us.
78 
Soon afterwards, Newin formed a new political party named Bhumjaitai, and switched 
his support to the opposition Democrat Party's leader, Abhisit Vejjajiva. Nearly forty 
PPP MPs also defected and joined Newin ' s Bhumjaitai Party. Without Newin's support, 
the political maneuver of the traditional elites in thwarting Thaksin' s power and 
elevating Abhisit to the post of prime minister would never been successful. Newin 
played a role of kingmaker and he became an indispensable figure in the Abhisit 
government 's survival. Abhisit rewarded him with seven lucrative and highly powerful 
ministerial posts in five ministries (i.e. Interior, Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture 
and Cooperatives, and Public Health). 79 
It was ironic that, in an attempt to destroy the Thaksin dynasty, the army and other 
traditional force were willing to collaborate with a provincial boss like Newin, as they 
had considered him one of the most unscrupulous politicians for years. Indeed the 
establishment put their whole faith in Newin's ad hoc party, believing that the 
Bhumjaitai Party would defeat the PPP in many constituencies, particularly in the 
northeast. Therefore, in the 20 11 election, the country witnessed a very strange 
combination of bedfellows: national bureaucratic forces and local bosses. In essence, the 
2006 coup and the 2007 constitution revitalized faction leaders and factional politics in 
order to subdue national populist leader and party politics. 
The Ch idchob's party-switching put Buriram voters in a difficult position. They wavered 
between voting for the local patron, Newin, or the national populist Thaksin . Many 
simply said they loved both, "Thaksi.n is a great leader and I like his party's populist 
po licies," but "Newin is good as well. His fo llowers visit the constituency regularly. 
Newin is kind and generous. He has always given us whatever we have asked for. " 80 But 
if forced to choose, vo ters seemed to choose the one who provided them immediate 
benefit s. As one noted, 
78 Interview, politi cal henchmen of the Chidchobs, Bangkok an d Buriram, 30 September and 20 October 
2010. 
79 Matichon Sudsapda, 16-22 Janua ry 2009: 11 . 
'
0 Interview, a group of shopkeepers in th e city market, Buriram, 19 October 2010. 
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most local people struggle to make a living daily. Now Thaksin is 
gone. He is not even in Thailand and he has no power. But Newin 
still has power and he is here with us. Ifwe vote for Newin, Buriram 
is going to be developed. So even though we still love Thaksin, we 
have no choice but to vote for Newin.8 1 
However, not every Buriram voter shared this practical mode of thinking, particularly 
staunch Red Shirt supporters. One Red Shirt leader said "I dislike Newin and Bhumjaitai 
because they betrayed Thaksin. They were not grateful to Thaksin." She strongly 
believed Red Shirt members would not vote for Newin. "But we could not express our 
political ideas openly. Buriram was under the control of Newin. If you were a zealous 
enemy of him, you would get yourself in serious trouble . .. so most of Red Shirts were 
silent and waited for election day to punish Newin."82 
In the 2011 Buriram election, the Thaksin-allied Pheu Thai Party was the only serious 
challenge to the Chidchobs since other parties were too weak to compete with the clan. 
However, the Pheu Thai Party did not spend much of it resources in Buriram as the party 
executives thought it was too costly to fight with Newin in his political stronghold. They 
believed it was more rational to channel resources at their disposal into other provinces 
rather than wasting them in Burirarn. Several Pheu Thai candidates. complained bitterly 
that their own party did not support them. 83 Pheu Thai expected to win only two or three 
seats maximum in Buri.ram. In some constituencies, especially Newin 's hometown, the 
Pheu Thai Party had difficulty fielding qualified candidates because nobody wanted a 
direct confrontation with the Chidchobs. Buriram's political situation was a stark 
contrast with situation in other northeast provinces in which the Party had too many 
strong contenders. Every northeastern politician wanted to run with the Pheu Thai, 
knowing that the party banner was a guarantee of electoral success. In Buriram, the only 
Pheu Thai strength was that which it received from the Red Shirt ' s steadfast supporters. 
Even though the Red Shirts were not satisfied with the quality of the candidates fielded 
81 Interview, a group of shopkeepers in the city markel, Buriram, 19 October 2010. 
82 Interview, Red Shi rt movement 's leader, Buriram, 18 October 20 I 0. 
83 Interview, three Pheu 1lrni candidates for Buriram MPs, Buriram, 30 September, 14 October and 23 
October 2010. 
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by the Pheu Thai Party, they still strongly supported Thaksin and the policies of the 
party.84 
In 2011, in Buriram and elsewhere, the Red Shirt supporters replaced the old-style 
network of vote canvassers. They were better campaigners: more committed, less-
corrupt , and volunteering to work for free. In Buriram, in the run-up to the election, Red 
Shirts dutifully organized meetings, knocked on doors, and distributed campaign 
pamphlets. In each small meeting, they invited candidates to speak to hundreds of voters 
about policy and the political situation. A recurring theme in the meeting was Newin's 
betrayal. The boss of the Chidchob family was attacked vehemently by Pheu Thai 
candidates, saying his unforgivable betrayal had damaged Thaksin and the Red Shirt 
movement. Moreover, Red Shirts believed Newin was involved in the crackdown on 
Red Shirt demonstrators in Bangkok in 2009 and 2010. The Pheu Thai Party used these 
highly emotive issues to mobilize vo tes from anti-Newin (or pro-Thaksin) voters.85 Just 
before the election, Yingluck Shinawatra and other leading Pheu Thai leaders, went to 
campaign in Buriram. They emphatically announced the Bhumjaitai Party was the arch 
enemy of the Pheu Thai Party and Thaksin. They told voters that if Pheu Thai received 
enough votes to form a coalition government, they would definitely not invite Newin ' s 
Bhumjaitai Party to join the coalition. This announcement illustrated a new political 
phenomenon in Thai po litics. The Pheu Thai party realized the Red Shirt movement 
(who se organization formed the backbone of the party's vote base) would lose faith in 
the party if they did not take a tough stance on Newin. The mass Red Shirt mo vement 
significantly shaped the party's choice of coalition partner. Previously, po litical parties 
were not differentiated in terms of political ideology and/or policy platform and thus 
willing to form a coalition with others if they successfully negotiated cabinet seats 
quotas and vested interests. In the past, personal enmities among party or faction leaders 
co uld be easily forgo tten or trumped by po litical expediency. Therefore, the overt and 
unwavering antagonism between the Pheu Thai and the Bhumjaitai parties witnessed in 
the 20 11 elect ion marked a watershed in Thai po litics. The closer and more mean ingful 
relationship between the po li tica l mass movement and the political party was a key 
fac tor in recent changes in the nature of pariy and electoral po litics. 
84 lnterview, Red Shirt movement ' s leader, Bu riram, 18 October 2010; Red Shi rt movement's member, 
Buriram, 18 October 20 I 0. 
85 Personal observa ti ons of Pheu Thai Pa r-iy's e lection campaigns, Buriram, 8 October 20 10, 14 October 
20 I 0 , 23 October 20 I 0, and 28 and 29 Jun e 2011 
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The 2011 Buriram election was peaceful and one in which the province had witnessed a 
new pattern of political competition. Rather than a group of local factions or families 
vying with each other for electoral seats, Buriram experienced a political battle of mass 
mobilization and ideology between two formidable figures, namely Newin and Thaksin. 
Color-coded politics and ideological conflicts between Abhisit government and the Red 
Shirt protestors dominated the 2011 general election. National-level political conflicts 
overrode family feuds at the local level. The ideological contestation between a mass-
movement supported party and a local political dynasty was not conducive to deadly 
conflicts. The challenge for both sides was primarily to win voters' hearts and minds, 
rather than eliminate their opponents. With this changing mode of conflict, the service of 
gunmen was not in demand as the assassination of individual candidates could not 
substantially alter election results. For these reasons, the 2011 Buriram election was 
undisturbed. 
The electoral results demonstrated that, in Buriram, the family's political machine 
remained strong. The Bhumjaitai party secured seven seats and the Pheu Thai party 
managed to obtain two. Party-list votes, on the other hand, signaled that Thaksin's allied 
party was still highly popular among the Buriram electorate as Pheu Thai received 
329,568 votes in comparison to Bhumjaitai's 226,741 votes.86 It simply meant that a 
large numbers of voters cast their ballots for Newin's candidates btit did not support his 
Bhumjaitai party: a political manifestation of divided loyalty. Nevertheless, given that 
the Pheu Thai party swept 104 seats out of 126 seats in the northeast region, the seven 
seats Newin and his family secured in his home province was an outstanding success. 
No other political clan in other parts of the country, except in the South, was able to 
withstand the immense popularity of Thaksin and Pheu Thai party as well as the 
Chidchobs. To be more precise, the Chidchobs were one of the very few political clans 
who managed to survive and maintain power in the midst of the political stonn of deeply 
polarized politics that country witnessed since the 2006 coup. In electoral pol itics 
elsewhere, the political polarization had clearly worked in favor of two major 
contending parties-Thaksin's allied party and the Democrat Party- and was 
detrimental to minor political factions and families. 
Apart fro m the Banharn's Silapa-archa family in Suphanburi, which actually, to their 
complete shock, lost one seat to a Pheu Thai cand idate in 20 11 , and Newin 's Chidchob 
86 For the official resu lts of votes, see the Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 2011: 6. 
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family, there was only one other political dynasty that has been able to sustain their 
family power: the legendary Thienthong family of Sa Kaeo province, to whom we now 
tum in the next chapter. 
338 
Chapter 12 
Sa Kaeo: Monopoly of one clan 
Sa Kaeo province is an exemplary case, demonstrating that the existence of a power 
monopoly is a key contributing factor to orderly and peaceful elections. At the same 
time, this border province contains several crucial factors that llsually contribute to 
electoral violence, namely a frontier, illicit economy, and the direct involvement of 
politicians in the illegal and rent-seeking business enterprises. As this analysis will 
show, the fundamental political condition that one political dynasty has ruled the 
province over a long period of time overrides these potentially violent factors. In Sa 
Kaeo, the Thienthong clan has enjoyed three decades of monopolistic control of the 
province since the early period of the transition to parliamentary democracy in the 
1980s. This level of success is unusual among Thai provinc·es, where the more common 
story is polarized or fragmented power structures (as previously demonstrated on violent 
case studies in Chapters 7, 8, and 9). 
In 2012, Sa Kaeo was subdivided into 9 districts (amphoe). The districts were further 
subdivided into 59 sub districts (tambon) and 619 villages (muban). It is not a small 
province in terms of area (ranked 28 th) , but it is one of the least populated provinces in 
the country (ranked 65 th). With a population of 550,000 residents, the province has been 
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apportioned only three seats fo r MPs. 1 This sparsely populated rural province, located on 
the eastern border of Thailand, faces the Banteay Meanchey and Battarnbang districts of 
Cambodia. Neighboring Thai provinces are Chanthaburi, Chachoengsao, Prachin Buri, 
Nakhon Ratchasima and Buriram. It used to be a large district under Prachinburi 
Province, but in December 1993 it was upgraded to a province when six Prachinburi 
districts (Sa Kaeo, Khlong Hat, Wang Nam Yen, Aranya Prathet, Ta Phraya and 
Watthana Nakhon) were integrated. It was one of three newly established provinces 
alongside Arnnat Charoen and Nong Bua Lamphu. 
The north of the province is covered with the large forested mountains of the Dong 
Phaya Yen range. To the south are foothill plains, which are mostly deforested. Most 
locals work in the agricultural sector. The 2009/2010 statistics show 52,783 households 
working in farrning. 2 The main agricultural products are rice, corn, cassava, and 
sugarcane. Industrial investment has been limited and has not contributed significantly to 
the economic development of the province. By 20 12, there were only 361 factories in the 
province and, combined, they hired merely 6,203 workers (3 ,741 male and 2,462 
female). Most industrial laborers, therefore, have had to migrate to find jobs in 
neighboring provinces or in Bangkok. 3 The small provincial industrial sector is divided 
into two types of enterprise: the agricultural products' industry and the lucrative 
construction material industry. Both industries provide enormous income fo r powerful 
pro vincial business politicians. 4 The province ' s long-winded slogan, "The Frontier of the 
East, Beautiful Forests and Splendid Waterfalls, Plenty of Ancient Civilizat ions and the 
Commercial Venue between Thailand and Cambodia," incorporates its frontier nature as 
well as its well-known and distinctive features. The province has benefited a great deal 
from lively cross-border trade with Cambodia and has acted as a significant trading post 
between the two countries. As discussed in Chapter 1 and 3, the border and frontier 
economy is vital to fa cilitating the emergence (and sustenance) of provincial bosses and 
extra-legal activities. 
1 Accordin g to 2006 stati stics, drawn from Sa Kaeo' s Provincial Stati stical Offi ce, "Sa Kaeo Prov ince," 
http://sakaeo.nso.go.th/sakaeo/cwdweb/sa kaeo.doc 
2 Sa Kaeo Provinc ia l Agri cultural Office, "2009/20 IO Agri cultural Stati stics," 
http://www.sakaeo.doae.go. th/sta ti sti c%2052. pd f 
3 Data from Sa Kaeo Provincia l Industri al Offi ce, " Factory Statistic," 
http://www.sakaeo.go.th/spoc/DA T Nlndustry/Factory. htrn 
4 See a fu ll lis t of fa ctori es in Sa Kaeo with nam es of the owners and th eir capital in Sa Kaeo Provincial 
Industria l Offi ce, " Li st of Factori es,'· hnp://www.sakaeo.go. th/spoc/DA T Nlndustry/FactoryName. htm 
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Like Buriram, Sa Kaeo is a relatively poor province by national standards. By 2010, the 
Gross Provincial Product (GPP) of Sa Kaeo was 26,506 million baht and GPP per capita 
was 48,206 baht, which make the province among the country' s fifteen poorest.5 Its GPP 
per capita was only slightly higher than its neighboring province, Buriram. Considering 
all basic information, it is not difficult to see that the characteristics and structure of 
Buriram' s and Sa Kaeo 's provincial economies are strikingly similar. Therefore they 
provide an excellent pair for comparison regarding the occurrence of electoral violence. 
The key difference between these two provinces- which share a similar economic 
structure-was the degree of monopoly of political power. The Chidchobs only recently 
succeeded in monopolizing power since several rivals had stood in their way, and 
Buriram experienced peaceful elections after the clan achieved its political mission in 
the mid 2000s ( see Chapter 11 ). The Thienthong family power, by comparison, has not 
been interrupted or challenged since the early 1980s. This prevailing political condition 
significantly contributed to the longer lasting peace witnessed in Sa Kaeo's electoral 
competitions. 
The Thienthong family: from boss to patron 
The most prominent and powerful figure in the province is Sanoh Thienthong ( 1934-), 
supreme patriarch of the Thienthong dynasty. It is no exaggeration that he and his 
family completely control the province. Sanoh, dubbed by media as the "jao pho Wang 
Nam Yen" (godfather of Wang Nam Yen),6 has been generally known as kingmaker of 
Thai politics since the 1990s. Though his role as a power broker has been declining 
under the current political crisis, he is still well regarded as one of the most experienced 
and well-connected politicians in Thailand. He first ran for MP for Prachinburi province 
in 1976 (before Sa Kaeo became a -province) and won the seat under the Chart Thai 
party, receiving the highest number of votes in the province. In that election, he was the 
only Chart Thai party member who won the elections in Prachinburi. Once Sanoh 
became an M)" he expanded his power and popularity in the provincial territory and was 
able to assist several of his family members enter Parliament. In the 1988 national 
election, he succeeded in having every member of his faction elected in six provincial 
constituencies. When the Chart Thai Party formed coalition government, Sanoh, as a 
5 Sa Kaeo 's Provincial Statistical Office, "Sa Kaeo Province," 
http: / I sakaeo. nso. go_ th/ sakaeo/ cwd web/ sakaeo. doc 
6 Wang Nam Yen is one of the districts in which his family had important business investments. It is a 
frontier area particularly well knoW.11 for its lawlessness. 
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leader of the largest political faction within the Party, was rewarded with the highly 
coveted position of Deputy Minister oflnterior.7 Since his election to this very powerful 
position, the boss from Sa Kaeo has never been out of the political limelight and has 
played a critical ro le in nat ional power plays at every tum. 
Perhaps no one better exemplifies the post-1973 rise of provincial elites to the national 
political scene than Sanoh Thienthong. His business and political career is an exemplar 
of the success stories after the dramatic political changes brought about by the 1973 
student uprising. It turns out that local notables from the margins of the Thai polity, 
notably represented by Sanoh, were those who gained the greatest benefits from the 
political upheaval in the capital city-an event in which they remotely involved (see 
Chapter 3 for the rise of provincial bosses). Sanoh was the son of an affluent family, 
whose father had relocated from Chachoengsao to Prachinburi after the Second World 
War and married the daughter of a wealthy Chinese family. In the early period, his 
family accumulated capital from selling market goods, running a cattle farm, growing 
rice, and bidding for logging contracts from the Railways Department. Later on Sano h's 
father expanded the fami ly business to include the highly profitable opium dens (for 
which he obtained government licenses legitimately). With considerable manpower in 
his vast business empire, Sanoh's father became a respectable figure in the local 
community and someone to whom people looked for help in times of trouble. The 
provincial governor thus appointed him sub-district head to oversee village local affairs. 
Sanoh 's father was well-known as a charismatic and reso lute local leader who applied 
strong-arm methods to keep social order. Whenever suspected criminals were caught in 
the community, Sanoh's fathe r would not send them to the police; instead, they would be 
detained and interrogated by him. On many occasions, the invest igation lasted almost a 
week and involved whippings until the person co nfessed. Sanoh's father considered h.is 
interrogation methods an effective deterrent against criminal act ivities and unruly 
behavior in his community. According to Sanoh, local residents wen: more afra id of his 
father than they were of the police. 8 
With the sudden death of his influential father in 1946, Sanoh had to step up and take 
over the family business emp ire. Sanoh inherited from his father a vast amount (6,000 
rai) of farming land covering the province with 500 tenant fanner families who rented 
7 Philal 200 1: 85. 
8 Watthana I 995: 11-12. 
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land from his family to cultivate rice. The clientelist relationship, in its classic form and 
definition, between Sanoh and the group of villagers who were his tenants were strongly 
built, and later these vital relations were mobilized for political purposes when Sanoh 
ran for the elective post. 9 By the age of 19, Sanoh was already called by villagers sia (a 
word used to refer to a very wealthy Chinese businessman). Within a short period of 
time he replaced his father as a charismatic and respectable community leader. He was 
kind and generous to his friends, followers, and tenants, but to those who were 
insubordinate or trouble makers Sanoh provided them with no kindness or sympathy at 
all. 
Chart 12.1: The Thienthong Family (a selected genealogy) 
Sawaeng+ Thongyu 
j 
Uea+wife I Sanun I Sanoh+Uraiwan lwitthaya +wife 
~ I Songyot 
Saengprathip Sonthidet 
l 
Phichet+ Kh wanruean 
Thanit Trinut 
two other sons 
Sorawong Surasak Surakiat Surachat Siriwan Chaturit 
Prior to the 1980s, Sa Kaeo was known as Thailand's "wi ld wild west" due to its frontier 
nature and thick rainforest covering large areas of the province and its proximity to the 
long-term deadly civil war in Cambodia. Local infrastructure was poor, and there was no 
main road connecting all districts. Some areas were only accessible by foot and public 
officials were often unwilling to accept post in this underdeveloped province. 10 
Nevertheless, with vast tracts of unoccupied land and rich natural resources, the province 
attracted a large flock of migrants from other provinces, who came to find a better 
opportunity for their lives. Conflicts related to land occupations were endemic and many 
resulted in gruesome murders. 
9 For a classic definition of clientelism, see Scott 1972 and Lande 1966. 
10 Interview, village headman, Sa Kaeo, 9 April 2012. 
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By the time Sanoh started to build his business fo rtune, the situat ion had deteriorated to 
widespread killing and lawlessness. It was Sanoh who decided to intervene and 
(forcefully) establish law and order in the area in which state authority was very weak; 
he truly was a law enforcer in a lawless territory. Sanoh recalled the situation: 
.The cases of [people] committing murder to take over land were common. 
Sometimes criminals killed the husband and harassed his wife. All sorts of tactics 
[were used]. I was aware of these incidents because my corn farrn workers told 
me. So I to ld them if those felons were defiant, I would not let my people die for 
nothing. I will give them justice ... Other folks could not deal with these matters, 
I was able to. When the villagers had problems, they came to see me instead of 
going to see the police, especially in the Wang Nam Yen district because it was 
uncivilized. It was like a barbaric region. 11 
By using forceful acts to suppress all lawbreakers and delinquents and restoring social 
order to the district long plagued by such anarchic violence, Sanoh thus earned the 
famous title of "godfather of Wang Nam Yen." Also, his business of cash-crop farming 
periodically required coercive force since a number of tenant farmers cheated him by 
fleeing after receiving credit money or by selling crops to other merchant ( an action that, 
in broad sense, fit in James Scott 's noted concept "weapons of the weak.") 12 When these 
types of incidents occurred, Sanoh emplo yed strong-arm methods to stop fu rther 
cheating. 13 The Wang Nam Yen boss made sure that the weapons of the weak were 
always confronted with the forcefu l weapons of the powerful. Sanoh put it plainly, he 
delivered protection and jobs to people and they, in turn, gave him love and respect. He 
was proud of the social stature the local community gave him and was satisfied wi th his 
ability to bring social order to his homeland. He once commented "if the country has no 
resolute figure or one who can act as a respectable chief, the country would never have 
peace." 14 At the beginning of his career, it was clear that Sanoh simultaneously assumed 
the roles of munificent patron and reso lute boss. These dual roles did not conflict with 
each other since the situation in Sa Kaeo required him to have a capacity to fill both 
ro les if he aspired to command authoritative power. Later, when he had secured a 
11 See a full interview of Sanoh Thienthong in Nopparat 20 10: 156-67. The quotation is ex tracted from 
p,a ges 159-60. 
· Scott 1987. 
13 Philat 2001: 264-66. 
14 Sanoh Thienthong· s interview in Nopparat 20 10: 160. 
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monopoly of power and completely subdued his opponents, he dropped the role of 
feared boss as it was no longer necessary. Acting as a patron bestowed a better image 
upon him and it was sufficient for the maintenance of his dynastic power. 
Also, the boss of Wang Nam Yen was more ambitious than his predecessors. In the early 
1960s, he expanded the family business to cover the highly profitable liquor franchise. 
In order to make the business succeed and prosper, he had to deal with the local 
moonshine business, which was at that time, controlled by local tough guys. As was 
Sanoh' s way, he used both forceful and soft tactics to take over the liquor franchise. 
Sanoh visited moonshine distillers and asked them to stop their business. For those who 
were willing to stop distilling and had no other occupation, he gave them land for 
farming. 15 At this point, he and his brothers founded a business company called "S. 
Thienthong," which later became the family's flagship company covering several 
Thienthong enterprises. At the end of the 1960s, Sanoh moved into the construction 
business, gas stations, and quarries. The construction business, in particular, generated 
enormous wealth as well as a political base for Sanoh and his clan. Due to the fact that 
he obtained government licenses for logging, gas, and quarries, his construction 
company was well equipped with construction materials and thereby able to undertake 
any construction project at a significantly lower cost than rival companies. Over time, 
his company monopolized construction business in the province by winning all major 
government contracts. 
After gaining control of the provincial level, Sanoh stepped up his bids for large-scale 
contracts from the national government and succeeded. The national-level Department 
of Highways and the Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning were 
two major clients of S. Thienthong Company. Most of the highways and government 
buildings in the northeast region were built by his company, including the small airport 
in Sa Kaeo district that his company subcontracted from the army. Through his business 
activities, in the midst of efforts by the communist insurgents to capture control of key 
areas, he gradually built close rapport with army generals in the northeast region. The 
army sought help from his company, asking for construction materials and equipment 
for use in security and military affairs. He commonly lent the company' s tractors to the 
army for several months without charge. Sometimes Sanoh's trucks also delivered 
massive food supplies to military compounds as an expression of his generosity. Sanoh 
15 Wattana 1995: 17-18. 
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never denied army requests. During the 1960s-1970s, senior army officials put great 
trust in him, as a highly respected provincial no table, and asked him for intelligence on 
the counterinsurgency operations. 16 
It was common fo r Sanoh and his famil y to disp ense a range of goods and services to 
offici als, the poor and the local community in general. For example, he and his family 
usually donated a large sum of money to 60-70 temples every year. Furthermore, large 
numbers of stones fro m his quarries were freely contributed to build temples in all 
twelve provincial districts. Besides this, his fami ly supplied stones to local people who 
lacked money fo r materials to build their houses. These acts of generosity were returned 
with votes at election time, as one of his uncles commented, 
[Sanoh] never failed in the elections because he used stones as his base. 
Stones were ground and sold fo r money. But they were also donated to 
temples and villagers. By doing that he received extra votes. His 
[political base] is as solid as stone. No one can topple him. 17 
With enormous wealth and influ ence, many political parties tried to persuade Sanoh to 
run for MP in the early 1960s. But he turned down all offers until after 1973, when his 
famil y business was relatively secure and MP positions carried more influence. The 
Chart Thai party, a major political party representing the right-wing fo rce in post-1973 
politics, sent the army general who was clo se w ith Sanoh to ask Sanoh to lead the Chart 
Thai team in Prachinburi. Sanoh agreed to stand in the 197 6 election and won with 
overwhelming votes. He effectively uti lized and mobilized the expansive cliente list 
netwo rk of his fam ily fo r electoral purposes . One of Sanoh 's most effecti ve campa igns 
was promis ing a debt moratorium to a large group of his tenant farmers just before the 
elect ion.18 
S ince the 1976 po ll, Sanoh stood in every election and never fa iled . With his impressive 
record of being a th irteen-time MP, Sanoh, at the age of 78, is one of the longest serv ing 
MPs in the current Parli ament (201 1-). From 1976 to 20 12, several other members of the 
Thienthong clan came to the House with his gu idance and assistance. Currently, the 
16 Nopparat 20 10: 158. 
17 Phi la t 200 1: 58. 
18 Wattana 1995: 3 1; Phi la t 200 I: 50. 
346 
Thienthong family is the strongest clan in the Lower House with five MPs (Sanoh, two 
of his sons, a nephew and a niece). In every poll, the Thienthong MPs have not only 
defeated their opponents by a gigantic margin, but also received the highest number of 
votes in the country. The apex of the family's popularity was reached in the 1996 
election when Sanoh received the highest number of votes in the country, followed by 
his nephew coming second and his brother, third. In that poll, they defeated the opposing 
team from the Democrat Party by a tenfold margin of votes. 19 At the local level, the 
family power was equally strong as one of his nephews was elected as the PAO 
Chairman and another became the Mayor of Wattana Nakhon District. 20rn the sub-
district, municipal and provincial level elections, most of the candidates who were 
supported by or connected with the Thienthongs won easily, their rivals suffering 
humiliating losses. The few who ran independently and happened to win had to pledge 
allegiance to the Thienthongs to be able to undertake their duties without pressure. All 
local politicians associated with the Thienthong family were responsible for canvassing 
votes for the clan during the national elections. 2 1 The situation in Sa Kaeo is the best 
manifestation of a local authoritarian enclave. 
There were two additional factors contributing to the Thienthong dynasty's power 
monopoly. First and foremost, they had a number of family members who were capable 
and had a keen interest in political affairs. Many other provincial political families were 
struggling hard to sustain their power over a long period of time because they lacked 
competent political heirs and/or tensions emerged in the families. The cases in point 
were the Ketcharts in Nakhon Si Thammarat, the Supasiris in Phrae, the Nirots and 
Khamprakops in Nakhon Sawan, as well as the rival families of the Angkinans and 
Chidchobs in Phetchaburi and Buriram respectively. The Thienthongs, in contrast, had 
ample politically skillful manpower. Sanoh has three brothers and one sister. His wife, 
Uraiwan, a capable politician, assumed several cabinet posts from Thaksin Shinawatra to 
Somchai Wongsawat administration (2001-2008). Two of Sanoh's sons followed in his 
footsteps as parliamentarians, one in Sa Kaeo and another in Bangkok. Sanoh 's younger 
brother, Witthaya, was elected as MP from 1983 to 2001. In April 2006, he was elected 
as Sa Kaeo senator along with his-sister-in-law. Witthaya has two sons involved in local 
19 Thawatchai 1998: I 14. 
20 Post Today, 1 November 2011. 
21 Interview, Sanoh Thienthong's cousin, Sa Kaeo, IO Apri l 2012. 
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politics; one has assumed the position of PAO Chairman since 2004 and another was 
elected city mayor of Sa Kaeo from 2000 to 2008. 
The family has allocated differing tasks to each family member: some clan members 
were positioned to take care of family businesses while others in the clan were actively 
involved in po litics. Sanoh, as family patriarch, assigned his youngest brother, Pichet, to 
manage family welfare. For several decades, Piche! was in charge of the Theinthong' s 
large business empire and looked after constituencies in Sa Kaeo while Sanoh was in 
Bangkok, constantly occupied in the national political affairs. Given Pichet ' s hard work 
and commitment to the family, Sanoh promised his children MP positions.22 Sanoh 
supported his brother 's two political heirs, Thanit and Trinut, to become lawmakers and 
they both excelled at extending and sustaining power for the Thienthong dynasty. At the 
age of merely 42, Thanit currently sits in the Yingluck cabinet as a deputy minister of 
interior. He admitted that being born into the Thienthong clan bestowed upon him many 
privileges, opportunities and advantages over his peers. At an early age, he was 
accustomed to his family's election campaign and helped by canvassing votes. More 
importantly, even before becoming an MP, he was well acquainted with the senior 
police, military offi cers and high-ranking civil servants from several ministries at both 
local and national level as he had met them socially, when they came to the house parties 
hosted by Sanoh and his father. After being appointed a Deputy Minister, he denied 
accusations that his fam ily used a so -called "system of mafia 's patronage" to control 
bureaucrats. To him, "din ing together is like siblings spending time chatting about daily 
events with each other. For me, it is a family effort to understand the problems of the 
local area and to know the demands placed on public officials rather than to control 
them. "23 The Thienthong clan members were clearly privileged and had greater political 
capital than other groups in Sa Kaeo; in addit ion, they were astute in utilizing the 
resources at their disposa l. 
Apart fro m political resources, the seco nd factor facilitating the Thienthong's complete 
co nt ro l of power was the administrative restructure in 1993 which saw the Prachinburi 
province divided in two: the old Prachinburi and the newly-created Sa Kaeo . As the 
Thientho ng' s po litica l stronghold and its business investment were co ncentrated in the 
22 Prac/,akhom Thong1hi11 , 5 (16 July- 15 August 2001 ): 63-64. 
23 Thai Pos1 , I November 20 11. See also an int erview of Thani t Thienth ong when he was first-time MP in 
1996 in Thawatchai 1998: 11 4. 
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districts that were located in Sa Kaeo, Sanoh and his clan thereby decided to put their 
political future in the new province by running for MPs in Sa Kaeo. With a smaller 
territory, it was easier for the clan to establish and retain its monopoly of power. In the 
1995 election, the first election for Sa Kaeo, Sanoh and his team won the three seats 
effortlessly. They have never lost since then; in fact, every election competition in Sa 
Kaeo turned out to be a non-event. There has never been a potent candidate who 
seriously challenged the Thienthong dynasty. Usually, election results are entirely 
predictable. 
In order to illustrate clearly how dominant the Thienthong clan has been, one might need 
to simply consider the list of Sa Kaeo MPs. Since 1996 every single MP for Sa Kaeo 
exclusively belonged to the Thienthong clan. Only one of 18 MPs, as shown here, came 
from outside the family. 24 
Table 12.1: List of MPs for Sa Kaeo province, 1995-2011 
Election Date List of MPs for Sa Kaeo province 
2 July 1995 Sanoh Thienthong, Witthaya Thienthong, Burin Hiranburana 
17 November 1996 Sanoh Thienthong, Witthaya Thienthong, Thanit Thienthong 
6 January 2001"' Witthaya Thienthong, Thanit Thienthong, Trinut Thienthong 
6 February 2005 Thanit Thienthong, Trinut Thienthong, Sorawong Thienthong 
23 December 2007 Thanit Thienthong, Trinut Thienthong, Sorawong Thienthong 
3 July 2012 Thanit Thienthong, Trinut Thienthong, Sorawong Thienthong 
Source: Nopparat 2010: 187-89; Office of the Election Commission of Thailand 2011 
Sano h' s absolute monopoly of power has prohibited new political players from entering 
the competition. Wealthy business elites, who possessed plenty of financial resources 
and potential to stand in the election, have chosen to stay away from electoral 
competitions. They do not want their business activities to be impaired by their political 
involvement. · Some businessmen in Sa Kaeo who had once tried running in the local 
elections explained that, 
competing with the Big House [Thienthong family] is tough because they 
controlled all sub-district and village heads. Their political network is like 
24 Burin Hiranburana, who was elected in 1995, is an old business ally of th e Thienthong fa mil y. 
25 Since 2001 , Sanoh has been elected to the House as national party-list MP, so hi s name does not appear 
in the table. 
349 
a brick wall... They are the big men who have been taking care of this 
province for a long time ... If you want to fight with them, you have to 
patiently bui ld your own political vote base. It takes too long and is not 
worth doing . . . For business families, lives are more pleasant if you a.re not 
invo lved in po litics.26 
Since the 2001 election, many political parties who competed against the Thienthongs in 
Sa Kaeo continued fie lding their candidates but had no expectation of winning. They 
only expected to secure votes in the nationwide district of the party-list system. 
The Thienthongs secured electoral victory without major recourse to either violence or 
vote buying. Many voters, journalists and local officials alike noted that distribution of 
money was hardly seen in the province elections. They said it has been unnecessary for 
the "Big House" to give cash directly to voters since various kinds of patronage have 
been channeled to constituencies over the years. When money was dispensed, it was at 
lower levels than that which was given out in other provinces. In the 20 11 poll, fo r 
example, Sa Kaeo voters reportedly received only 50-1 00 baht per head fo r their vote-
selling, while voters in neighboring provinces were paid 200 baht. Also, the village 
headmen and sub-district heads who worked fo r the clan earned a meager 1,000 and 
2,000 baht each, respectively, for their vote-canvassing jobs. Elsewhere, it is co mmon 
fo r them to be paid 10,000 to 30,000 baht. 27 The Thienthong opposition were not 
spending their money on a compet ition they knew they had no chance of winning. 28 
Ano ther reason fo r the absence of vote-buying in Sa Kaeo was that the clan had absolute 
control over the local state apparatus. Why would they need to intricate themselves in 
illega l and costly (and sometimes ineffective) conduct of vote-buying when they 
contro ll ed the provincial governor, the police chief, the district chief officers, the 
provincial elect ion commissioners, and all local officials who were responsible for vote-
counting at po ll ing stations. 29 
26 ln1erview, loca l businessman , Sa Kaeo, 8 April 20 12. 27 ln lerview, two seni or ETC offi cers, Bangkok, 8 June 201 1; interview, loca l journ alis t, Phetchaburi , 17 
April 20 12. 
28 lnlerview, loca l journal isl, Sa Kaeo, IO April 20 12; intervi ew, vill age headman, Sa Kaeo, 9 Apri l 20 12. 29 A village head, a long-1ime vote ca nvasser for the Th ienthong, told me abou t his experience as a loca l 
comm ittee member overseein g the e lection process at po ll ing stati on th at he was g iven "green light" by 
the governor and th e police to "do whatever I need to do." Interview, vi ll age headm an, Sa Kaeo, IO April 
20 12 . 
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It was conceivable that even without the creation of Sa Kaeo as a new province in 1993 
Sanoh may still have been able to achieve political control in Prachinburi in the same 
way as he did in Sa Kaeo. The fact that Sanoh assisted the Chart Thai Party's candidates 
to win every seat in Prachinburi since 1998 elections attests to the enormous power he 
wielded within the province. Nonetheless, it was less daunting to control a smaller area 
comprised of only three MP constituencies. In Prachinburi, there were six seats 
available. To achieve power there he had to exercise his muscle and extend his clientelist 
network to terrain not in his main stronghold. He needed to strike several bargains with 
his non-clan allies to solve conflicts. A few times negotiations failed and led to tensions 
within his team. In 1992, there was one family, formerly allied with Sanoh, that wanted 
to assert its power and no longer be overshadowed by the Thienthongs. The famil y 
switched to join another party in opposition to the Chart Thai te,lm of candidates led by 
Sanoh. Prachinburi witnessed a few violent incidents during the September 1992 
election campaign. 30 Though Sanoh was able to defeat his disloyal ally and took all six 
seats in the province, circumstances compelled him to put more energy and muscle into 
winning. In Sa Kaeo, with fewer seats up for grabs, his clan was able to dominate the 
province with less money, manpower, and political maneuvering. 31 
Sanoh 's political roles at both the national and local levels strongly reinforced each 
other. His clan domination in the province served as a springboard to his successful 
political career in the national government. In turn, by having secured several prominent 
cabinet posts throughout his long career, he gained access to extensive government 
resources (budget, concessions, licenses, goods, appointments, projects, etc) which 
enabled him to fund his clientelist network and strengthen his power grip on his 
hometown. His political connections and influence buttressed his famil y business 
empire. In the 1990s his major family business activities, particularly construction, were 
growing constantly and expanded to real estate, land development, transport , service 
industries, and cement production. 32 Sanoh's sister-in-law, who was in charge of the S. 
Thienthong Co mpany, admitted that even though she was operating her business legally, 
30 See th e news reports about these incidents in Thai Rath, 3 1 Jul y 1992: 17: Thai Rath, 10 August 1992: 
1, 7: Thai Rath, 13 September 1992: 1, 22 , 25. 
" The contrasting development in Prachinburi and Sa Kaeo after separation clearl y demonstrates th e 
peace ful effect of th e monopoly of power. Electoral contests in Prachinburi in both national and loca l 
levels were more turbul ent and bloody than Sa Kaeo. Without the Thienthong's presence, no single 
politi ca l fa mil y or fac ti on had been powerful enough to achi eve complete control in Prachi nburi. The 
province's power st ructure remained fragmented up until the 20 I I poll , in whi ch some shooting inci dents 
occurred and people were injured. See Prajak 20 12. 
32 Wattana 1995: 33-44 ; "Networks and Business of the Th ienth ong Fam ily," Nation Sudsapda 4 ( 14- 20 
July 1995): 13. 
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Sanoh's political connections clearly worked in favor of the family business: "it has 
provided protection to our family business. No one dared harass us. It was a contributing 
fac tor as to why our business has never been in disarray. "33 
The Thienthong family was among the few political dynasties who survived the new 
post-1997 po litical environment with their power intact. However, the influence of 
Sanoh Thienthong in national politics was not as strong as it used to be pre-1997. 
The survival of a political dynasty in the new political landscape: the Thienthongs 
after 1997 
Sanoh's political career developed hand in hand with factiona l politics as they evo lved 
during the pre-1 997 period. This type of politics is well known for its very weak political 
parties comprised of several vying factions tied together largely by personal and 
patronage networks.34 Factions can move from one party to another if the leaders believe 
that by doing so they will enhance their chances of winning elections and then joining 
coalition governments. In general, factions led by influential provincial bosses 
constituted the core elements of Thai political parties, and their political defections could 
have serious consequences on the survival of the government. The withdrawal of 
political support of any large political faction frequently led to the government's demise. 
Sanoh's infamous Wang Nam Yen faction was the largest and most influential faction in 
the 1990s. 
Throughout his career he had gradually built a political faction that came to dominate 
several provinces in the central, eastern, and northeastern regions. A large number of 
MPs had been induced to work under his patronage. Interestingly, instead of creating a 
political party of his own, Sanoh preferred to play the role of dealmaker by shifting his 
powerful faction from one party to another. After 1992 his faction moved to the Chart 
Thai Party, which went on to win the most seats in the Parliament in the 1995 election. 
Without Sanoh's support, Banharn Silapa-acha, a Chart Thai Party' s leader, would not 
have been able to assume the prime ministership. Sanoh 's association with the Chart 
Thai Party was terminated in 1996 because he was extremely upset with Banharn, who 
denied him the highly influential position of Minister oflnterior. 35 Sanoh and his fact ion 
33 Phi la t 200 1: 58. 
34 See useful di scussion on thi s issue in Hicken 2006; Ockey 2004. 35 As di scussed in Chapters 3 and 5, bei ng the minister of interior is one of th e most desirable positi ons for 
Thai politicians because it enables control of the regional and loca l governm ents, th e land department , the 
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then decided to defect from Banham and join the New Aspiration Party (NAP) of 
General Chavalit Yongchaiyuth in the 1996 poll. With the critical inclusion of Sanoh's 
powerful faction, NAP was able to obtain the most seats in the election and General 
Chavalit became the prime minister. Chavalit rewarded Sanoh with a position he long 
coveted: Minister of the Interior. 
However, with the New Aspiration Party's fortunes waning after it was forced out of 
power in 1997, Sanoh and his faction switched parties again in the 2001 election. His 
Wang Nam Yen faction moved to join the newly-founded Thai Rak Thai party of 
Thaksin. By the time Sanoh's faction moved to TRT, he had around seventy MPs under 
his control, the largest faction ever to exist in the Thai political party system. 36 Thaksin 
was more than willing to use Sanoh's political service, as he had done with other 
influential provincial bosses, to fulfill his aspiration to power. The TRT won the election 
in a landslide, and Thaksin became the third prime minister that Sanoh had supported. 
After the government was formed, Thaksin appointed Sanoh to three highly prominent 
positions: prime minister's chief advisor, the TRT Party's chief advisor, and the chief 
whip of the coalition parties. 37 
Over time, however, Thaksin sidelined Sanoh's faction since he did not want any faction 
to assume too much control over party members. As the supreme le.ader, Thaksin played 
the classic maneuvering game of divide and rule by pitting factions within his party 
against each other. The faction led by Thaksin's sister slowly became larger and more 
powerful than Sanoh's faction. As a result, Sanoh fe lt disgruntled at the way he had been 
treated by Thaksin and became one of Thaksin's most vocal critics within the Party. 
After the 2005 election, with a landslide victory and 375 seats won by the TRT, Thaksin 
could see that his party's electoral victory had been decided much more by his personal 
popularity and policy platfonn than by the delivery of votes by such provincial bosses as 
Sanoh. Therefore he formed his cabinet in a way that paid no attention to the old quota 
system through which cabinet seats were given to faction leaders who had won a large 
number of seats for the party. Sanoh's faction was completely disregarded and his role in 
the party was significantly diminished; only his wife was appointed to the insignificant 
post of Cultural Minister. Feeling humiliated, he started to attack Thaksin openly in 
security units, and gives responsibility for administrating and overseeing the election (prior to the 1997 
constitution, which replaced the Minister oflnterior with the Office of Election Commission). 
36 His faction thus counted for one seventh of the parliament, as the 2001 Lower House has 500 MPs. 
37 Prachakhom Thongthin , 5 (16 July- 15 August 2001): 62-64. 
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public. When the anti-Thaksin movement was starting to develop in 2005, Sanoh 
decided to join the bandwagon and eventually went onto the People Alliance of 
Democracy (PAD) stage to criticize Thaksin as a dictatorial leader. According to Sanoh, 
"the prime minister's thoughts run faster than the constitution, so it might be necessary to 
change the law to keep up with him. He is a commander who moves faster than his 
army."38 
The declining power of Sanoh and his faction in determining the government 's sm vival 
and in shaping electoral contests during the Thaksin era demonstrates the larger 
structural and institutional changes that transpired after 1997, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
It was the result of a combination of crucial factors: the 1997 economic crisis, the 1997 
constitution, and the attempt ofThaksin's administration to reduce the ro le of provincial 
bosses and their factions. First of all, the economic crisis decreased the wealth of several 
bosses, especially the ones whose economic empires were based on real estate and 
construction. The Thienthong family was no exception. Moreover, cabinet positions 
were preferably allocated to party list MPs, technocrats, or close aides ofThaksin rather 
than given to the godfather-style politicians. Without cabinet posts, provincial politicians 
had fewer resources to support their followers and maintain their power bases. The 1997 
constitution introduced a new rule requiring that politicians be a member of a political 
party fo r at least 90 days before voting day; this inhibited the old practice of party-
hopping prior to the elections. Finally, the Thaksin 's highly popular campaign against 
"dark influences" serious ly hmt many mafia-style politicians or any politicians who 
associated with bosses (as discussed in Chapter 5) . 
By February 2006, Sanoh commanded the loya lty of on ly 37 MPs. He and his wi fe 
resigned from the TRT in February 2006 to establish a new party, the Pracharaj Party. It 
was the first time in his long polit ical career that Sanoh assumed responsibility as the 
leader of po litical party. Things have not gone wel l, as his party has been through many 
unforeseen difficulties and int ra-party co nflicts since the beginning, and some of the 
fo unding members resigned shortly afterwards because they believed that the party had 
no chance of perform ing well in the elect ion. Importantly, most of his Wang Nam Yen 
factio n members remained wit h the TRT instead of fo llowing Sanoh and joining his new 
party. Only his fami ly members and a few steadfast fo llowers decided to continue 
38 Bangkok Post, 2 October 2007. 
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working with Sanoh. Most politicians, especially in the northeast, knew very well that 
Thaksin and his policy platforms were still highly popular among voters. If the faction 
members switched and joined Sanoh's new party, they would face difficulty 
campaigning against the Palang Prachachon Party (PPP). Their chances of winning were 
almost zero. Several technocrats and leading businessmen, initially persuaded by Sanoh 
to be party executive members, turned down the offer for similar reasons. In addition, 
some commented that the old-fashioned and parochial image portrayed by Sanoh and his 
clan was not a selling point in the new era ofpost-1997 electoral politics.39 The heyday 
of local strongmen had gone with the premiership of Banham, the last provincial boss 
who managed to reach the apex of national power. 
The rise and fall of Sanoh' s political influence in national politics is reflected in the 
dramatic change in numbers of his faction ' s members from 1996 to 2007. In 1996, when 
his faction moved to the NAP of Chavalit, there were about 60 MPs. It increased up to 
around 70 in 2001 when the faction joined the TRT, and shrunk to the size of30 in 2006 
when Sanoh had his falling out with Thaksin. By 2007, only nine MPs remained under 
the control of the Wang Nam Yen boss. 
Although his role in shaping politics at the national level has been in decline, Sanoh' s 
political control over his own province is still as strong and absolute_ as ever. The 
striking fact is that four out of nine of his party's MPs were from Sa Kaeo, and all of 
them were Thienthong family members. The media mocked his political party as "Sa 
Kaeo party", a remark that made him furious. 40 In one interview given a few weeks 
leading up to the polling day in December 2007, Sanoh said he never had any doubt that 
the candidates from the Thienthong family would win seats. He strongly believed that 
they would defeat their opponents as they always had. His only concern was that they 
might win by a margin ofless than 100,000 votes, a victory he would consider a failure. 
He said, "even if I do not come to campaign here, just walk by, I strongly believe that 
we are still going to win in this election because my family has done all good things [for 
the province]."41 
39 See comments in Manager Weekly, 24 April 2006: AI-A4; Khao Sod, October 2007: I , 10. 
40 Matichon , 2 August 2007: 11. 
41 Matichon , IO December 2007. 
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During the peak ofThaksin's and his party's popularity, the best strategy for survival for 
provincial polit icians was to join the Thai Rak Thai party. Party became much stronger 
than faction. Political party banners had greater significance as demonstrated in the 2001 
and 2005 elections. Many influential political families who lacked political endorsement 
from Thaksin's party simply lost. The only political family who still managed to win all 
available seats in their own province was the Thienthong fami ly of Sanoh. Even though 
he had already joined the TRT in those two elections, he ran the campaign by depending 
largely on his own political machine, and did not ask the party for help. The strength of 
his machine was proved clearly in the 2007 poll when Sanoh defec ted from Thaksin and 
his family still won all seats-defeating opposing candidates from the PPP party of 
Thaksin by large margins. This fact demonstrated that Sa Kaeo was first and foremost 
the Thienthong's unchallengeable political turf, over which they had no problem 
sustaining a Jong-lasting monopoly of power throughout the period of turbulent political 
crisis (2006-2011 ). 
At present, it is clear that Sanoh's power is geographically limited to only the specific 
location of his home province. The failure of his son's campaign for Bangkok MP in the 
2007 poll under the Pracharaj Party indicated the limits of his power. In an interview 
given to the media prior to voting, Surachart Thienthong, the second son of Sanoh, said 
that he did not want people to think that the Thienthong clan members "could win an MP 
seat only in Sa Kaeo province."42 His background was totally different from his father's. 
He spent ten years living abroad, earning both Bachelor 's and Master 's degrees from 
universities in the US. When he came back to Thailand, he worked in the private sector 
with one of the biggest companies in Thailand fo r seven years, before turning to politics. 
He lived in Bangkok since he came back from America. For this reason he wanted to be 
a Bangkok representat ive, despite his father 's stern efforts to have him contest in Sa 
Kaeo . It turned out that he failed to get elected to the parliament , losing to the Democrat 
candidates by a large margin. Clearly, the Theingthong fam ily's power produced no 
effect in the cap ital city. Four years later, in 201 1, Surachart 's political dream fina lly 
came true when his fami ly joined fo rces with Thaksin. He ran in the same constituency, 
and tJ1e popu larity of Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party vote base enabled him to defeat 
his former opponent from the Democrat party and win a seat fo r Bangkok.43 
42 Mcuichon , 15 November 2007: 11. 
43 See Surachart ' s long interview about hi s election victory in Matichon , 7 Sep tember 20 11 . 
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The Thlenthong family ' s political decision to join Thaksin's side in the July 201 1 
election revealed a striking development in electoral politics as well as a change in the 
pattern of political violence in Thailand. The street violence and state repression that 
paralyzed the country from 2006 to 201 1 came as a rude awakening to the dominant clan 
from Sa Kaeo . After the occupation of government buildings and airports, and violent 
clashes between protesters and government forces, Sanoh and hls family realized that the 
elimination of Thaksin had created many unintended and undesirable consequences for 
the who le polit ical system, including their clan. Veteran politician Sanoh perceived the 
dissolution of political parties by the Constitutional Court and the army intervention in 
politics as a political nightmare. According to Sanoh, the political maneuvering of 
traditional elites was out of control and made politics completely chaotic and hlghly 
unstable. Thls was unacceptable for a political boss who came from an utterly peacefu l 
and orderly province. In May 2011, soon after Abhlsit called for a general election, 
Sanoh gave an interview, "I want to convey the message to every Thai person that if we 
let our country fa ll to thls low level, we will regret it later. I live in a border province. I 
have seen the disunity before . .. the crisis that has been going on for the last five years is 
very worrying."44 Unlike Newin Chidchob who was highly skilled at mobilizing the 
masses, the Wang Nam Yen boss was uncomfortable with mass movement politics and 
street confrontation. 
In the 2011 poll, Sanoh changed his political stance and decided to collaborate with 
Thaksin to bring back political stability and order. His small Pracbaraj Party was 
dissolved and integrated into the Pheu Thai Party. He traveled around the Northeast 
region campaigning very hard for the Pheu Thai Party and Thaksin' s sister, Yingluck 
Shinawatra. During a long, tiring campaign, the old big boss from Sa Kaeo gave many 
rounds of incendiary speeches lambasting the army, the judges, the Yellow Shirts, the 
Democrat Party, and Newin. In one emotional speech, he told voters 
our country is falling down. I could not let it fall further. I prayed 
every night asking all sacred spirits to so lve all troubles the country 
is facing and to rescue our country from bad people who are 
44 Th ai Rath, 13 May 201 1. The quote was extracted fr om a speech given by Sanob on the day that he 
publicly announced hi s decision to join th e Pheu Thai Party. 
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governing our country at the moment, not letting them rule the 
country any longer. 45 
He then proceeded to explain that the reason he could not retire from politics, even 
though he was already 78, was because Thaksin had asked him to help the country one 
more time.46 On another occas ion, he said, "this election is the most important election. 
Politics has been so chaotic in the past couple of years, full of grave accusations. Some 
even dared to accuse their opponents of disloyalty to the king." He then denounced the 
army fo r "stealing the people's power, toppling the democratically elected government" 
and intervening in the formation of a coalition government that unfairly made Abhisit 
prime minister.47 
In the aftermath of the 2011 election, Sanoh and his clan had returned to the center of 
power once again. He was appointed a chief advisor of the Pheu Thai Party, his beloved 
nephew Thanit was awarded the powerful position of Deputy Minister of Interior, and 
three additional members from his family entered parliament as lawmakers. With a c lear 
majority for the Pheu Thai Party, and the smooth transition of power from Abhisit to 
Yingluck in the wake of July 20 11 election, the main streets in the capital Bangkok 
were, at least temporarily, clear of violent protests and clashes. The army provisionally 
withdrew to their barracks. Meanwhile, back in Sa Kaeo, everything remained as calm 
and peaceful as ever. 
45 Personal observation , Sanoh Thienlhong 's speech on Pheu Thai 's stage, Kabinburi District, Prach inburi, 
28 June 2011. 
40 Persona l observa ti on, Sanoh Thienth ong's speech on Ph eu Thai 's stage, Kabinburi District, Prachinburi, 
28 June 20 1 I. 
" Personal observation, Sanoh Thienthong·s speech on Pheu Thai 's stage, Soengsang District, Nakhon 
Ratchasima, 31 May 20 1 I . 
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Part IV: Conclusion 
Chapter 13 
Wealth, power, and 
trajectories of electoral violence in Thailand 
The primary motivation for this research was to understand the relationship between 
political violence and democratic structures in modem Thailand- a crucial topic that has 
broad implications for the political development of the country but hitherto has been 
given little scholarly attention. Focusing specifically on election-related vio lence, this 
study set forth to identify the primary factors and political processes that cause or 
instigate violence in elections and to explain the variation in Thai electoral violence 
across time and space. In regard to change over time, a major part of the answer can be 
found in the national political structure and institutional settings. With respect to 
geographical variation, the explanatory factors are located at the subnational level: 
provincial political economic conditions and the provincial elite power structure. This 
concluding chapter summarizes the argument and the evidence presented in the previous 
chapters and discusses the comparative insights offered by Thailand 's experience. It 
concludes with a broad assessment of trajectories of electoral violence and the possible 
dynamics of political contestation in Thailand in the near future. 
Elections worth killing for: instrumental violence under the patrimonial state 
Electoral violence poses a major threat to democracy building and consolidation around 
the world. It not only does damage to a large number of people 's lives, but also destroys 
the legit imacy of democracy at its roots. Electoral processes and institutions become a 
source of conflict, rather than being a source of. peaceful solutions to conflict. 1 
Intimidation as well as outright fonns of violence deprive citizens of their right to 
participate in the electoral process without inhibition. Candidates who become victims, 
quite obviously, lose their right to contest. 
P1;or to 1973, as discussed in Chapter 2, elect ion campaigns were peaceful for two major 
reasons: elective posts possessed no real power and electoral processes were heavily 
1 Sisk 2008; Snyder 2000. 
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controlled by authoritarian rulers. First, under a series of patrimonial administrative 
states, elections were held as a mere political ritual to give legitimacy to the incumbent 
power holders. Elections had no real significance because elective offices had limited 
power and privilege; the policy-making process, budget allocation, and rent-distribution 
were instead controlled by non-elected, bureaucratic elites. With no real power over 
either administrative or legislative activities, enfeebled MP posts offered no incentive for 
oligarchs, national or local, to engage in electoral politics. In essence, elections were not 
worth killing for. Second, elections were largely free of bloodshed because they were 
not competitive. Authoritarian bureaucratic elites used many exclusionary tactics to 
prohibit opposition forces from participating in elections: extra-judicial killings, 
imprisonment, detention, forced disappearance, and several draconian laws. In addition, 
military leaders rigged or stole elections by committing electoral fraud. These coercive 
and manipulative tactics of autocratic rulers made elections in the 1932-1973 period 
unfree and unfair, but calm and peaceful. 
Thailand's long, sustained experience of electoral vio lence began with the 1973 student 
uprising and the process of democratizat ion. The pattern and intensity of violence have 
changed over time-albeit not in a linear fashion-in connection with the 
reconfiguration of state structure, changes in electoral and party systems, and evolving 
modes of political struggle. 
In the wake of the 1973 co llapse of Thanom Kittikhachorn 's authoritarian regime and 
the decay of the patrimonial administrative state, electoral violence emerged in Thailand 
in the 1975 and 1976 elections. The motivations behind and character of violence during 
these two elections were unique and different from the general pattern that emerged after 
the 1980s. The primary cause of violence was the po litica l vulnerability felt by the royal-
military elites that was caused by the changes in state structure and new institutional 
sett ings wrought by the events of 14 October 1973. After 1973, these old elites lo st their 
capacity to control and manipulate electoral processes; exclusionary tactics and poll 
rigging were no longer an option. Therefore, royal -military elites were compel led to 
reso1i to coercive force to eliminate political threats and to dictate electoral results. The 
main pattern of electo ral violence during 1975 and 1976 was state-sponsored vio lence 
target ing socialist parties. Violent incidents occurred mostly during the pre-election 
period and on election day. State agents and state-backed paramilitary groups were the 
chief perpetrators as they used assassination, bombing, and other fonns of vio lence to 
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terrorize left-leaning parties and their supporters. Spectacular violence in elections was 
part of a larger campaign of the royal-military alliance against a range of progressive 
forces, who struggled for radical change during this period. Electoral and non-electoral 
violence were both driven by ideological struggle and thus interconnected. In this sense, 
electoral violence from 1975 to 1976 was an extension of state violence to el iminate the 
enemies of the state. 
After 1976, when political and economic structures at both the national and local levels 
changed dramatically, there were significant changes in the pattern, logic, and methods 
of electoral violence as well. State-sponsored electoral violence began to disappear and 
was replaced by private killings perpetrated by provincial business politicians. Under the 
emerging oligarchic patrimonial state and parliamentary democracy of the late 1970s, 
elective posts became a major source of patronage, protection and high rents. They thus 
provided incentives for provincial business elites to enter electoral competition. 
Provincial bosses face higher stakes in elections than do other types of candidates since 
their wealth is mainly based on rent-seeking and trade in the illegal economy, which 
requires political connections. Their political involvement made election campaigns 
fierce and uncompromising. Political bosses, popularly called jao pho or godfathers, 
primarily used secretive, violent methods, mostly assassination, to eliminate rival 
candidates, vote canvassers for their rivals, and disloyal vote canvassers who betrayed 
them. They refrained from using indiscriminate or spectacular methods because they 
wanted to avoid police and media attention. The aim of the use of force by jao pho was 
not to terrorize the general population or to advance any political ideas or beliefs, but to 
weaken their threatening politico-business enemies and to consolidate their own power. 
The pattern of violence revealed that coercive forces served not only the immediate goal 
of winning elections, but also the long-tenn objective of maintaining authority. In the 
post-1976 period, electoral violence became privatized, decentralized, less spectacular, 
and non-ideological. In essence, electoral violence became instrumental and profane. 
There was, and has been, nothing symbo lic or sacred at stake in election-related vio lence 
in post-1976 Thailand.2 
Whereas electoral violence from 1975 to 1976 was part ofa national, ideological battle 
between the leftists and the rightists, electoral violence in the post-1976 period has 
2 For tl1e distinction among instrumental , symbolic and sacred violence, I draw on Girard 1977; Kal yvas 
2006; and Kri shn a 20 I 0. 
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become part of the struggle to control wealth and power in provincial areas. Therefore, it 
needs to be situated and understood within the broad context of local power struggles 
and economic structures. FundamentalJy, electoral violence in the 1980s and 1990s was 
private violence in the realm of electoral democracy; it targeted individual election-
related actors, not the electoral process or institutions. Electoral democracy under 
patrimonial oligarchic rule largely benefited the provincial political lords. They clearly 
had no desire to mobilize mass-scale violence to overhaul or to directly challenge the 
prevailing political order. Within their territory, local elites used their power to contain 
any types of chaotic violence that had the potential to disrupt or dismantle the extant 
electoral institutions that genuinely served the accumulation of their power. 
Even though electoral vio lence in the post-1976 period is violence of provincial bosses 
and violence for provincial bosses, it is .carried out by another group of people. Bosses 
use their material resources to hire violence specialists (muepuen or gunmen) to 
undertake violent acts. Since the 1980s, the market for political killings has expanded in 
line with rapid economic development and personalistic political struggles. In Thailand, 
the supply of violence is abundant, inexpensive, and highly mobile. Precisely due to the 
factors, the supply side-guns and gunmen-did not determine the frequency and 
location of vio lence within Thailand . Electoral violence occurred in accordance with the 
demand side. Demand mostly came from political bosses who invested heavily in high-
risk, high return businesses and were desperate to enter political office to safeguard these 
businesses. As long as the structural and institutional incentives generated from elective 
posts remain unchanged, and there are no structural or institutional impediments to the 
market for gunmen, the demand for vio lence will exist and supply will follow. The 
degree of electoral violence was relatively constant from 1979 to 1996. There were ebbs 
and flows, but the total number of violent incidents remained relatively constant. The 
lack of sharp fluctuation in the degree of violence stemmed from the fact there were no 
major structural and institutional changes in the period between 1979 and 1996, in the 
patrimonial state structure, central-local relations, or the electoral and party system. 
After 1997, a series of major political , social, and economic changes took place which 
led to the significant fluctuation and the emergence of new forms of vio lence. In the 
200 I and 2005 elections," there was a sharp rise in the number of violent incidents and 
casualties. Vio lent protests erupted in severa l constituenci es after elections, which 
delayed the announcement of results. The new pattern of collective violence in electoral 
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process highlighted the greater degree of participation of voters in political contestation. 
In 2007 and 2011 , by contrast, elections turned relatively more peaceful. Four national-
level factors explain the fluctuation in violence: 1) the 1997 constitution and its newly 
designed electoral system; 2) the implementation of decentralization and its 
empowerment of local electiye posts; 3) the rise of a strong populist party and Thaksin 
Shinawatra; and 4) the 2006 military coup and the rise of ideological politics. The first 
three factors increased the levels of violence as, they, collectively, destabilized the 
existing local political order by making the provincial power structure more fragmented 
and upsetting the power balance among local elites. Competing bosses fought fiercely to 
maintain their realm of power and ward off encroaching enemies. In contrast, the coup 
and the development of ideological contestation each separately decreased the levels of 
violence in elections. The post-1997 shift in democratic structures facilitated the rise of 
stronger political parties. The subsequent rise ofThaksin, in 2001, brought in a populist 
government with monopolizing goals. This became a threat to the traditional, unelected 
elites and the 2006 military coup was carried out with the intention of stemming this 
threat by directly interfering in the electoral process. In the aftermath of the coup, the 
royal-military elites intervened heavily in politics by suppressing electoral politics and 
stifling political competition among political bosses. This made the 2007 election unfree 
but relatively peaceful. The intense ideological conflicts in Thai society since the 2006 
coup have also brought about a decline in violence. Ideological conflict reshaped 
political struggle and redirected conflicts toward political ideas and platforms, which 
therefore bypassed the personal conflicts among local bosses. New political 
developments altered the direction and degree of violence. From 2006 to 2011, the 
terrain of political contestation moved from the electoral arenas to the streets, and state 
and street violence overshadowed electoral violence. 
The violent path to monopoly of power: bosses, bullets, and ballots 
Broadly speaking, the Thai political system is highly centralized. With a centralized 
bureaucratic structure and state apparatus, power is primarily located in Bangkok. Even 
though the decentralization process implemented after 1997 brought about certain 
important changes, it did not radically transform central-local relations (as noted in 
Chapter 5). The capital is st ill the political and economic center of gravity and the most 
vital source of wealth and power in the country. Under these circumstances, every 
politician dreams of capturing a slice of power by entering national parliament and/or 
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cabinet. Therefore Bangkok is a desired, fina l political destination for all bosses. The 
primary sites of political battle, however, are provincial towns. To obtain national 
power, ambitious political bosses first need to acquire power at home. Controlling the 
province is the key to unbridled financial , social and political power at the local level. 
The desired political endgame of every local o ligarch is the monopoly of provincial 
power, as holding a political monopoly leads to securing dominant control over 
economic resources, natural assets, patronage distribution, and bureaucratic structure. 
When bosses monopolize their province and completely subdue their opponents, they 
acquire the ability to play the role of benevo lent patron and can drop the "dirty" and 
coercive tactics that they fo rmerly used to buttress their power. Acting as a patron 
bestows a better image upon them and is sufficient fo r the maintenance of their power. 
Vio lence becomes less necessary for bosses enjoying a monopoly of local power. 
Nevertheless, many provincial elites simultaneously assume the roles of munificent 
patron and fearful boss. These dual ro les do not conflict with each other since 
competitive and volat ile provincial politics require them to have the capacity to fill both 
roles if they aspire to command authoritative power. 
Fighting among bosses to secure the monopoly of power has become a major source of 
violent conflicts in provincial areas. These conflicts are most heightened during election 
times because elections decide who has legitimate control of political office. Typically, 
Thai candidates deploy various tactics to win electoral competitions, including direct 
vote-buying, pork and patronage dispensing to constituents, reliance on personal fame 
and party branding, and coercive methods. V iolence is not universally used by every 
candidate as a primary strategy to win elections. Even boss-type candidates try to refrain 
from resorting to intimidation or ki lling because these vio lent tactics at best bring 
complications and at worst may backfire. When boss-type cand idates face non-bo ss 
opponents, the bosses do not need to deploy strong-arm tactics, as they can handily 
· defeat their competitors with stronger vote-canvassing networks and a deeper war chest. 
Violence is necessary only under specific circumstances, specifically, when confronted 
with a rival boss in the battle fo r provincial dominance. Political bosses typical ly possess 
simil ar power and wealth and use the same (dirty) electioneering style. The only option 
fo r an embattled boss to ensure victory is to eliminate his or her opponents by force. 
When boss-style candidates are confro nt ed with each other in an electoral campa ign in 
whi ch there is a power monopo ly at stake, elections are most prone to violence because 
business and political conflict became inseparable. Business enemies turn into po lit ical 
364 
rivals, and elections become a war of domination and survival. The six case studies 
examined show that when the logic of war governs elections, it effectively changes the 
dynamics and mode of competition. Friends and enemies are clearly, and rigidly, 
defined, shutting down the possibility for compromise. 3 The opposing candidate and key 
vote canvassers were the main casualties of "electoral war," and a small number of 
activists, journalists, election commissioners, and local officials were caught between 
the two sides. 
Electoral violence in Thailand is associated with and carried out by individual 
candidates, rather than parties. My research found no correlation between political 
parties and the frequency of electoral violence. Put another way, there is no clear 
difference between political parties with regards to the use of violent tactics. All parties 
have a record of their candidates or supporters engaging in the use of force during 
campaigning, including the Democrat Party, which had been portrayed by certain 
political observers .and journalists as the "reformist, non-boss" party. Studies of three 
violent provinces, namely Phrae, Nakhon Sawan, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, provided 
ample evidence of the involvement of the Democrats in violent electoral conflicts. Intra-
party conflict among the Democrats in Nakhon Si Thammarat was as fierce and bloody 
as inter-party conflicts in other provinces. 
To reiterate my argument, violence is a tool mainly used by candidates, whose wealth 
and power are based primarily on rent-seeking and illegal activities, when they are 
confronted with strong rivals. This type of candidate can be found in every political 
party and every region in Thailand. This leads to the question of geography of violence: 
if boss-type candidates- the protagonists of violence-are located almost everywhere, 
why do we witness violent electoral competition in certain provinces but not in others? 
My research found that many subnational factors widely mentioned by scho lars as 
explanatory variables for political violence fail to explain electoral violence in provincial 
Thailand. Specifically, the variables of regional location, level of economic development 
and poverty, homicide rate, everyday culture of violence, size of province, and number 
of elective positions do not help explain patterns of electoral violence in Thailand. 
3 Several studies on political violence explained powerfully the linkages between the logic and "discourse 
of war" and the facilitation and acceleration of violence in civil conflicts. See Straus 2008; Browning 
1993. 
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Instead, my case studies identify two determining factors that account for the variation in 
the timing and location of violence: the political economy of elite competition and the 
provincial power structure. The economic base of the political elite is more significant 
than the general political economic character of the province in explaining the presence 
or absence of violence, as electoral violence in Thailand is primarily a quite selective 
business involving powerful elites rather than collective violence involving mass-
mobilization. Most important is the provincial power structure. The provinces that 
harbor the combinat ion of the two deadly factors-personalistic fighting between rival 
bosses and an absence of a monopoly of power-are the most prone to electoral 
violence. 
The balance of power in Thai provincial po litics takes three fundamental forms: 
monopoly, polarization, and fragmentation. Monopoly is rare as it is difficult to achieve 
and maintain. Only a few bosses or clans manage to secure complete control over their 
province. Sanoh Thienthong of Sa Kaeo and Banham Silpa-archa ofSuphanburi are two 
prime examples. The more common situation is polarization (two rival factions which 
compete with one another) , and fragmentat ion (mult iple groups which compete against 
one another). My research found that polarized and fragmented power landscapes are 
conducive to violent electoral conflict. Without a monopoly of power, the pro vincial 
elites are unable to fully secure needed protection and support from the local 
bureaucracy; they also have difficulty in manipulating electoral processes and outcomes. 
Furthermore, their business rackets are at risk of being encroached upon by enemies, and 
their fo llowers may be enticed by better offers to switch loyalty. Political bosses have to 
struggle fiercely to protect their enclaves and personal networks of power. The frequent 
use of coercive force thus reflect s the vulnerability, not the strength, of the local elites. A 
precarious and unstable situation forces them to have recourse to the use of force. People 
who stand in the way of their domination were targeted for intimidation and/or murder. 
The path to obtaining a monopoly of power is tainted with bloodshed. The paradox of 
this politica l phenomenon is that vio lence paves the way fo r the emergence of an 
·'orderly" provincial politica l order. 
As I argued in the introductory chapter, my stud ies of six provinces, whi le not 
representative of Thailand as a whole, can illuminate the configuration of political power 
and pattern of violence in other provinces throughout Thailand. I wou ld like to briefly 
discuss other provinces not examined in this thesis. With regards to provinces affl icted 
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by vio lence during elections, a list of high-risk provinces includes: Chiang Mai, Chiang 
Rai, and Lampang (in the northern region); Nakhon Ratchasima and Khon Kaen (in the 
northeastern region) ; Kanchanaburi, Ayutthaya, Lopburi, Nakhon Pathom, Pichit, Samu! 
Prakam, Chonburi, Saraburi, Prachinburi, and Ang Thong (in the central region); and 
Yala, Narathiwat, and Songkhla (in the southern region). With respect to location, these 
high-risk provinces are scattered around the country. They also vary in terms of the level 
of economic development and per capita income. Only some are notorious fo r having a 
high murder rate (Songkhla, Chonburi, Nakhon Ratchasima, and Chiang Mai) and/or 
being a hub of hired guns (such as Kanchanaburi, Lopburi, and Songkhla) .4 The size of 
population (and the number of MP seats at stake) of these provinces ranges fro m small 
to medium to very large. For example, tiny Ang Thong has two MP seats and Pichit and 
Yala have three, while the medium-sized Kanchanaburi, Ayutthaya, and Nakhon Pathom 
all have five seats for competition. Large provinces like Chiang Mai and Nakhon 
Ratchasima provide ten and fifteen available seats up for grabs, respectively: 5 Being 
different in many important aspects, these violence-prone provinces, however, share in 
common the deadly elements: the active involvement of political bosses in electoral 
campaigns accompanied with a polarized or fragmented structure. 
Like Phrae, the fo llowing provinces-Pichit, Kanchanaburi, Lampang, Saraburi, 
Prachinburi, and Angthong- typify the po larized power landscape of Thai provincial 
polit ics. All of them have long suffered from hostile and cut-throat rivalries between two 
local fac tions whose economic base is nanow and overlapping. At times, one boss or 
family managed to assert a temporary upper hand over its enemies but neither of them 
succeeded in keeping their opponents completely at bay, leaving provincial politics 
volati le and bloody. Kanchanaburi, a province located in the western central region of 
the country, for example, can be characterized as a political twin of Phrae. The province 
has been witness to two rival bosses fighting for control of natural resource extraction 
(namely minerals and timber) and construction businesses as well as the control of 
elect ive positions. 6 
4 The Research and Development Division of the Royal Thai Police Department 2004: Appendix ko. 
5 Nakhon Ratchasima is the second most populous province of Thailand, surpassed on ly by Bangkok. 
6 I referred to the situation in Kanch anburi brie fl y in Chapter 5 when discussing the "war on in fl uentia l 
people'· of the Thaks in government. More detail s on Kancbanaburi can be found in Sanyalak 2003; 
" Heated battle between two famous kamnan: Electoral wars in Kanchanaburi," Kham Chat Luek, 2 June 
201 l ; Matichon, 8 July 2003: 13; Matichon, S March 20 12. 
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Another set of violent p rovinces share a similar composition of elites and power 
structure with that observed in Nakhon Sawan and Nakhon Si Thammrat. That is, they 
have a highly-fragmented landscape of power. These high-risk provinces include Chiang 
Mai, Chiang Rai, Nakhon Ratchasima, Khon Kaen, Ayutthaya, Lopburi, Nakhon 
Fathom, Samul Prakarn, Chonburi, and Songkhla. In these provinces, multiple factions 
and clans compete in a hostile environment as they strive to subdue formidable 
opponents, who possess roughly matching material resources and an equal capacity to 
resort to vio lent force. The end result of this inter-elite fierce contention was the 
presence of rampant killings. For example, consider the central province of Lopburi , 
which has five prominent clans-Khlangpha, Worapanya, Tharaphum, Chiraphanwanit, 
Kiatwinaisakun-vying for provincial domination. These "five great families," as they 
are locally dubbed, are all heavily invested in the same type of business, with all of 
them direct owners of or otherwise involved in construction. Each of them has fielded 
their family members and assistants in both national elections and local polling contests. 
After decades, no family was able to achieve a power monopoly. In the July 2001 
election, while many other provinces started to see a decline in private killings among 
bosses, Lopburi remained a province in the grip of violence and bloodshed. The Lopburi 
PAO Chairman Suban Chiraphanwanit , who fielded his younger sister in the election, 
was shot dead in the middle of campaign. Moreover, since 1997 , local election 
competitions in Lopburi have been among the bloodiest in the country as all five 
families have attempted to assert local control in order to bolster their standing in 
nat ional elect ion campaign. 7 
The analytica l framework set fo rth in the int roduction and the findings fro m the three 
peaceful provinces (Phetchaburi, Buriram, and Sa Kaeo) can help us explain the peaceful 
situation in provinces such as Mae Hong Son, Maha Sarakham, Nong Bua Lamphu, 
Sakhon Nakhon, Roi Et, Trat, Ranong, Samul Songkhram, Phuket, Phang Nga, 
Yasothom, Tak, Amnat Charoen. From this list, six provinces, including Mae Hong Son, 
Phang Nga, Ranong, Trat , Phuket, and Samul Songkhram, were under the dominant 
contro l of a single faction or fami ly. T hese are small -sized provinces which have one or 
7 I discussed Suba n·s assass inat ion bri e fl y in Chapter 6. For fu11 her deta ils on Lopburi po li t ics, see "Open 
Ta lk with Na tt ha ph on Ki atwin a isakun : ' My fat her 's death was th e moti vati on I stood in e lecti ons," 
Matichon, 22 January 200 I: I 02 ; Thawon Senniam, " Evo lvin g character of Tha i soc iety: Case studi es o f 
Lopburi candidates," Matichon , 14 February 2002 : 7; " Su ban Chiraph anwanit: Th e prov ince will 
prosperous and I am workin g fo r Lopbu ri," Phunam Thongthin , 4:43 (September 2004): 49, 52-53; 
" Lopbu ri politics under fire: TAO head was attacked w ith expl os ive bombs three times," Naew Na, 28 
December 20 I 2. 
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two seats for grab. Nevertheless, it is not the size per se that accounts for the lack of 
violence, as some small provinces, such as Ang Thong, suffered badly during hotly-
contested elections. Rather, what is more important is the way the small territory 
indirectly eases the elite's attempt at power monopolization. 
Apart from those small-sized provinces, many other peaceful provinces (namely, Maha 
Sarakham, Nong Bua Lamphu, Sakhon Nakhon, and Yasothom) are either medium or 
relatively large, with an allocation of four to eight MP seats. Clearly, the population size 
does not even play an incidental role here. In fact, there is an absence of monopoly in 
these provinces. The orderly and peaceful nature of elections in these provinces stems 
from the fact that their election contests were not marred by aggressive confrontation 
between political bosses. Most of their MP candidates had occupational backgrounds as 
teachers, lawyers, university lecturers, professionals, community leaders, activists, 
NGOs, retired officials, or small-scale entrepreneurs. Sakhon Nakhon is a prime 
example of this argument. The province is relatively large with seven MPs, but it has not 
been witness to violent incidents or casualties since 1975 . Their current seven MPs had 
diverse backgrounds before launching into politics but none were positioned as a 
political boss.8 In some provinces, such as Maha Sarakham, provincial business elites or 
political bosses were engaged in elections, competing with non-boss opponents, and won 
handily by relying simply on an ample war chest and a strong network of vote 
canvassers. Without a threat from rival bosses, they did not need to deploy violent tactics 
to win the race. 9 In a nutshell, different kinds of threats demand different types of 
responses. My findings about electoral violence in Thailand is in line with the general 
argument put forth by Jeffrey Winters, whose study of oligarchy across the world in 
various historical period found that oligarchic rulers employ varying strategies in 
handling diff~rent types of political threats. 10 
The presence of a peaceful political order under the thumb of local patrimonial lords is 
surely not an optimal outcome. The monopolized province is orderly and untroubled by 
rampant politically-motivated killings, but not necessarily prosperous or greatly-
8 Among seven of them, there are two loca l civi l servants, a merchant, a teacher, an independent scholar, a 
school director, and a red-shirt leader. The information is drawn from Thai Post, 24 October 2012; Thai 
Parliament 's MP database (http://mp.parliament.go.th/map2554/map esan.htm). 
9 Wichian and Natthaphong 2010. See also the interview of Mahasarakham leading businessman-tumed-
MP, whose family owned one of the largest rice mills in the province, about electoral competition in Maha 
Sarakham in Matichon, 5 November 2012: 7. 
'
0 Winters 2011: 32-39. 
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developed. Sa Kaeo and Suphanburi, two peaceful provinces under boss contro l, are 
relatively underdeveloped and their economic development and people's well-being lag 
behind several other provinces. The domination of bosses has created an unlevel-playing 
field, preventing young, energetic, or reformist fo rces from thriving in the polit ical 
realm. The absolute contro l of bosses has also put in place a stumbling block to any 
. substantive socio-economic advancement in the province which they deem detrimental 
to their patrimonial rule. 11 Undoubtedly, the situations in Sa Kaeo and Suphanburi are 
better than what occurred in Phrae, which has long been stricken by poverty and violent 
clan feuding. Local residents and political actors in Sa Kaeo and Suphanburi do not have 
to worry that they will become the target of harassment, intimidation or attack by 
warring factions. Political life is safe and predictable. For tho se in volatile Phrae, in 
contrast, they live in distress and do not dare to actively participate in political affairs as 
they fear becoming the victims of fi erce, unstable politics. The challenge fo r both 
concerned scholars and policy-makers is to find ways to make Thai provinces free from 
boss ru le, and, at the same time, manage to put in place peacefully competitive elections 
with a progressive reform agenda. Further research is clearly needed to facilitate an 
attempt at fostering a new pattern of"progress without murder" in provincial Thailand . 12 
Unsafe democracy in Thailand and beyond : chalJenges and strategies for mitigation 
Since the late 1990s, many academics and practitioners have advocated the building of 
strong civil society and social capital as the foundation of functioning democracies. 
"Making democracy work" has become a buzz phrase and led the list of priorities fo r 
research and policy agendas. 13 ln the past decade, however, democracy has suffered a 
major setback in many parts of the world, as democratic processes and its institutions 
have been weakened, derailed or dismantled by violent conflicts in vario us guises. 
Democracy was seen to be at risk, and election-related vio lence presented itself as a 
distinct ive form of imminent threat; some observers viewed it as the newest trend of 
11 Once they achieved monopolistic con trol over th eir areas, Thai provincial bosses effeclively act as local 
patrimonial rulers, who, in keeping wi th Max Weber's description of"patrimonial local lords,", moved 
toward "the heredit ary app ropriation of the po liti cal office by a fami ly, lega ll y or in fact , or at least by a 
monopolis ti c group of loca l honoratiores" (Weber 1978, vol. 2: I 058) . 12 Comparative studies of political and economic development and democra tic governance at the 
subnational leve l provide a guiding analyt ica l framework and constructive debate in relation to thi s 
question. See, for example, Trounstine 2008; Pasotti 2009; Erie, Kogan and MacKenzi e 20 11. 13 The most important work is Putnam 1994 ; see also other related works including Barber 1998 ; Couto 
and Guthrie 1999; Norris 2012. 
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violence in developing countries. 14 I agree with some of these scholars that before we 
can make democracy work, we first need to make democracy safe. The danger of 
electoral violence lies not merely in the way it poses an imminent threat to the life and 
liberty of the people. The further danger is in the way that it endangers the exercise of 
democracy and destroys the legitimacy of democratic process as a peaceful mechanism 
for the transfer of power. 15 To discount the harmful effects of electoral violence by 
considering only the actual numbers of dead bodies badly misjudges all that is at stake. 
In recent decades, electoral violence has manifested itself in dissimilar forms in different 
countries. National-level factors, namely state structures, electoral and party systems, 
patterns of central-local relations, and types of social cleavages, shaped the pattern and 
degree of violence. There is no unified characterization of the eruption of violence in 
relation to elections, and therefore no universal solution for the mitigation of violence. In 
order to formulate a tangible mechanism and policy platform for electoral peace, one 
needs to, first and foremost, acknowledge cross-national variation. Fundamentally, the 
rise or persistence of electoral violence is a symptom of a deeper problem (or problems) 
faced by a given country. In the broadest sense, as explained in Chapter 3, a state that 
exhibits strong patrimonial features, whether democratic or non-democratic, is more 
prone to witness uncompromising and violent electoral competitions than non-
patrimonial states. Patrimonial structures create high perks for el1ective posts and thus 
high stakes for electoral winnings. Consequently, elections have become a space of 
intense conflict-a theater of war-in which power hungry, avaricious elites heavily 
invest and fight. Patrimonialism, personalistic politics, and electoral violence are 
inextricably interwoven in countries such as Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, Sri 
Lanka, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe 
and Kenya. 
More thorough and systematic research is needed, however, to understand why those 
troubled countries have had different levels of intensity and distinct patterns of electoral 
violence. With an eye to comparison, I tum to briefly discuss the experience of electoral 
violence in the Philippines and Kenya in order to highlight certain significant points. In 
the Philippines, Thailand 's fellow Southeast Asian middle-income country, electoral 
competition has long been maned by violence in many forms, with over one hundred 
14 Abimanyi 2009; see also Colliers 2009 for the penetrating analysis of voting and violence in Africa. 
15 Alston 2010. 
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killed in each recent election. The methods of violence used by perpetrators include 
shooting, explosion, arson, harassment, kidnapping, ambush, clashes, ballot snatching 
and destruction of property. According to nationwide statistics collected by the 
Philippine National Police (PNP) , there were 249 election-related violent incidents with 
468 casualties in the 2004 general elections, and 229 incidents resulting in 297 casualties 
in the 2007 polls. In the May 10, 2010 elections, which the PNP and the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines (AFP) declared as "the most peaceful electoral exercise" in the 
country's recent history, officials still counted as many as 180 electoral violence 
incidents and the 155 casualties during the whole five-month election period. 16 Much of 
the bloodshed has been perpetrated by partisan armed groups (comprised ofretired and 
active duty policemen, soldiers and paramilitary personnel) controlled by powerful 
regional politicians. In some areas, communist rebels or Muslim secessionists have also 
been responsible for election0related murders and instances of intimidation. 17 Even with 
repeated efforts of several administrations to rid the country of private annies, police 
· records showed that , as of April 2010, 107 private annies still operated across the 
country. 18 Politically powerful families, writes Luz R. Rimban, "employ violence 
routinely to stay in power, eliminate opponents, grab land, conduct illegal activity and 
generally instill fear in the population." 19 These powerful clans normally follow the 
same pattern of fielding their family members in several elective contests, both 
nationally and locally (including senator, legislator, provincial governor, mayor, town 
councilor) to strengthen their political clout and purportedly sustain their dynastic 
predominance. Studies show that the groups of people prone to be victims of violence in 
the polls in the Philippines are political candidates and their supporters, government 
officials, uniformed personnel and civilians.20 
The pattern of electoral violence which exists in the Philippines is similar to that in 
Thail and : private, targeted killings and intimidation during the election campaign by 
anned men in connection with rivalries among local bosses. The degree of violence in 
Philippine polling contests has been, however, greater than th at in Thailand. The 
relatively high level of vio lence, I would argue, could be attributed to the fact that 
16 Da1a cited in Chua and Rim ban 20 11: 3. Of the 155 casualties, 58 were in the November 2009 
" Ampatuan'" massacre in Maguindanao province--the worst case of election-related violence the country 
has seen (see Arguillas 20 1 I: 17-42). 
17 Gu ti errez 2003. 
18 Rim ban 201 I : 8. 
19 Rim ban 201 I. 2. 
io Pat ino and Velasco 2004, 2006. 
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Philippine patrimonial oligarchy and bossism have been much more long-lasting and 
deeply entrenched. They have thus created greater opportunities and motivation for 
winning elections with illegal and violent tactics in the Philippines. Electoral violence is 
primarily caused by personal struggle between competing bosses who want to capture 
political office for personal material gain. 21 The Ateneo School of Government, in its 
studies on electoral violence in the Philippines 's "polling hotspots" found that "political 
competition, more than the monopoly of a single powerful clan," characterizes violent 
dynamics in every hotspot. 22 "The emergence of private armies in the country's political 
scene," a study notes, "is a phenomenon that traces its origin in the grim reality of the 
politicians ' struggle for dominance in their respective jurisdictions .. . without the 
politicians who nurture them, no privates armies could ever exist."23 This finding is in 
line with the lesson that we learned from Thailand, in which the demand of violence 
largely came from local bosses who placed high stakes on elections, and thus their 
vio lent demands generated and determined the supply of"violence specialists." The only 
difference is, in the Philippines, violence specialists were drawn mostly from local goons 
working directly for their bosses, rather than hired gunmen operating independently in 
the market. The symptom of widespread politically-motivated killings reflects the 
enduring character of the patrimonial state, the highly factionalized political party 
system, and the predatory oligarchy present in the Philippine polity. 
In the mid 1990s, some Philippine scho lars compared Thailand and the Philippines as 
"political twins," arguing that, with several parallel developments, Thailand had been 
moving from its old-style structure of bureaucratic polity to Philippine-style bossism.24 
Nevertheless, after 1997, these "twins" appeared to diverge. 25 As mentioned in the 
historical chapters (Chapters 2-6), since 1997 Thailand underwent several major 
economic, social, and political changes which deeply transformed the political 
configuration and landscape of power. The rise of programmatic and ideological politics 
have significantly replaced particularistic politics and undermined the political standing 
21 For analysis of the historical roots of the Philippine patrimonial oligarchic state, see Hutchcroft 1998. 
On bossism and clan power, see Side! 1999; McCoy 1993 ; Lacaba 1995. The way in whi ch Philippine 
leading political families dominate the congress is documented and discussed in Guitierrez, Torrente and 
Narca 1992; Guitierrez 1994; Coronel et al. 2004. 
22 Ateneo School of Government, "Cause and Effect Study on Abra ' s and Nueva Ecija 's Electoral 
Violence," cited in Rim ban 2011: 9. 
23 The conclusion of the lndependent Commission Against Private Armies (created by the Arroyo 
administration) led by Monina Zearosa, cited in Rimban 2011: 9. 
24 Side! 1996: 56-63; cf. Hutchcroft 1999 for similar observation. 
25 Hutchcroft 1999 noted the impacts of the 1997 economic crisis and constitutional reform as two 
important factors that steered Thailand onto a different path from that of the Philippines. 
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of provincia l bosses nationwide. Consequently, the number of violent incidents and 
casualties during elections recently dropped. In contrast, the Philippines has undergone a 
less dramatic transformation in the character of the state, the electoral system, and party-
boss relations. The strength and power of provincial oligarchs has remained largely 
intact and inter-boss conflict over territorial control still prevails, explaining the 
persistently high level of electoral violence. 
Patterns and dynamics of violence in Kenya 's elections differ from those in both 
Thailand and the Philippines. Election-related violence has been involved in and 
connected to mass-mobilization and communal, ethnic conflict. In the wake of the 
December 2007 presidential elections and sparked by disputes over electoral results, the 
country witnessed the worst inter-ethnic violence in its recent history. Several prominent 
Kenyan politicians were accused of inciting the violence for the purpose of manipulating 
and rejecting the outcome of the election. More than 1,400 Kenyans were killed and over 
600,000 people forcibly displaced as a result of post-election riots, bringing the country 
to the brink of civil war. 26 Election-related violence is, however, not a new phenomenon 
in Kenya, as violence has sporadically occurred since the restoration of multi-party 
politics in the early 1990s. Violent fighting in previous polls, however, caused a much 
lower number of casualties and mainly took place in the pre-election period with the 
objectives of dislocating and disenfranchising opponents' voters. 27 
The power-sharing government comprised of conflicting parties was created through a 
peace agreement negotiated by UN secretary General Kofi Anan as an effort to avert 
fmiher deadly confrontation. Several institutional changes and reforms have been 
implemented since then in hope ofrestoring the country's stability and making the new 
pres idential election (in March 2013) orderly and peaceful. Despite some progressive 
reforms, the risk for polling violence still runs high. From January 201 2 to February 
2013 , reports show that 495 Kenyans were killed, 346 injured, and 116,074 displaced in 
connection to inter-co mmunal conflict involving struggle between rival politicians.28 
26 
"Q&A: Kenya poll violence,'· BBC, 1 November 2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
2/hi/africa/7 I 65962.stm); "Orphaned by Kenya pol l violence," BBC, 29 December 2008 
(http:!/news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/africa/77928 18.stm). 
" Kasara 20 IO; Mwagiru 200 I : 18-20. 
28 
'" Kenya: No Ord inary Election-Connict Map," JRJNNEWS20 13, 
{http://www.irinnews.org/Ken ya20 13/in fographi c _map.html). 
374 
Nevertheless, scholars argue, it is misguided to explain the eruption of electoral violence 
in Kenya as being directly caused by the deep animosity between different tribes or 
ethnic groups-the barbaric tribal warfare explanation. Regional or ethnic divisions 
provide some grounds for grievance, but violence actually broke out when ethnic 
tensions were exploited and politicized by politicians for political gains.29 The planning 
and . organization of violence primarily stemmed from the actions of rival political 
bosses-the funders and masterminds of violence-who are mostly the heirs of powerful 
political families or wealthy businessmen. 30 Most violent acts were carried out by 
criminal gangs, delinquent youth, and militias associated with politicians. Many of them 
were paid to maim and kill opponent groups, while some perpetrated violent acts on the 
order of their bosses. Similar to Thailand and the Philippines, there was an uneven 
distribution of violence across the country when riots broke out in 2007-2008 in Kenya; 
eight areas were identified as hotbeds of killings. 31 The patrimonial character of the 
Kenyan state offered high incentives for oligarchic elites to employ all necessary means 
to win elective posts, including aggressive and antagonistic mobilization of support. 
Controlling political office leads to rapid accumulation of wealth, strong foundations of 
patronage, and the ability to consolidate control over vast amount of public resources. 
The resilient character of neopatrimonialism in several African democracies, including 
Kenya, has been thoroughly examined and explained by many scholars. Under 
neopatrimonial rule, the state is a resource in itself, in which inc_umbents are fiercely 
determined to hang on to power as long as possible and ambitious opposition candidates 
fervently aspire to have their turn to "eat." The politics of plundering state resource, 
ethnic mobilization, and violent electoral competition are closely connected. 32 Viewed in 
this light, the problem of electoral violence in Kenya, and some other African countries, 
is probably not entirely different than those in Thailand and the Philippines. The 
common features found in these countries are the overarching patrimonial state 
structures and personal boss rules combined with weak party organizations that intensify 
the stakes in elections. The motivation behind the use of violence in elections is 
29 Klopp 2001. 
3
° For example, the two main candidates for the Presidential election in 2013 came from Kenya ' s leading 
political dynasties: Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta is the founding president 's son and has featured in Forbes 
magazine as one of the richest Africans, and Raila Amollo Odinga, currently prime minister, is the son of 
the country' s first vice-president ("Kenya's 2013 Elections," BBC, 22 February 2013 
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-afiica-2 I 4 78869). 
31 Klopp 200 I; "Q&A: Kenya poll violence," BBC, 1 November 2008 (http ://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/africa/7165962.stm). 
32 On Kenya 's oligarchy, see Wrong 2010; on neopatrimonial rule in Africa, see Bratton and van de Walle 
1997: 61-82; Hyden 2005: 50-116. The linkages between patrimonial rule, political bosses, and electoral 
violence in Africa are discussed in Basedau, Erdmann and Mehler 2007; Omotola 2007, 2011. 
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eminently political. It is merely the linkage between ethnic cleavage and political 
mobilization that has made Kenya 's pattern of electoral violence different from those 
found in Thailand and the Philippines. 
To mitigate election-related vio lence that has appeared around the world , many scholars 
and institutional bodies have proposed a long list of recommendations, including the 
provision of effective conflict management systems, the strong capacity and 
independence of the electoral management bodies (EMBs), a strong and nonpartisan 
security sector, political dialogue and negotiation between competing part ies, strict law 
enforcement on gun control and criminal gangs, a more active role fo r civil society and 
international organizations in election observation and monitoring, and media sector 
reform. 33 In the context of Thailand, one might suggest some concerted campaigns or 
policy tools aiming to subdue the power of political bosses. The necessary actions might 
include, for example, diversifying the local economy which will consequently destroy 
the narrow economic base (and thus the political influence) of local bosses and at the 
same time facilitate the emergence of a new type of business entrepreneur who will 
invest more in productive economic activities that depend less on government 
connections and protection. Another effort should focus on strengthening the political 
party system and programmatic politics. The lessons from Thailand show that when 
strong party and programmatic politics came into effect, it reduced the political standing 
of local strongmen and weakened personalistic, candidate-center campaigns; electoral 
competition was directed more toward a11iculating the differences over policy platform 
and patiy branding rather than cultivating personal clientelistic networks. Last but not 
least, ideological politics is good fo r democracy and help diminish the use of private 
electoral killings. As we have seen in Thailand since the 2006 coup, people have been 
motivated to fi ght , more than ever before, over rea l substantive issues. These currently 
include the ro le of the monarchy and the army in politics, the legitimacy of the military 
coup, and the social and political inequalities between the urban and the rural as well as 
between the elites (ammat) and common people (phrai). In effect, the ideological 
co nfli ct has overrid ed or trumped the local persona l feud between poltical clans. What 
we need is thus more, not less, programmatic and ideological struggle. The challenge is 
how to institutionalize ideo logical politics-relocating it as much as possible from street 
33 The li st is drawn from UNDP 2009; Ajayeoba 2009; Sisk 2008; Hoglund 2009; Fischer 2002; Alston 
20 10. 
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arena to parliamentary debates and ballot boxes in order to avoid the harmful effects of 
unruly confrontation. 
Undoubtedly, these prescribed measures are important as short- or medium-term 
solutions that might be able to alleviate or minimize the risk of violence. Also, tighter 
security during the election period and strong political will from the government and 
civil society to tackle election-related violent incidents are significant in preventing the 
violence. Still it is insufficient to fully eradicate the problem. This is because these 
suggestions do not tackle the heart of the problem directly, and leave the nature of the 
state and the political economy of violent competition untouched. Without fixing the 
prevailing patrimonial structure and eliminating the government spoils that emanate 
from political offices, the motivation for winning political competition or power through 
violence will stay as high as ever. In sum, there are therefore limits to the the efficacy of 
specific policy measures as long as the nature of the state remains the same. 
Thailand in a state of fragile transition 
After considering the experience of the Philippines and Kenya, I want to conclude by 
addressing Thailand 's political future. Fundamentally, the country is in a state of fragile 
transition. The lack of consensus around basic "rules of the gam~" among key power 
elites as well as among civil societal groups renders the country highly volatile and 
unstable. The relatively stable pre-1997 political order, in which the provincial elites, the 
national capitalists and the royal-military leaders shared power under a weak 
parliamentary system, has long collapsed and is unlikely to be revived. The post-1997 
order, facilitated by the economic crisis and constitution, which paved the way for the 
strong rule of a populist prime minister and his party machine, was derailed by the 2006 
coup. Since then, the country has been tom apart by various forms of civil strife and 
political violence and yet is still far from being able to reach a new arrangement of 
political order that would be deemed legitimate and acceptable by all conflicting entities. 
Be that as it may, the vast array of political and social transformations that have 
transpired dramatically since 1997 have changed the configuration of power among 
three groups of Thai elites: the royal-military potentates, the national-level oligarchs, 
and the provincial bosses. 
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Unlike their oppo nents, business tycoons like Thaksin and his allies have been more 
adept in connecting themselves to the vast majority of people in rural areas, who have 
long been neglected by an unresponsive bureaucracy and/or subdued by local strongmen. 
With the aim of monopolizing the electoral market, Thaksin's populist party and it s 
policy program mobilized state resources to address the social grievances and po litical 
aspirations of the "awakened" rural electorate, who have clearly become an emergent 
vital social force since the late 1990s. As several studies show, these emerging voters in 
the provincial areas are more "w-banized," "cosmopolitan," and "politically active." 34 
They can no longer be viewed as a mass of passive, destitute, and uneducated country 
people, uncapable of exercizing their voting rights and meaningfully participating in the 
democratic process, as has long been portrayed by Thai conservative elites and pundits. 35 
After the 2006 coup, a large number of them have joined the political movement 
mobilized by the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), or so-.called 
the "red shirts," to oppose the coup-installed government and the illegitimate political 
influence of the anny in politics. Thaksin's allied parties and the red shirt movement 
have, until now, mutually supported and relied on each other in their political struggle 
against the old establishment. Their decisive and consecutive successes in electoral 
battles in 2007 and 2011 came at the expense of traditional elite groups as well as local 
bosses. The current turmoil has not yet revealed to us the clear winner, but within the 
electoral rules of the game-the only legitimate game accepted by the international 
community- jao and ammat (monarchy and aristocratic leaders) and jao pho are 
gradually lo sing. The traditional elites are losing because they are not willing to play 
within the democratic rules of the game. The local go dfathers, on the other hand, have 
been tamed, weakened, co -opted, and made less relevant with the rise of prograrrunatic 
and ideo logical struggle (as discussed in Chapter 5). Functioning as political dynasties, 
both groups of elites are also inevitably faced with the issue of succession and the 
sustenance of their familial power. At the highest level, His Majesty the King, the 
world 's longest-serving monarch, is currently frai l at the age of 84.36 At the local level, 
34 Scholars have dep loyed many different term s to identify this emergent group, in cluding " middl e-income 
peasants/politi ca l peasan ts" (Wa lker 20 12); "cosmopolitan vi I lagers" (Keyes 20 12); "urbani zed vi I lagers" (Naruemon and McCargo 201 ! ). Settin g aside tenniJ1ological difference, th ese term s denote the new 
identity and new characteristics of Thai populati on li ving in the provincial areas. 35 I offered an elaborate critique of this conserva ti ve perception in Prajak 2009: 140- 155. 36 King Bhumibol Adu lyadej has shown sign of fat igue and ha s been hospitalized sin ce 2009. The roya l 
succession has become one of the most critica l issues of concern for a ll Thais and is closely conn ected to 
the curren t cris is. After the 2006 coup, th e status and th e role of the monarchy under tli e constituti onal, 
democrat ic framework has emerged as one of th e most hotly-con tes ted topics. However, it still cann ot be 
publ icly discussed or deba ted freely because of th e draconi an lese- majeste law (Thitinan 20 I 2; Streck fu ss 
20 1 !). 
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the power of many prominent political families is in decline. Some prominent bosses 
have been arrested and prosecuted, some have died from natural causes, and others have 
failed to adapt to the rapidly changing political and economic environment. 37 Several 
clans that lost their patriarchs are facing difficulties in keeping their power intact, as 
their younger generation are often proing themselves to be incompetent and 
inexperienced, and lacking in charisma and leadership skills. 
Thai electoral politics and its pattern of vio lence are currently in a state of transition. 
Some new elements have emerged, but they have not yet completely replaced the old 
ones. The exercise of privatized coercive forces by the provincial bosses was a remnant 
of the political and economic order that was established in the 1980s. This unsettling 
phenomenon will not entirely disappear until the patrimonial structure of the state is 
radically transformed and personalistic fighting over the government spoils and rent-
distribution are substantially reduced. Until then, if the current situation continues ( and 
presuming there will not be a. substantial unexpected intervention of internal or external 
factors), we should see no increase in violence in the next national elections (in 2015). 
The country will then move even .further in a different direction from its former twin, the 
Philippines. On the contrary, ifroyal-military-bureaucratic alliance still wants a return to 
the old model of "bureaucratic polity" in which the bureaucracy and military dominate 
politics under the auspices of the monarchy, Thailand will continue to face uncertainty 
and (violent) instability in years to come. This conservative elite group is tiny but 
powerful, as they still. control critical parts of the state apparatus, such as the army, 
courts and some parts of the bureaucracy. Consequent ly, it still has the capacity to 
destabilize elected government; a coup or some other form of non-electoral (violent) 
intervention from these potentates cannot be ruled out. The worst-case scenario for 
Thailand would be if the royal-military alliance chooses to unseat the popularly-elected 
government, prevent the next general election from happening, and subvert 
parliamentary democracy through extra-legal means in order to bring back their supreme 
dominance. In that case, Thailand will definitely be plunged into chaos. It is highly 
37 Within the first two months of 2013, Thai society witnessed the fall of many provincial bosses. On 30 
January 2013, after six years on the run, the 75-year-old boss of Chonburi, Somchai Khunpluem, aka 
Kamnan Pob, was arrested by a team of police on his way back from the hospital and was immediately put 
in jail, where he is currently serving 30-year sentence. On 21 January 2013, Suphanburi boss Banham 
Silpa-archa lost his younger brother, Chumpol, who died of heart failure at the age of 73 , while holding 
the offices of Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Tourism and Sports. Chum pol also helped Banham 
carry on the party after Banham was banned from politics. Lastly, political boss of Pichit Sanan 
Kachonprasart, former deputy prime minister in the cabinet of Abhisit , died of emphysema on 15 February 
2013 at the age of 77 (see, Thairath , 21 January 2013: I; Matichon, 30 January 2013: I; Matichon, 15 
February 2013: !). 
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likely that the country will re-experience the sort of mass-mobilization angry protests, 
large-scale vio lence, and civil strife which occurred in the streets of Bangkok during the 
turbulent years of 2009-2010. While the July 2011 election brought the country out of a 
protracted deadly crisis, the risk of democratic breakdown and violent confrontation 
continues. The electoral violence chronicled in this thesis would thus be replaced not by 
a stronger democracy but by a different type of political strife. 
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